AMERICAN   CRISIS   BIOGRAPHIES 

Edited  by 

Ellis  Paxson  Oberholtzer,  Ph.  D. 


Gbe  Bmerican  Crisis  3Bio0rapbie0 

Edited  by  Ellis  Paxson  Oberholtzer,  Ph.D.  With  the 
counsel  and  advice  of  Professor  John  B.  McMaster,  of 
the  University  of  Pennsylvania. 

Each  1 2 mo,  cloth,  with  frontispiece  portrait.  Price 
$1.25  net;  by  mail,  $1.37. 

These  biographies  will  constitute  a  complete  and  comprehensive 
history  of  the  great  American  sectional  struggle  in  the  form  of  readable 
and  authoritative  biography.  The  editor  has  enlisted  the  co-operation 
of  many  competent  writers,  as  will  be  noted  from  the  list  given  below. 
An  interesting  feature  of  the  undertaking  is  that  the  series  is  to  be  im 
partial,  Southern  writers  having  been  assigned  to  Southern  subjects  and 
Northern  writers  to  Northern  subjects,  but  all  will  belong  to  the  younger 
generation  of  writers,  thus  assuring  freedom  from  any  suspicion  of  war 
time  prejudice.  The  Civil  War  will  not  be  treated  as  a  rebellion,  but  as 
the  great  event  in  the  history  of  our  nation,  which,  after  forty  years,  it 
is  now  clearly  recognized  to  have  been. 

Now  ready : 

Abraham  Lincoln.     By  ELLIS  PAXSON  OBERHOLTZER. 
Thomas  H.  Benton.     By  JOSEPH  M.  ROGERS. 
David  G.  Farragut.      By  JOHN  R.  SPEARS. 
William  T.  Sherman.      By  EDWARD  ROBINS. 
Frederick  Douglass.     By  BOOKER  T.  WASHINGTON. 
Judah  P.  Benjamin.      By  PIERCE  BUTLER. 
Robert  E.  Lee.     By  PHILIP  ALEXANDER  BRUCE. 
Jefferson  Davis.     By  PROF.  W.  E.  DODD. 
Alexander  H.  Stephens.     BY  Louis  PENDLETON. 
John  C.  Calhoun.     By  GAILLARD  HUNT. 
"  Stonewall"  Jackson.     By  HENRY  ALEXANDER  WHITE. 
John  Brown.     By  W.  E.  BURGHARDT  DUBOIS. 
Charles  Sumner.     By  PROF.  GEORGE  H.  HAYNES. 
Henry  Clay.     By  THOMAS  H.  CLAY. 
William  H.  Seward.     By  EDWARD  EVERETT  HALE,  Jr. 

In  preparation : 

Daniel  Webster.     By  PROF.  C.  H.  VAN  TYNE. 
William  Lloyd  Garrison.     By  LINDSAY  SWIFT. 
Stephen  A.  Douglas.     By  PROF.  HENRY  PARKER  WILLIS. 
Thaddeus  Stevens.      By  PROF.  J.  A.  WOODBURN. 
Andrew  Johnson.      By  PROF.  WALTER  L.  FLEMING. 
Ulysses  S.  Grant.     By  PROF.  FRANKLIN  S.  EDMONDS. 
Edwin  M.  Stanton.     By  EDWARD  S.  CORWIN. 
Robert  Toombs.     By  PROF.  U.  B.  PHILLIPS. 
Jay  Cooke.     By  ELLIS  PAXSON  OBERHOLTZEB. 


AMERICAN  CRISIS  BIOGRAPHIES 


WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 


EDWARD  EVERETT  HALE,  JR. 


PHILADELPHIA 

GEORGE  W.  JACOBS  &  COMPANY 
PUBLISHERS 


COPYRIGHT,  1910,  BY 

GEORGE  W.  JACOBS  &  COMPANY 

Published  September,  1910 


All  rights  reserved 
Printed  in  U.  S.  A. 


PREFACE 

THE  present  life  of  Seward  is  chiefly  a  political 
biography ;  an  account,  to  use  his  own  words,  of 
his  own  particular  part  in  the  transactions  and 
events  which  occurred  while  he  lived.  It  differs 
somewhat  from  its  predecessors  in  that  it  devotes 
relatively  more  attention  to  Se  ward's  career  as  a 
public  man  in  the  state  of  New  York  than  has  been 
usual.  It  has  appeared  to  me  that  the  history  of 
the  United  States  before  the  war  will  be  made  much 
more  comprehensible  by  a  more  particular  under- 
standing  of  the  men  and  issues  of  the  separate 
states.  The  influence  of  New  York  politics  is 
visible  in  Seward  long  after  he  became  a  national 
leader. 

In  following  this  course  I  have  had  to  be  some 
what  irregular  in  method.  The  period  of  Seward' s 
national  activity,  especially  that  of  the  Civil  War, 
has  been  so  extensively  and  intensively  studied, 
that  I  have  felt  that  I  could  depend  upon  certain 
well-known  authorities.  For  the  first  half  of  his 
life,  however,  the  events  are  often  obscure  and  the 
accounts  insufficient  and  conflicting.  Even  Sew 
ard' s  own  Autobiography,  written  in  his  last  years, 
needs  to  be  critically  examined  where  it  concerns 
minor  details.  For  this  period,  therefore,  I  have 
worked  largely  from  original  sources,  partly  nianu- 


340217 


4  PEEFACE 

script,  but  chiefly  from  official  records  and  the 
newspapers  of  the  time.  In  the  latter  portion,  as 
in  the  earlier,  I  have  tried  to  make  use  of  any  illus 
trative  material  that  has  appeared  since  the  works 
of  Mr.  Frederick  W.  Seward,  Mr.  Lathrop,  and  Mr. 
Bancroft,  which,  I  need  not  say,  have  been  of  much 
assistance  to  me. 

The  great  mass  of  Seward  manuscripts  still  avail 
able,  I  have  thought  it  not  necessary  or  even  desir 
able  again  to  go  over  :  they  have  already  been  very 
carefully  and  thoroughly  studied.  I  have  used  to 
good  advantage  the  Van  Buren  manuscripts  in  the 
Congressional  Library,  though  I  have  not  been  able 
by  any  means  to  give  this  material  the  attention  it 
deserves.  I  have  also  had  access  to  some  smaller 
but  still  very  valuable  collections  of  Seward  manu 
scripts,  especially  those  of  his  letters  to  Thurlow 
Weed  and  to  Mrs.  George  Schuyler,  to  whom  he 
wrote  very  freely  on  political  matters. 

I  would  make  most  thankful  acknowledgment  to 
Mr.  F.  W.  Eichardson,  president  of  the  Cayuga 
Historical  Society,  and  through  him,  to  the  Society 
for  access  to  their  collection  of  newspapers  and 
manuscripts  relating  to  Seward's  early  life  ;  to  Mr. 
Edward  W.  Paige,  of  Schenectady,  for  files  of  the 
Schenectady  Cabinet ;  to  the  librarian  of  Union  Col 
lege  for  his  kind  assistance  in  using  the  considerable 
collection  of  early  newspapers  to  be  found  there ;  to 
Miss  Georgina  Schuyler  for  the  very  valuable  letters 
of  Seward  to  her  mother ;  to  Mrs.  George  C. 
Hollister  for  access  to  the  newspapers  and  letters 
originally  belonging  to  Thurlow  Weed  ;  and  to  Mrs. 


PREFACE  5 

Maurice  Perkins  for  letters  exhibiting  curiously  the 
life  at  Union  College  while  Seward  was  a  student. 
Their  help  has  been  very  great  and  I  am  only  sorry 
that  I  have  not  been  able  to  make  a  more  particular 
use  of  it. 

EDWARD  E.  HALE,  JR. 

Union  College. 


CONTENTS 

CHRONOLOGY    ....  9 

I.     EARLY  YEARS 13 

II.    POLITICAL  CONDITIONS    ...  32 

III.  ADAMS  AND  CLINTON       ...  49 

IV.  THE  ANTI-MASONIC  MOVEMENT       .  67 
V.    STATE  SENATOR        ....  84 

VI.  THE  RISE  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY      .     103 

VII.  ELECTION  AS  GOVERNOR  .        .        .120 

VIII.  GOVERNOR  SEWARD         .        .        .141 

IX.  SECOND  TERM  AS  GOVERNOR    .        .     155 

X.     NEW  ISSUES 168 

XI.  UNITED  STATES  SENATOR        .        .    185 

XII.  THE  NEBRASKA  BILL       .        .        .203 

XIII.  THE  REPUBLICAN  PARTY         .        .219 

XIV.  THE  PRESIDENCY     ....    236 
XV.     CIVIL  WAR 262 

XVI.    THE  DANGER  OF  FOREIGN  INTER 
VENTION        .                                .  279 
XVII.    THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS  305 
XVIII.     MATTERS  AT  HOME  .        .        .        .323 
XIX.    THE  END  OF  THE  WAR    .        .        .  340 

XX.     LAST  DAYS 356 

BIBLIOGRAPHY         ....  374 

INDEX  377 


CHRONOLOGY 

1 80 1 — May  1 6th,  born  in  Florida,  Orange  County,  New  York,  the 
third  son  of  Dr.  Samuel  S.  Seward  of  that  place.  Was 
educated  in  the  school  at  Florida  and  at  the  Farmers'  Hall 
Academy,  Goshen. 

1816 — September,  enters  the  Sophomore  class  of  Union  College. 

1819 — January  1st,  leaves  college  because  of  a  disagreement  with 
his  father.  Goes  to  Putnam  County,  Georgia,  where  he 
teaches  for  a  while  at  the  Union  Academy.  In  the  summer 
returns  to  his  home. 

1820— January,  reenters  Union  College,  from  which  he  graduates 
in  July. 

1820-1822 — Studies  law,  at  first  with  John  Anthon  in  New  York  ; 
then  with  Ogden  Hoffman  in  Goshen.  Is  admitted  to  the 
bar  at  Utica,  October,  1822. 

1823—  January  ist,  settles  in  Auburn,  New  York,  as  law  partner  of 
Judge  Elijah  Miller. 

1824 — Acts  politically  with  the  friends  of  Adams  and  Clinton. 
1824 — October  2Oth,  married  to  Miss  Frances  Miller. 

1826 — Continues  to  act  with  the  friends  of  Adams  and  those  of 
Clinton. 

1827 — October,  nomination  sent  to  the  Senate  as  Surrogate  of 
Cayuga  County,  but  not  confirmed. 

1828 — August,  chairman  of  the  Convention  of  Young  Men  favorable 
to  the  reelection  of  Adams. 

1829— On  the  defeat  of  Adams,  joins  the  Anti-Masons  ;  delegate  to 
the  Albany  Convention,  January. 

1830 — September,  delegate  to  National  Anti-Masonic  Convention 
at  Philadelphia.  Elected  state  senator  from  the  sixth  dis 
trict. 

1831-1834 — Serves  in  the  state  senate,  as  one  of  the  small  Anti- 
Masonic  minority.  In  the  summer  of  1833  makes  a  trip 
abroad  with  his  father.  In  the  winter  of  1833-1834,  the 
Anti-Masonic  party  in  the  legislature  is  dissolved. 


10  CHRONOLOGY 

1834— April  8th-ioth,  charter  election  in  New  York  City  which 
shows  unexpected  strength  of  the  Whig  party.  In  the  sum 
mer  is  nominated  for  governor  on  the  Whig  ticket,  but  not 
elected. 

1834 — Returns  to  Auburn  and  continifes  the  practice  of  law. 

1836 — Becomes  associated  with  Gary,  Lay,  and  Schermerhom  in 
the  adjustment  of  their  land  purchase  from  the  Holland 
Land  Company. 

1837 — Great  increase  of  Whig  strength  following  the  panic ; 
Whig  majority  in  the  Assembly. 

1838 — Nominated  for  the  governorship  on  the  Whig  ticket  and 
elected.  The  Whigs,  however,  not  in  complete  control  of 
the  state  government. 

1839 — The  Whigs  gain  control  of  the  state  government :  Seward 
advocates  the  party  policy  of  internal  improvement,  and 
also,  without  regard  to  party,  a  public  school  policy. 

1840 — Reflected  governor,  but  with  a  reduced  majority.  Contin 
ues  his  public  school  policy  and  is  involved  in  the  Virginia 
search  case,  the  McLeod  case,  and  the  Helderberg  anti-rent 
war. 

1842 — At  the  close  of  his  administration  returns  to  Auburn  and 
takes  up  his  law  practice. 

1842-1846 — Not  active  in  politics,  though  "  mentioned  "  for  sen 
ator,  governor,  President.  Defends  Wyatt  and  Freeman. 
Turns  his  attention  to  patent  cases. 

1846 — January,  going  to  Washington  on  patent-law  and  anti- 
slavery  cases,  he  comes  more  into  touch  with  national 
politics. 

1 848— Takes  the  stump  to  support  Taylor,  against  the  Free-Soil 
party. 

1849— February,  elected  United  States  senator. 

1850 — The  Compromise:  Seward  stands  as  representative  of  the 
administration  in  the  Senate ;  speech  on  California,  March 
I  ith  ;  death  of  Taylor,  July  9th. 

1850— Separation  of  the  Silver  Grays  at  the  New  York  state  con 
vention,  on  the  issue  of  approving  Seward's  course. 

1852 — Active  in  procuring  the  nomination  of  Scott ;  Scott  utterly 
defeated. 


CHRONOLOGY  11 

1854 — January  4th,  Douglas  brings  in  the  Nebraska  Bill.  Ques 
tion  of  organizing  the  Republican  party  in  New  York  ;  or 
ganization  deemed  inadvisable. 

1855 — February,  reelection  as  senator  after  a  hard  canvass,  com 
plicated  by  the  Know-Nothing  party.  In  the  summer  the 
Republican  party  in  New  York  is  organized. 

1856— Does  not  present  his  name  as  Republican  candidate  for  the 
presidency.  Fremont  nominated  and  defeated. 

1858 — October  25th,  speech  on  "  Irrepressible  Conflict." 

1859— May-December,  trip  abroad,  during  which  occurs  the  John 
Brown  raid. 

1860 — Candidate  for  Republican  nomination;  the  convention, 
however,  nominates  Lincoln,  May  i8th.  Seward  accepts 
position  of  Secretary  of  State. 

1860-1861 — At  Washington  engaged  in  efforts  to  avert  further  se 
cession  of  Southern  states. 

l86l — Assumes  duties  of  Secretary  of  State.  Cooperates  with  the 
President  in  domestic  matters.  In  foreign  affairs  deals 
with  the  recognition  of  belligerency  of  the  Southern  states 
by-. Great  Britain  and  France,  May;  the  case  of  Bunch, 
consul  at  Charleston ;  the  unofficial  envoys  to  England  and 
France  ;  the  Trent  Affair,  November,  December. 

1862 — The  Oreto ;  first  suggestion  by  Lincoln  of  emancipation, 
July  1 2th  ;  the  Alabama  gets  to  sea,  July  2Qth  ;  Gladstone's 
Newcastle  speech,  October  jth,  indicates  British  recognition 
of  Confederacy. 

1863 — The  Alexandra  ;  Mr.  Roebuck's  attempt  to  force  recogni 
tion  ;  the  Laird  rams  stopped  September  8th ;  the  Russian 
fleet  in  America. 

1864— Maximilian  accepts  the  throne  of  Mexico,  April  loth. 

1865 — Hampton  Roads  Conference,  February  3d ;  second  term 
as  secretary,  March  4th ;  carriage  accident,  April  5th ; 
attacked  by  assassin  April  I4th ;  retains  position  under 
Johnson. 

1866 — Supports  Johnson  in  his  Reconstruction  policy. 
1867 — French  troops  finally  evacuate  Mexico. 
1868— Signs  Alaska  treaty,  March  3Oth. 


12  CHRONOLOGY 

1869— March  4th,  concludes  service  as  Secretary  of  State  and  re 
turns  to  Auburn. 

1869 — June  7th  to  March  I5th,  1870,  trip  to  the  West. 
1870— August  gth  to  October  9th,  1871,  trip  around  the  world. 
1872 — October  loth,  death. 


WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 


CHAPTER  I 

EARLY  YEARS 

THE  family  of  Seward,  in  the  early  days  of  the 
state  of  New  YorkT  represented  different  branches 
of  the  British  peoples.  William  H.  Steward  >s  grand  - 
father  John  Steward,  was  of  Wftlshj  and  his  mother's 
father,  Isaac  Jennings,  was  of  English  descent.  His 
mother's  mother  came  of  an  Irish  family,  probably 
frmnty  north  of  Trpland.  He  found,  as  he  looked 
back  in  later  years,  no  trace  of  Scotch  ancestry. 

William  Henry  fi^^aT^j^J^rri  Mgy  1fi,  T^01, 
in  Florida,  then  a  little  village  of  a  dozen  houses  in 
the  southern  part  of  Orange  County,  some  twenty 
miles  from  the  Hudson  and  not  far  from  the  New 
Jersey  boundary.  He  was  thus,  as  many  other 
great  Americans  have  been,  a^country  boy,  but  un 
like  many  he  always  preferred  a  country  life.  Al 
though  it  was  never  possible  foFhTm  to  reside  in  the 
actual  country,  yet  in  his  devotion  to  Auburn,  first 
a  village  and  never  a  great  city,  we  see  that  the 
complicated  ways  of  New  York,  for  instance,  re 
pelled  rather  than  attracted  him.  Of  his  early 
years  very  little  that  is  significant  is  told.  His  love 


14  WILLIAM  H.  SEWABD 

for  nature^  beginning  iml  pru  Milling  Lhiuugh  ttfe, 
<s^  one  reason  why  he  was  never  willing  to  make 
kjg  home  in  a  large  city.  Perhaps  he  may  not  have 
spent  much  time  in  direct  appreciation  of  the  moun 
tains  and  woods  about  him,  but  they  were  not  with 
out  their  effect,  and  years  afterward  he  used  to 
remember  them,  so  that  a  mention  of  Mount  Eve, 
for  instance,  would  at  once  bring  to  mind  the  picture 
of  the  "  forest-covered  steep,  with  beautiful  fleecy 
clouds  gathering  midway  in  the  ascent,  and  with  it 
[he  goes  on]  is  sure  to  come  the  recollection  of  the 
hundred  times  when  I  watched  it,  to  see  if  there  was 
cause  to  fear  a  storm  might  mar  anticipated  sport." 
These  days  must  have  had  much  of  this  unconscious 
^ducafion,  nol  ouiy  from  li'aUiro,  but  from  other  sur- 
roundings,  as  u  the  perplexing  enigma  "  offered  by 
slaves  in  his  father's  family,  which  determined  him 
aTan  early  age  to  he,  a,n  A  h^Ht  l/\»iut,  1  —  But  that  life 
is  passed  away  and  lost  now,  save  as  we  may  make 
our  inference  from  the  scattered  mention  of  after 
years,  or  note  the  few  recollections  of  his  own,  as  of 
the  deep-  instilled  feeling  during  the  War  of  1812  of 
the  necessity  of  supporting  the  government  in  a 
foreign  war. 

His  formal  education  was  not  remarkable,  except 
perhaps  in  so  far  as  it  v>rrmgV»f  form  hi  y  to  mind  his 
to  Rp^ak  in  pnb1i>      He_teLLs_jis  that  he 
fo  thp   debating  nnn'rty   of  the  Gosh  en 

tes  T>ut  .never 


1  This  is  his  own  expression  (Life,  Vol.  I,  p.  28),  perhaps  not 
carefully  considered.  He  never  became  what  was  commonly 
called  an  Abolitionist. 


EARLY  YEARS  15 

part  in  HUMI^  So  it  was  with  him  constantly 
in  early  life :  in  the  Adelphic  Society  at  college 
where,  though  he  did  not  remain  silent,  he  found 
that  he  was  unable  to  deliver  effectively  what  was 
well  written.  So  it  was  afterward  in  the  New  York 
"  FornmT"~when  he  studied  law,  and  so  even  in  the 
Senate  of  the  state  of  New  YorkT  when  he  first  took 
the  floor.  It  is  a  testimony  to  his  determination 
and  ability  that  in  after  years  he  was  able  to  speak, 
if  not  with  the  eloquence  of  Webster  and  Clay,  at 
least  so  as  to  command  the  closest  attention  and 
keenest  interest. 

Tp  1»S16  he  was  ready  for  r.ollege.  His  father, 
Dr.  Samuel  S.  Seward,  although  a  man  of  great 
ability,  had  had  no  training  of  this  kind,  for  during 
his  youthful  days  Columbia  College  had  been  disor 
ganized  by  the  war.  But  Seward  himselfjwas_earlv 
chq§en  from  the  rest  of  the  family  for  a  college  edu 
cation,  partly  because  he  was  less  robust  than  his 
brothers  and  apparently  less  able  to  taEe~care  of 
himself, ^and  partly  because  of  a  docile  disposition 
ancMstudious  habits.1  Union  College  was  selected 
by  his  father  j^.ar-COn^t  nf  thft  great  g.nd_jmvwing 
reputation  of  its  president.  The  boy  was  but  fifteen 
when  he  appeared  at  Scheuectady  and  was  even  for 
that  age  undersized,  pale  and  delicate,  with  red  hair 
and  sandy  complexion.  He  wore  plain  sheep's 
gray,  homespun  and  home-made  clothing. 

Both  Schenectady  and  Union  College  were  very 
different  from  what  they  are  now.  Schenectady 
was  still  a  little  town,  with  its  Tontine  Coffee-House 
1  Cayuga  Co.  Hist.  Soc.,  Vol.  VII,  p.  27. 


16  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

and  its  stage-coach;  it  still  reckoned  its  time  by 
"  early  candle-light,'7  and  gained  preeminence  over 
other  towns  by  the  accomplishments  of  its  spinsters 
in  spinning  ;  its  papers  still  advertised,  as  a  matter 
of  course,  lottery  tickets  and  negro  men  and 
women.1  Of  Union  College  at  that  day  we  would 
gladly  know  much  more  than  we  do.  Seward,  on 
the  morning  of  his  arrival,  breakfasted  at  Giveus' 
Tavern,  walked  up  the  hill  to  the  college  which  had 
hut.  J:WQ  years  before  hpen  TflPV0^  fmm  ifo  gg.r1ior 
situation  nearer  the  river,  and  offered  himself  for 
examination.  The  professor  who  conducted  it,  the 


was  sixteen,  Seward  was  matriculated  as  a  sopho- 
mbre.  This  entering  tha  MgTiftr  rln.sapft  wag__fiha.r- 

acteristic  of  Union  College  at  that  timeand  later. 
Under  the  presidency  of  Dr.  Nott,  studeliBPfery 
commonly  joined  the  upper  classes :  the  old  cata 
logues,  printed  as  broadsides,  give  considerable 
numbers  of  seniors  and  juniors,  fewer  sophomores, 
and  almost  no  freshmen  at  all. 

Having  already  gone  over  some  of  the  sophomore 
work,  Seward  found  bis  studies  .fairly  easy.  He 
later  expressed  some  criticism  of  the  educational 
method ;  it  consisted,  without  doubt,  of  the  recita 
tion  in  class  of  lessons  previously  prepared.  The 
older  rules  of  the  college  were  particular  in  desig 
nating  times  not  only  for  recitation,  but  for  study 
and  recreation,  and  these  rigid  rules  were  in  general 
approved  by  Dr.  Nott.  As  is  often  the  way  at  such 
1  Schenectady  Cabinet,  1816-1820  passim. 


EAKLY  YEAES  17 

institutions,  Seward  profited  not  so  much  by  the 
prescribed  studies  of  the  curriculum  as  by  other  in 
tellectual  voyages  and  adventures.  Certainly  the 
college  and  its  president  obtained  a  strong  hold  on 
his  affections,  but  as  he  looked  back  over  fifty  years, 
he  rather  condemned  the  systematic  education  of 
that  day.  "There  was  a  daily  appointment  of 
three  tasks,"  he  writes,  "in  as  many  different 
studies,  which  the  pupils  were  required,  unaided,  to 
master  in  their  rooms  ;  —  the  young,  the  dull,  and  the 
backward,  equally  with  the  most  mature  and  the 
most  astute.  The  pupil  understood  that  he  per 
formed  his  whole  duty  when  he  recited  three  daily 
lessons  without  failure.  "  With  immaterial  changes, 
something  of  the  sort  is  likely  to  be  the  case  in  an 
American  college  to-day,  and  the  escape  from  it 
by  which  a  student  has  offered  him  an  election  be 
tween  studies  very  differently  conducted  is  not 
much  better  for  the  average  man.  SewaroLread^the 
classics  with  Francis  WaylandT 
of  Brown,  and  though  t-h 


carried  on  their  work  in  rather  ao.hoolhny 
and  though  Seward  himself  was  never  a  classical 
scholar,  yet  he  read  Latin  a,nrl  Qppk  rpa.dily  through 
life,  and  that  for  pleasure.  Mathematics  he  did  not 

like    but    he    probably  got,    a,  gnrvrl   mQfhpmq.Hr»Q.r  Aia- 

cipline.  Blakls  Rhetoric  he  also  atndiftd,  and  per 
haps  its  rather  formaLcojirftptinTi  of  tin*  art  ^f  writ- 
ing  had  some  effect  on  his  style,  which  was  doubt 
less  otherwise  formed.  On  his  philosophical  studies 
thej-e  remains  a  curious  side-light.  Matthew  Fuller- 
ton,  a  member  of  Seward'  s  class  from  Pennsylvania, 


18  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

OD  January  28,  1819,  wrote  to  a  friend  in  Philadel 
phia  a  letter  which  gives  an  interesting  view.1 
"  The  question  you  asked,"  he  says,  "respecting 
the  opinion  of  the  students  of  Mr.  Stewart's  treatise 
on  the  philosophy  of  the  human  mind  just  occurs. 
The  time  we  spent  in  studying  it  enabled  me  to 
gather  their  thoughts  on  that  subject  at  least  dur 
ing  that  session.  Our  class  and  all  classes  in  this 
college  were  averse  to  the  study  of  metaphysics. 
The  Pope  never  issued  his  anathemas  with  more 
vehemence  against  the  abandoned  heretic,  than  the 
seniors  of  this  institution  against  metaphysical 
writers  in  general,  more  particularly  against  Mr. 
Stewart.  No  mercy  is  extended  to  him,  as  he  is  the 
most  immediate  author  of  all  our  outological 
troubles.  His  exertions  for  the  improvement  of 
science  met  with  contempt — they  are  considered  as 
useless  and  his  whole  treatise  dry  and  repulsive. 
You  must  not,"  he  goes  on,  however,  "  draw  from 
what  I  have  said  an  inference  unfavorable  to  all  my 
classmates  : — for  it  is  my  impression  that  few  would 
now,  when  the  labor  of  study  is  over,  entertain  such 
an  opinion  of  that  important  work.  The  opinion 
that  has  been  formerly  professed  in  college  is  what 
warps  the  judgment  of  many.  There  is  an  estab 
lished  faith,  and  whoever  dissents  from  it  is  a 
heretic  ;  and  as  much  exposed  to  punishment  as  the 
man  that  in  a  preceding  age  believed  in  the  existence 
of  such  animals  as  antipodes." 

1  Matthew  Fuller-ton  to  George  Potts.  Perkins  MSS.  Seward 
•was  not  in  college  at  just  this  time,  but  he  had  been  until 
within  a  month. 


EARLY  YEAKS  19 

Seward  was  probably  not  unlike  the  rest ;  one  of 
(be  few  anecdotes  which  he  himself  preserves  for  us 
concerning  his  college  studies  shows  much  the  same 
kind  of  temper.  It  tells  us  how  the  class  in  Homer, 
in  reciting  to  the  abstracted  Francis  Wayland,  con 
sidered  it  a  grievance  when  they  were  called  upon 
out  of  turn,  and  were  thereby  disturbed  in  the 
reading  of  the  novels  which  they  used  to  bring  with 
their  copy  of  the  chief  of  poets.  It  is  probable  that 
the  college  work  was  an  intellectual  discipline 
rather  than  an  intellectual  stimulus. 

It  must  have  been  that  Seward  learned  something 
from  Dr.  Nott,  partly  because  the  president  was  one 
of  the  foremost  educators  of  the  day,  and  partly  be 
cause  Seward  had  through  life  a  great  respect  for  his 
character  and  opinion.  If  we  ask  just  what  it  was 
that  he  learned  from  him,  we  may  be  pretty  sure 
that  it  was  not  alone  the  theory  of  criticism  to  be 
found  in  Kames'  Elements,  long  the  favorite  medium 
of  teaching  used  by  the  president.  Reward  prqfr- 
ably  received  from  Dr.  Nott  something  of  the  stamp 
of  character  that  remained  with  nim  through  life, 
— the  combination  of  practical  man  and  idealist. 
The  two  were  not  unlike  In  possessing  this  double 
character  and  were  further  alike  in  that  neither  of 
them  could  quite  manage  the  combination.  Dr. 
Xott  seems  to  have  been  by  nature  a  man  of  affairs  : 
he  was  his  true  self  in  practical  business,  in  making 
stoves,1  managing  lotteries,  grading  real  estate. 

1  It  was  just  about  the  time  of  Seward's  graduation  that  he 
finished  his  "  Fireplace  and  Chimney,"  on  which  he  was  said  to 
have  spent  eight  years  and  ten  thousand  dollars.  Scheuectady 
Cabinet,  March  22,  1820. 


20  WILLIAM  H.  SEWABD 

His  lines  being  cast  in  circumstances  that  demanded 
ideals,  he  found  himself  entirely  able  to  create  them. 
But  he  remained  to  the  end  a  practical  man  of 
idealistic  declarations.  Seward 


saim^way,  though  the  relation  of  the  elements  of  his 
n.h  Q.Tift4>f  op  rhfffred.  He  was  Dy  nature  all  idealist^ 
ail<Lt>y  force  of  circumstances  he  became  absorbed  in 
practical  affairs,  and  of  course  carried  them  on  well. 
jiut^  neither  he  nor  Dr.  Kott  was  able  to  create  an  d 
maintain  an  organic  consistency  h^fw^n  his  afcfoaml 
his  ideals  ;  the  lack  of  harmony  was  alwaysfelt  and 
sometimes  jarringly.1  What  Seward~iearne3rTri- 
stinctively  from  his  teacher  was  probably  the  les 
son  that  both  the  practical  and  the  ideal  were  neces 
sary  and  admirable,  and  that  it  was  better  to  have 
both  even  if  one  could  not  entirely  harmonize  them. 
If  we  could  truly  realize  for  ourselves  the  day-to-day 
life  of  that  time,  we  should  be  astonished  that  men 
did  as  well  in  this  way  as  they  did.  Whon  Sownrd 
came  to  Union  Cnllpgg,  tlipre  WAVP;  nnf  o  imml  r  ed 
miles  from  Schpnp.r.tn,f1yJ  s^ttl^m^nta  wliprti  the 
nnly  111  nn  miner  by  young  mni  or 


women  who  themselves  knew  little  more  than  the 
u  three  B's"  :  wh^rf  In.wyprB  and  PYftn  jnflg^fi  had 
commonly  more  of  the  logic  of  common  sense  and 
daily  eypon'pmrfr  than  t.hoy  ^^^  ImnwI^flgA  nt  1  h^nw  • 
where  ministers,  if  there  were  any  at  all^wero 

"on  Sun- 


1  Oue  of  the  best  evidences  of  this  feeling  may  be  found  in  the 
Reminiscences  of  Carl  Schurz,  who  admired  Seward  greatly  at  a 
distance,  and  became  much  prejudiced  against  him  when  he 
came  to  know  him. 


EARLY  YEAES  21 

days  to  preach  in  the  little  log  schoolhouse.  Yet  on 
these  practical  facts  were  built  tlie  college,  the  state, 
the  church.  It  is  not  astonishing  that  men  found  a 
difficulty  in  accommodating  practical  affairs  to  the 
highest  ideals  ;  the  astonishing  thing  is  that  they 
had  any  ideals  at  all. 

Seward  looked  back  with  more  interest  upon 
his  connection  with  the  debating  societies.  The  de 
biting-  snftiftt.ifta  were^  at-thifi  time,  aTrecognized  and 
important  institution  in  American 


ing_in  the  mind  of  the  studentbody  something  of 
thg  place  that  the  f  rater  nities~~Eave  helcT"smce. 
ThlT  Adelphic  Rooiety,  to  which  ^Sewardjbelonged, 
and  _the  Philomathean,  were  quasi-official  jinstitu- 
tipns.  They  had  well-furnished  meeting-rooms  in 
the  college  buildings  ;  their  annual  debate  was  one 
of  the  ceremonies  of  commencement  ;  their  libraries 
were  a  very  valuable  adjunct  to  the  college  li 
brary.  Among  the  students  they  supplied,  with 
the  class  system,  the  bases  of  the  social  structure. 
This  function  has  now  been  taken,  as  a  rule,  by  the 
fraternities,  but  in  Seward'  s  day  the  fraternities  be 
longed  to  the  future,  although  the  Phi  Beta  Kappa 
had  existed  for  several  years.  To  this  society  Sew 
ard  was  elected  when  a  junior. 

Beside  Se  ward's  scholastic  and  literary  occupa 
tions,  we  get  but  a  slight  idea  of  what  he  did  in 
college.  A  few  years  after  his  time,  there  was  a 
gymnasium  at  Union  with  a  teacher,  Colonel 
Tarde,  a  retired  Swedish  officer.1  It  was  after  his 
time  also  that  Professor  Jackson  formed  the  students 
1  Albany  Argus,  July  2,  1827. 


22 


WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 


into  a  military  body  which  made  an  encampment 
each  Fourth  of  July  at  some  interesting  place. 
While  Seward  was  in  college  the  only  suggestion  of 
athletic  amusement  that  one  finds  is  the  account 
written  by  "  Alumnus  "  of  a  walk  to  the  Falls  of 
Cohoes,  and  this  is  such  as  to  make  it  very  clear 
that  trips  of  the  kind  were  rare.1  It  may  be  added 
that  the  excursion  was  severely  criticized  by  "  Citi 
zen,"  who  held  that  students  would  be  better  em 
ployed  in  attending  to  their  studies  than  in  wander 
ing  about  the  country.2  We  cannot  even  surely  say 
that  Seward  spent  his  leisure  hours  "with  friend 
or  book,  straying  up  the  rivulet  and  through  the 
woods  behind  North  College,"  as  did  his  friend 
David  Berdan.8  His  own  account  would  lead  us  to 
believe  that  he  spent  much  time  in  studying  in  his 
room,  38  North  College. 

In  the  middle  of  his  seniorear,  SewarcLran-away 

eoTgia  where 

he  taaght'tnjin  nradomy  for  m  Trhilr  His  account 
of  the  episode  is  extremely  entertaining ;  it  gives 
a  curious  view  of  Northern  resource  and  Southern 
hospitality.  But  perhaps  the  most  significant  thing 
about  it  all  is  the  independent  spirit  of  Seward 
himself.  Though  said  to  have  been  of  a  "-decile" 
temper  as  a  boy^jiejiad  onco  boforo  left  college  on 
being^reprovjsd-by  Mr.  Way] and,  tind  oniyTeturned 
after  some  management  by  his  honored  president. 
On  the  later  occasion  his  lather  was  unwilling  to 

1  Scheneotady  Cabinet,  Dec.  8,  1819. 
9  Ibid.,  Dec.  15,  1819. 
3  Works,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  123. 


EAELY  YEAES  23 

pay_his  tailor's  bills  amLsome  others,  and  ka there 
fore  jeft  college  without  a  word  to  either  father  or 
president.  Iii  after  life  he  perhaps  had  more  of  this 
temper  than  most  people  imagined,  but  if  so  he  suc 
ceeded  in  toning  it  down  into  mere  independence 
and  self-reliance.  It  jnay  be  added  that  the  elder 
Sevrard  was  by  no  mftana  as  diplomatic  a  person  as 
Dr.  Nott :  of  his  three  sons,  the  eldest  had  a  misun 
derstanding  with  hisjfoher  a"d  went  to  Illinois  ; 
William  him  pp.1  f  rnn  uwuy  tn  ^nnrjvin  j  nnH  thp  next 
boy  strayed  from  home  and  enlisted  in  the  army. 
Seward  learned  much  in  Georgia  ;  it  was  always  a 
good  thing  for  him  to  have  lived  for  a  while  in  a 
slave  state. 

When  he  came  back,  which  he  did  in  a  few 
mouths  at  his  parent's  request,  he  went  home,  as  it 
was  useless  to  proceed  to  college  until  the  new  year, 
and  studiedjaw  for  some  time  in  Goshen,  the  county 
town.  AtHbhe  beginning  of  the  second  term,  he 
returned  to  Union  aud  took  his  degree  in  July,  1820. 
On  getting  back  to  college  he  ha,d  a  taste  of  t.hft-po- 
litical  excitement  that  WHS  to  make  so  large  an  ele 
ment  of  hi  a  fntnrp.  lift*..  But  he  evaded  all  diffi 
culties  and  came  out  successfully  as  one  of  those 
who  received  higfrpst.  honors,  one  of_jthe_three_ 
Adelphic  spffiifrpra,  and — one  of  tho — elass— maoi-__ 

ers.^. 

In  estimating  the  effect  on  Seward' s  life,  we  should 
recognize  that  Schenectady  itself  must  have  been 
something  of  an  influence,  though  in  the  main  but  a 
temporary  one.  The  first  thing  he  said  of  the  town, 
as  he  looked  back  in  later  life,  was  this  :  "At 


24  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

Schenectady  I  alighted  on  the  banks  of  the  Mohawk 
River,  then  [1816]  navigated  with  bateaux.  .  .  . 
It  was  not  yet  nor  indeed  until  a  much  later  period  * 
that  I  was  to  conceive  iny  first  idea  of  the  commer 
cial  and  political  importance  of  this  great  thorough 
fare.  "  Probably,  however,  fi^ward  w;is  iugpnsihly 

led  to  favor  the  then  existing  carrying  trade.  The 
navigation  01  the  Mohawk  was  at  this  time,  ITnd 
had  long  been,  the  great  interest  of  tV-  ^ty-  There 
were  often  forty  or  fifty  large  Durham  boats  in  the 
port  discharging  and  taking  on  cargo.  Just  about 
this  time  a  daily  line  of  packets,  with  cabins  amid 
ships,  carried  passengers  to  Utica.  The  merchants, 
shippers,  forwarders,  boatmen,  as  well  as  the  boat- 
builders  (for  the  boats  were  mostly  constructed  in 
Schenectady),  and  those  occupied  in  the  land  car 
riage  of  goods  and  passengers  to  Albany,  made  up 
a  large  element  of  the  population.  It  is  natural 
that  Seward  should  have  been  perhaps  uncon 
sciously  impressed  by  the  town  and  should  have 
adopted  its  view  ;  in  this  way  we  may  in  part 
explain  the  well-known  essay  in  which  he  demon 
strated  "  that  the  Erie  Canal  .  .  .  was  an  im 
possibility,  and  that  even  if  it  should  be  successfully 
constructed,  it  would  financially  ruin  the  state." 
Further  explanation  conies  from  general  political 
conditions.  Dr.  Seward,  and  his  son  as  well,  both 
acted  with  that  part  of  the  Republican  party  just  at 
this  time  called  the  "  Bucktails,"  of  whom  the  chief 
distinguishing  characteristic  was  that  they  were  op- 

1  Only  about  six  years  afterward.     See  p.  33. 
5  Life,  Vol.  I,  p.  47. 


EAELY  YEAES  25 

posed  by  De  Witt  Clinton.  As  the  Erie  Canal,  then 
in  construction,  was  the  especially  Clintonian  meas 
ure,  we  shall  readily  see  how  Seward,  in  the  sur 
roundings  we  have  noted,  could  find  little  in  it  of 
value. 

Seward  had  chosen  his  profession  early  in  life,  and 
at  this  time  had  already  begun  to  read  law  with 
John  A.  Duer  of  Gosheu.  In  the  autumn  of  1820, 
he  went  to  New  York  and  entered  the  office  of  John 
Authou.  A  year  and  a  half  later  he  returned  to 
Gosheu  to  join  Mr.  Ogdeii  Hoffman,  who  had  lately 
moved  there,  and  remained  until  he  was  ready  to 
take  his  bar  examination  and  settle  for  himself. 

One  w^ujd__glailly  know  flomothing  of  the  year 
and  a  half  that  Se^r^  «ppnt,  171  TsTPw  YorV,  hnt,  wa 
get  the  very  slightest  glimpses  of  it.  In  his  Auto- 
biography  he  mentions  only  his  connection  with  the 
literary  socjgty,  +**  New  VnrV 


changed  productions  with  one  of  the  most  eloquentT 
who  gave  Beward?s  speech  so  that  the  applause 
echoed  as  far  as  Broadway,  while  his  own  delivery 
of  his  friend's  essay  was  received  in  silence. 

In  the  summer  of  1821,  there  came  to  the  office  of 
Mr.  Anthon  a  fellow  student  of  college  days.  David 
Berdan  was  a  man  of  ability,  devoted  to  literature 
rather  than  to  law,  which  he  followed  in  order  to 
have  something  to  rely  upon.  Seward  was  much 
attached  to  him  though  he  never  sympathized 


26  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

wholly  with  his  artistic  aspirations,  or  at  least 
iiever  made  them  his  own.  "  How  would  you  like 
to  lead  a  literary  life  ?  "  wrote  Berdaii  to  him  a  little 
later;  "  that  is  to  say,  be  in  possession  of  a  com 
petency,  and  instead  of  attaching  yourself  to  the 
study  of  a  particular  science,  range  through  the 
whole  garden  of  knowledge?"  Seward  probably 
Lad  something  of  the  same  desire  for  a  competency 
that  might  allow  him  to  follow  out  the  ideals  and 
plans  that  drifted  through  his  mind  ;  he  certainly 
looked  at  the  law  chiefly  as  giving  him  such  an  in 
come.  But  he  had  no  idea  of  devoting  his  leisure 
time  to  literature  :  even  now  we  may  be  pretty  sure 
that  his  ambition  had  turned  to  public  affairs.  The 
more  may  we  regret  that  we  know  so  little  of 
Seward'  s  occupation  during  these  years.  It  was 
while  he  was  in  New. 


for  fhp   rrmsHtnHnrm.l    ftonvftniinii,  and  Jjmt 

they  deliberated,  and  it  was  just  after  he  had  re- 
turned  to  Goshen  that  the  results  were  offered  to  the 
people.  It  was  while  he  was  in  New  York  that  the 
discussions  of  Governor  Clinton's  "  Green  ftagJVfoa- 
sage"  and  the  actsj)f  Skinner's  Comidj_jnjist-have 
stirred  his  mind  to  a  consideration  of  the  true 
principles  of  party  politics  ;  and  the  political 
activities  of  the  Tammany  Society  in  New  York 
City  must  have  given  him  many  practical  ideas  on 
the  same  topic.  But  there  is  almost  nothing  to  help 
us  look  back  to  that  period.  He  made  no  connec 
tions  that  we  can  discern  in  later  life,  however 
much  he  may  have  laid  foundations  by  study  and 
thought.  Almost  his  only  recollection  of  these 


EAELY  YEARS 


27 


years  that  has  coine  down  to  us  gives  a  curiously 
unexpected  idea  of  his  day-to-day  life.  Ten  years 
afterward,  being  in  the  city,  he  found  nothing  left 
of  the  old  associations,  and  looked  back  from  the 
pressure  of  his  political  activities  to  "the  idleness, 
the  poetic  feeling,  the  buoyant  enjoyments  of  that 
period."  1  No  one  would  think  of  these  things  as 
belonging  to  Seward's  life  at  that  time,  and  yet 
perhaps  this  suggestion  will  give  us  as  much  con 
ception  of  it  as  would  many  pages  that  told  just 
what  he  did. 

Although  he  had  studied  law  in  New  York  City, 
Seward  decided  to  practice  in  the  western  part  of 
the  state,which  was  at 

dity.     An  innate  sympathy  for  and 


n 


interest  in  people 

in  a  new  cominum 

—  • * 

the  more  settled  Ijfc  of  the  pattern  part  of  HIP. 

He  passed  his  legal  examination  at  Utica  in  Octo 
ber  ?JL822j  and  went  on  farther  WPSJ-,  to  p^plorp,  the 

frontier  towns.      He  rlppirJprl  nprm    Anhru". 

One  reason  for  this  determination,  or  it  may  be 
the  chief  reasonwhy  he  went  west  at  all,  was  that 
Auburn  was  the  home  of  Miss  Frances  Miller,  a 
fellow  student  of  SewaixTs  sister  at  Miss  Willard'  s 
School  in  Troy.  The  somewhat  dusty  investiga 
tions  among  political  histories  and  constitutional 
records  are  lighted  up  by  the  mention  of  this 
young  lady,  not  so  spirited,  it  is  said,  as  her  sister 
Miss  Lizette,  but  with  more  charm.  She  was  not 
the  acknowledged  belle  of  Auburn,  nor  did  Seward 
lLife,  Vol.  I,  p.  198. 


28  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

become  the  most  popular  young  man  of  the  village. 
More  striking  figures  in  the  society  and  amusements 
of  the  young  people  were  Miss  Sarah  Payne  who 
had  so  many  lovers  that  she  could  hardly  choose 
among  them,  and  Mr.  Van  Schoonhoven  Myers, 
who  was  a  recognized  wit.  But  they  had  their  day 
and  are  no  longer  remembered  by  history,  while 
the  gracious  and  winning  Miss  Frances  and  her 
slight,  red-haired  admirer  are  the  ones  who  make 
that  village  life  worth  recalling.  On  coming  to 
Auburn,  perhaps  to  see  Miss  Miller,  Seward  con 
sidered  the  opportunities  of  the  place,  and  deter 
mined  to  remain. 

A  more  "practical"  reason  for_choosing  Auburn 
was  that,  with  the  exception  of  IJtica,  it  was  then 
the  chief  town  west  ^f  A  Ibany  Borne  had  just  been 
incorporated  as  a  village  ;  Syracuse  was  a  village  of 
a  few  hundreds  and  had  only  lately  attained  a  sepa 
rate  name ;  Rochester  had  a  population  of  hardly 
more  than  two  thousand  ;  and  even  Buffalo  was  not 
much  larger.  But  Auburn  at  this  timft  hnrl  a  popu 
lation  of  twentyj-fivejhundred  and  was  growing  every 
day.  It_haiLjdsen-  xapidly  from  the  settlement  at 
Hardenburgh's  Corners,  was  in  a  fertile  country  and 
on  the  great  road  to  the  West  now  thronged  with 
emigrants.  In  Se ward's  day  there  passed  through 
Auburn  each  year  thousands  of  wagons  bound  for 
western  New  York  and  farther.1  It  was  a  busy 

1  Mrs.  Deborah  Bronson  quotes  Captain  Francis  Hall's  state 
ment  that  in  1815,  16,000  wagons  went  west  over  the  Cayuga 
Bridge,  and  adds  that  it  seems  to  her  to  be  not  exaggerated. 
Recollections  of  Mil  Enrly  Life :  Cayuga  Historical  Society  Col 
lections,  No.  6,  1888. 


EAKLY  YEAES  29 

place  with  churches,  a  bank,  an  academy,  a  news 
paper,  all  gathered  in  hardly  more  than  a  dozen 
years.  One  thing  about  Auburn  seemed  more  im 
portant  than  it  did  later,  or  rather  it  seemed  impor 
tant  for  a  different  reason  :  the  village  was  on  high 
land.  At  the  time  this  was  an  advantage  because 
it  gave  Auburn  the  water-power  which  caused  its 
first  growth.  But  it  also  prevented  the  Erie  Canal 
from  coming  any  nearer  than  Weedsport,  seven 
miles  away.  In  1823,  however,  the  canal  was  still 
unfinished,  the  difficulties  of  position  were  unap 
preciated,  and  Auburn  was  the  chief  place  in  all 
that  part  of  the  state. 

Miss  Frances  was  the  daughter  of  Judge  Miller, 
one  of  the  principal  men  of  the  town.  An  old  Fed 
eralist,  in  earlier  days  the  leading  political  figure 
of  the  village,  he  had  for  some  time  been  county 
judge.  Bat  his  term  of  service  was  drawing  to  a 
close,  and  in  returning  to  the  practice  of  law  he  was 
glad  of  the  opportunity  to  associate  himself  with  an 
active  and  a  well-educated  young  man. 

Settled  at  Auburn _  by  the  beginning  of  1823, 
Seward  at  once  took  up  seriously  the  business  of 
Ulfe,  both  private  and  public.  Hisjaw  practice  he 
was  able  to  carry  on  to  the  satisfaction  of  those 
whom  he  served  :  from  the  very  first  year  he  jade 
a^  reasonable  living.  Life  was  not  so  complex  in 
those  days  and  money  went  farther  than  it  does 
now.  We  can  judge  of  Seward's  idea  of  a  liveli 
hood  from  his  agreement  with  his  senior  partner, 
that  if,  during  the  first  year,  his  share  in  the  profits 
should  fall  short  of  $500,  the  deficiency  should  be 


30  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

made  up.  He  was  fortunately  able  to  exceed  that 
amount.  He  tried  his  own  and  Judge  Miller's  cases 
in  the  justice's  courts;  he  attended  to  mercantile 
business  and  collecting,  and  to  the  questions  of  laud 
titles  that  were  constantly  arising  ;  he  became  known 
for  his  care  and  skill  in  drawing  up  papers.  His 
mode  of  life  was  simple  ;  he  contented  himself  with 
a  room  behind  his  office,  and  boarded  with  a  little 
set  of  young  men,  who  like  himself  were  in  Auburn 
to  make  their  fortunes  and  grow  up  with  the  country. 
"Lawyers,  merchants,  and  bankers,"  he  described 
them  in  his  Autobiography,  half  humorously.  Per 
haps  there  were  not  a  few  of  them  who  like  many 
Americans  of  that  day  followed  not  only  all  those 
occupations  in  turn,  but  others  as  well.  In  one 
thing,  however,  all  were  doubtless  alike,  and  that 
was  their  determination  to  do  everything  for  Auburn 
that  they  could,  to  make  it  a  place  worth  living  in. 
"  It  was  a  busy  town,"  he  wrote,  looking  back  in 
1841, '  "  filled  with  adventurous  spirits."  He  gives 
us  a  good  idea  of  his  own  temper.  In  his  earlier 
legal  experiences,  he  tells  us,  the  lawyer  had  been 
supposed  to  stick  to  his  office  and  his  law  books. 
He,  however,  broke  away  from  such  narrowness  :  he 
read  his  law  books  when  necessary,  but  took  care 
also  to  read  the  papers  and  magazines  and  reviews, 
as  well  as  other  new  publications  of  the  day.  He 
not  only  attended  to  his  office,  but  manifested  a 
keen  interest  in  whatever  else  was  going  on  in  town. 
He  took  a  pew  in  the  Episcopal  church,  joined 
the  militia,  presided  over  a  debating  society,  and 
lLife,  Vol.  I,  p.  544. 


EAELY  YEARS  31 

even  managed  dancing  assemblies,  though  he  had 
no  skill  in  dancing  himself.  /Most  important  of  all, 
he  went  to  political  meetings,  characteristically 
' '  acting  generally  as  secretary/ '  He  was  definitely 
settled  in  life. 


CHAPTEE  H 

POLITICAL   CONDITIONS 

PRECISELY  how  Seward  turned  to  politics  cannot 
now  be  said.  Doubtless  the  idea  of  a  public  life 
had  been  for  some  time  in  his  mind.  He  himself 
tells  us  that  he  practiced  law  for  a  competence  only  ; 
that  politics  was  the  great  and  engrossing  business 
of  the  country  ;  that  he  regarded  the  rights  and 
responsibilities  of  citizenship  at  that  time  more 
highly  than  any  one  he  ever  met.  The  real  ques 
tion  was  not  whether  he  should  go  into  politics,  but 
with  what  party  he  should  act. 

Political  feeling  was  then  very  strong,  but  party 
organizations  were  not  so  sharply  defined  as  they 
had  been,  or  as  they  were  later.  There  was  very 
little  of  the  political  machinery  of  our  own  day 
which  does  so  much  to  render  these  permanent. 
Party  politics  in  the  state  of  New  York  fluctuated 
and  varied  and  changed  so  as  to  be  very  confusing. 
The  old  Federalist  party  had  practically  passed 
away  and  its  members  had  sought  new  connections. 
The  name  was  often  used  for  individuals.1  On  the 

1  "The  name  Federalist  is  almost  universally  dropped  in  this 
district,  in  the  district  of  which  Oueida  County  is  part,  and  in 
the  Herkimer  County  meeting.''  Clinton  to  Post,  Oct.  21, 
1822.  On  the  other  hand,  a  year  afterward  Flagg  wrote  to 
Van  Buren,  Nov.  12,  1823  :  "  A  Federalist  of  the  old  school  is 
elected  in  Franklin.  ...  I  fear  that  the  Federal  senator 
is  elected  in  the  fourth  district. ' '  Van  Bureii  MSS. 


POLITICAL  CONDITIONS  33 

other  baud,  the  Ant  i- Federal  party,  as  it  had  once 
been  called,  alwayTthe  stronger  party  in  the  state, 
now  known  indifferently  as  jRepublican  or  Demo 
cratic,  had  become  the  only  party.  IFwas  therefore 
divided  into  factions,  one  gathering  about  the  pre 
eminent  figure  ofTDe  Witt  Clinton  and  bearing  his 
name,  and  the  other  led  byjVan  Buren  and  com 
monly  called  the  "  BucktajtfsT"  Each  faction  as 
sumed  the  party  name,  and  spoke  of  the  other 
sometimes  as  "the  opposition"  and  sometimes  as 
"  Federalists."  ' 

Between  the  two  Seward  made  an  easy  choice. 
Clinton  stood  for  the  Erie  Canal  and  the  policy  of 
internal  improvement.  Seward' s  father,  living  in 
Orange  County,  had  been  a  regular  Eepublican  and 
a  Bucktail,  and  so  had  Seward  himself  while  at  col 
lege.  When  he  had  come  to  Auburn,  however, 
"  certain  scales  dropped  from  his  eyes,"  and  as  he 
went  through  the  Mohawk  Valley  he  began  to  ap 
preciate  tne  immense  importance  of  that  roadway  to 
the  new  West.  If  he  had  needed  more  to  determine 
his  action,  he  would  have  found  it  in  his  law  part 
ner.  Judge  Miller  had  been  a  Federalist,  but  with 
the  lapse  of  that  party  he  had  begun  to  act  with 
Governor  Clinton,  and  was  now  "  confessedly  at  the 
head  of  the  Clintonian  party  in  Auburn."  2  It  was 


^he  Albany  Argus  pretty  uniformly  calls  the  opposition 
papers  "Federal,"  and  is  itself  dubbed  a  "Federal  sheet"  by 
the  Rochester  Telegraph,  for  instance. 

%2MS.  Memoir.  He  had  been  appointed  First  Judge  of  the 
county  by  Clinton  in  1817,  and  was  delegate  to  the  Clintonian 
convention  of  1826. 


34  WILLIAM  H.  SEWABD 

most  natural,  therefore,  that  Seward  should  ally 
himself  to  the  Clintonian  side  of  politics. 

So  far  as  national  affairs,  also,  were  concerned, 
Seward  found  no  difficulty  in  reaching  an  opinion. 
Whether  he  was  ever  one  of  those  who  thought  of 
Clinton  as  a  candidate  for  President,  we  cannot  say.1 
Now  and  for  some  years  that  idea  had  found  ex 
pression  at  one  public  meeting  or  another,  though 
never  at  Auburn.  We  may  suppose  that  Seward's 
mind  settled  readily  upon  Adams  as  the  obvious 
candidate  for  one  who  thought  as  he  did  on  the  sub 
ject  of  internal  improvement.  The  need  of  the  na 
tion,  he  felt,  as  he  long  afterward  described  his 
ideas,  was  "a  policy  which  shall  strengthen  its 
foundation,  increase  its  numbers,  develop  its  re 
sources,  and  extend  its  dominion."  But  the  tenden 
cies  of  the  Eepublican  party  at  large  seemed  to  him 
not  to  lead  in  that  direction.  Van  Buren  and  those 
who  acted  with  him  favored  Crawford  of  Georgia. 
The  Clintonians  were  divided  :  some  urged  Clinton 
himself  to  accept  a  nomination  ;  some  desired  Adams, 
some  Jackson,  and  a  few  Clay.  Seward,  with  feel 
ings  even  then  concerning  the  harmful  economic 
effects  of  slavery,  determined  to  favor  Adams. 

But  though  these  matters  were  important  and  had 
much  to  do  with  settling  Seward's  place  in  the  po 
litical  world  of  Auburn,  Cayuga  County,  and  New 
York  State,  there  were  other  matters  of  greater  im 
mediate  significance.  Seward  was  not  a  man  who 

TThe  Cayuga  Republican  of  Jan.  29,  1823,  gives  the  news  of 
Clinton's  nomination  at  public  meetings  in  Ohio,  but  does  not 
take  up  the  idea  itself. 


POLITICAL  CONDITIONS  35 

thought  his  political  duties  done  when  he  had  con 
sidered  policies  and  candidates,  determined  for  whom 
he  would  vote,  and  had  voted.  These  he  did  as  a 
matter  of  course,  but  he  did  more  too.  He  wanted 
to  take  such  part  in  public  life  as  would  count.  He 
was  young,  but  he  was  one  of  the  educated  men  of  the 
village  ;  he  could  think  and  write  effectively.  He 
undoubtedly  took  a  keen  interest  not  only  in  na 
tional  or  state  policies,  but  in  what  was  going  on 
under  his  very  eyes  in  Auburn.  He  began  his  law 
practice  the  year  of  the  promulgation  of  the  new 
constitution.  He  had  voted  for  it,  and  he  approved 
highly  of  those  of  its  provisions  which  seemed  steps 
toward  a  larger  democracy.  But  there  were  other 
matters  in  the  constitution,  the  full  import  of  which 
he  learned  only  after  some  practical  experience ; 
namely,  the  provisions  relating  to  appointment  to 
office. 

The  first  immediately  important  political  event 
that  took  place  in  Auburn  after  Seward  began  to 
consider  public  affairs,  was  the  appointment  of  Ger- 
shom  Powers  to  the  position  of  FicsLJaidge  of  the 
county,  heretofore  held  by  Seward' s  partner,  Elijah 
Miller.  This  event  pointed  directly  to  the  appoint 
ment  of  Mr.  Powers'  brother-in-law,  EnosT.  Throop, 
as  Circutt^jTudge  of  the  Seventh  District,  which 
shortly  came  about.1  These  appointments  were 
significant  in  the  world  of  politics ;  they  meant 
Buck  tail  supremacy  in  Cayuga. 

The  judge  in  those  days  was  in  one  respect  a  very 

1  Powers  was  appointed  January  29th,  Throop  April  21st,  both 
by  Governor  Yates. 


36  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

different  sort  of  person  from  his  successor  of  the 
present.  He  was  usually  an  active  politician,  ap 
pointed  for  political  reasons  and  expected  to  act  in 
concert  with  the  men  who  appointed  him.  Judge 
Throop,  like  the  other  judges  of  the  state,  was  a 
strict  party  man.  No  one  questioned  his  integrity 
or  the  purity  of  his  action  upon  the  bench  ;  but  he 
was  known  to  be  inflexibly  devoted  to  party 
and  to  party  leaders,1  and  had  been  the  main  in 
strument  in  turning  the  politics  of  the  county  from 
Federalism  to  Eepublicanism.  He  had  been  post 
master  of  Auburn  from  1809  to  1815,  county  clerk 
of  Cayuga  from  1815  to  1819,  and  had  served  a  term 
in  Congress.  When  in  1823  it  was  the  duty  of  the 
governor  to  appoint  eight  circuit  judges  for  the  state, 
it  was  understood  by  everybody  that  he  would  make 
his  selection  from  his  own  political  friends.  No  one 
in  the  county  was  better  fitted  from  the  political 
standpoint  than  Mr.  Throop. 

But  the  appointment  of  a  circuit  judge  had  an 
especial  interest  just  then,  because  the  circuit  judge 
was  a  well-recognized  factor  in  the  political  machin 
ery  of  the  state.  Under  the  new  constitution,  the  cir 
cuit  judge  was  to  be  the  successor  of  the  justice  of 
the  Supreme  Court,  who  rode  on  circuit.  At  a  time 
when  the  state  was  thinly  settled  and  transportation 
was  difficult,  the  justice  on  circuit,  who  went  into 
every  county  and  had  an  acquaintance  with  lawyers 

1  Jenkins,  in  his  life  of  Throop  (Lives  of  the  Governors, 
p.  543),  denies  these  views  of  Hammond,  Vol.  IT.,  p.  335;  but 
in  his  life  of  Seward  (lb.  p.  636)  he  writes,  "The  politics  of  the 
county  at  this  time  received  their  tone  from  Mr.  Throop." 


POLITICAL  CONDITIONS  37 

everywhere,  was  a  political  bond  between  the  great 
men  of  the  party  at  Albany  and  the  little  men  of  the 
party  all  over  the  state.  Under  the  old  system, 
when  an  immense  number  of  appointments  were_ 
made  by  the  old  council,  the  justice  of  the  Supreme 
Court  was  a  very  influential  person.1  Under  the 
new  constitution  the  appointing  power  was  very 
much  curtailed,  but  still  a  considerable  patronage 
was  left  to  the  governor  with  the  Senate,  and  the 
judge  of  the  circuit  district  was  an  important  means 
by  which  this  power  was  to  be  used  for  party  good. 
He  was  assisted  by  the  judges  of  the  county  courts, 
but  these  officials  were  also  appointed  in  the  same 
way  as  the  circuit  judge.  All  appointments  and 
removals  as  well  were  frankly  political,  and  the  ap 
pointive  power  was  still  considerable.  County  su 
pervisors  had  always  been  elected  :  by  the  new  con 
stitution,  sheriffs  also  were  to  be  elected.  But  the 
justices  of  the  peace,  as  well  as  many  other  officials, 
from  village  presidents  to  notaries  public,  were  still 
to  be  appointed.  The  justices,  of  whom  there  were 
more  than  twenty-five  hundred  in  the  state,  were  re 
garded  as  an  especially  influential  element  in  politics. 
Eufus  King  in  a  speech  in  the  constitutional  con 
vention  put  the  matter  well.  "Each  of  these  jus 
tices,"  he  said,  "  employs  his  constables  or  marshals, 
and  is  attended  by  the  small  lawyers  who  excite  and 
sustain  the  suits  which  are  tried  before  the  justices. 
There  being  on  the  average  four  justices  in  each 

.'  Hammond,  Political  History,  Vol.  I,  p.  420  f.,  describes  in 
some  detail  the  way  in  which  he  could  be  a  political  force.  He 
ascribes  the  system  to  Chief- Justice  Spencer. 


38  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

town,  the  justices,  the  constables,  the  suitors,  the 
pettifoggers,  and  the  idle  attendants,  make  together 
a  great  collection  of  people.  Indeed  so  important 
is  this  magistracy  and  its  associates  in  the  state, 
that  it  has  been  said  in  relation  to  their  offices,  that 
he  who  can  control  or  dispose  of  their  appointments, 
would  possess  greater  political  influence  than  were 
he  able  to  dispose  of  all  the  other  offices  throughout 
the  state."  l 

Judge  Miller,  having  retired  from  the  bench,  was 
shortly  elected  a  county  supervisor.  One  of  the 
first  duties  of  this  office  was  to  nominate  justices  of 
the  peace.  As  the  new  constitution  stood,  lists  of 
j  ustices  were  to  be  named  separately  by  the  super 
visors,  and  by  the  county  judges.  If  the  lists 
agreed,  those  designated  were  confirmed :  if  they 
disagreed,  they  were  sent  to  the  governor  who  made 
his  choice  between  them.  In  Cayuga  County  the 
lists  agreed  and  in  spite  of  Judge  Miller,  the  judges 
and  the  supervisors,  being  in  the  main  of  the  same 
political  party,  at  once  named  for  the  county  sixty 
justices  "  of  their  own  political  stripe."  Perhaps 
this  was  merely  what  was  to  be  expected  ;  if  super 
visors  and  judges  were  of  the  same  political  partj^ 
it  might  have  been  proper  that  the  justices  should 

1  Proceedings  of  the  Constitutional  Convention  :  Carter  and  Stoi\e, 
p.   315.     The  view  was  common.     Cf.    Hammond,  Vol.  I,   p. 
420.     Samuel    Beards! ey,   writing     to    Ela   Collins,   Sepfe.   20, 
1821.  says,  "Though  but  of  trifling  consequence  individually, 
yet  when  arrayed  together,  they  need  not  shrink  from  contrast 
ing  their  official  power  with  any  other  class  of  officials  in  the 
state."     VanBurenMSS.  « 

2  See  the  letter  of  "Brutus,"  Cayuga  Republican,  March  26, 
1823.  t 


POLITICAL  CONDITIONS  39 

be  also.  But  it  soon  appeared  that  this  was  not  all. 
In  other  counties  where  the  elected  supervisors  and 
the  appointed  j  udges  differed,  the  nominations  were 
sent  to  the  governor.  It  was  immediately  noticed 
that  Governor  Yates  always  endorsed  the  nomina 
tions  of  the  judges  who  were  his  own  appointees. 
In  fact,  the  j  ustices  of  the  peace  were  no  more  elect 
ive  than  they  had  been.  The  supervisors,  who  rep 
resented  the  people,  might  name  the  justices  only 
on  condition  that  they  should  be  satisfactory  to  the 
governor.1 

A  change  in  the  mode  of  appointing  the  justices 
became,  therefore,  an  issue  of  importance  and  we 
may  be  sure  that  Seward  was  upon  the  popular  and 
Cliutoniau  side.  There  arose  also  another  question 
of  the  sort,  but  of  greater  immediate  significance. 
At  this  time  presidential  electors  were  chosen  in 
New  York  by  the  legislature.  But  it  was  now 
charged  that  Van  Buren,  the  recognized  leader  of 
the  Bucktail  party  and  United  States  senator, 
had  promised  the  vote  of  the  state  to  Crawford.  Of 
all  the  presidential  candidates,  excepting  Calhoun, 
Crawford  had  the  least  following  in  New  York. 
Adams  or  Clinton,  even  Clay  and  perhaps  Jackson, 
would  have  commanded  a  larger  popular  vote.  It 
was  now  proposed  to  change  the  mode  of  choosing 
presidential  electors  and  give  the  election  to  the 
people.  Agitation  to  this  end  immediately  began, 
especially  in  the  city  of  New  York  and  the  lower 
river  counties,  and  the  People's  party  arose  upon 

1  Van  Buren  was  chairman  of  the  committee  which  had  re 
ported  this  plan  to  the  constitutional  convention. 


40  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

this  issue.  It  included  many  who,  although  opposed 
to  Van  Buren  on  this  question,  were  yet  notClinton- 
ians  :  for  instance,  Seward's  father,  a  prominent 
man  in  Orange  County,  favored  it,  though  opposed 
to  Clinton.  But  the  Clintoniaus  took  up  the  issue  * 
and  in  Cayuga  County,  though  the  People's  party 
never  reached  formal  organization,  it  yet  became  the 
important  point  in  the  canvass.2  On  Octobor  13th, 
a  public  meeting  at  Auburn  drew  up  resolutions  in 
favor  of  direct  elections.  On  the  21st,  the  county 
convention  nominated  candidates  for  the  Assembly 
in  favor  of  "  direct  election  and  the  cause  of  the 
people."  The  other  side  was  the  side  of  "  King 
Caucus.'7 

Interest  in  this  matter  overshadowed  that  in  the 
election  of  justices.  On  January  7,  1824,  Henry 
Wheaton  in  the  Assembly  asked  and  obtained  leave 
to  bring  in  a  bill  for  popular  election  of  presidential 
electors  ;  on  January  13th,  he  proposed  an  amend 
ment  to  the  constitution,  providing  for  the  election 
of  justices.  But  the  former  question  was  the  more 
important  and  meetings  in  its  favor  were  held  all 
over  the  state.  In  spite  of  the  Van  Buren  party,  led 
on  this  occasion  by  Azariah  Flagg,  a  man  who  soon 
became  prominent,  the  electoral  bill  was  passed  by 

1  It  was  said,  because  they  thought  they  could  so  manage  to 
elect  Cliuton.     "  The  fears  that  Mr.  Clinton  will  get  the  vote  of 
the  state  on  a  general  ticket  are  by  no  means  idle."     Marcy  to 
Van  Buren,  Jan.  11,  1824.     Van  Buren  MSS. 

2  Note,  for  instance,  that  Seward  was  president  of  the  Auburn 
Debating  Club,  which  on  Oct.  2,  1823,  took  for  the  subject  of 
discussion,  "Should  the  electors  for  President  and  Vice-President 
be  chosen  by  the  legislature  as  they  now  are,  or  immediately  by 
the  people?" 


POLITICAL  CONDITIONS  41 

the  Assembly.  When  it  went  to  the  Senate,  however, 
it  was  indefinitely  postponed,  seventeen  senators  vot 
ing  against  it.  For  a  time  these  seventeen  were  the 
main  target  for  obloquy  throughout  the  state,  but 
on  the  last  day  of  the  session  there  occurred  another 
event  which  further  aroused  public  feeling,  and  for 
the  moment  strengthened  the  alliance  of  the  dis 
cordant  elements  with  which  Seward  felt  political 
sympathy.  De  Witt  Clinton  was  removed  from  his 
position  as  president  of  the  canal  board. 

The  act  was  entirely  political.  It  had  been  long 
contemplated  by  the  Van  Bureu  leaders.1  The  year 
before  there  had  been  rumors  that  steps  were  to  be 
taken  in  the  legislature.  First  it  was  said  that 
Victory  Birdseye,  senator  from  the  seventh  district, 
had  a  resolution  to  this  effect ;  a  week  later  the  re 
port  was  that  there  was  to  be  a  reorganization  of 
the  canal  board  which  should  leave  out  Clinton 
and  Myron  Holley.2  Neither  of  these  rumors  came 
to  anything,  but  at  the  end  of  the  session  of  1824, 
the  occasion  seemed  good.  If  such  a  resolution 
were  offered,  the  People's  party  leaders,  Wheaton 
and  Tallmadge,  who  were  bitterly  opposed  to  Clin 
ton,  would  be  forced  to  take  a  position  for  or  against 

1  "  From  all  I  can  collect  at  this  place,  I  apprehend  that  there 
is  a  strong  disposition  among  many,  and  perhaps  a  majority  of 
onr  friends  throughout  the  state,  to  turn  out  the  whole  of  tho 
Clintonian  canal  commissioners.  As  to  the  governor  [Clinton] 
I  presume  there  is  no  diversity  of  opinion  and  that  he  ought  to 
<jo."  P.  B.  Porter  to  Van  Bnren,  Nov.  1.  1820.  Van  Buren 
did  not  agree.  ''Judge  Skinner  behaves  quite  well  ;  now  and 
then  he  indulges  his  spleen  against  certain  persons  for  keeping 
Clinton  in  the  board  of  canal  commissioners."  Marcy  to  Vail 
Buren,  Jan.  11,  1«'?4  Van  Buren  MSS. 

*  Cayuga  Republican,  March  5  and  12,  1823. 


42  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

him.  It  seemed  a  chance  to  split  the  opposition. 
The  result,  however,  showed  the  wisdom  of  Van 
Bureu,  who  had  disapproved  the  step  :  the  People's 
party  leaders  voted  against  Clinton  but  their  fol 
lowers  all  over  the  state  took  up  his  issue  and  the 
Cliutonians  became  zealous  in  the  cause  of  "  the 
people."  The  feeling  was  strong  at  Auburn  as 
elsewhere.  On  the  Fourth  of  July  the  following 
toasts  were  drunk  : 

"The  Electoral  Law:  called  for  by  the  wishes 
and  wisdom  of  the  people;  opposed  by  a  faction 
selfish  and  corrupt." 

"The  Seventeen  Senators:  seventy  times  seven 
offenders  against  the  rights  of  the  people.  Once 
more— and  they  will  have  filled  up  the  measure  of 
their  transgression." 

"The  People:  there  is  a  majesty  in  their  will, 
against  which  none  can  sin  and  be  forgiven." 

We  may  be  sure  that  Seward  was  present  on  this 
occasion  for  he  delivered  the  oration  of  the  day. 

In  an  extra  session  called  in  July,  the  seventeen 
senators  did  fill  up  "the  measure  of  their  trans 
gression"  by  their  continued  refusal  to  pass  an 
electoral  bill  ;  and  with  these  steps  we  come  to 
Seward' s  first  definite  appearance  in  politics. 
When  the  county  convention  (calling  itself  Ee- 
publican,  but  really  Clintonian)  met  at  Auburn, 
Seward  was  a  delegate  and  wrote  the  address.2 


1  In  the  fall  elections  the  Cayuga  Clintouians  called  their 
ticket,  "The  People's  Ticket." 

8  See  the  Cayuga  Republican.  Oct.  15.  1824,  and  Works,  Vol. 
Ill,  p.  335,  where  the  main  part  is  reprinted. 


POLITICAL  CONDITIONS  43 

"  Honest  and  honorable  men,"  it  stated,  "  are  con 
vinced  that  a  combination  exists  in  this  state, 
enjoys  its  honors  and  wields  its  powers,  whose 
principles  and  practices  are  at  war  with  its  best 
interests,  its  prosperity  and  its  fame."  This  is  the 
first  note  that  we  now  get  of  an  opposition  which 
greatly  influenced  Seward's  political  action  for 
rnanj^eaTs. 

The  true  history  of  the  Albany  "Begeucy,"  as 
this  combination  was  called  at  the  time  of  Se ward's 
address  and  afterward,  is  not  very  exactly  known, 
but  the  main  lines  are  fairly  clear.  The  new  con 
stitution  made  a  great  change  in  the  politics  of  the 
state,  so  great  that  it  was  thought  of  by  some  as  a 
revolution.  It  was  clear  that  there  would  have  to 
be  new  political  methods  to  suit  the  new  political 
conditions.  The  old  system  of  appointments  had 
been  given  up  :  the  new  system  was  somewhat  ex 
perimental. 

The  new  system  had  been  reported  to  the  con 
vention  from  a  committee  of  which  Martin  Van 
Buren  had  been  chairman.  For  some  years  the 
leading  opponent  of  Governor  Clinton  in  state 
politics,  he  was  at  this  time  in  Washington  as 
United  States  senator.  He  affected  to  have  noth 
ing  to  say  about  New  York  politics ;  he  had  seen 
enough  of  them  for  many  years.  He  had  made  his 
debut  in  the  Senate  ;  his  present  position  was  ex 
actly  what  he  liked  and  he  had  no  desire  to  change 
it.1  But  for  all  his  protestations,  he  was  in  con 
stant  communication  with  those  who  had  previously 
1  Van  Buren  to  Worth.  Van  Buren  MSS. 


44  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

acted  with  him  or  under  hirn.  These  close  political 
friends  of  Van  Buren  became  a  definite  force  in 
New  York  politics  :  they  were  called  all  sorts  of 
names,  sometimes  a  cabinet  council,  sometimes  a 
cabal,  sometimes  a  junto,  but  most  permanently 
the  "Eegency."  ' 

Of  Van  Buren' s  early  political  friends,  the  chief 
figure  was  Eoger  Skinner,  a  powerful  and  an  acrid 
personality,  a  politician  of  the  old  school,  at  first 
state  senator  and  now  United  States  judge  and  re 
tired  from  politics  except  in  an  advisory  character. 
Though  often  spoken  of  as  a  force  in  the  Eegency 
councils,  he  rather  held  himself  apart  during  the 
years  of  Seward's  entrance  upon  public  life.2  Of 
greater  active  importance  at  this  time  was  William 
L.  Marcy  who  had  come  into  politics  more  lately, 
and  when  Skinner  managed  the  council  of  appoint 
ment,  had  been  made  adjutant  general.  Associated 
with  these  three  were  Benjamin  F.  Butler,  Van 
Buren' s  law  partner;  Benjamin  Knower,  the  presi- 

1  The  name  is  sometimes  attributed  to  Tlmrlow  Weed ,  but 
the  evidence  is  rather  against  it.     In  the  Rochester  Telegraph, 
of  which  Weed  was  at  this  time  the  editor,  the  name  first  occurs 
Aug.  17,  1824,  by  which  time  it  may  be  found  in  various  other 
papers.     It  became  common  in  the  campaign  following,  but  its 
origin   is   earlier.     The  first  use  I  have  met  with  is  in  the 
Albany  Advertiser  of  Jan.  17,   1824,  where  we  read  of  "the 
cabinet  council  of  Van  Buren,  or  rather  the  regency  whom  he 
has  appointed  to  govern  the  state  in  his  absence."     The  mem 
bers  of  this  presumed  council  are  designated  :  Leake,  Talcott, 
Knower,    Skinner  and  Butler.     The  name,  however,  did  not 
immediately  become  popular.     It  is  rarely  found  before  Aug., 

2  So  Dudley  to  Van   Buren,  Dec-  21,   1821  ;  Marcy  to  Van 
Buren,  Jan.  11, 1824.  Van  Buren  MSS.     He  died  in  the  summer 
of  1825. 


POLITICAL  CONDITIONS  46 

dent  of  the  Mechanics  and  Farmers'  Bank  ;  and 
Moses  Cantine,  the  editor  of  the  Albany  Argus  and 
state  printer.  These  gentlemen  "  acted  together," 
according  to  a  political  phrase  then  current,  in  the 
days  when  Clinton  and  Van  Buren  strove  for  the 
supremacy  of  the  Eepublicau  party.  As  time  went 
on,  some  changes  occurred :  Judge  Skinner  acted 
less  and  less  with  the  others  ;  Mr.  Cantine' s  place 
was  taken  by  Edwin  Croswell,  a  young  man  who 
became  one  of  the  most  brilliant  of  political  editors  ; 
and  in  1819  Samuel  A.  Talcott  of  Utica  was  added  to 
the  group. 

At  the  first  election  under  the  new  constitution  in 
the  fall  of  1822,  it  was  a  matter  of  great  importance 
who  should  be  governor.  The  governor  was  to  ap 
point  a  large  number  of  officials,  including  the  new 
circuit  judges  who  were  to  be  removable  for  cause 
only,  and  it  was  obvious  that  they  would  be  an  in 
fluential  element  in  the  control  of  the  state  for  a 
long  time  to  come.  A  number  of  candidates  were 
prominent.  The  friends  of  Governor  Clinton,  how 
ever,  became  convinced  that  he  could  not  be  re- 
elected  and  he  declined  a  nomination.  Van  Buren' s 
intimate  friends  desired  that  he  should  offer  him 
self,1  but  he  replied  that  he  preferred  his  position 
as  senator.  Marcy,  Talcott,  Skinner,  and  Cantine 
then  thought  they  could  nominate  General  Porter.2 
Colonel  Young  and  Nathan  Sanford,  both  prominent 
men,  had  something  of  a  following.  More  popular 

1  Talcott  to  Van  Buren,  Feb.  7,  1822 ;  Knower  to  Van  Buren, 
March  4,  1822.     Van  Buren  MSS. 

2  Ulshoeffer  to  Van  Buren,  March  11, 1822.     Van  Buren  MSS. 


46  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

than  any  of  those  mentioned,  however,  was  Judge 
Yates,  a  conservative  man,  who  had  long  been  a 
member  of  the  Supreme  Court.  When  it  came  to 
the  legislative  caucus,  in  which  nominations  were 
then  made,  Van  Buren's  friends  left  Porter  and 
gave  their  votes  to  Yates,  who  was  elected  over 
Colonel  Young.  The  nomination  was  equivalent  to 
an  election  for  there  was  no  real  opposition. 
Almost  every  member  of  the  Senate  and  Assembly 
chosen  at  that  time  was  a  regular  Eepublican  ;  that 
is,  neither  a  Federalist  nor  a  Clintonian. 

The  election  of  state  officers  took  place  early  in 
the  new  year,  1823.  The  comptrollership  was  the 
matter  of  most  importance.  Van  Buren's  friends 
put  forward  Marcy  and  were  joined  by  the  govern 
or's  party.  Colonel  Young's  friends  nominated 
James  Tallmadge.  There  was  a  good  deal  of  ex 
citement  but  Marcy  was  elected,  which  i  l  rendered 
everything  safe  and  tranquil."  l  The  appointment 
of  circuit  judges  was  the  next  matter  of  importance. 
Governor  Yates  proved  himself  somewhat  intrac 
table.  He  consulted  few  people  and  was  especially 
unfriendly  to  Van  Buren,2  who,  he  thought,  had 
called  a  caucus  in  New7  York  to  control  his  conduct. 
But  while  he  did  not  care  for  Van  Buren,  he  be 
haved  as  though  he  did.3  The  appointments  were 


Skinner  to  Van  Buren,  Feb.,  1823.     Van  Bnren  MSS. 

2  "He  feels  particularly  unfriendly  to  you."  Skinner  to 
Van  Buren,  Feb.,  1823.  Van  Buren  MSS. 

8  "  Your  friends  will  be  provided  for.  Duer  will  be  made  a 
circuit  judge.  Throop  also. "  Sutherland  to  Van  Buren,  Feb., 
1823.  Van  Buren  MSS. 


POLITICAL  CONDITIONS  47 

made  on  strictly  party  lines,  and,  as  we  have  seen, 
ensured  the  county  patronage. 

Van  Buren  and  his  friends  had  helped  nominate 
and  elect  Governor  Yates,  who  recognized  their 
action,  and  by  the  means  devised  by  Van  Buren 
himself,  their  joint  influence  was  diffused  over  the 
state.  The  friends  of  Van  Buren  had  now  become 
a  powerful  body.  He  himself  was  in  the  Senate  of 
the  United  States,  Marcy  was  comptroller,  Knower 
was  state  treasurer,  Talcott  was  attorney-general, 
Croswell  was  state  printer.  Two  younger  men, 
Azariah  Flagg  and  Silas  Wright,  were  in  the  As 
sembly  and  the  Senate,  respectively.  It  was  a 
strong  combination,  holding  or  controlling  almost 
all  the  offices  in  the  state,  and  influencing  the  press 
and  the  banks,  through  the  Albany  Argus  and  the 
Mechanics  and  Farmers'  Bank.  They  continued  in 
power  almost  constantly  for  twenty  years. 

Such  was  the  body  against  which  Seward  directed 
the  address  of  1824,  1 1  an  institution  which  com 
bines  in  one  strong  phalanx  the  office-holders  from 
the  governor  and  senators  down  to  the  justices  of 
the  peace  in  the  most  remote  parts  of  the  state ; 
which  makes  the  governor  a  subservient  tool  of  the 
faction  which  designates  him  ;  converts  the  other 
wise  respectable  judiciaries  of  the  counties  into  a 
shambles  for  the  bargain  and  sale  of  offices  ;  and 
selects  justices  of  the  peace  (in  whose  courts  are 
decided  questions  involving  a  greater  amount  of 
property  than  in  all  the  other  tribunals  of  the  state), 
not  from  among  those  whom  an  intelligent  people 
would  choose,  but  from  the  supple  and  needy  para- 


48  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

sites  of  power,  who  may,  and  it  is  to  be  feared  do, 
bring  not  only  influence  but  the  very  authority  of 
their  offices  to  the  support  of  the  party  whose 
creatures  they  are."  Stripping  this  statement  of 
its  flowers  of  rhetoric,  it  will  be  seen  to  set  forth 
exactly  what  the  Regency  aimed  to  accomplish. 
Van  Buren  and  his  friends  took  New  York  politics 
as  they  found  them.  They  believed,  as  did  Seward, 
in  political  parties  ;  they  further  believed  that  par 
ties  must  be  kept  together  through  discipline,  and 
nobody,  not  even  Seward  himself,  could  think  of 
any  party  discipline  not  founded  upon  office.  The 
Eegency  was  no  worse  than  any  other  group  of  poli 
ticians  of  their  day,  except  in  being  successful. 

The  issue  of  1824  was  then  practically  an  opposi 
tion  to  this  body.  The  election  of  justices  would 
deprive  them  of  one  political  means  ;  that  of  presi 
dential  electors  would  take  from  them  another, 
though  it  is  true  that  it  was  too  late  to  influence  the 
coming  election.  It  was  the  year  for  choosing  a 
governor,  and  in  a  state  convention  held  at  Utica, 
Clinton  was  nominated.1  He  was  triumphantly 
elected  by  a  very  large  majority. 

1  Henry  Wharton,  the  leader  of  the  People's  party  men  in 
the  Assembly,  walked  out  of  the  convention  when  Clinton  waa 
nominated,  followed  by  a  number  of  delegates,  including,  I 
suppose,  Steward's  father  who  was  a  delegate  from  Orange 
County. 


CHAPTEE  III 

ADAMS  AND  CLINTON 

WE  shall  not  suppose  that  politics  took  up  all  of 
Seward's  time.  Shortly  after  the  county  conven 
tion,  for  which  he  wrote  his  Kegency  address,  oc 
curred  his  marriage  to  Miss  Frances  Miller.  It  had 
been  largely  through  his  interest  in  her  that  Seward 
had  been  attracted  to  Auburn,  and  this  interest  had 
led  to  an  engagement.  He  had  not  been  long  settled 
there  before  his  father  came  to  visit  him,  and  an 
excursion  to  Niagara  Falls  was  planned  by  the  elder 
Seward  and  Judge  Miller.  It  was  more  of  a  matter 
than  it  would  be  to-day  :  the  two  parents  provided 
a  stage-coach  for  the  party  and  it  was  made  into  a 
considerable  excursion.  We  need  not  doubt  that 
there  was  plenty  of  political  discussion.  Dr.  Sew 
ard  was  a  leading  figure  in  Orange  County.  Hostile 
to  Clinton,  like  the  rest  of  that  part  of  the  state,  he 
was  yet  strongly  in  favor  of  the  electoral  bill.1 
Judge  Miller,  on  the  other  hand,  was  an  old  Feder 
alist  who  had  become  a  Clintonian.  Opposed  as  he 
had  been  to  extension  of  the  suffrage,  he  now  found 
himself  drawn  to  a  sympathy  with  the  People's 

1  In  July,  1824,  he  was  chairman  of  a  meeting  in  Goshen. 
Orange  County,  approving  the  electoral  bill  and  condemning 
the  Senate.  But  in  September  when  he  was  delegate  to  the 
Utica  convention,  he  opposed  the  nomination  of  Clinton.  See 
Proceedings  of  the  New  York  State  Convention,  Sept.,  1824. 


50  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

party.  Seward  himself,  not  much  bound  by  pre 
vious  considerations,  agreed  with  both.  As  the 
party  passed  through  Rochester,  they  met  with  a 
slight  accident,  which  Jed  to  an  acquaintance  with 
Thurlow  Weed.  Here  began  a  political  friendship 
and  a  personal  intimacy  of  the  greatest  significance. 
Mr.  Weed  was  a  most  attractive  and  interesting 
person,  at  this  time  a  printer  and  editor  of  the 
Eochester  Telegraph,  a  strong  Adams  and  Clinton 
man,  now  acting  with  the  People's  party,  by  whom 
he  was  sent  to  the  Assembly  in  1824.  It  was  on  this 
excursion,  too,  that  Seward,  as  he  became  acquainted 
with  Buffalo  and  its  possibilities  for  the  traffic  of 
the  West,  grew  more  than  ever  fixed  in  his  advo 
cacy  of  the  policy  of  internal  improvement  in  state 
and  nation. 

With  the  year  1825  we  may  think  of  him  as 
definitely  settled  in  Auburn  with  a  recognized  po 
sition  in  the  life  of  the  place.  He  had  married  into 
one  of  the  leading  families  of  the  town  ;  he  had  an 
increasing  law  practice  and  was  a  familiar  figure  in 
the  courts ;  he  had  also  made  a  definite  mark  in 
politics.  He  took  part  in  all  the  enterprises  of 
public  interest  in  the  neighborhood. 

One  of  these  enterprises  we  may  tell  of  a  little 
more  at  length.  When  John  L.  Hardenburgh  set 
tled  on  the  outlet  of  Owasco  Lake,  it  was  because 
of  the  water-power.  Hardenburgh' s  Corners  be 
came  Auburn,  a  village  of  growing  importance  on 
the  western  road.  When  emigration  pushed  out 
through  the  Mohawk  Valley,  Auburn  was  an 
obvious  stopping-place  :  in  1815  it  is  recorded  that 


ADAMS  AND  CLINTON  61 

16,000  wagons  passed  through  the  town.  It  grew 
rapidly  and  was  prosperous.  When  the  Erie  Canal 
was  projected  and  finished,  however,  it  became  evi 
dent  that  there  was  a  new  factor  in  the  situation. 
Eochester  and  Syracuse  upon  the  canal  began  to 
increase  in  population  in  the  most  striking  manner. 
Auburn  was  on  high  land,  and  there  had  never 
been  hope  that  the  canal  could  be  brought  through 
her  bounds.  But  it  was  now  felt  that  if  the  town 
could  be  connected  with  the  Erie  Canal,  there  would 
be  an  opportunity  by  means  of  Owasco  Lake  to 
reach  the  country  on  the  Susquehanna  and  gain  a 
considerable  part  of  the  commercial  activity  and 
prosperity  that  lay  in  the  future. 

Seward  with  his  immense  interest  in  practical  af 
fairs,  and  especially  in  internal  improvements,  was 
of  course  concerned  in  this  plan.  Judge  Miller  was 
one  of  its  most  earnest  advocates.  In  1820  a  meet 
ing  had  considered  the  project  visionary  but  in 
1825  interest  in  it  revived,  and  David  Thomas  was 
employed  to  survey  the  route  from  the  Owasco  to 
the  summit  level.  His  results  were  very  favorable.1 
He  also  surveyed  the  route  from  the  Erie  Canal  to 
the  foot  of  Owasco  Lake.  But  as  it  was  impossible 
to  get  the  state  to  take  up  the  matter,  it  hung  fire. 
In  1827  another  meeting  was  held,  on  January  12th, 
and  it  was  put  in  the  hands  of  Seward  and  eight 
others  to  report.  Seward  induced  Elkana  Watson 
to  visit  the  outlet  and  give  an  opinion.  His  view 
may  be  read  in  the  Cayuga  Republican  for  June 
30,  1827  :  it  is  favorable  and  even  enthusiastic  ; 
1  Albany  Advertiser,  Dec.  1st. 


52  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

Auburn  he  believed  might  readily  have  its  place 
upon  a  navigable  thoroughfare  between  Chesapeake 
Bay  and  New  York  State.  A  company  was  formed 
in  which  Seward  took  some  stock,  and  he  also 
acted  upon  the  committee  to  memorialize  the  legisla 
ture.  Before  this  plan  was  carried  out,  however, 
came  the  railroad  that  connected  Auburn  with  the 
commercial  world  in  a  more  effective  manner.  The 
project,  though  nothing  came  of  it,  is  typical  of  the 
enterprise  of  those  who  had  it  in  hand. 

Politics  was  the  main  issue,  though  the  imme 
diate  excitements  had  rather  passed  away.  The 
election  of  Clinton  as  governor  had  been  followed 
by  that  of  Adams  as  President.  The  electoral  law 
and  the  election  of  justices  seemed  in  the  way  of 
being  settled  rightly.  It  was  a  time  for  organizing. 
"  Uniting  with  the  opponents  of  the  Kepublican 
party/'  says  Seward,  "I  spoke  for  the  new  move 
ment,  wrote  resolutions  and  addresses  and  acted  as 
delegate  in  meetings  in  my  own  town  and  county. " 
He  was,  in  fact,  greatly  interested  in  a  change  that 
was  going  on  in  political  methods. 

In  the  years  preceding  the  constitution  of  1822, 
public  affairs  were  carried  on  by  a  comparatively 
small  number  of  persons.  The  electorate  was  very 
small,  about  one- third  of  what  it  is  now.1  On  the 


1  The  difference  will  be  seen  by  a  comparison  of  the  vote  for 
governor  in  1820  and  1900. 

Vote  Population  Percentage  of  voters 

1800—  93,437  1,372,812  6  81 

1900—     1,548,551  7,268,894  21.56 


ADAMS  AND  CLINTON  53 

other  hand,  the  appointing  power  was  very  great : 
the  only  officials  elected  by  the  people  were  governor 
and  lieutenant-governor,  the  members  of  the  national 
House  of  ^Representatives,  the  members  of  the  state 
legislature,  the  county  super  visors  and  certain 
minor  town  officials.  Presidential  electors,  like 
United  States  senators,  were  elected  by  the  legisla 
ture,  and  all  other  officials  from  chief -justice  of  the 
Supreme  Court  down  to  the  notaries  public,  the 
public  auctioneers,  and  the  inspectors  of  hay,  grain, 
etc.,  were  appointed  by  a  Council  of  Appointment. 
As  nominations  to  the  principal  elective  offices  were 
made  by  legislative  caucus,  it  will  be  perceived  that 
the  political  situation  could  readily  be  controlled  by 
a  small  number  of  persons.  The  new  constitution 
enlarged  the  franchise  and  made  very  many  officers 
elective.  We  have  seen  how  political  action  was  at 
once  directed  to  the  election  of  justices  of  the  peace 
and  presidential  electors. 

A  change  began  to  take  place  also  in  the  extra 
legal  methods  of  politics.  The  legislative  caucus 
began  to  give  way  to  the  convention.  In  the  elec 
tion  of  1822  Yates  was  nominated  by  legislative 
caucus  and  Southwick,  who  offered  something  of  an 
opposition,  nominated  himself.  At  the  next  elec 
tion,  in  1824,  however,  the  opponents  of  the  Eegency 
called  a  state  convention  to  nominate.  This  was  a 
new  departure,  but  a  successful  one  :  in  1826  another 
convention  was  called  by  the  Clintonians,  and  this 
year  their  opponents  followed  their  example.  Con 
ventions  had  long  been  held  for  the  election  of 
county  and  district  officers  :  this  was  but  the  exten- 


54  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

sion  of  a  current  system  j  it  was  soon  proposed  to 
make  it  national. 

The  system  was  still  far  from  complete.  There 
was  no  central  organization  : l  each  locality  acted 
for  itself  under  the  guidance  of  local  politicians 
more  or  less  in  touch  with  one  another.  The  call 
ing  of  meetings  was  a  matter  of  spontaneity,  some 
times  attended  to  by  the  president  and  the  secretary 
of  a  previous  meeting,  sometimes  by  a  committee  of 
correspondence,  sometimes  by  leading  men  of  the 
party.  The  Utica  convention  of  1826  declared  that 
the  convention  of  1824  had  been  an  experiment 
which  had  proved  successful,  but  urged  that  some 
provision  for  permanent  action  was  necessary.  * 
dominations  for  Congress  or  the  legislature  were 
still  made  with  less  formality :  the  nomination  by 
convention  was  the  common  course,  but,  especially 
at  just  this  time,  persons  often  offered  themselves  as 
candidates.  "  I  had  an  active  though  humble  part 
in  these  proceedings,"  says  Seward  in  speaking  of 
these  matters.  For  such  service  his  gifts  were  most 
useful.  Having,  as  we  have  seen,  the  power  of  ex 
pressing  himself  effectively  in  writing,  he  was 
employed  in  drawing  up  resolutions  and  addresses, 
and  in  acting  as  delegate  and  secretary. 

It  was,  then,  into  a  changing  political  world  that 
Seward  as  a  young  man  made  his  way,  and  he  gave 
his  best  effort  to  the  movements  which  promoted 
the  change.  He  approved  of  the  larger  electorate 

1  Hence  an  irresponsible  body  like  the  Regency  was  really  a 
natural  result. 
*  Resolutions  in  Albany  Advertiser,  Sept.  25,  1826. 


ADAMS  AND  CLINTON  55 

and  the  smaller  appointing  power.  He  approved 
of  the  wider  appeal  to  the  people  by  committee  and 
convention,  and  the  lesser  use  of  the  caucus.1  These 
objects  were  helped  by  the  election  of  1824  in  which 
Clinton  had  been  made  governor,  and  Seward  was 
the  more  confirmed  thereby  in  his  opposition  to  the 
Eegency.  As  the  matter  lay  in  his  mind,  this  was 
a  combination  directed  by  Van  Buren  for  the  polit 
ical  advantage  of  its  own  members,  which  advan 
tage  had  called  for  the  election  of  Crawford  to  the 
presidency.  Not  only  was  the  whole  Eegency  system 
wrong,  but  the  candidacy  of  Crawford  or  any  other 
Southern  man  was  obviously  detrimental  to  the  true 
interests  of  the  country.  It  would  oppose  internal 
improvements  and  defend  slavery.  It  would  con 
tinue  the  Virginia  dynasty  of  Jefferson,  Madison, 
and  Monroe  ;  for  Crawford,  though  not  a  Virginian 
himself,  was  the  regular  Southern  candidate,  the 
candidate,  for  instance,  of  the  Richmond  Junto,  a 
more  formidable  combination  than  the  Albany 
Begency.  This  combination  of  personal  politics  in 
the  chief  states  of  the  North  and  the  South,  Seward 
remarked  and  was  much  influenced  by  it.2 

As  he  understood  the  political  situation,  the  im- 

1  Although  the  caucus  was  much  decried,  and  though  both 
parties  substituted  the  convention  in  the  state  and  the  nation, 
yet  of  course  the  legislative  caucus  remained  a  useful  political 
means  employed  by  all  parties. 

2  He  said  afterward,  "  I  do  not  know  who  was  before  myself 
in  taking  notice  of  this  coalition  in  the  political  transactions  of 
1824  and  1828."     Life,  Vol.  I,  p.  37.     There  is  some  reference 
to   the  supposed   conjunction   in   the   newspapers  during  the 
winter  of  1824-1825.     See  a  letter  in  the  Albany  Advertiser, 
Nov.  13,  1824,  and  an  article  with  a  quotation  from  the  Rich 
mond  Enquirer  in  the  same  for  May  30,  1825. 


56  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

portant  thing  was  to  effect  a  union  between  the 
friends  of  Adams  and  of  Clinton  ;  of  internal  im 
provements  in  the  state  and  in  the  nation  ;  of  better 
and  more  truly  democratic  politics.  "  I  felt  myself 
obliged, "  he  writes  in  his  Autobiography,1  "to 
adhere  through  all  chances  and  changes  to  the  new 
political  organization  of  1824  as  the  party  through 
whose  agency  the  great  interests  of  the  state  and 
nation  to  which  I  had  dedicated  myself  could  be 
promoted."  Doubtless  he  threw  himself  earnestly 
into  the  work  of  organizing  into  a  party 2  the  dif 
ferent  elements  in  favor  of  the  ideas  and  principles 
that  were  to  him  all-important.  Bat  he  had  to  deal 
with  actual  political  conditions,  and  the  really  es 
sential  political  movement  of  those  years  was  not 
the  formation  of  an  Adams  party,  but  the  formation 
of  a  Jackson  party. 

The  rise  of  Jacksonian  democracy  in  New  York 
was  not  so  immediate  nor  so  rapid  as  in  the  South 
and  West.  The  defeat  of  Jackson  in  the  House  in 
1825,  and  the  appointment  by  President  Adams  of 
Clay  as  his  Secretary  of  State,  were  taken  by  many 
as  a  proof  of  a  "  corrupt  bargain."  The  Richmond 
Junto  was  at  once  in  opposition.  "  I  care  not  what 


1  Page  64. 

-  In  the  Autobiography  he  calls  it  "our  new  National  Repub 
lican  party.''  But  here  it  seems  as  though  his  memory  must 
have  been  at  fault.  The  name  "National  Republican"  does 
not  appear  at  this  time ;  in  fact,  not  till  1829.  in  any  document 
that  I  have  seen.  Calls  for  conventions,  addresses  and  resolu 
tions,  political  news  and  editorials  of  the  years  1824-1828,  use 
all  sorts  of  other  titles  but  not  that.  The  party  had  no  definite 
name.  The  point  is  not  without  significance  :  it  lacked  a  name 
partly  because  it  had  no  real  political  coherence. 


ADAMS  AND  CLINTON  57 

principles  regulate  Mr.  Adams'  and  Mr.  Clay's  ad 
ministration,"  said  a  writer  in  the  Bichrnond  En 
quirer;  UI  care  not  how  they  conduct  themselves, 
they  must  be  put  down."  The  Albany  Eegency, 
however,  was  by  no  means  so  outspoken.1  It  was 
three  years  before  the  Argus  came  out  definitely  for 
Jackson.  Van  Buren  believed  in  a  "  non-commit 
tal"  policy  and  his  friends  maintained  it  firmly  for 
some  time. 

But  although  the  Jackson  cult  was  not  so  strong 
in  New  York  as  elsewhere,  there  were  other  condi 
tions  in  the  state  which  made  the  course  of  those 
who  agreed  with  Seward  by  no  means  easy.  It  is 
true  that  Clinton  had  been  elected  by  a  large  ma 
jority  and  that  Adams  had  received  not  only  a  large 
majority  of  the  electoral  votes  of  the  state,  but  also 
the  vote  of  the  state  in  the  House.  It  is  true  that 
both  Clinton  and  Adams  believed  in  those  great 
material  improvements  which  Seward  recognized 
to  be  so  necessary  for  the  progress  of  the  country. 
The  Erie  Canal  was  almost  completed  and  the  agi 
tation  for  subsidiary  canals  had  begun.  The  ques 
tion  of  a  state  road  through  the  southern  counties 
from  the  Hudson  to  Buffalo  had  become  important. 
Further  important  matters  concerning  the  franchise 
and  election  to  office  were  on  a  fair  way  to  settle 
ment.  It  would  seem  as  though  there  were  a  great 
opportunity  for  men,  who  like  Seward  believed  in 
these  things,  to  work  together. 

1  It  was  not  so  outspoken  as  some  Clintonians :  for  instance, 
J.  C.  Spencer,  even  before  the  election,  prophesied  opposition 
to  Adams.  Tracy  to  Spencer,  Hollister  MSS. 


58  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

But  from  the  standpoint  of  partisan  politics,  mat 
ters  were  not  so  simple.  Seward,  like  many  others 
among  the  voters  if  not  among  the  politicians, 
favored  Adams  and  Clinton.  Unfortunately  those 
leaders  did  not  harmonize.  Adams,  it  is  true, 
offered  Clinton  the  position  of  minister  to  England, 
but  he  declined  it,  and  though  not  opposed  to  the 
President,  gave  no  sign  of  especial  adherence  to 
him.  Neither  the  Cliutoriian  papers,  nor  the  Clin- 
touian  politicians  were  unitedly  for  Adams.1  In 
the  early  part  of  his  administration  there  was  still 
talk  of  Clinton  himself  as  President,  although  the 
governor  probably  never  authorized  such  expres 
sions.  In  the  first  months  of  1824,  he  seems  to  have 
considered  a  coalition  with  the  Eegency  on  the  basis 
of  Jackson  as  a  candidate.2  Later  his  friends  rep 
resented  to  the  President  that  he  desired  closer 
relations,  but  neither  of  the  principals  offered  any 
advances.  In  fact,  Adams  made  several  appoint 
ments  that  he  must  have  known  were  most  distaste 
ful  to  the  governor  and  his  party.3  There  were  cer 
tainly  in  the  state  people  who  like  Seward  were 


'The  Cayuga  Republican,  for  instance,  while  not  clearly  for 
Jackson  in  1825  and  1826,  inclined  in  that  direction.  J.  C. 
Spencer,  the  Clintonian  senator  from  the  seventh  district,  was 
an  open  Jackson  man. 

2  See  Life  of  Weed.  Vol.  I,  p.  165,  for  an  account  of  a  meeting 
at  Governor  Clinton's  between  some  political  friends  of  the 
governor's  and  of  Van  Buren's. 

3  Notably  that  of  S.  R   Betts  to  be  United  States  judge  of  the 
southern  district  of  New  York.     Of  this  Thurlow  Weed  in  the 
Rochester  Telegraph  said,  "  All  the  fruits  of  the  triumph,  which 
New  York   obtained   for  Mr.  Adams,  have   been   deliberately 
bestowed  upon  those  who  labored  most  zealously  to  defeat  his 
election."     Albany  Advertiser,  Feb.  5,  1827. 


ADAMS  AND  CLINTON  59 

loyal  to  Adams  and  Clinton,  but  they  had  little  to 
hold  them  together. 

The  Regency  at  first,  it  would  seem,  was  silently 
supporting  Crawford.  That  formidable  body  was, 
by  some  opponents,  exulting  in  the  majorities  of 
1824,  considered  as  dead  :  "  the  quondam  Regency  " 
it  was  called.1  But  this  idea  was  an  error.  The 
Regency  was  by  no  means  dead  :  it  was  indeed  ap 
parently  becoming  more  organic,  more  conscious  of 
itself  and  its  influence.  Judge  Skinner  died  in  the 
summer  of  1825  and  just  at  this  time  Mr.  Knower 
had  almost  retired  from  active  politics  ;  but  Marcy, 
Talcott,  Butler  and  Croswell  must  have  come  to  a 
very  thorough  understanding  of  their  power.  On 
them,  it  would  appear,  Van  Buren  in  Washington 
chiefly  relied.2  Silas  Wright  was  still  in  the 
state  Senate,  and  Azariah  Flagg  shortly  became 
Secretary  of  State.  As  a  party,  they  certainly  had 
the  most  able  political  intelligence.  They  held  the 
higher  offices  of  the  state,  and  under  the  new  con 
stitution  could  not  easily  be  turned  out.  And 
though  there  was  no  such  formal  party  organization 
as  to-day,  they  still  had  the  party  name  :  they  were 
the  successors  of  the  Republicans  of  1798. 3 

With  these  hindrances  in  the  way  of  strong  or- 

1  Albany  Advertiser,  April  25,  1825. 

*E.  g.,  at  the  end  of  a  letter  from  Van  Buren  to  Croswell,  we 
have  the  direction  :  ' '  Look  at  this  part  of  the  case  minutely 
with  the  aid  of  the  General  [Marcy],  Mr.  Talcott  and  Butler." 

3  It  is  true  that  the  GMintonians  also  often  called  themselves 
Republicans.  The  party  newspapers  sometimes  took  or  retained 
the  name,  as  the  Caynga  Republican  of  Auburn,  the  Columbia 
Republican  of  Hudson.  '  The  Albany  Advertiser,  a  Clintonian 
paper,  commonly  speaks  of  the  Republican  ticket. 


60  WILLIAM  H.  SEWABD 

ganization  within,  and  this  powerful  opposition 
without,  it  is  no  wonder  that  the  party  was  brought 
together  with  great  difficulty.  Perhaps  it  hardly 
was  a  party  ;  it  was  rather  a  set  of  incongruous  ele 
ments  which  had  been  united  by  circumstances  for 
an  especial  crisis.  At  the  very  beginning,  in  the 
Utica  convention  it  was  obvious  that  the  Clintonians 
could  agree  on  only  one  point,  the  electoral  reforms. 
When  this  point  was  carried,  there  was  no  further 
reason  for  keeping  together.  Seward  saw  with  re 
gret  that  "the  organization  became  torpid  and  de- 
cl  iued  in  strength. ' J  At  the  Utica  convention  of  1826, 
Clinton  was  renominated  for  governor.  Seward  may 
have  been  present  at  this  convention  ;  Judge  Miller 
was  a  delegate  and  one  of  the  committee  which  drew 
up  the  address.  But  Clinton,  who  had  carried  the 
state  in  1824  by  10,900,  was  elected  in  1826  by  3,650 
only,  while  the  candidate  for  lieutenant-governor  was 
beaten.  When  the  legislature  met,  a  United  States 
senator  was  to  be  chosen.  The  Adams  men  held  a 
caucus,  but  could  gather  only  a  few  Clintonians ; 
the  Bucktails,  whether  favoring  Adams  or  not,  voted 
for  Van  Buren.  Van  Buren  himself  at  this  time 
was,  or  was  said  to  be,  non-committal  as  to  the  presi 
dency.  He  apparently  desired  to  conciliate  Clinton  ; 
the  chances  were  that  both  would  be  on  Jackson's 
side  in  1828. 

This  possibility  was  a  death-blow  to  Seward' s 
hopes  of  a  new  party,  although  perhaps  he  did  not 
clearly  understand  it  at  once.  The  material  for  the 
party  consisted  of  Clintonian  Adams  men  like  him 
self,  former  Federalists  like  his  father-in-law,  Peo- 


ADAMS  AND  CLINTON  61 

pie's  party  men  like  his  father,  and  such  disaffected 
Eepnblicans  as  might  be  won  over.  At  best,  it  was 
a  difficult  combination.  A  strong,  popular  leader 
like  Jackson  or  a  strong  political  leader  like  Van 
Buren  might  have  held  them  together ;  but  a  na 
tional  leader  like  Adams  and  a  state  leader  like 
Clinton  could  not.  And  now  it  appeared  probable 
that  Clinton  himself  was  in  favor  of  the  Regency's 
candidate.  Some  of  his  friends,  like  John  C. 
Spencer,  the  senator  from  Seward's  district,  had 
long  been  open  Jackson  men ;  some  of  the  recog 
nized  Clintonian  papers  had  advocated  Jackson. 
Many  individual  supporters  of  Adams, — for  instance, 
Thurlow  Weed, — must  have  known  how  Clinton 
stood.  In  the  winter  of  1826-1827  rumors  began  to 
be  persistent  that  he  was  coming  to  an  understanding 
with  Van  Buren.  The  understanding  was  denied 
by  Clintonians  and  Bucktails  alike,  but  the  Argus 
remarked  blandly  that  probably  both  would  support 
Jackson  the  next  year. 

Under  these  circumstances,  Seward  had  an  expe 
rience  with  the  adversities  of  political  life  that  long 
left  an  impression  upon  him.  By  the  time  of  the 
campaign  of  1827, l  he  had  become  a  considerable 
figure  in  the  political  affairs  of  the  county.  When 
the  surrogate  resigned,  he  was  advised  to  apply  for 
the  place  ;  he  went  to  Albany,  made  his  application, 
and  was  recognized  without  question  as  a  proper 

1  He  says  in  his  Autobiography  (p.  66)  that  this  occurrence 
took  place  in  Jan.,  1828.  But  it  was  really  in  Oct.,  1827  :  the 
difference  in  date  has  some  importance  because  it  shows  that  the 
time  was  just  before  an  election  in  which  the  Jackson  and  anti- 
Jackson  lines  were  being  closely  drawn. 


62  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

person  for  executive  approval.  Governor  Clinton 
sent  his  nomination  to  the  Senate. 

But  the  situation  was  one  that  brought  out  all  the 
political  weakness  of  Seward' s  position.  Interest 
in  the  presidential  nomination  was  increasing  and 
people  were  taking  sides.  Just  at  thistime,  on  Octo 
ber  29,  1827,  a  meeting  was  called  at  the  capital  of 
"  Republican  citizens  of  Albany  and  other  parts  of 
the  state  opposed  to  the  election  of  Andrew  Jackson 
for  President  of  the  United  States."  '  Seward  went 
to  the  meeting  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  his  nomina 
tion  lay  before  a  Senate  which  had  long  been  clearly 
Jacksoniau.2  The  next  day  the  Senate  rejected  his 
nomination  as  surrogate  :  one  can  hardly  see  how  he 
could  have  expected  it  to  be  confirmed. 

The  meeting,  however,  had  an  importance  of  a 
more  general  character.  It  was  the  result  of  a  good 
deal  of  communication  between  men  who  felt  that 
they  must  find  some  better  way  to  act  in  concert 
than  they  so  far  had.  Heretofore,  they  had 
been  held  together  by  common  adherence  to  the 
governor.  But  his  defection,  as  they  thought  of  it, 
though  it  was  a  severe  blow  to  many,  had  at  least  this 
advantage  ; — it  allowed  them  to  unite  upon  an  issue 


1  Seward  himself  (p.  67)  calls  it  "a  meeting  held  at  the  capi 
tal  by  the  '  National  Republicans  '  at  Albany  to  consider  the 
political  dilemma"  produced  by  Clinton's  combination  with 
Van  Buren.  But  the  name  "National  Republican  "  does  not 
appear  in  anything  that  I  can  find  about  the  meeting,  which 
adopted  distinctly  administration  and  anti-Jackson  resolutions. 

2 Six  months  before,  on  Van  Buren's  election,  one  Clintoniau 
senator  after  another, — Spencer,  Allen,  Viele,— had  declared 
himself  for  Jackson,  while  others  had  voted  for  Van  Buren, 
which  was  much  the  same  thing. 


ADAMS  AND  CLINTON  63 

on  which  all  thought  alike.  The  meeting  was 
called  for  those  who  opposed  Jackson  and  it  re 
sulted  in  a  coalition  in  favor  of  Adams.  A  com 
mittee  was  appointed  which  proceeded  to  attempt  a 
more  definite  organization.  They  began  to  corre 
spond  with  Adams  men  all  over  the  state,  urging 
the  holding  of  county  meetings  and  asking  the  co 
operation  of  influential  citizens  in  every  town.  The 
Regency  papers  condemned  their  action,  but  it  was 
quite  in  accord  with  Seward's  political  creed,  and 
doubtless  he  gave  effective  aid.  All  winter  they 
labored  to  perfect  their  organization  j  in  the  spring 
they  called  a  meeting  in  Albany  which  was  at 
tended  by  people  from  all  over  the  state.  This  meet 
ing  published  a  call  for  a  regular  convention  at 
Albany  on  June  10th,  and  that  convention  called 
another  at  Utica  to  nominate  presidential  candi 
dates. 

It  is  not  clear  why  these  two  conventions  should 
have  been  necessary,  but  the  proceedings  in  general 
show  a  development  and  an  organization  of  the  con 
vention  system  into  something  more  definite  than 
had  existed  before  :  that  it  was  something  new  is 
quite  clear  from  the  abuse  lavished  upon  it.  To  our 
minds  to-day  it  seems  quite  proper  for  men  who 
wish  to  carry  out  some  political  object  to  meet  and 
devise  an  organization  for  that  purpose.  The  ob 
jects  of  the  organization  we  may  criticize,  but  the 
means  are  entirely  understood.  In  1828,  however, 
there  was  just  enough  reason  to  assail  it  for  irreg 
ularity.  The  Albany  Argus,  during  the  spring, 
speaks  of  the  whole  movement,  not  only  with  the 


64  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

natural  scorn  and  contempt  of  a  political  opponent, 
but  on  the  ground  of  its  being  a  truly  bad  element 
in  political  life.  "  Eepublicans,"  said  the  Argus, 
April  15,  1828,  "  will  arouse  themselves  to  exer 
tion  in  the  old-fashioned  way.  They  will  indite  no 
secret  circulars,  nor  appoint  central  managers,  nor 
fill  the  country  with  electioneering  misstatements, 
nor  call  *  spirits  J  of  all  shades  by  a  motley  array  of 
names  to  a  Federal  convention.  They  will  act 
openly  and  aboveboard."  When  we  remember 
that  this  was  written  by  the  close  friend  of  the  man 
who  was  at  this  time  distinguished  above  all  others 
in  the  country  for  skill  in  political  manipulation, 
we  shall  be  the  better  able  to  understand  the  change 
in  political  methods. 

We  may  well  ask  what  was  this  change.  The 
"  old-fashioned  "  plan  was  for  the  Eepublicau  mem 
bers  of  the  legislature  to  hold  a  caucus  and  call  a  con 
vention.  Then  "  having  recommended  a  delegated 
expression  of  the  wishes  of  the  people  in  the  fall,  in 
the  old  way,  for  the  selection  of  Eepublican  candidates 
for  governor  and  lieutenant-governor,  they  leave 
all  else  to  the  unbiassed  will  of  an  intelligent  com 
munity."  l  What  Mr.  Croswell  had  in  mind  as  he 
wrote  the  last  sentence,  one  cannot  be  sure.  Not 
long  before  he  must  have  read  the  following  from  the 
New  York  Enquirer : 2  "  We  trust  that  every  mem 
ber  [of  the  legislature]  on  his  arrival  among  his 
constituents  will  animate  them  in  their  prepara 
tions  for  the  ensuing  election — that  all  the  town  and 

1  Albany  Argus,  May  27,  1828. 

2  He  quoted  it  on  May  6th. 


ADAMS  AND  CLINTON  65 

county  committees  will  forthwith  organize  and  keep 
up  an  active  correspondence  with  each  other,  and 
look  about  in  time  for  the  elector  in  their  district, 
bringing  forward  the  most  sound,  orthodox  and 
popular  Jackson  man,  and  make  such  preparations 
for  the  field  as  to  ensure  success." 

It  is  hard  to  see  why  one  of  these  methods  is  "  the 
unbiassed  will  of  an  intelligent  community "  any 
more  than  the  other.  The  fact  is  that  neither  is 
anything  of  the  sort :  one  is  the  method  of  the  party 
in  power  ;  the  other  the  method  of  the  opposition. 

Seward' s  particular  activity  we  cannot  follow 
closely.  Auburn  was  represented  at  Utica  not  by 
Judge  Miller  who  had  been  in  the  convention  of 
1826,  but  by  John  H.  Beach,  like  the  judge,  a 
former  Federalist.  The  description  from  the  opposi 
tion  press  of  the  meeting  at  which  he  was  chosen  is 
worth  reading  :  "A  few  old  Federal  leaders  [pre 
sumably  Judge  Miller,  Mr.  Beach  and  others]  with  a 
few  half- resisting  associates  [Seward,  of  course,  and 
Christopher  Morgan]  with  downcast  visage  and 
averted  eye,  marched  slowly  up  to  the  hall  of  justice 
more  like  men  who  were  going  to  be  tried  for  their 
lives,  than  like  the  sons  of  liberty,  flushed  with  hope 
aud  patriotism."  l  Such  was  the  jaundiced  view  of 
a  political  opponent.  Seward  was  not  a  delegate  to 
this  convention  but  at  a  young  men's  convention, 
held  somewhat  later,  of  delegates  from  all  over  the 
state,  he  was  present  and  was  chosen  presiding 
officer. 

In  spite  of  all  these  efforts,  Adams  was  not  re- 
1  Cayuga  Patriot.  Quoted  in  the  Albany  Argw,  June  9, 1828. 


66  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

elected.  Probably  the  best  informed  politicians 
hardly  expected  that  he  would  be.  The  Eichmond 
Enquirer  in  the  previous  April  published  an  estimate 
of  the  result,  which  was  very  nearly  accurate.  In 
its  estimate  of  New  York,  it  was  exact.  There  were 
thirty -six  electors,  of  whom  thirty-four  were  chosen 
by  popular  vote  in  the  congressional  districts,  and 
two  more  by  the  electors  so  chosen.  The  Enquirer 
placed  the  vote  at  twenty  for  Jackson  and  sixteen 
for  Adams,  and  such  was  the  result.  The  congres 
sional  district  of  which  Auburn  was  a  part  favored 
Jackson. 

Four  years  before  Seward  might  have  felt  that 
there  was  an  Adams  and  Clinton  party.  But  events 
had  shown  that  though  there  were  friends  of  Adams 
and  of  Clinton  and  of  both,  they  did  not  form  a 
party.  This  was  not  formed  until  Clinton's  death 
simplified  the  situation  and  made  it  possible  to  draw 
the  lines  on  national  issues.  The  coalition  met 
with  defeat,  however,  and  before  it  could  be  reor 
ganized  it  was  necessary  to  consider  a  new  element 
which  for  some  years  became  a  controlling  factor  in 
Se ward's  political  life.  This  was  the  Anti-Masonic 
movement. 


CHAPTEE  IV 

THE  ANTI-MASONIC  MOVEMENT 

IN  the  early  twenties,  the  institution  of  Free- 
Masonry  became  very  popular  in  the  United  States, 
and  especially  so  in  New  York.  In  1821  was  estab 
lished  at  Schenectady  the  Delta  Lodge  of  Perfection. 
A  monument  over  Brother  George  Washington  was 
planned.  Masonic  halls  were  built,  Masonic  news 
papers  were  started,  and  Masonic  odes  were  written. 
Poinsett,  the  Minister  to  Mexico,  established  a 
lodge  in  that  country,  including  some  of  the  prin 
cipal  public  men.  The  year  1825  was  full  of  Ma 
sonic  interest.  In  the  spring  a  Grand  Lodge  of 
Master-Masons  was  held  at  Tammany  Hall  at  which 
116  lodges  were  represented  and  forty-four  charters 
for  new  lodges  were  issued.  In  the  fall,  Stephen 
van  Eensselaer  was  installed  as  Grand -Master  of  the 
State  of  New  York,  by  De  Witt  Clinton,  Past-Grand- 
Master,  with  public  ceremonies  at  Albany.  At  the 
opening  of  the  Erie  Canal  there  were  "Masonic 
ceremonies  typical  of  the  completion  of  the  great 
work."  A  capstone  was  adjusted  in  Masonic  form 
and  the  three  emblematic  knocks  were  given,  after 
which  ' i  the  brethren  passed  around  as  if  to  inspect 
and  verify  the  truth  of  the  annunciation."  1  In  the 
ceremonies  attending  the  enthusiastic  reception  of 

1  Levi  Beardsley,  Reminiscences,  pp.  213,  214. 


68  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

Lafayette  in  1825,  the  Masons  everywhere  had  an 
important  share.  Seward,  who  as  adjutant  in  the 
militia  took  part  in  the  welcome  of  Lafayette  to 
Auburn,  had  not  a  high  appreciation  of  Free-Ma 
sonry,  nor  did  he  understand  why  it  should  be  so 
prominent  on  social  and  political  occasions.  He 
was  somewhat  enlightened  by  an  interview  which 
he  witnessed  between  Lafayette  and  Gad  Bennett,  a 
tinsmith,  but  the  incident  left  no  increase  of  respect 
in  his  mind  for  the  institution.  In  spite  of  this, 
however,  there  is  no  doubt  that  Masonry  was  very 
widely  spread  among  the  public  men  of  the  day.  It 
is  said  that  a  majority  of  those  in  official  life  in  New 
York  were  Masons.1 

This  popularity  of  the  order  led  to  an  event  of 
great  political  import.  A  man  named  William 
Morgan,  at  the  time  living  in  western  New  York, 
who  seems  to  have  thought  he  could  turn  it  to  his 
own  advantage,  prepared  an  account  of  certain 
secrets  of  Masonry,  which  he  proposed  to  publish. 
In  the  summer  of  1826  he  offered  it  to  a  Mr.  Miller, 
the  owner  of  the  Batavia  Advocate,  by  whom  it  was 
set  up  and  printed.  The  matter  became  known  to 
many  members  of  the  order,  and  efforts  were  made 
to  prevent  the  publishing  of  the  book.  At  first,  it 
is  said,  these  were  of  an  entirely  lawful  and  proper 
nature,  but  on  the  failure  to  purchase  or  suppress 
the  book,  the  opposition  grew  more  vigorous. 
Morgan  was  several  times  arrested  at  the  instance  of 
creditors,  or  those  who  alleged  that  they  were  cred 
itors,  but  each  time  he  was  liberated.  Miller's 

1  Hammond,  Political  History,  Vol.  II,  p.  238. 


THE  ANTI-MASONIC  MOVEMENT        69 

printing-office  was  attacked  and  set  on  fire,  but  the 
attempted  arson  was  unsuccessful.  Finally  a  more 
elaborate  plan  was  carried  out.  Morgan  was  ar 
rested  upon  a  warrant  from  Canaudaigua,  was  taken 
to  that  village  and  confined  in  the  jail.  Later, 
on  the  night  of  September  12th,  he  was  put  in 
a  closed  carriage  and  driven  to  Batavia,  to  Lock- 
port,  and  finally  to  Fort  Niagara.  Here  he  was 
kept  for  a  night  in  an  unused  magazine,  and  then 
carried  across  to  Canada,  where  it  was  supposed 
there  would  be  persons  ready  to  receive  him.  It 
appeared  that  the  persons  who  had  been  relied  upon 
were  unwilling  to  do  this,  and  he  was  therefore  re 
turned  to  the  American  side.  Precisely  what  took 
place  there  has  never  been  settled  beyond  dispute, 
but  it  is  generally  believed  that  he  was  thrown  into 
the  river  and  drowned. 

All  of  these  facts  did  not  come  to  public  knowl 
edge  immediately,  nor  was  it  simply  the  fate  of 
Morgan  that  so  stirred  the  community  as  to  cause 
the  formation  of  a  new  party  in  state  and  even  in 
national  politics.  It  was  really  not  so  much  the 
particular  crime  committed  against  Morgan  that 
aroused  public  sentiment,  as  it  was  the  subsequent 
conviction  that,  out  of  devotion  to  their  order, 
Free- Masons  were  resolutely  and  successfully  inter 
fering  in  the  administration  of  justice.  Feeling  ran 
very  high.  It  was  widely  believed  in  western  New 
York  that  the  personal  right  to  life  and  liberty  had 
been  endangered  ;  that  grand  juries  which  should 
make  presentment  or  indictment  of  such  lawlessness 
were  so  influenced  by  Masonic  jurymen,  attorneys, 


70  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

and  sheriffs  that  no  action  was  taken  ;  that  even 
when  cases  came  to  trial,  important  witnesses  were 
spirited  away  or  else  withheld  their  testimony,  so 
that  the  facts  could  not  be  ascertained  ;  that  even 
when  the  truth  was  known,  juries  could  not  be 
depended  upon  to  convict.  The  results  of  such 
accusations  made  themselves  felt  in  mauy  walks  of 
life,  but  especially  in  politics. 

The  exact  bearing  of  these  matters,  however,  on 
political  conditions  was  not  at  once  clear.  Ab 
stractly  people  might  have  said  that  they  had  no 
political  bearing.  Even  those  who  felt  deeply 
the  menace  to  the  general  peace  and  justice  of  a 
secret  organization,  such  as  the  enemies  of  the  order 
represented  Free-Masonry  to  be,  were  of  the  opinion 
that  the  question  did  not  much  concern  the  state 
or  the  national  legislative  or  executive  authorities. 
It  was  a  matter  to  be  pursued  in  the  normal 
course  of  justice  or  by  special  steps,  and  a  confusion 
with  political  issues,  they  felt,  was  likely  to  be 
more  hurtful  than  useful  to  the  cause  of  good  gov 
ernment.  'Few,  at  first,  could  really  have  believed 
that  Jackson's  being  a  Mason,  while  Adams  was 
not,  made  any  great  difference  in  their  qualifica 
tions  for  the  presidency,  any  more  than  the  fact  of 
Clinton's  being  a  high  Masonic  official  made  him  a 
better  or  a  worse  governor.  But  such  views,  though 
sensible  enough,  naturally  would  not  prevail  at  a 
time  of  popular  excitement.  When  everybody  was 
discussing  Masonry,  when  all  sorts  of  accusations 
were  made,  when  Masons  were  resigning  from  their 
lodges,  it  was  impossible  that  the  matter  should  not 


THE  ANTI-MASONIC  MOVEMENT         71 

have  its  influence,  at  least  in  local  politics.  In 
western  New  York,  where  the  excitement  was 
greatest,  it  was  impossible  that  Auti- Masonry 
should  not  have  become  an  issue.  At  first  people 
merely  agreed  not  to  vote  for  Masons,  or  else  nomi 
nations  were  made  with  Masonic  considerations  in 
view.  This  was  in  the  spring  of  1827  :  the  town 
elections  proved  that  Anti-Masonry  was  a  political 
force. 

As  this  matter  became  more  and  more  certain, 
each  party  began  to  think  how  it  could  best  be 
used.  Van  Bureu  interested  himself1  and  offered 
his  services  as  special  counsel.  Judge  Throop 
pronounced  Anti-Masonry  "a  blessed  spirit,"  and 
George  Throop  of  Auburn  took  advantage  of  his 
brother's  popularity  to  help  himself  into  the  New 
York  Senate.2  Other  friends  of  Van  Buren  in  the 
central  part  of  the  state  came  out  as  Anti-Masons.3 
They  were  somewhat  handicapped,  however,  by  the 
fact  that  Jackson  was  a  Mason.  The  Adams  men, 
on  the  other  hand,  were  in  a  better  position,  for  he 
was  not,  and  was  known  to  have  no  interest  in  the 
institution.  It  happened  that  those  who  first  be- 

1  There  is  in  the  Van  Buren  MSS.  a  very  curious  letter  to  him 
from  Younglove  of  Hudson,  an  old  political  friend,  advising 
him  to  use  the  opportunity.     It  is  dated  Dec.  8,  1820,  but  this 
must  be  an  error,  perhaps  for  1826. 

2  This  was  later  alleged  as  notorious,  and  also  denied.     It 
seems  probable  :  in  October,  1827,  the  town  of  Sempronius,  the 
largest   in   Cayuga   County,    passed  Anti-Masonic  resolutions. 
In  the  following  election,  George  Throop  in  a  vote  smaller  than 
the  preceding   year   made  a  great   increase   in   the   Bucktail 
majority. 

3  Evening  Journal,  Oct.  27,  1830,  not  the  most  impartial  au 
thority  in  such  a  matter. 


72  WILLIAM  H.  SEWABD 

came  aggressive  in  bringing  the  matter  to  light 
were  Adams  men.  Prominent  among  them  was 
Thurlow  Weed,  then  a  printer  and  editor  of  Koch- 
ester.  He  was  a  man  active  in  all  public  affairs, 
among  the  first  to  have  any  knowledge  of  the  move 
ment  and  among  the  first  to  call  for  investigation 
and  to  serve  upon  committees  that  did  investigate. 
He  was  earnest  and  devoted  in  his  effort  to  ferret 
out  and  bring  to  justice  the  guilty.  He  was  ac 
quainted  with  Seward,  as  he  was  with  very  many 
politicians  throughout  New  York,  and  in  the  spring 
of  1827  invited  him  to  join  a  conference  of  gentle 
men  of  the  western  part  of  the  state,  who  met  to 
consider  the  political  bearing  of  these  subjects. 
The  decision  was  to  the  effect  that  it  was  very 
inadvisable  that  Anti-Masonry  should  become  a 
matter  of  politics.  Such  a  course  they  doubtless 
held  would  prevent  the  attainment  of  justice. 
So  far  political  lines  had  not  been  drawn,  and  yet  it 
was  hard  to  overcome  the  Masonic  opposition.  The 
conference  parted  to  repress,  as  far  as  possible,  the 
disposition  to  carry  the  question  into  politics.  At 
this  time  Clinton,  who  may  be  thought  of  as  still  at 
the  head  of  his  party,  was  a  high  Mason.  So  also, 
however,  was  Jackson,  and  the  persistent  rumor 
that  Clinton  had  determined  to  support  Jackson 
rather  put  on  the  same  side  those  who  were  opposed 
to  Jackson  and  those  opposed  to  Free-Masonry. 

Such  is  the  view  presented  afterward  by  Thurlow 
Weed  :  "  Masonry,  as  I  have  before  remarked,  hav 
ing  sought  and  found  protection  in  the  Jackson 
party,  Anti-Masons  naturally  affiliated  with  the 


THE  ANTI-MASONIC  MOVEMENT        73 

Adams  party."  l  But  when  we  consider  this  view, 
T/e  must  remember  that  Masons  and  Anti -Masons 
were  not  people  outside  of  the  Jackson  and  the 
Adams  parties  :  they  were  parts  of  those  parties. 
The  real  question  was,  not  so  much  whether  Masons 
or  Anti -Masons  would  join  one  or  the  other  party, 
but  whether  the  Anti-Masonic  issue  would  disturb 
the  ordinary  party  relation.  In  1827  this  question 
was  of  minor  significance,  but  in  1828,  when  the 
presidential  campaign  was  in  full  swing,  it  became 
very  important.  Here  was  an  element  in  western 
New  York  which  would  control  votes.  What  view 
shall  we  suppose  the  political  managers  would  take 
of  it? 

The  conference  just  mentioned  was  mainly  made 
up  of  nieii  favorable  to  Adams.  Thurlow  Weed 
had  been  the  principal  agent  in  the  arrangement 
by  which  New  York  had  voted  for  Adams  in  1824. 
Francis  Granger  was  already  well  known  in  politics 
by  three  years'  service  in  the  Assembly  ;  Albert 
Tracy  was  a  member  of  Congress  in  whom  Adams 
had  great  personal  confidence  ;  G.  H.  Boughton  had 
been  in  the  Assembly  ;  others  had  a  more  local  au 
thority,  as  that  of  postmaster.2  Seward's  political 
position  we  know.  He  desired  to  rally  the  power 
of  the  state  in  the  service  of  internal  improvement 
under  Adams  and  Clinton.  He  was  not  a  Mason 

1  Life  of  Weed,,  Vol.  I,  p.  303. 

2  This  of  course  showed  administration  politics.     In  June, 
1829,  G.  H.  Bonghton  of  Lockport,  Bates  Cooke  of  Lewiston 
and  Trurabnll  Gary  of  Batavia  (all  present  at  this  conference) 
were  removed  by  the  Jacksonian  postmaster-general.     Anti- 
Masonic  Enquirer,  June  16,  23,  1829. 


74  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

and  of  course  disapproved  of  Masonic  influence  in 
politics  as  of  the  influence  of  any  private  aggrega 
tion.  Still  he  felt  that  the  matter  was  not  to  be 
dealt  with  by  political  means. 

The  problem  before  him  was  one  of  difficulty. 
It  is  true  that  at  the  time  there  was  little  evidence  of 
Anti-Masonry  in  Cayuga,  but  in  the  fall  of  1827  a 
considerable  meeting  in  the  town  of  Sempronius 
passed  Anti-Masonic  resolutions,  and  as  the  winter 
continued  it  was  clear  that  the  "infection,"  as  it 
was  called,  was  growing.  In  1828  the  Cayuga  Ee- 
publican,  the  heretofore  Clintouian  paper,  after  for 
some  time  proclaiming  its  impartiality  but  filling  its 
columns  with  Anti-Masonic  material,  came  out  def 
initely  for  the  party  and  the  Anti-Masons  of  the 
county  organized.  A  convention  was  held  at 
Auburn  in  June  of  that  year.  Seward  did  not  join 
them.  The  death  of  Clinton  had  deprived  him  of 
one  political  leader,  but  he  was  still  committed  to 
Adams  and  was  an  earnest  worker  in  the  Adams  or 
ganization  that  was  being  vigorously  pushed 
throughout  the  state.1  During  the  summer  great 
efforts  were  everywhere  made  to  get  the  Anti- 
Masonic  and  administration  parties  together,  but 
each  insisted  upon  a  separate  state  ticket.  In 
Cayuga,  Seward  tried  to  make  an  arrangement  with 
the  An ti -Masons,  whereby  they  should  nominate 
candidates  acceptable  to  the  Adams  men.  In  this  ef 
fort  he  was  only  too  successful  :  the  Anti -Masonic 
convention,  although  a  different  arrangement  had 

1  He  was  one  of  the  county  committee.  Cayuga  Republican, 
July  17th. 


THE  ANTI-MASONIC  MOVEMENT        75 

been  agreed  upon,  nominated  Seward  himself  for 
Congress.  He  was  at  once  hailed  as  "  the  master 
spirit,  who,  behind  the  curtain,  pulled  the  wires  and 
managed  the  whole  transaction."  1  This  was  cor 
rect  in  part  only,  but  the  transaction  discredited 
Seward  with  his  own  political  friends.  The  Adams 
men,  however,  so  far  appreciated  Se ward's  position 
that  they  endorsed  the  Anti-Masonic  candidate  for 
the  state  senate,  and  he  was  the  only  man  on  the 
ticket  to  be  elected. 

With  the  choice  of  Jackson,  Adams  ceased  to  be 
a  further  presidential  possibility,  and  this  event, 
following  closely  upon  the  death  of  Clinton,  left 
Seward  entirely  without  the  political  leading  with 
which  he  had  begun  his  public  life.  Of  the  former 
Clintoniaus,  some  had  always  supported  Jackson, 
many  were  now  Clay  men.  Seward  could  favor 
neither.  Almost  of  necessity  he  became  an  Anti- 
Mason  and  threw  himself  earnestly  into  the  work  of 
organization.  In  February,  1829,  he  was  a  delegate 
from  Cayuga  to  the  Anti-Masonic  convention  held 
at  Albany. 

This  convention  settled  the  status  of  Anti-Masonry. 
So  far  it  had  been  an  influence  in  elections,  an  in 
fluence  that  each  party  accused  the  other  of  trying 
to  use.  Politics  had  been  incidental  to  its  main 
purpose.  So  far  there  might  be,  as  the  Argus  put  it, 
"  many  honest  people  who  believed  that  the  objects  of 
Anti-Masonry  were  to  vindicate  truth  and  eradicate 
error. "  With  this  convention,  however,  the  Auti- 
Masous  took  definite  position  as  a  political  party 

1  Cayuga  Patriot. 


76  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

and  naturally  became  the  opponents  of  the  regular 
Republicans.  The  Argus,1  in  writing  of  the  con 
vention,  spoke  of  the  importance  of  the  Morgan 
question,  but  condemned  severely  those  who  sought 
to  convert  it  ' '  into  a  convenient  instrument  for  their 
own  uses,  and  for  the  promotion  of  objects  having 
no  sort  of  connection  with  the  abduction  of  Morgan, 
with  the  principles  or  practice  of  Masonry,  or  with 
the  real  intentions  of  Anti-Masonry."  This  was  of 
course  party  language  :  yet  one  can  hardly  feel  that 
Seward  was  quite  content  in  the  new  organization, 
enthusiastic  as  it  certainly  was.  He  disapproved  of 
secret  organizations  in  politics,  of  Free-Masons,  if 
they  interfered  in  politics,  just  as  much  as  of  the 
Regency.  But  he  could  hardly  have  tried  to  per 
suade  himself  that  this  one  issue  was  more  essential, 
even  at  that  time,  than  the  other  state  and  national 
questions  which  interested  him.  Still,  in  joining  the 
Anti-Masonic  movement,  he  gave  up  no  political 
principles.  The  electoral  questions  which  had  been 
prominent  when  he  went  into  politics  had  been 
settled,  and  settled  as  he  thought  rightly.  Internal 
improvement  was  thoroughly  recognized  in  New 
York,  even  though  Clinton  was  dead.  Seward  still 
felt  the  importance  of  national  issues,  internal  im 
provement,  protection,  slavery.  But  the  national 
campaign  was  for  the  moment  over :  in  Anti- 
Masonry  Seward  saw  a  cause  with  which  he  en 
tirely  sympathized,  which  was  a  powerful  influence 
with  many  men  with  whom  he  otherwise  agreed, 
and  with  whom  he  had  previously  acted.  It  would 
1  Feb.  26,  1829. 


THE  ANTI-MASONIC  MOVEMENT         77 

have  been  absurd  for  him  to  have  held  aloof.  He 
could  not  join  the  regular  Republicans.  He  did 
not  like  to  remain  with  what  was  left  of  the  admin 
istration  party,  for  after  the  defeat  of  Adams,  this 
party  had  shown  that  it  would  shortly  turn  to 
Henry  Clay.  Clay  was  not  at  all  the  same  man  as 
Adams,  at  least  for  Seward,  for  though  committed 
to  internal  improvement  he  was  a  Southerner  and  a 
slaveholder. 

The  election  of  1829  was  only  for  members  of  the 
legislature,  but  the  vote  for  state  senators  offers  us  a 
means  of  judging  the  political  complexion  of  the 
state.  We  may  be  sure  that  Seward  studied  the  re 
turns  with  care.  In  New  York  City  the  Eepublican 
candidates  had  been  successful  :  there  was,  how 
ever,  a  very  strong  opposition  of  Workinginen,  who 
almost  elected  their  candidate,  and  a  few  Anti- 
Masons.  In  the  second  district,  consisting  of  the 
lower  Hudson  Eiver  counties,  the  Eepublican  can 
didate  had  been  chosen  with  no  opposition  at  all. 
In  the  third  district,  the  counties  near  Albany,  the 
Eepublicans  had  polled  three  times  as  many  votes 
as  their  opponents,  who  were  only  in  part  Anti- 
Masonic.  In  the  fourth,  the  northern  part  of  the 
state,  the  Eepublicans  had  succeeded  because  the 
National  Eepublicaus  (as  the  friends  of  Henry  Clay 
were  here  first  called)  and  the  Anti- Masons  could 
not  agree.  In  the  fifth  district,  the  counties  on  the 
Mohawk  Eiver,  the  regular  candidate  had  beaten 
the  combined  opposition,  and  the  same  was  the  case 
in  the  sixth  district,  the  southern  tier  of  counties. 
In  the  seventh  district,  Seward' s  own,  the  vote  had 


78  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

beeu  closer,  but  A  uti- Masonry  had  been  defeated. 
In  the  eighth  (western)  district  alone,  had  Anti- 
Masonry  been  completely  victorious. 

To  the  student  of  such  returns,  two  things  were 
clear :  if  a  union  with  the  Workiugmen  could  be 
made,  New  York  City  might  be  carried,  and  if 
a  union  with  the  National  Republicans  could  be 
made,  the  northern  counties  could  be  carried. 
Then  with  the  ordinary  chances  in  the  seventh 
(Seward' s)  district,  there  was  hope  of  electing  a 
state  ticket  in  1830. 

The  summer  of  that  year  found  Seward  in  the  full 
tide  of  politics.  He  was  chairman  of  the  Central 
Corresponding  Committee  of  the  county  and  pre 
sumably  the  author  of  the  address.1  In  August  he 
was  a  delegate  to  the  state  convention,  and  by  this 
time  we  can  see  the  standing  of  Anti-Masonry  in  the 
county  from  the  fact  that  Judge  Miller  was  also  a 
delegate.  The  convention  nominated  a  state  ticket. 
Francis  Granger  was  named  for  governor :  he  had 
been  on  the  National  Eepublican  ticket  the  year 
before.  Samuel  Stevens  was  named  for  lieutenant- 
governor:  he  was  a  Workingman.  It  was  hoped 
thus  to  conciliate  all  elements  of  opposition  to  the 
Regency. 

The  convention  went  a  step  farther  and  elected 
delegates  (Seward  among  them)  to  a  national  con 
vention  to  be  held  in  Philadelphia,  for  by  this  time 
Anti-Masonry  had  become  a  national  movement. 
Even  in  1829  the  party  had  organized  in  Vermont, 
Massachusetts,  Ehode  Island,  Connecticut,  Pennsyl- 

1  Cayuga  Republican,  July  28,  1830. 


THE  ANTI-MASONIC  MOVEMENT        79 

vania,  Ohio,  and  Michigan  :  now  it  was  felt  that 
the  national  character  would  be  strengthened  by  a 
convention.  It  was  desired  by  many  that  a  presi 
dential  nomination  should  be  made,  but  the  New 
York  delegation  was  entirely  against  such  an  act, 
for  it  would  have  alienated  the  National  Eepub- 
licans,  who  supported  Clay,  who  was  a  Mason.  The 
convention  contented  itself  with  a  statement  of  prin 
ciples  in  an  address.1 

On  his  return  from  Philadelphia  Seward  fouud 
that,  at  the  suggestion  of  Thurlow  Weed,  he  had 
been  nominated  by  the  Anti-Masons  of  the  seventh 
district  to  the  state  Senate. 

The  Senate  at  that  time  was  a  body  of  thirty-two 
members,  one  being  chosen  annually  for  a  four-year 
term  from  each  of  eight  districts.  The  seventh 
district  had  been  considered  generally  Republican, 
though  in  1824  John  C.  Spencer  had  been  elected 
on  the  Clintonian  ticket.  In  1828  Hiram  Mather 
had  been  elected  on  the  Anti-Masonic  ticket,  but 
the  next  year  the  eccentricity  had  been  corrected. 
Cayuga  County  was  regarded  as  being  safely  for  the 
Eegency  :  the  influence  of  Judge  Throop  (this  year 
the  candidate  for  governor),  Judge  Powers, 
George  Throop,  and  Nathaniel  Garrow  was  such 
that  they  made  a  little  junto  of  their  own,  whose 
followers  were  called  "juntoerats"  in  the  op 
position  papers.  The  senatorial  vote  in  the  county 
after  the  constitution  of  1822  shows  a  Eepublican 

1  Proceedings  of  the  United  States  Anti-Masonic  Convention, 
Sept.  11,  1830. 


80 


WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 


majority  which,  in  the  year  1829,  had  increased  to 
1,749.' 

This  hostile  majority  Seward  had  to  bring  over  to 
his  side.  He  had  in  his  favor  personal  popularity, 
a  growing  enthusiasm  for  Anti-Masonry,  the  united 
support  of  the  National  Eepublicans,  and  possible 
help  from  the  Workiugmen.  These  latter  appear 
to  have  been  an  element  worth  considering  :  at  the 
Workingmen's  convention  held  at  Salina  that  year 
there  were  more  delegates  from  Cayuga  County 
than  from  any  other,  and  most  of  them  from 
Auburn.  The  Workingmen  of  this  county  made 
nominations  for  the  Assembly  but  none  for  the 
Senate.  The  result  showed  their  importance :  the 
Anti-Masonic  candidates  for  the  Assembly  were  de 
feated,  but  Seward  succeeded  in  getting  a  majority 
of  seventeen.  This  change  of  1,766  votes  in  his 
own  county  gave  him  a  comfortable  majority  in  the 
district. 

The  result  in  the  state  at  large  was  not  so  fortu 
nate.  The  Anti-Masons  carried  the  whole  west,  the 


BucJctail  or       Clintonian, 
Regency  Adams  or 

Candidate      Anti- Masonic 


1823           2,170 

2,027 

1824            2,942 

3,047 

1825           2,849 

3,237 

1826           3,214 

3,007 

1827           3,430 

2,074 

1828           2,952 

1,951 

1829            3,870 

2,121 

1830           3,634 

3,651 

These  figures  are  from 

the  "  Official 

the  papers  each  year. 

Total 

Bucktail  or 

Regency 

Majority 

4,197 

143 

5,989 

—105 

6,086 

—388 

6,221 

207 

5,504 

1,356 

4,903 

1,001 

5,991 

1,749 

7,285 

—  17 

Canvass"  published  in 


THE  ANTI-MASONIC  MOVEMENT        81 

eighth,  seventh,  and  sixth  districts,  but  the  sec 
ond,  third,  and  fourth  caine  out  against  them  with 
heavy  majorities.  These  had  been  the  real  fightiug- 
grouuds.  The  fourth  would  have  voted  for  Granger 
could  he  have  got  the  National  Republican  vote, 
and  the  third  might  have  done  so  too.  As  it  was, 
he  was  beaten  by  8,000  in  a  vote  of  250,000. 

With  this  election  Seward  made  a  definite  step  in 
political  life.  So  far  he  had  been  a  public-spirited 
citizen,  desirous  that  his  ideas  and  principles  should 
prevail,  and  taking  such  action  as  the  political  con 
ditions  of  the  time  allowed,  to  carry  his  ideas  into 
practical  form.  Now,  however,  he  was  one  of 
the  public  men  of  the  state,  a  member  of  the  upper 
house  of  the  legislature,  chosen  for  four  years  to 
make  the  laws  under  which  the  state  government 
should  be  administered,  one  of  the  successful  leaders 
of  a  growing  political  party.  This  position  had 
been  gained  by  no  easy  steps.  He  had  begun  his 
public  life  as  the  earnest  follower  of  two  great  men,] 
who,  in  his  view,  were  the  embodiment  of  the  prin 
ciples  essential  to  the  progress  of  the  country,— 
Clinton  in  the  state  and  Adams  in  the  nation.  They 
stood  for  the  great  principle  of  internal  improve 
ment,  or  as  we  should  now  call  it,  transportation, 
in  Seward's  mind,  the  fundamental  necessity  of  the 
day.  The  tariff,  the  bank,  even  the  franchise,  — none 
of  these  questions  to  him  seems  to  have  been  of  equal 
importance  with  transportation,  at  the  moment 
by  highway  and  canal,  and  soon  by  railway.  In 
his  political  considerations,  that  point  was  the 
main  thing  :  on  it  depended  not  merely  the  fortunes 


82  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

of  Auburn,  nor  even  of  western  New  York,  but  of 
the  new  West,  then  only  beginning  to  be  settled. 
But  though  the  matter  of  transportation  was  of  prime 
importance,  there  was  another  which  in  its  practical 
bearings  came  even  more  pressingly  to  notice ; 
namely,  the  question  of  political  methods.  The 
state,  as  Seward  saw  it,  and  the  United  States  too, 
was  governed  by  a  comparatively  small  group  of 
men  :  it  was  a  democracy  in  name  only.  The  elec 
tive  franchise  meant  no  more  than  the  power  to  ratify 
the  choice  of  the  political  managers.  So  long  as 
caucus  nominations  prevailed,  even  the  advances  in 
broadening  the  franchise  and  lessening  the  appoint 
ing  power  would  be  insufficient  to  give  the  people 
in  general  the  direction  of  their  own  affairs.  So 
Seward  was  against  Van  Buren,  the  Eegency,  and 
the  official  Republican  party  of  his  day.  To  oppose 
them  he  had  followed  Clinton  till  he  seemed  about 
to  join  them  ;  he  had  followed  Adams  till  he  had 
been  irretrievably  beaten  ;  and  now  he  was  profiting 
by  the  example  of  his  political  friends  in  using  the 
political  power  generated  by  the  Morgan  outrage  for 
the  cause  of  good  government  in  state  and  nation. 

He  was  now  quite  well  to  do  ;  he  was  not  rich,  but 
he  supported  himself  and  his  family  comfortably, 
and  was  also  able  to  help  various  friends  and  re 
lations  less  fortunate,  or  less  able,  than  himself.  He 
had  at  this  time  two  sons,  Augustus  and  Frederick, 
and  lived  in  a  pleasant  house  opposite  the  home  of 
his  father-in-law,  which  he  had  purchased  the  year 
before.  On  his  election  to  the  Senate,  however,  he 
was  compelled  to  change  his  plans.  He  decided  to 


THE  ANTI-MASONIC  MOVEMENT        83 

close  his  new  house  and  to  go  to  Albany  alone.  His 
wife  and  children  joined  the  household  of  Judge 
Miller  and  he  started  for  the  state  capital. 


CHAPTER  V 

STATE  SENATOR 

ON  a  Wednesday  morning  in  December,  1830,  be 
tween  daylight  and  sunrise,  Seward  took  the  coach 
for  Albany.  The  way  led  over  the  Northern 
Turnpike  to  Syracuse,  which  he  reached  at  five  in 
the  afternoon.  As  was  usual  at  the  time,  the  polit 
ical  magnates  dropped  into  the  hotel  bar-room  to 
gossip  with  the  stage  passengers.  Seward  was  sur 
rounded  by  local  politicians  who  received  him 
warmly  and  at  once  asked  him  to  write  an  address 
for  the  convention  which  they  were  about  to  hold  on 
New  Year's  Day.  This  he  consented  to  do,  and 
stayed  over  night  for  the  purpose.  On  Thursday  a 
coach  came  along  in  the  afternoon  and  in  it  he  had  a 
fatiguing  ride  of  sixteen  hours  to  Utica.  Here  he 
stopped  for  breakfast  and  pressed  on  in  a  hard  storm, 
going  down  by  the  river  on  the  Mohawk  Turnpike,1 
through  Herkimer  and  Little  Falls,  by  Sprakers' 
Tavern  to  Fonda.  He  got  a  good  start  on  Saturday, 
and  without  stopping  at  the  college  at  Schenectady, 
drove  into  Albany  at  seven  in  the  evening,  well  tired 
with  four  days7  traveling.  He  put  up  at  the  Eagle 
Tavern,  the  great  political  gathering  place,  where 
for  the  present  he  was  given  a  room  with  George  H. 

1  Which  had  been  "built  in  an  expeditious  and  unsubstantial 
manner  of  the  material  found  along  the  line."  Benton's  Her 
kimer  County,  p.  214. 


STATE  SENATOR  85 

Boughton,  an  outgoing  Anti-Masonic  senator  from 
the  eighth  district. 

He  had  plenty  to  do  even  before  his  legislative 
duties  began.  He  had  to  look  after  some  law  busi 
ness  in  the  Supreme  Court,  a  number  of  old  friends 
to  see,  and  much  Anti-Masonic  politics  to  talk  over. 
Of  the  leaders  of  the  party  Thurlow  Weed  was  now 
in  Albany  as  editor  of  the  Evening  Journal,  just  be 
ginning  its  second  year.  In  the  Senate  there  was 
an  Anti-Masonic  minority  of  seven :  William  H. 
Mayuard  and  H.  F.  Mather  had  been  elected  two 
years  before,  Albert  F.  Tracy  the  previous  year, 
while  with  Seward  had  come  Charles  W.  Lynde, 
Trumbull  Cary,  and  Philo  C.  Fuller.  With  the  ex 
ception  of  Maynard  all  were  from  the  western  part 
of  the  state.  In  the  Assembly  there  was  about  the 
same  proportion  of  Anti-Masons,  also,  in  the  main, 
from  the  western  counties,  led  by  John  C.  Spencer. 
Three  prominent  Anti-Masons  at  this  time  were  not 
in  Albany  :  Francis  Granger  had  just  been  defeated 
in  his  campaign  for  governor,  and  Frederick  Whit- 
tlesey  and  Bates  Cook  were  in  Congress.  Seward, 
though  almost  the  youngest,  was  already  one 
of  the  party  leaders.  Weed  was  the  man  for 
planning  and  counsel ;  Maynard  and  Tracy,  Spencer 
and  Granger  were  prominent  in  the  legislature. 
But  it  was  usually  Seward  who  drew  up  the 
party  addresses,  the  resolutions,  the  statements  of 
principle. 

As  he  looked  out  into  the  political  world,  he  felt 
that  it  was  very  large  and  that  he  was  very  small. 
And  yet  there  was  then  in  the  state  no  man  in  pub- 


86  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

lie  life  who  achieved  greater  fame  than  his.  Van 
Buren  and  Marcy,  Silas  Wright  and  John  A.  Dix 
may  be  compared  with  him,  but  not  to  his  disad 
vantage.  In  the  roll  of  the  Senate  and  Assembly 
there  were  no  names  beside  his  own  that  will  be 
generally  remembered  to-day,  except  those  of  Millard 
Fillmore  and  perhaps  N.  P.  Tallinadge  and  J.  C. 
Spencer.  Yet  Seward  at  the  beginning  of  a  great 
career  felt  diffident.  "  Every  other  member  of  the 
Senate,  in  my  view,  had  the  knowledge  and  ability 
that  the  station  required.  On  the  other  hand,  I  had 
a  painful  sense  of  incompetency." 

In  the  Senate,  the  two  leaders  of  the  Regency 
forces,  as  they  were  currently  called,  at  least  by 
Seward  and  his  friends,  were  Nathaniel  S.  Beuton 
and  N.  P.  Tallrnadge.  Each  had  naturally  a  confi 
dence  that  Seward  lacked,  for  each  spoke  and  acted 
as  the  representative  of  a  strong  majority,  of  a 
dominant  political  party, — indeed,  of  the  people  of 
the  state  and  of  the  United  States.  But  there  were 
other  men  who  doubtless  had  a  character  and  a  con 
fidence  that  made  their  impression.  Levi  Beardsley, 
of  Otsego  County,  had  been  brought  to  New  York 
as  a  child,  and  carried  through  the  wilderness  to 
begin  life  on  the  frontier. l  He  was  a  sensible  law 
yer,  and  a  public  man  of  character,  who  in  his 
youth  had  built  log  fences,  wrestled  with  the 
county  and  fought  wolves.  Alvin  Bronson,  of 
Oswego,  was  another  practical  man,2  a  merchant  in 
a  little  town,  a  "  prominent  citizen"  in  a  small 

1  See  his  very  interesting  Reminiscences' 

2  See  Hammond,  Vol.  II,  p.  322. 


STATE  SENATOR  87 

community,  but  a  person  of  reading  and  thought. 
Such  men  are  sensible  lawmakers  under  our 
American  conditions  :  it  was  natural  that  Seward, 
the  best  educated  of  all,  should  have  felt  that  they 
had  something  that  he  had  not.  He  had  to  develop 
and  show  his  powers  ;  in  following  the  proceedings 
of  the  Senate  one  sees  that  he  was  at  first  a  negli 
gible  quantity.  In  his  first  session  he  was  placed 
on  the  Committee  on  Enrolled  Bills  ;  in  the  next 
he  was  also  placed  on  the  Committee  on  States 
Prisons,  because  of  his  home  in  Auburn.  His  ac 
tivity  consisted  largely  in  presenting  petitions  or 
remonstrances  from  the  seventh  district,  reporting 
enrolled  bills  from  the  committee,  acting  as  chair 
man  when  the  Senate  went  into  Committee  of  the 
Whole.  The  affairs  of  the  Senate  were  carried  on 
without  much  regard  to  Seward,  or  indeed,  to  the 
An ti- Masonic  minority.  In  the  session  of  1831  he 
introduced  two  bills  ;  one  on  the  routine  of  the 
Court  of  Chancery,  and  one  on  the  public  records  of 
the  state.  The  next  year  he  introduced  two  more  ; 
one  on  the  jurisdiction  of  surrogates,  and  the  other 
on  the  routine  of  the  Supreme  Court.  He  offered 
amendments  and  resolutions  ;  one  on  the  militia, 
for  instance,  and  one  on  colonial  documents.  His 
minor  legal  reforms  were  carried,  but  his  other  ideas 
met  with  opposition.  Still  he  continued  to  think 
broadly  on  public  affairs,  not  merely  as  an  Anti- 
Mason,  not  merely  as  representing  the  seventh  dis 
trict.  His  militia  amendment  was  a  matter  of  real 
concern  to  him.  He  had  been  interested  in  the 
service  ever  since  he  had  been  in  Auburn  :  at  this 


88  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

time,  like  several  of  his  colleagues,  he  was  a  colonel 
and  was  sometimes  so  called. 

He  took  the  occasion  of  a  bill  introduced  into  the 
Senate  to  express  himself.  Feeling  very  diffident 
and  hardly  daring  to  open  his  mouth  among  such 
capable  and  eloquent  persons  as  surrounded  him,  he 
felt  that  he  must  choose  something  that  he  was  fa 
miliar  with,  and  speak  on  it,  or  else  sit  absolutely 
still.  He  therefore  prepared  a  careful  speech, 
which  may  be  read  in  his  Works.  With  this  begin 
ning  he  continued  more  easily,  beside  taking  definite 
position  on  party  affairs,  to  use  his  influence  in 
various  matters  of  a  non-political  nature.  Thus  he 
warmly  seconded  the  efforts  making  to  improve  the 
school  system,  the  plan  for  publishing  the  docu 
mentary  history  of  the  state,  the  betterment  of 
prison  discipline,  the  establishment  of  a  separate 
penitentiary  for  women.  He  also  pressed  several 
plans  which  though  at  first  view  non-political,  were 
found  to  have  some  connection  with  interests  at  the 
capital.  He  advocated  the  abolition  of  imprison 
ment  for  debt,  of  which  one  result  was  that  it  cut 
down  the  revenue  of  the  state  printer  by  discon 
tinuing  the  advertisements  of  insolvent  debtors. 
He  opposed  the  bills  for  increasing  the  salaries  of 
higher  judicial  officers,  but  found  that  this  plan, 
as  well  as  his  own  project  for  the  surrogates,  also 
had  a  political  element. 

He  was,  of  course,  an  active  politician,  and  a  day- 
to-day  view  of  his  position  shows  us  the  Anti-Ma 
sonic  senator  from  the  seventh  district,  one  of  a 
small  minority,  with  eyes  fixed  on  the  movements 


STATE  SENATOR  89 

of  the  opposing  party.  When  he  offered  a  motion 
to  inquire  into  the  conduct  of  the  state  salt  springs 
in  Ouondaga  County,  he  saw  with  pleasure  that  he 
"  had  thrown  the  Regency  carnp  into  confusion." 
When  Adjutant-General  Dix  made  a  call  upon  him, 
Seward  noted  that  he  was  the  third  member  of  the 
Regency  who  had  visited  him.  Later  a  Regency 
man,  wanting  Seward  to  vote  for  the  Perm  Yan 
Bank,  tried  to  play  on  whatever  feeling  may  have 
been  between  himself  and  his  fellow  townsman  and 
senator,  George  Throop.1  So  he  was  much  inter 
ested  in  the  resentment  called  forth  by  General 
Root's  attack  on  the  Regency  in  Congress,  observing 
that  the  factious  of  the  other  side  hated  each  other 
more  than  they  did  the  Anti-Masons.  From  day  to 
day  he  noted  talks  with  his  Anti-Masonic  colleagues 
and  their  views  of  the  other  party.3 

But  though  these  minor  matters  of  partisan  poli 
tics  were  interesting  enough  to  mention  in  a  letter 
to  his  wife,  they  were  in  reality  only  ripples  in  the 
main  course  of  life.  Public  events  in  these  years 
were  directed  by  the  Democratic  party  without 
much  relation  to  Anti-Masonry,  nor  did  the  Anti- 
Masons  themselves  have  any  positive  issue  to  insist 
upon  in  variation.  The  legislation  of  the  first  years 
that  Seward  served  in  the  Senate  was  directed 
mainly  to  two  points  ; — the  canals  and  railroads, 
and  the  banks. 

The  first  of  these  matters  was  to  him   all-im- 

1  They  ran  against  each  other  the  next  year  for  county  super 
visor,  and  Seward  was  beaten. 

2  These  notes  will  all  be  found  in  the  Life,  Vol.  I,  passim. 


90  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

portant.  Improved  means  of  transportation  was 
what  lie  commonly  thought  of  under  the  term  then 
current  of  internal  improvements  ;  first  roads,  then 
canals,  then  railroads.  At  this  time  the  canal  sys 
tem  had  long  been  the  chief  feature  in  any  internal 
improvement  policy.  The  development  of  the  high 
ways  had  not  been  pressed,  except  in  the  case  of  a 
great  state  road  through  the  southern  counties 
where  a  canal  was  impracticable.  The  immense 
success  of  the  Erie  Canal,  however,  had  led  to 
plans  for  a  good  many  subsidiary  "  lateral "  canals, 
of  which  one  of  the  least  important  should  connect 
Auburn  (on  a  hill)  with  the  Erie.  This  particular 
canal,  however,  though  Seward  was  among  those 
who  planned  and  urged  it,  never  came  to  anything. 
The  project  most  in  the  public  eye  was  the  Chenango 
Canal,  which,  for  several  sessions,  served  as  a  bat- 
tle-grouud  for  opposing  parties.  Neither  objected 
to  a  canal  system,  but  while  the  Anti-Masons  rep 
resenting  the  western  part  of  the  state  advocated  a 
liberal  construction  policy,  the  Eepublican  party  in 
general  was  very  conservative,  holding  to  the  idea 
that  no  canal  should  be  built  unless  it  could  be 
counted  upon  to  pay  its  cost  of  construction  in  a 
definite  time ;  or  at  least,  to  be  a  direct  source  of 
revenue. 

But  interest  in  the  canals  was  being  eclipsed  by 
the  new  inventions.  During  Seward' s  first  year  in 
Albany,  the  Mohawk  and  Hudson  Eailroad  between 
Albany  and  Schenectady  was  completed  and  put 
into  operation.  At  that  and  the  following  ses 
sions,  there  were  applications  for  charters  from 


STATE  SENATOE  91 

several  new  companies,  generally  on  lines  to  the 
north  and  west  of  Albany,  while  great  public  inter 
est  was  manifested  in  a  line  from  the  lower  Hudson 
to  Lake  Erie.  The  value  of  the  railway  as  an  inter 
nal  improvement  at  first  appeared  much  the  same  as 
that  of  the  canal,  but  circumstances  put  the  two  upon 
a  diifereut  basis.  From  the  standpoint  of  the  mo 
ment,  it  was  held  that  as  the  canal  was  already 
built,  the  railway  should  not  be  allowed  to  interfere 
with  it.  Looked  at  more  scientifically,  in  course  of 
time  it  appeared  that  the  railway  was  a  very  differ 
ent  sort  of  highway.  A  canal  was  a  public  high 
way  like  a  turnpike :  any  one  might  travel  on  it 
who  would  pay  the  tolls.  A  railway,  on  the  other 
hand,  could  not  be  open  to  general  traffic  because  of 
the  particular  kind  of  locomotion  employed.  At 
first  this  was  not  obvious,  since  all  kinds  of  locomo 
tion  were  used  on  the  railroads  :  horse-power,  hand- 
power,  steam-power,  even  the  power  of  the  wind, 
were  all  tried.  But  as  the  steam-locomotive  soon 
proved  itself  the  only  practicable  means,  the  char 
acter  of  the  railway  changed.  It  could  not  be  built 
by  the  state  and  used  as  a  turnpike  :  it  must  belong 
to  a  private  company.  And  at  once  arose  the  ques 
tion  of  the  rights  to  be  given  to  such  a  company. 
Seward's  view  was  very  impractical  and  yet  had  a 
sounder  foundation  than  that  finally  adopted.  He 
would  have  had  the  state  own  the  roads  and  allow 
any  one  to  use  them.1  The  plan  was  visionary,  yet 
in  so  far  as  he  felt  that  the  state  ought  to  keep  some 
right  of  property  in  the  railroad,  he  was  far  wiser 
1  Life,  Vol.  I,  p.  94. 


92  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

than  those  who  would  have  granted  valuable  fran 
chises  to  companies,  for  no  return  except  the  imme 
diate  advantage  in  transportation. 

But  these  matters  had  also  their  political  bearing, 
and  Se ward's  views  and  votes  were  likely  to  be  in 
fluenced  in  that  direction.  The  Cheuaugo  Canal 
was  a  great  political  means  :  it  had  meant  thousauds 
of  votes  for  Francis  Granger  its  champion  ;  if  there 
had  been  two  Chenaugo  Canals  he  would  have  been 
elected  governor.  Yet  Seward  could  not  bring  him 
self  entirely  to  favor  it,  and  in  this  respect  he  was 
wise,  for  the  waterway  was  probably  the  least  useful 
and  profitable  of  all  the  lateral  canals  which  had 
been  planned  by  Clinton,  and  the  one  which  should 
have  been  last  constructed.  As  to  the  railway  bills, 
Seward  felt  that  the  interests  of  the  state  for  the 
future  should  be  more  definitely  cared  for  than  was 
commonly  the  case  in  the  charters  that  came  to  the 
Senate,  and  we  find  him  offering  amendments  which 
were  generally  voted  down. 

The  next  important  subject  for  legislation  was  the 
bank  question.  This  matter  was  one  which  could 
not  be  separated  from  the  more  general  political 
considerations  of  the  time  :  men's  thinking  on  bank 
questions  was  necessarily  connected  with  their  view 
of  Andrew  Jackson,  then  in  his  first  term  and  a 
candidate  for  reelectioD.  People  either  took  sides 
for  or  against  the  United  States  Bank  from  their 
view  of  Jackson,  or  took  sides  for  or  against  Jackson 
from  their  view  of  the  bank.  It  was  natural  that 
the  state  of  New  York  should  be  against  the  bank, 
partly  because  it  was  thought  that  so  powerful  an 


STATE  SENATOR  93 

institution  in  the  city  of  Philadelphia  was  contrary 
to  the  commercial  interests  of  New  York  City,  and 
partly  because  it  was  thought  that  if  the  United 
States  did  not  deposit  its  money  in  a  national  bank, 
it  must  deposit  with  state  banks.  Hence  came  a 
great  number  of  applications  for  bank  charters 
which  the  Regency  was  inclined  to  grant,  and  the 
Anti-Masons  to  reject  or  restrict. 

Otherwise  there  was  no  immediate  cause  for  action. 
The  charter  of  the  United  States  Bank  ran  until  1836 
and  there  seemed  no  obvious  step  called  for  in  the 
Xew  York  legislature  by  the  President's  opposition 
to  its  renewal,  nor  even  to  his  subsequent  with 
drawal  of  the  deposits.  But  the  Democratic  leaders 
of  the  state  were  in  the  main  followers  of  Van 
Bureu,  and  so  were  earnest  Jackson  men.  It  was 
natural  that  they  should  wish  to  endorse  the  action 
of  the  administration  :  resolutions  were  therefore 
offered  in  the  legislature.1  In  the  Senate  Maynard 
opposed  the  administration  policy  with  great  vigor, 
and  Seward  took  the  opportunity  to  declare  himself 
at  length.  By  this  time  he  had  become  recognized 
as  a  man  to  be  considered.  The  Senate  of  that  day 
was  a  small  body  and  the  usual  style  of  address  was 
almost  colloquial,  but  on  this  occasion  the  audience 
was  increased  by  a  crowd  of  spectators  and  Seward 
delivered  an  elaborate  speech.  If  the  Democratic 

1  April  11  and  12,  1831,  the  Senate  discussed  and  passed 
the  Assembly  resolutions  affirming  that  the  charter  ought  not 
to  be  renewed,  and  the  next  year,  Jan.  24th,  27th,  3 1st,  and 
Feb.  4th,  resolutions  of  their  own  to  the  same  effect.  On  these 
last  Seward  spoke  at  length,  but  the  speech  has  not  been  re- 
published  from  the  papers. 


94  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

party  fears  a  great  bank  aristocracy,  he  asked,  why 
is  it  so  eager  to  charter  state  banks  which  create  a 
small  bank  aristocracy  in  every  part  of  the  state  ? 
Seward's  position  on  the  President's  policy  was  that 
it  led  to  the  creation  of  state  banks,  and  this  seemed 
a  dangerous  political  step.  The  Eegency,  he  be 
lieved,  owned  the  Mechanics  and  Farmers'  Bank  of 
Albany  :^  their  connections  formed  banks  in  the 
smaller  towns.  Then  by  means  of  their  influence 
with  the  canal  commissioners,  the  bank  commis 
sioners,  and  the  comptroller  of  the  state,  they 
managed  the  distribution  of  the  "  enormous  revenues 
collected  from  the  canals,  and  the  surplus  of  those 
revenues,  now  amounting  to  a  million  and  a  half  of 
dollars."  l  He  saw  in  this  combination  a  possibility 
disastrous  to  good  government. 

It  was  by  these  speeches  more  than  by  any  other 
influence  that  Seward  began  to  make  his  reputation 
with  the  state  at  large.  He  was  not  an  u  origi 
nal"  Anti-Mason,  nor  could  he  ever  speak  on 
Anti-Masonry  with  the  real  enthusiasm  of  Francis 
Granger  and  others.  Moreover,  the  ideas  of  Anti- 
Masonry  did  not  arouse  the  whole  state.  On  the 
bank  question  it  was  different.  The  results  of  the 
bank  policy  made  themselves  apparent  everywhere. 

1  These  were  current  opposition  charges  now  hard  to  prove  or 
disprove.  They  represent  beliefs  in  Seward's  mind  and  cer 
tainly  possibilities  in  matters  of  fact.  The  Mechanics  and 
Farmers'  Bank  of  Albany  had  for  a  president  Benjamin  Knower, 
a  gentleman  of  great  political  wisdom  and  independence,  but 
always  reckoned  as  one  of  the  Regency.  The  comptroller  at 
this  time  was  Silas  Wright.  The  canal  and  bank  commissioners 
were  elected  by  a  legislature  that  had  long  had  a  Regency 
majority. 


STATE  SENATOR  95 

"Whether  they  felt  strongly  on  the  matter  or  not,  the 
people  of  every  village  had  to  know  something  by 
experience  of  the  national  and  state  handling  of  the 
financial  question.  The  administration  policy  was 
bitterly  opposed  by  many,  and  those  who  opposed  it 
looked  to  Seward  as  their  champion  in  the  Senate. 
In  1834  he  delivered  speeches  that  were  long  re 
membered,  on  the  removal  of  the  deposits  and  the 
six  million  dollar  loan.  Some  years  afterward  one 
of  his  hearers  wrote  :  "The  lobby  and  gallery  were 
filled.  It  had  been  whispered  that  the  eloquent 
Seward — the  youngest  man  in  the  Senate — was  to 
make  a  speech,  and  an  unparalleled  concourse  of 
ladies  and  gentlemen  were  present.  It  was  our  task 
to  report  his  speech.  We  followed  him  through 
his  beautiful  debut  and  kept  close  upon  his  back 
while  repelling  some  of  the  minor  libels  of  the  mis 
erable  demagogues  who  sought  to  crush  him — but 
when  he  launched  away  into  the  ocean  of  eloquence 
—when  he  poured  out,  as  it  were,  in  a  stream  of 
living  light,  his  patriotic  indignation  at  the  base 
hirelings  who  sought  to  traduce  his  principles  and 
the  principles  of  those  with  whom  he  acted,  our 
pen  refused  to  do  its  office.  We  hung  upon  the 
lips  of  the  speaker,  as  did  all  present— even  his 
enemies — and  were  lost  in  admiration  at  the  power 
of  intellect,  and  the  sublime  eloquence  of  truth."  ' 
Even  with  large  allowance  here  for  eulogistic  rhet 
oric  and  political  objects,  we  cannot  fail  to  detect 
in  these  words  the  profound  impression  made  by 

1  Rochester  Telegram  quoted  in  the  Evening  Journal  Sept.  19. 
1838. 


96  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

Seward  upoii  the  public  opinion  of  the  state.  When 
we  remember  that  this  triumph  of  eloquence  was 
achieved  by  one  who  fifteen  years  before  could  spoil 
an  excellent  speech  by  his  tame  delivery,  who 
twenty-five  years  afterward  still  spoke  with  husky 
voice  and  dry  and  didactic  manner,1  we  shall  see 
that  it  was  by  no  superficial  power  nor  magnetic 
fascination  that  Seward  impressed  his  hearers. 
Now,  as  long  afterward,  it  was  that  he  clearly  stood 
as  the  champion  of  ideas  which  they  deeply  felt 
themselves. 

These  matters  seem  to  us  to-day  much  more  inter 
esting, — and  indeed  really  were  far  more  significant, 
— than  the  points  of  party  policy.  As  one  reads 
the  record  of  Se  ward's  legislative  experience,  one  is 
likely  to  forget  that  he  was  an  Anti-Mason.  During 
his  first  session  occurred  important  trials  on  the 
Niagara  circuit ;  during  this  session  and  the  next 
there  was  much  interest  in  politics  on  account  of 
the  Anti-Masonic  National  Convention  and  its  nomi 
nation  for  President.  But  from  day  to  day  in  the 
Senate  there  was  little  that  had  anything  to  do  with 
Anti-Masonry  :  other  matters  were  much  more  essen 
tial.  Seward  acted  with  a  minority  of  seven  or 
sometimes  of  eight.  They  were  all  from  the  western 
part  of  the  state  except  Mayuard  of  the  fifth  dis 
trict.  On  strictly  party  questions  there  were  rarely 
any  to  act  with  them.  On  matters  where  the  party 
lines  were  not  too  closely  drawn,  they  sometimes 

1  J.  S.  Pike  in  his  report  of  Seward 's  speech  in  the  New  York 
Tribune,  March  2,  1860.  See  also  page  238  for  Carl  Schurz's 
mention  of  Seward 's  eloquence  in  1854. 


STATE  SENATOR  97 

gained  the  support  of  one  or  two  of  the  senators 
from  New  York  or  the  southern  tier  of  counties. 
But  almost  always  they  had  against  them  a  solid 
block  of  the  senators  from  the  Hudson  River  coun 
ties  and  the  northern  part  of  the  state.  Here  was 
the  main  strength  of  the  Regency,  and  not  unnatu 
rally,  for  these  were  the  home  counties  of  the  men 
who  composed  it.  They  formed  a  solid,  almost  un 
varying  body,  and  with  certain  organization  men 
like  George  Throop  of  the  seventh,  and  Benton 
of  the  fifth  district,  they  were  practically  sure  of 
victory. 

Anti-Masonic  politics  were  undoubtedly  too  diffi 
cult  a  matter  even  for  the  wisdom  of  Maynard,  the 
political  sense  of  Thurlow  Weed,  and  the  brilliant 
cleverness  of  Seward,  not  to  mention  the  others. 
They  had  not  only  difficulties  of  circumstance  but 
of  system  as  well.  As  we  have  seen,  the  political 
system  of  New  York  maintained  order  by  a 
partisan  distribution  of  offices  by  and  with  the 
advice  of  the  judges  of  the  Supreme  Court  whose 
judicial  duties  carried  them  everywhere  in  the 
state.1  This  general  plan  was  further  effected  by  a 
careful  use  of  newspapers  which  were  held  to  ac 
countability  by  the  distribution  of  public  advertis 
ing,  and  of  banks  which  were  managed  by  a  deposit 
of  public  money.  Weed  and  Seward  and  those  who 
acted  with  them  had  no  offices,  nor  judges,  nor  pub- 

1  It  was  during  Seward's  second  session  that  Marcy  made  the 
famous  declaration  of  the  spoils  system  in  the  United  States 
Senate.  Of  course  he  was  no  more  responsible  for  the  system 
than  any  one  else,  though  he  had  done  more  than  most  by 
means  of  it. 


98  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

lie  advertising,   nor  public  money.     They  had  to 
hold  their  friends  together  in  other  ways.     Thurlow 
Weed  himself  went  far  to  overcome  most  of  the 
deficiencies  of  the  old  system.     He  had  in  earlier 
days  traveled  all  over  the  state  as  a  journeyman 
printer,  always  makiug  it  his  business  to  meet  the 
prominent  men  of  every  town.     He  had  since  then 
constantly  gone  about  on  political  errands  so  that 
his  political  acquaintance  was  now  very  large.    The 
difficulty  of  having  no  appointive  offices  to  promise 
he  made  up  by  suggesting  nominations  to  elective 
offices,  and  seeing  at  conventions  that  his  suggestions 
were  carried  out.     He  could  not  manage  to  create  a 
network   of   newspapers    dependent  upon  himself 
for  their    own    advancement,    but   in  the  Evening 
Journal  he  did  a  great  deal  to  solidify  the  anti- 
Eegency  sentiment.     If  only  from  necessity,  he  was 
certainly  much  more  of  a  real  Democrat  in  his  man 
agement  of  politics  than  the  political  machine  bear 
ing  that  name.     Seward's  share  in  this  matter  was 
by  no  means  so  great  as  Weed's,  yet  in  one  point  it 
was  more  important.     Weed   carried  on   the  old 
system  as  well  as  he  could  :  his  ideal  of  politics  was 
a  system  of  groups  of  public  men  in  different  places 
who  acted  together,  and  as  friends  of  one  or  another 
more  prominent  than  the  rest.     Seward,  however, 
'developed  a  far  better  and  more  permanent  political 
\  means  ;  namely,  the  party  committee.     He  did  not 
*{   devise  this  means :  it  had  long  been  in  use.     But 
he  himself  had  been  for  some  time  chairman  of  the 
Cayuga  County  committee,  and  from  the  detailed 
accounts  he  gave  to  Weed  it  is  clear  that  he  devel- 


( 


STATE  SENATOR  99 

oped  the  workings  of  the  committee  in  a  manner 
then  quite  new. 

As  the  next  presidential  election  drew  on,  the 
political  situation  became  more  and  more  difficult. 
There  was  a  National  Anti-Masonic  Convention  at 
Baltimore  which  nominated  William  Wirt  for  the 
presidency.1  The  state  convention  nominated  Gran 
ger  and  Stevens  again,  and  electors  pledged  to  Wirt. 
The  National  Eepublicau  convention  accepted  these 
nominations  and  it  was  at  once  charged  that  there 
had  been  a  bargain.  The  National  Republicans 
were  to  help  elect  Granger  and  Stevens,  and  in  re 
turn  the  Anti-Masonic  electors  were  to  vote,  not  for 
William  Wirt,  but  for  Henry  Clay.  There  was 
some  antecedent  possibility  for  such  a  course  :  if  the 
Anti-Masons  and  the  National  Republicans  could 
combine,  they  had  a  chance  of  defeating  Jackson. 
But  if  there  was  to  be  a  coalition,  it  could  be  better 
made  on  Clay  than  on  Wirt,  because  Clay  had  some 
strength  in  several  states  where  Anti- Masonry  flour 
ished,  whereas  in  the  states  where  Clay  was  strong 
est,  there  was  no  Anti-Masonry  at  all.  So  it  was 
probably  apparent  to  the  politicians  that  if  the 
coalition  could  carry  New  York,  it  would  be  advisa 
ble  that  the  state  should  cast  its  electoral  vote  for 
Clay.  Unfortunately  for  any  arrangement,  Henry 
Clay  was  a  high  and  adhering  Mason,  and  if  Anti- 
Masonry  meant  anything  in  principle,  it  meant  that 
such  men  should  be  excluded  from  office.  The 
Democratic  papers  of  course  charged  Thurlow  Weed 

1  Seward  was  a  delegate,  and  so  was  his  father,  whose  con 
nection  \vifch  Anti-Masonry  I  have  been  unable  to  trace. 


100  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD' 

with  a  bargain  in  which  all  the  Anti-Masonic  elect 
ors  (except  John  C.  Spencer)  should  vote  for  Clay, 
and,  indeed,  it  is  not  improbable  that  Clay  expected 
this  course  to  be  taken.  Seward  in  his  Autobiog 
raphy  l  says  that  he  himself  expected  that  the  Anti- 
Masonic  electors  (if  chosen)  would  vote  for  Wirt  if 
he  could  thereby  be  elected  :  but  if  it  should  appear 
that  Wirt  could  not  be  elected,  the  vote  of  New 
York  was  to  be  cast  for  Clay.  In  other  words,  the 
question  of  Anti-Masonic  principle  had  vanished 
and  the  question  was  one  merely  of  party  politics  : 
Wirt,  if  he  could  be  elected,  and  if  not,  Clay. 
Seward  does  not  say,  what  must  have  been  clear  to 
him  at  the  time,  that  there  was  no  chance  at  all  for 
Wirt,  and  a  very  good  chance  for  Clay.  If  the 
coalition  had  carried  every  state  in  which  Anti-Ma 
sonry  was  held  in  any  large  degree  of  favor,  namely, 
New  England,  New  York,  Pennsylvania,  and  Ohio, 
they  might  have  had  131  votes  for  Wirt  out  of  286. 
But  if  they  had  agreed  upon  Clay  in  all  those  states 
where  there  was  a  strong  Clay  party,  they  might 
have  had  156  votes,  and  Clay  would  have  been 
elected.  It  is  not  probable  that  men  of  the  po 
litical  acumen  of  Seward  and  Weed  had  any  idea 
that  Wirt  could  be  successful.  This  could  have 
come  about  only  by  the  Clay  party  deliberately 
handing  over  to  Wirt  states  which  had  no  interest 
at  all  in  Anti-Masonry.  Seward  had  slight 
connection  with  the  actual  campaign  :  he  prob 
ably  saw  that  Anti-Masonry  was  practically 
impossible.  There  were  few  who  really  believed 

1  Page  100. 


STATE  SENATOR  101 

its  fundamental  principle  to  be  a  matter  of  political 
importance. 

The  result  was  a  worse  defeat  than  might  have 
been  expected.  On  appealing  to  the  state  on  an 
issue  which  was  really  no  issue  at  all,  and  which 
half  of  the  party  leaders  believed  was  not  a  matter 
of  politics,  the  Anti-Masonic  party  was  beaten  again. 
Granger  had  5,000  more  votes  against  him  than  be 
fore  ;  only  one  senator  in  the  eight  districts  was 
elected ;  the  minority  in  the  Assembly  was  two- 
thirds  of  what  it  had  been.  The  Jackson  electors 
were  chosen  by  a  large  majority. 

It  was  a  hard  blow  and  gave  a  setback  to  all 
hopes.  The  next  year  Seward  saw  less  of  politics 
than  usual,  for  at  the  close  of  the  session  he  sailed 
for  Europe  with  his  father.  The  tour  was  of  great 
advantage  to  Seward  :  he  eagerly  made  use  of  the 
opportunity  to  broaden  his  horizon  and  to  learn  by 
comparison  and  contrast  something  more  of  the  true 
value  of  the  American  institutions  and  ways  of  life 
that  so  absorbed  his  mind.  He  was,  of  course, 
especially  interested  in  the  debates  in  the  House  of 
Commons.  There  he  saw  O'Conuell  and  heard  him 
burst  out  in  a  discussion  on  the  state  of  the  Irish 
Church,  and  there  he  found  himself  in  a  position  to 
have  a  little  talk  with  some  of  the  members,  though 
he  had  no  time  for  long  observation.  He  enjoyed 
Holland,  Germany,  Switzerland,  and  turned  home 
ward  by  way  of  Paris,  where,  in  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies,  he  looked  eagerly  for  Lafayette.  He  had 
not  only  a  chance  to  see  Lafayette  in  the  Chamber, 
but  was  most  cordially  invited  to  make  him  a  visit 


102  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

at  his  country-place  at  LaGrange.  This  experience 
long  remained  in  his  memory.  Lafayette  died  the 
next  year,  and  it  was  always  a  source  of  great  satis 
faction  to  Seward  to  remember  that  he  had  been  able 
to  see  him  and  know  him  in  the  personal  intimacy 
of  his  home. 

Seward  and  his  father  returned  to  America  just  in 
time  to  take  part  in  an  election  in  which  Anti- 
Masonry  was  again  defeated,  and  that  more  def 
initely  than  the  year  before. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  RISE  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 

WHEN  Seward  returned  to  Albany  in  the  fall  of 
1833,  to  attend  the  Court  of  Errors,  he  took  rooms 
at  first  at  Congress  Hall.  At  the  foot  of  the  stairs, 
as  he  wrote,  was  the  ladies'  parlor,  at  this  time  bear 
ing  upon  its  door  the  card  of  Martin  Van  Buren. 
The  Vice-President  was  making  a  short  visit  to  his 
friends  in  Albany,  and  a  constant  succession  of  call 
ers  came  to  welcome  him  and  exchange  political 
views.  Fewer  were  those  who  went  up-stairs  to  call 
upon  the  senator  from  the  seventh  district.  He  had 
not  so  many  political  friends  in  Albany  as  in  pre 
vious  winters.  Mayuard  was  dead,  and  the  loss  to 
Seward  had  been  very  great.  Mayuard  had  been 
the  leader  of  the  little  Anti-Masonic  minority,  a  man 
of  intellect  and  eloquence.  Tracy  was  still  in  the 
Senate ;  indeed,  he  had  just  been  reelected.  But 
even  before  this  time  he  had  fallen  under  the  influ 
ence  of  Van  Buren,  and  had  become  convinced  that 
Anti-Masonry  had  accomplished  all  that  it  could 
ever  achieve  as  a  political  party.  He  proposed, 
therefore,  to  support  the  bank  policy  of  the  admin 
istration.  Weed  and  Seward  could  not  follow  him 
in  this,  though  they  had  slight  hopes  of  Anti-Ma 
sonry.  It  was  still  strong  in  the  western  part  of  the 
state,  but  they  felt  that  the  party  should  not  be  kept 
alive  merely  that  a  few  friends  might  gain  ree'lec- 


104  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

tions.  Granger  and  Stevens  had  been  beaten  the 
year  before  by  majorities  much  increased  over  1830, 
while  the  minority  in  the  Assembly  had  dwindled 
almost  to  nothing  at  all.  In  the  Senate  Seward 
could  count  only  on  Cary  who  had  been  elected  with 
him,  the  gloomy  Birdsall,  and  John  Griffin,  all  from 
the  faithful  eighth  district.  The  outlook  was  dark  : 
Seward  at  times  felt  that  Mayuard  had  died  fortu 
nately.  "  The  ruin  of  the  political  interests  which 
he  had  so  much  at  heart  would  have  consigned  him 
to  unmerited  and  insupportable  obscurity. ' '  Doubt 
less  if  Seward  had  gone  down-stairs  some  evening 
for  a  pleasant  talk  with  Mr.  Van  Buren,  he  might 
have  dispersed  many  of  the  clouds  that  surrounded 
him.  But  although  he  had  much  personal  ambi 
tion,  he  had  also  enthusiasm  for  the  right :  as  he 
said  himself  about  this  time,  he  saw  that  the  latter 
consideration  stood  in  the  way  of  the  former. 

When  it  became  clear  that  the  Anti-Masonic 
party  was  gaining  no  new  strength  and  losing  much 
of  its  old,  its  representatives  at  Albany  resolved 
that,  so  far  as  they  were  concerned,  the  party  tie 
should  be  dissolved  and  that  every  member  should 
be  at  liberty  to  follow  his  own  judgment.  With 
this  action  the  party  ceased  to  be  u  definite  factor  in 
New  York  politics.  There  still  remained,  especially 
in  the  western  counties,  a  strong  Anti-Masonic  feel 
ing,  and  in  some  sections  of  the  state  the  name  was 
retained  in  the  local  elections  of  this  year.  In 
other  states,  also,  the  party,  or  at  least  the  party 
name,  lingered  on.  But  with  this  consultation  the 
organization  in  New  York  was  dissolved. 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY      105 

Whatever  we  may  think  of  Anti-Masonry  itself, 
a  general  view  of  state  politics  indicates  it  to  have 
been  one  of  the  many  efforts  against  the  dominant 
faction  of  the  Deniocratic-Kepublican  party.  From 
the  time  of  the  end  of  the  Federalist  party  to 
the  establishment  of  the  (later)  Republican  party, 
New  York  politics  shows  a  series  of  radical  attempts 
to  break  the  power  of  the  conservative  element. 
The  Clintoniaus,  the  People's  party,  the  Anti- 
Masons,  the  Whigs,  the  Locofocos,  the  Barn 
burners,  show  the  opposition  cohering  about  some 
man  or  some  measure.  No  one  of  these  groups 
was  permanent,  largely  because  no  one  united 
enough  people  or  presented  a  broad  enough  issue.  | 
The  practical  bond  of  union  was  generally  hostility 
to  the  old -line  Republican  (later  the  Democratic 
machine.  That,  in  fact,  was  Seward's  real  positio 
for  a  long  time.  But  what  might  seem  merely  a' 
factious  negative  position  was  in  his  case  a  positive 
policy.  He  consistently  opposed  the  Democratic- 
Republican  party,  especially  as  represented  by  Van 
Bureu  and  Jackson,  because  he  believed  internal 
improvements  to  be  necessary  to  the  development 
of  the  country.  The  dominant  party  opposed  the 
principle,  sometimes  openly  both  in  nation  and  i 
state  ;  sometimes  indirectly  as  when  they  favo 
slavery,  which  Seward  held  to  be  the  great  enemy  o 
national  development,  and  when  they  destroyed  th 
United  States  Bank  without  providing  any  substitute 
except  the  state  banking  systems.  These  were  the 
foundation  articles  in  Seward' s  creed  :  to  maintain 
them  he  was  by  turns  a  Clintonian,  an  Adams  man, 


106  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

an  Anti-Mason.  These  names  were  but  names 
(sometimes  not  even  that)  :  his  own^political  prin 
ciples,  however,  remained  much  the  same  through- 
out. 

He  had  at  this  time  still  a>  year  to  serve  in  the 
Senate  and  in  spite  of  the  gloomy  political  view,  it 
was  not  an  unpleasant  year.  His  position  was  in 
some  respects  more  advantageous  than  it  had  been 
before,  for  he  was  now  entirely  free  from  any 
political  restraints  except  those  of  circumstances,  his 
constituents,  and  his  own  conscience.  On  the  other 
hand,  he  stood  before  the  legislature  and  the  peo 
ple,  not  as  a  free  lance  or  an  adventurer,  but  as  a 
working  politician  like  anybody  else.  Three  years' 
activity  had  not  only  increased  his  political  powers  ; 
it  had  made  them  generally  recognized.  It  was  but 
natural  that,  as  he  notes  himself,  his  colleagues 
listened  in  a  kindly  manner  to  whatever  he  pre 
sented  to  them,  and  that  save  on  party  questions 
they  adopted  any  just  views  which  he  advocated. 

The  political  aspects  of  the  winter  are  therefore 
of  a  more  general  character  than  before.  One  great 
interest  was  the  bank  controversy,  which  in  the 
phase  of  the  removal  of  the  deposits  had  led  to 
strong  Jacksonian  resolutions  in  the  New  York 
legislature.  Seward  spoke  strongly  against  them, 
and  his  political  position  is  clearly  shown  by  the 
fact  that  on  what  should  have  been  a  definite  party 
question,  he  spoke  for  a  minority  of  five  in  the 
Senate  and  nine  in  the  Assembly.  In  like  manner 
he  challenged  a  vote  on  the  resolutions  approving 
Jackson's  veto  of  the  public  land  bill  of  1834.  The 


THE  EI8E  OF  THE  WHIG  PAETY      107 

session  was  shorter  than  usual  and  by  April  the 
Assembly  was  ready  for  adjournment.  Sewai'd's 
legislative  career  was  at  an  end,  though  h*e  Lacitetill 
some  duties  in  attending  the  Court  of  Error's. 

One  pleasing  feature  of  this  relief  was  that  he 
would  now  have  leisure  for  his  family  and  time  for 
his  law  practice,  both  of  which  had  suffered  from 
neglect  by  his  long  seasons  of  absence  at  Albany. 
The  interruption  of  family  life  he  had  felt  keenly. 
He  had  at  first  lived  at  the  Eagle  Tavern,  the  great 
political  hostelry  of  the  time,  and  his  letters  and 
journals  show  his  constant  desire  for  the  compan 
ionship  of  his  wife  and  his  two  little  boys.  In 
Auburn,  even  though  he  was  often  busy  from 
morning  till  night,  he  yet  had  odd  moments  that 
made  a  great  difference  in  the  working  day.  In 
Albany  he  felt  lonely.  The  lack  was  corrected  to 
some  degree  by  bringing  his  family  with  him  for  the 
session,  in  the  last  half  of  his  term.  But  he  was  al 
ways  glad  to  get  back  to  Auburn  and  now  he  looked 
forward  to  a  long  season  of  quiet  work  and  peaceful 
domestic  life. 

Such  anticipations  were  not  to  be  realized,  as,  in 
deed,  they  rarely  are  in  actual  life.  Seward  had  no 
real  idea  of  retiring  from  politics,  or  any  serious 
desire  to  do  so.  Doubtless  the  difficulties  and  an 
noyances  incident  to  his  position  led  him  to  feel  a 
certain  relief  when  the  press  of  responsibility  was 
removed  :  he  looked  forward  with  delight  to  unac 
customed  freedom.  But  such  freedom  could  not 
last :  his  political  ideas  were  as  firm  as  ever,  and 
even  the  success  of  the  opposing  party,  which 


108  WILLIAM  H.  SBWABD 

gave  him  n  moment's  relief,  demanded  fresh  exer 
tions.  Another  opportunity  was  supplied  by  the 
sudden  gathering  of  a  new  political  party,  under 
the  name  of  Whig. 

The  name  was  not  absolutely  new  even  in  its 
present  application.1  It  was  used  in  the  elections 
of  this  spring  by  those  in  New  Hampshire  and  Con 
necticut,  who  wished  to  give  a  popular  aspect  to 
their  resistance  to  Jacksouism.  They  were  the 
patriots,  and  being  so,  like  their  forefathers  of  sixty 
years  before,  they  took  the  title  of  Whig,  and 
stigmatized  supporters  of  the  "  Old  Hero,"  whom 
they  held  to  be  hirelings  of  the  tyrant,  as  Tories. 
Naturally  the  statesmen  of  the  dominant  party  were 
not  forward  to  accept  a  nickname,  which  at  that 
time  had  a  bad  significance  in  America.  They  had 
an  excellent  name — Democrat — which  they  were  not 
to  be  wiled  into  giving  up.  Their  opponents  might 
circle  around  them  with  all  sorts  of  ingenious  and  se 
ductive  appellations,  but  they  held  fast  to  the  best 
political  name  that  American  parties  have  ever  had. 

The  name  Whig,  however,  was  good  enough  for 
the  moment,  even  if  the  Democrats  would  not  play 
at  being  Tories.  In  New  York  City  the  municipal 
election  was  held  in  the  mouth  of  April,  while  the 
legislature  was  still  in  session.2  It  was  an  occasion 

1  It  occurs  in  the  political  literature  of  the  previous  decade, 
sometimes  even  beiu^  applied  to  Jacksonian  ideas  and  prin 
ciples.  It  was  not  uncommon  as  the  name  of  a  newspaper. 

'2  We  can  date  the  use  of  the  name  "Whig"  with  curious 
definiteness.  Philip  Hone  in  his  Diary  speaks  of  Gillian  C. 
Yprplanck,  on  March  19th.  as  nominated  by  a  "committee  of 
National  Republicans  ":  on  April  8th,  he  is  the  candidate  of 
the  "  Whig  party." 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  WHIG  PAKTY      109 

of  intense  excitement.  It  lasted  for  three  days  and 
included  great  activity  in  voting,  serious  riots,  and 
packed  meetings  to  protest  in  the  interest  of  order. 
As  a  result,  the  Whig  candidate  for  mayor  was 
beaten  by  180  votes,  but  the  Whigs  gained  a  major 
ity  in  the  board  of  aldermen  and  assistants.  In 
spite  of  the  loss  of  their  leader,  this  was  considered 
a  great  victory,  and  was  everywhere  celebrated  by 
those  opposed  to  the  administration. 

Nowhere  was  the  matter  more  eagerly  taken  up 
than  at  Albany.  Almost  in  a  day  Seward  had  a 
party  again.  The  Whig  party  was  a  means  of 
political  expression  and  immediately  Thurlow 
Weed,  Granger,  Whittlesey,  Seward,  and  other  old 
Anti-Masons  gathered  to  consider  the  situation. 

So  as  he  went  home  to  Auburn,  Seward  was  again 
in  political  harness.  He  at  once  saw  the  direction 
in  which  he  was  to  be  useful  :  it  was  his  duty  to 
present  and  explain  the  principles  of  the  organiza 
tion.  He  himself  was  not  much  pleased  with  the 
name  "  Whig,"  l  and  would  have  preferred  another 
with  a  wider  significance,  that  expressed  in  a  way 
the  principles  for  which  the  party  stood.  But  not 
much  good  had  come  from  the  name  "Anti- 
Masonic,"  however  accurately  expressive,  and 
though  Seward  probably  had  no  very  serious  belief 
that  he  was  representing  the  Whigs  of  1776,  yet  the 
designation  aroused  enthusiasm  and  he  was  ready  to 
accept  it.  The  main  point  was  somehow  to  rally 
the  opposition  throughout  the  state,  and  put  into 
political  form  the  forces  that  would  work  for  in- 
1  Life,  Vol.  I,  p.  155. 


110  WILLIAM  H.  SEWABD 

ternal  improvement  and  the  development  of  the 
country. 

The  first  steps  of  immediate  importance  were  the 
arranging  for  a  convention  which  should  nominate 
candidates  for  the  fall  election  and  determining  the 
best  candidates  for  the  convention  to  nominate. 
The  managing  committee  met  and  decided  upon 
Jesse  Buel  for  governor,  and  it  seemed  that  Seward 
himself  would  be  a  good  candidate  for  lieutenant- 
governor.  It  was  Seward' s  task  to  present  Mr. 
BuePs  name  to  the  public  and  to  the  Whig  party  in 
such  a  way  as  to  do  most  for  success  at  the  polls. 
He  had  but  just  prepared  a  statement  when  it  ap 
peared  that  Mr.  Buel,  who  had  consented  to  run 
for  the  office,  had  lately  expressed  himself  in  ap 
proval  of  Jackson' s  policy  in  regard  to  the  bank  and 
the  withdrawal  of  the  deposits.  This  made  him  im 
possible,  but  another  candidate  was  hard  to  find. 
Francis  Granger,  who  had  twice  been  the  Anti- 
Masonic  nominee,  was  now  assured  of  an  election  to 
Congress,  which  he  preferred  to  only  a  chance  of 
being  governor.  Mr.  Verplanck,  who  had  made 
such  a  brilliant  run  for  mayor  in  New  York  City, 
was  an  obvious  possibility  but  he  declined  to  allow 
his  name  to  be  used.  When  the  news  of  the  con 
vention  reached  Auburn,  the  citizens  were  astonished 
to  find  that  their  fellow-townsman  Seward  had  been 
nominated.  He  had  not  even  been  mentioned  as  a 
candidate,  but  Thurlow  Weed  the  week  before  had 
privately  presented  the  name  to  his  political 
friends,  and  the  convention  had  readily  taken  it  up. 

The  campaign  was  most  active  not  only  in  New 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY      111 

York,  but  everywhere  else.  The  fiction  of  the 
Whig  party  being  a  band  of  patriots  was  sustained 
by  liberty-caps  :  their  opponents  showed  their  Tory 
spirit  by  violent  riots.  The  Whigs  rejoined  in  the 
same  manner,  and  often  surpassed  them.  Each 
side  upbraided  the  other  with  being  despicable  hire 
lings  ;  one  of  a  despotic  tyrant,  the  other  of  a  cor 
rupt  aristocracy.  Seward  remained  chiefly  in 
Auburn.  His  nomination  was  well  received  by  his 
party,  though  without  enthusiasm:  "Our  candi 
date  is  twenty-six,  has  red  hair,  and  a  long  nose," 
announced  the  Kew  York  Times.  i  *  The  Argus  is  yet 
silent,"  wrote  Seward  on  September  19th  :  this  was 
doubtless  because  he  had  not  read  the  issue  of 
September  13th  in  which  the  Whig  nomination  was 
pronounced  to  be  that  of  "  John  Doe  and  Eichard 
Roe."  In  spite  of  this  modest  beginning  the 
campaign  became  animated,  and  the  Argus  soon 
broke  its  silence  with  most  vigorous  presentations 
of  Seward' s  political  course.1  The  day  before  the 
election  it  made  an  earnest  appeal  to  the  intelligent 
voter  :  "  Was  there  ever  such  a  chameleon  candi 
date  presented  to  the  people  !  In  the  west  he  is  an 
Anti-Mason  ;  in  the  east  he  is  the  great  champion  of 
the  bank  without  regard  to  Anti-Masonry  ;  in  the 
north  and  along  the  canal  he  is  decidedly  opposed 
to  the  Erie  Railroad  which  is  represented  as  a  rival 
work,  designed  to  divert  the  business  from  the 
canals  ;  in  the  south,  his  letter  [approving  of  the 

1  Such  things  are  instructive  reading.  Thus  the  Argus  of 
Nov.  1st  accuses  Seward  of  calling  himself  a  CHntonian  and  a 
friend  of  internal  improvements,  while  he  voted  against  the 
Chenango  Canal,  on  which  see  p.  92. 


112  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

New  York  and  Erie]  is  to  gull  the  people  into  bis 
support  by  bis  professions  for  tbeir  interests."  A 
little  knowledge  of  Seward's  career  sbows  that 
except  for  the  third  point  which  is  merely  a  perver 
sion  of  what  was  a  real  interest,  these  different  posi 
tions  were  all  natural  developments  of  Seward's 
principles.  u  In  nothing  is  be  consistent  but  in  op 
position  to  the  Democratic  party,  and  in  his  devo 
tion  to  the  great  corrupting  monopoly,  the  United 
States  Bank."1  This  too  had  a  color  of  fact: 
Seward  was  a  consistent  opposer  of  the  Regency, 
and  as  he  thought  a  national  bank  of  some  kind  was 
a  necessity  to  the  interests  of  the  country,  he  was 
earnest  in  its  support. 

The  campaign  was  short  but  vigorous,  and  at 
the  end  Seward  and  his  friends  hoped  for  success. 
Such  was  not  the  result :  Marcy  was  chosen  by  10,- 
000  majority,  and  the  Whigs  elected  but  one  senator 
and  a  few  assemblymen  and  members  of  Congress. 

The  hopes  aroused  in  the  spring  had  not  been 
realized.  Seward  was  now  unequivocally  out  of 
politics  and  could  take  as  much  time  as  be  wished 
for  his  family  and  his  law  practice.  There  was, 
however,  one  important  difference.  In  the  winter 
he  had  seemed  to  be  left  to  himself  politically  by 
the  melting  away  of  Anti-Masonry.  As  a  new 
winter  began,  he  found  himself  once  more  one  of 
the  leaders  of  a  party, — a  beaten  leader,  it  is  true, 
of  a  beaten  party.  But  it  was  a  new  party  full  of 
vigor,  enthusiasm  and  power.  Nor  was  it  a  local 
party  :  indeed,  as  it  had  arisen  outside  of  New 

1  Albany  Argus,  Nov.  1,  1835. 


THE  KISE  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY      113 

York,  so  it  was  more  successful  elsewhere.  The 
outlook  was  full  of  hope,  even  if  he  did  not  imme 
diately  perceive  it  to  be  so. 

"I  am  once  more,  thank  God,  and  I  hope  for  a 
long  time,  at  home."  So  Seward  wrote  toThurlow 
Weed  as  he  took  up  his  neglected  law  practice. 
He  had  now  a  partner,  who  had  some  time  before 
been  a  student  and  afterward  his  chief  assistant. 
Seward  was  a  hard  worker,  preferring  to  concentrate 
his  attention  upon  one  subject,  even  at  the  cost  of 
keeping  at  it  day  and  night.  A  good  deal  of  his 
business  consisted  of  suits  in  the  then  existing 
Court  of  Chancery  in  which  many  papers  had  to  be 
drawn  up.  In  this  proceeding  Seward  was  an  easy 
master.  He  did  not  at  this  time  appear  as  often  in 
court  as  he  had  formerly  done.  His  practice  hacl 
extended  into  the  county  and  over  the  western  part* 
of  the  state.  Politics  he  put  away  from  him,  tell 
ing  Weed  to  build  no  more  cob-houses  (another 
civilization  would  say  "  card- houses"),  and  offering 
rather  gloomy  predictions  as  to  the  fortunes  of  the 
Whigs,  which  were  commonly  realized.  Still  he 
did  not  utterly  despair,  as  may  be  seen  by  his 
earnestly  advising  Weed  not  to  emigrate  to  Mich 
igan,  not  merely  on  business  grounds,  but  for 
political  reasons.  "If  popular  principles  change, 
and  ours  come  into  vogue,  it  is  likely  to  happen 
here  as  soon  as  there." 

He  used  the  time  also  to  increase  his  experience. 
In  the  summer  of  1835,  as  the  health  of  Mrs.  Seward 
seemed  to  need  a  change,  he  planned  and  carried 
out  a  two -months'  trip  through  Pennsylvania  and 


114  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

Virginia.  Going  necessarily  in  his  own  carriage  in 
a  leisurely  way,  he  had  a  good  opportunity  to  enjoy 
the  scenery  which  delighted  him  greatly.  The 
mountain  valleys  of  Pennsylvania  charmed  him  ; 
they  seemed  as  wild  and  romantic  as  anything  he 
had  seen  in  Switzerland.  The  broader  and  more  ex 
tended  beauty  of  the  Valley  of  Virginia,  with  its  ex 
traordinary  attractions  of  limestone  cave  and  natural 
bridge,  was  also  delightful.  But  it  is  probable  that 
his  chief  interest  was  in  the  general  condition  of 
the  country.  We  shall  get  near  his  final  conclusions 
by  comparing  his  impressions  of  the  little  mountain 
villages  of  Pennsylvania,  and  the  towns  in  the 
Shenandoah  Valley.  At  Harrisburg,  after  several 
days  on  the  Susquehanua,  he  wrote  :  "  There  is  an 
air  of  quiet  repose  about  these  villages  which,  with 
the  primitive  appearance  of  the  buildings,  gives 
them  an  especial  charm.  The  log-houses  in  this 
country  are  altogether  superior  to  ours,  and  may  be 
called  cottages  with  propriety.  ...  I  never 
could  have  imagined  a  log-house  so  attractive  as 
many  I  have  seen  here."  In  the  Valley  of  Virginia, 
he  wrote  :  "  An  exhausted  soil,  old  and  decaying 
towns,  wretchedly  neglected  roads,  and  in  every 
respect  an  absence  of  enterprise  and  improvement, 
distinguish  the  region  through  which  we  have  come, 
in  contrast  to  that  in  which  we  live.  ...  I 
should  do  injustice  to  neglected  and  abandoned 
East  Caynga  if  I  were  to  bring  it  into  comparison 
with  this  place,  the  only  one  of  importance  in  the 
county."  !  We  need  not  here  consider  the  justness 
1  Life,  Vol.  I,  p.  268. 


THE  BISE  OF  THE  WHIG  PABTY      115 

of  these  statements  :  it  will  be  enough  to  recognize 
Se ward's  views.  Doubtless  he  was  very  ready  to  be 
impressed  just  as  he  was,  and  probably  equally 
ready  with  his  reason.  * '  Such  has  been  the  effect 
of  slavery.  And  yet  the  people  are  unconscious, 
not  merely  of  the  cause  of  the  evil,  but  in  a  great 
degree  ignorant  that  other  portions  of  the  country 
enjoy  greater  prosperity." 

Still  we  must  not  imagine  the  Sewards  driving 
through  Virginia  with  an  eye  single  to  the  evils  of 
a  slave  state.  They  did  see  things  that  shocked 
them,  but  beside  the  beauty  and  wonder  of  the 
natural  scenery,  they  found  much  that  was  admi 
rable.  The  country  taverns,  for  instance,  even  the 
accommodation  in  private  houses,  Mrs.  Seward 
thought  far  superior  to  those  of  New  York,  and 
she  noted  with  approval  that  few  of  them  kept 
spirituous  liquor.  Mr.  Seward,  at  the  University 
of  Virginia,  in  spite  of  his  loyal  recollection  of 
Dr.  Nott  and  Union  College,  considered  the  plan 
of  education  superior  to  that  of  any  other  college  in 
the  country. 

On  their  return,  by  way  of  Washington,  he  took 
the  opportunity  of  being  presented  to  the  President, 
but  in  spite  of  the  democratic  simplicity  at  the 
White  House  he  was  not  led  to  revise  his  views  of 
the  political  character  of  the  "  Old  Hero." 

Settling  down  at  Auburn,  Seward  found  many 
ways  to  help  the  different  enterprises  for  develop 
ing  the  town  and  the  country  around.  He  pushed 
the  plan  for  the  Auburn  and  Owasco  Canal  espe 
cially,  and  aided  the  project  for  a  railroad  to  Syracuse. 


116  WILLIAM  Ji.  SEWABD 

His  mind  was  actively  at  work  seeking  possibilities 
for  prosperous  development,  and  he  labored  zeal 
ously  to  arouse  the  public  to  them,  and  to  remove 
the  difficulties  raised  by  reactionaries  and  obstruc 
tionists.  A  toast  given  by  him  at  this  time  is  note 
worthy  :  "  The  Union  of  these  States.  It  must 
be  preserved.  Our  prosperity  began,  and  will  end 
with  it."  We  might  dissent  from  this  view  and 
probably  Seward  himself  would  have  agreed  that 
the  foundations  of  our  present  civilization  in 
America  were  laid  long  before  the  Union  was 
thought  of.  But  for  the  prosperity  that  he  then 
had  in  niind — the  material  development  of  the 
continent — the  Union  was  necessary. 

During  these  years,  however,  he  did  not  spend 
all  his  time  quietly  at  Auburn,  carrying  on  his 
law  business,  and  meditating  the  fortunes  of  the 
country.  He  took  hold  of  a  practical  piece  of 
work,  which  though  it  may  seem  not  entirely  in 
line  with  his  activities  so  far,  was  yet  quite  in 
harmony  with  his  ideas  and  interests.  A  personal 
and  political  friend,  Mr.  Trumbull  Cary,  had  be 
come  active  in  the  Holland  Land  Purchase,  one  of 
the  means  by  which  the  lands  of  the  state  came 
into  the  hands  of  individual  small  owners.  A 
great  tract  in  the  western  part  had  in  1792  been 
acquired  by  Kobert  Morris.  He  had  sold  a  large 
portion  of  it  to  the  Holland  Land  Company,  which 
proposed  to  open  it  for  settlement.  But  the  com 
pany  in  Holland  found  difficulty  in  managing- 
matters  directly,  and  by  this  time  was  dividing 
its  estate  among  smaller  holders  who  would  see  to 


THE  EISE  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY      117 

the  actual  details.  The  firm  of  Gary  and  Lay  had 
control  of  all  the  land  in  Chautauqua  County,  and 
appointed  Seward  to  carry  out  the  necessarily  com 
plicated  arrangements.  The  greater  part  of  the 
county  was  already  partially  settled,  much  laud 
was  occupied  though  not  yet  wholly  paid  for,  the 
population  was  excited  by  all  sorts  of  consider 
ations.  There  had  been  violence,  and  in  Chautau 
qua  even  destruction  of  the  land  office,  so  that 
satisfactory  adjustments  were  by  no  means  simple. 
We  need  not  follow  Seward  in  this  business  which 
called  for  skill  as  a  lawyer,  tact  as  a 'politician 
and  courage  as  a  business  man.  He  tnrew  him 
self  earnestly  into  the  work,  settled  in  'Chautauqua 
County,  and  by  the  end  of  the  year  put  matters 
into  such  a  condition  that  the  bargain  with  the 
Holland  Land  Company  could  be  satisfactorily 
carried  out.  The  sale  was  arranged  and  Seward  be 
came  a  partner  in  the  enterprise. 

At  this  time  the  Democratic  party  was  firmly 
entrenched  in  power  in  New  York.  Van  Buren  was 
President,  Tallmadge  and  Wright  were  Senators, 
Marcy  was  Governor,  Dix  Secretary  of  State,  Flagg 
Comptroller,  and  Croswell  State  Printer.  In  the 
Senate  they  had  hardly  an  opponent ;  in  the  As 
sembly,  a  majority  of  two  to  one.  The  Federal  and 
state  patronage  had  long  been  at  their  control  and 
they  had  used  it  openly.  They  had  an  organization 
perfected  during  fifteen  continuous  years  of  power. 

Now,  however,  came  the  panic  of  1837.  This 
panic  is  said  to  have  been  the  natural  result  of 
the  wonderful  expansion  of  1836.  Doubtless  this 


118  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

was  the  case,  but  the  Whigs  of  that  day  would 
have  been  more  than  human  if  they  had  not  de 
clared  it  to  be  the  natural  result  of  Andrew 
Jackson.  It  is  true  that  the  "Old  Hero"  had 
retired  to  his  "  Hermitage, "  but  he  had  left  his 
political  heir  in  the  White  House.  There  is  a 
tradition  or  an  invention  that  the  Jacksonian 
dynasty,  beginning  with  two  terms  of  the  "Old 
Hero,"  was  to  go  on  with  two  terms  of  Van  Buren, 
and  then  two  terms  of  Benton.  But  Van  Buren 
had  been  in  the  White  House  not  two  mouths, 
before  it  became  not  merely  doubtful  as  to  whether 
he  could  be  reflected,  but  a  matter  of  great  good 
luck  that  he  had  been  elected  at  all.  If  specie  pay 
ments  had  been  suspended  six  months  before  they 
were,  Van  Bureu  would  never  have  won. 

To  Seward,  busy  at  this  time  in  Chautauqua 
County,  and  full  of  the  affairs  of  the  land  company, 
the  panic  was  a  matter  of  keen  interest.  Its  dis 
tresses  were  less  felt  in  the  western  part  of  the  state 
than  in  New  York  City  and  the  east,  and  it  appears 
that  Seward  and  his  friends  in  the  land  business 
were  not  ever  put  to  more  than  temporary  incon 
venience.  But  he  could  not  help  being  greatly  con 
cerned  in  the  entire  prostration  of  business  and 
industry  around  him,  and  he  naturally  also  con 
sidered  the  political  aspects  of  the  case.  As  he  saw  v 
it,  the  chief  point  was  that  the  "works  of  internal 
improvement,  of  paramount  importance,  are  sus 
pended."  At  Auburn,  the  canal,  the  railway,  the 
college,  as  well  as  other  plans  for  more  especially 
municipal  improvement  had  come  to  a  dead  stop. 


THE  KISE  OF  THE  WHIG  PAETY      119 

What  was  the  cause  and  what  the  cure  f  The  cause 
was  the  extended  speculation  that  had  arisen  from 
the  easy  accommodation  of  the  many  state  banks 
and  the  destruction  of  the  United  States  Bank  ;  the 
latter  the  immediate  act  of  Jackson.  The  cure  was 
that  the  people  should,  as  far  as  possible,  take  pub 
lic  affairs  out  of  the  hands  of  a  set  of  men  who  had 
shown  themselves  incapable  of  managing  them,  and 
confide  them  to  men  who  had  Jiad  nothing  to  do 
with  these  evils,  and  who  would  rectify  them  by 
measures  at  once  conservative  and  well  matured. 
Such  at  least  was  Seward's  opinion,1  and  similar 
views  existed  everywhere,  not  only  in  New  York 
but  in  all  parts  of  the  country.  It  was  most  natural 
that  the  fall  elections  should  result  greatly  to  the 
advantage  of  the  Whigs.  It  was  an  odd  year  :  as 
it  followed  a  presidential  election  there  were  neither 
electors  nor  congressmen  nor  governors  to  be  chosen. 
But  in  the  selection  of  members  of  the  legislature, 
the  result  was  entirely  decisive.  The  Whigs  elected 
six  out  of  the  eight  senators  and  101  members  of  the 
Assembly  out  of  128.  The  governor  and  a  majority 
of  the  senators  who  held  over  were  Democratic,  so 
that  the  Whigs  had  by  no  means  a  free  hand.  But 
much  had  been  done,  and  the  future  seemed  to  look 
suddenly  bright. 

1  Expressed  in  a  speech  at  Auburn  in  the  county  Whig  con 
vention.     Life,  Vol.  I,  p.  340. 


CHAPTER  VII 

ELECTION    AS    GOVERNOR 

IMMEDIATELY  after  the  election  of  1837,  Seward 
left  Auburn  for  Cliautauqua,  ua  buzz  of  glorious 
Whig  victories  ringing  in  his  ears."  Everywhere, 
as  he  went  west,  he  passed  through  crowds  of  friends 
who  were  delighted  with  the  outcome  and  would 
have  had  him  celebrate  with  them.  For  these 
celebrations  he  did  not  much  care  :  his  stomach  for 
war,  as  he  said,  ended  at  the  capitulation  of  the 
enemy.  But  he  also  had  some  other  matters  which 
absorbed  his  mind,  perhaps  to  theexclusion  of  rejoic 
ing  over  past  success.  This  was  an  off  year,  but  it 
seemed  probable  that  the  Whig  triumphs  would 
continue,  and  that  the  result  of  the  next  year's 
election  might  be  as  fortunate  as  this  year's  :  at 
that  time  a  governor  of  the  state  was  to  be  chosen. 

It  would  have  been  impossible  for  Seward's  mind 
not  to  turn  naturally  in  this  direction,  for  he  him 
self  was  an  obvious  candidate.1  In  1834  he  had 
been  the  candidate  in  the  first  Whig  campaign,  and 
had  raised  the  highest  hopes  of  election  during  the 
campaign. 

But  if  Seward  was  an  obvious  candidate,  there 
was  another  equally  obvious;  namely,  Francis 

'On  Deo.  18th  the  Albany  Argus  spoke  of  "William  H. 
feewara,  the  would-be  governor. " 


ELECTION  AS  GOVERNOR  121 

Granger.  Granger  bad  been  the  Anti-Masonic  can 
didate  in  18.30  and  had  astonished  everybody  by  his 
run  against  Throop.  He  had  tried  again  in  1832, 
but  then  had  been  beaten  by  Marcy  by  a  large  ma 
jority.  In  1834,  when  there  was  some  chance  for 
the  Whigs,  he  had  preferred  an  assured  election  to 
Congress.  On  leaving  Congress  he  had  been  the 
Whig  candidate  for  Vice-President  in  1836.  He 
and  Seward  were  old  friends  and  political  asso 
ciates  ;  yet  undoubtedly  Seward  felt,  and  with  per 
fect  justice,  that  he  was  a  more  competent  man 
than  Granger.  He  considered  him  politically  to  be 
brilliant  and  of  great  talent,  but  without  any  large 
fund  of  information  or  power  of  argument.  Neither 
Seward  nor  Weed  thought  him  the  equal  of  Albert 
H.  Tracy,  once  a  co-laborer  in  the  Anti-Masonic 
field. 

Whatever  doubt  he  had  of  Granger's  attainments, 
however,  Seward  felt  that  his  rival  had  decided 
claims.  He  had  been  the  Anti-Masonic  and  Whig 
candidate  in  hard  days,  and  it  would  certainly  be 
but  fair  for  him  to  be  recognized  in  days  of  success. 
He  had  had  a  broader  experience  than  Seward,  and 
was  a  man  of  national  reputation  :  it  was  under 
stood  that  he  could  not  be  the  Whig  candidate  for 
Vice-President  at  the  next  election.  Seward  let  it 
be  known  that  he  was  desirous  of  deferring  to  any 
right  that  might  be  seen  in  the  claim  of  Granger  ; 
otherwise  he  wished  to  leave  the  matter  to  his 
friends,  though  he  foresaw  that  they  might  make  a 
pretty  quarrel  out  of  it. 

The  circumstances  of  the   year  were   favorable. 


122  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

The  Whigs  were  in  a  majority  in  the  Assembly, 
but  not  in  the  Senate.  They  could,  therefore, 
express  their  views,  while  they  ran  slight  danger 
of  making  mistakes  because  they  could  not  control 
legislative  or  executive  action.  They  joined  the 
Democrats,  who  urged  a  general  banking  law  and 
the  completion  of  the  enlarged  Erie  Canal ;  buf 
more  immediately  important  than  either  of  these 
measures,  they  urged  the  abrogation  of  what  was 
called  the  Small  Bill  Law.  In  the  year  1830, 
S.  S.  Lush  of  Albany  had  offered  a  resolution  in 
the  Assembly,  "instructing  the  bank  committee 
to  inquire  as  to  the  expediency  of  prohibiting  a 
circulation  of  all  bank-notes  of  a  less  denomina 
tion  than  five  dollars."  The  idea  was  borrowed 
from  the  English  practice,  with  a  view  to  bringing 
specie  into  circulation.  Nothing  was  done  about 
it  at  the  time,  but  in  1835  Governor  Marcy,  follow 
ing  out  the  general  Jacksouian  plan,  advised  the 
gradual  suppression  of  smaller  bank-notes  and  at 
once  a  bill  was  passed  to  that  effect.  It  was  a 
most  unpopular  law,  for  the  lack  of  small  bills  did 
not  bring  out  specie,  which  became  the  only  legal 
tender,  but  instead,  all  sorts  of  promises  to  pay, 
called  "shinplasters."  These  were  issued  by  any 
body  whose  credit  was  respected,  from  a  coffee 
house  that  gave  refreshment  tickets  good  for  six  and 
a  quarter  cents,  to  the  trustees  of  a  village  who  paid 
their  employees  in  certificates  of  one  dollar  each. 
Early  in  the  year  1838  Seward  came  to  the  con 
clusion  that  the  issue  of  small  bills  was  necessary 
before  the  complete  resumption  of  specie  payments. 


ELECTION  AS  GOVERNOR  123 

With  others,  be  called  a  meeting  at  Auburn  to 
consider  the  subject,  and  demand  relief  from  the 
shinplasters.  Other  meetings  were  held  every 
where  and  the  matter  became  one  of  popular  im 
portance.  The  Whigs  failed  to  get  a  repeal  of  the 
law,  but  the  Democrats  consented  to  a  suspension 
for  two  years.  This  was  much  in  favor  of  the 
WThigs,  for  they  got  all  the  credit  for  the  con 
venience  of  the  small  bills,  while  their  opponents  who 
held  to  the  principle  of  the  law,  got  all  the  odium 
for  its  inconvenience. 

The  year  continued  without  important  political 
events  :  the  spring  elections  in  the  towns  and  cities 
were  for  the  most  part  favorable  to  the  WThigs,  and 
maintained  the  belief  that  their  popularity  was 
not  yet  at  the  flood ;  the  general  judgment  of 
the  Whig  managers  in  the  state  was  favorable  to 
Se ward's  nomination.  The  canvass,  however,  was 
active :  Granger  determined  to  go  into  the  con 
vention,  in  spite  of  the  opinion  of  the  party 
managers,  and  Luther  Bradish,  whom  the  WThigs 
had  chosen  speaker  of  the  Assembly,  was  also 
announced  as  a  candidate.  Others  were  men 
tioned,  and  their  friends  were  active.  Seward 
was  active,  too,  and  carried  out  an  elaboration 
of  his  committee  system  which  was  most  effective. 
Though  by  no  means  so  systematic  and  business 
like  as  the  political  machinery  of  to-day,  it  was 
a  step  in  advance  of  the  older  methods,  and  the 
detail  with  which  Seward  describes  it  to  Weed1 
shows  that  it  was  something  new.  As  it  began  to 
1  Life,  Vol.  I,  p.  368. 


124  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

be  known,  it  was  adopted  in  Ontario,  and  Monroe, 
and  Seneca  Counties. 

The  convention  was  held  in  Utica  in  September  ; 
and  instead  of  finding  that  it  chiefly  favored 
Seward,  as  the  party  managers  had  expected,  his 
friends  found  themselves  in  a  minority.  Granger, 
Bradish,  Judge  Edwards  each  had  a  following, 
less  than  that  of  Seward,  but  enough  to  keep  him 
from  gaining  a  majority.  The  two  last-named 
candidates,  however,  were  after  two  ballots 
neglected  and  the  fourth  ballot  showed  a  majority 
for  Seward.  There  was  no  ill-feeling  on  the  part 
of  Granger  and  his  friends,  but  the  Whigs  went 
to  work  unitedly  and  a  lively  campaign  ensued. 

-Seward  and  the  party  chiefly  pressed  their 
financial  propositions.  The  Journal  kept  at  the 
head  of  its  editorial  column  :  '  *  The  True  Issue  : 
Suppression  of  Small  Bills"  with  a  quotation  from 
the  opponent's  platform.  They  accused  the  Demo 
crats  of  tampering  with  the  currency  to  build  up 
a  local  banking  system  for  their  own  ends.  They 
declared  against  the  recent  "  experiments,"  as 
they  called  the  Jacksouian  financial  policy, 
against  the  sub- treasury  system,  against  the  Small 
Bill  Law  and  the  shinplasters,  and  in  favor  of 
a  national  banking  system,  and  of  internal  im 
provements. 

The  campaign  of  the  other  side,  however,  is 
rather  more  instructive  to  one  especially  interested 
in  Seward.  The  Democrats  accepted  the  financial 
issue  and  called  Seward  "the  irredeemable  bank 
Whig  candidate."  But  the  personal  canvass  was 


ELECTION  AS  GOVERNOR  125 

hotter  than  the  canvass  of  principles.  The  Argus 
opened  fire  almost  at  once  :  the  Democratic  party 
had  carried  every  election  for  governor  for  years 
except  in  the  case  of  Clinton,  and  they  began  an 
active  attack  on  the  Whig  candidate.  Setting  aside 
minor  matters — the  fact  that  Seward  was  young,  the 
opinion  that  he  was  insignificant,  his  relations  with 
Henry  Clay,  his  imputed  Federalism — the  main  al 
legations  were  of  a  serious  nature.  They  were,  first, 
that  Seward  was  the  agent  and  lobbyist  of  the  Mam 
moth,  or  United  States  Bank  ;  and,  second,  that  he 
was  the  agent  of  a  soulless,  foreign  corporation 
which  was  oppressing  the  hardy  freemen  of  Chau- 
tauqua  County.  The  third  point  was  a  combination 
of  these  two  ;  namely,  that  his  services  as  a  lobbyist 
in  carrying  through  the  Assembly  in  1837  the  re 
jection  of  Marcy's  six-million-dollar  loan,  and  his 
proposal  of  an  irredeemable  post-note  scheme,  were  a 
quid  pro  quo  for  the  advance  of  $300,000  made  by 
the  United  States  Bank  to  Cary,  Lay,  and  Scher- 
merhorn  for  their  land  purchases.1  The  first  two 
points  were  of  the  vague  general  character  that 
is  most  useful  in  a  political  editorial  or  on  the 
stump.  Doubtless  Seward  did  approve  of  the  bank 
and  also  of  the  action  of  the  Whig  Assembly  of 
1837.  But  that  he  was  the  means  of  carrying  this 
action  (through  the  agency  of  Victory  Birdseye)  is 
something  that  can  now  be  neither  proved  nor  dis 
proved  ;  indeed,  perhaps  never  could  have  been. 
It  certainly  seems  not  at  all  likely  to  one  who  closely 
reads  his  letters  at  this  period.  That  Seward  was 
1  Albany  Argus,  Oct.  9,  1838. 


126  WILLIAM  H.  SKWAKD 

"the  agent  of  a  soulless  foreign  corporation  "  and 
so  on,  was  only  a  way  of  putting  a  well-known  fact. 
He  and  others,  as  we  have  seen,  had  purchased  of 
the  Holland  Laud  Company  their  rights  in  Chau- 
tauqua  County.  To  pay  for  these  rights  they  bor 
rowed  money  of  the  United  States  Bank  through  an 
intermediate  stage,  represented  by  the  American 
Trust  Company  of  Baltimore.  This  last  institution 
was  the  i '  foreign  corporation  ' '  so  constantly  men 
tioned,  because  it  was  incorporated  under  the  laws 
of  Maryland  rather  than  of  New  York.  Such  mat 
ters  were  largely  rhetorical  perversions  of  well- 
known  facts.  The  third  point  was  much  more  prac 
tical  in  form  at  least :  it  was  clearly  implied  in  the 
Argus  that  Seward's  position  on  the  bank  question 
was  the  result  of  the  bank's  lending  $300,000  to  him 
and  his  associates.  But  such  a  charge  was  ob 
viously  absurd.  Seward's  position  in  this  respect, 
as  we  have  seen,  was  settled  long  before  the  land 
operations  were  thought  of.  It  was  a  very  natural 
position,  the  position  of  all  his  political  associates, 
and  one  easily  deducible  from  the  principles  on  the 
subject  of  internal  improvement  that  had  long  been 
his  political  fundamentals.  Doubtless  he  and  his 
friends  had  borrowed  money  of  the  bank  when  they 
wished  to  negotiate  their  Chautauqua  land  propo 
sition  :  it  was  for  just  such  purposes,  Seward  thought, 
that  the  institution  existed.  Possibly  he  managed 
the  transaction  more  easily  for  being  a  hearty  and  in 
fluential  approver  of  the  bank  and  its  policy,  than 
he  would  if  he  had  been  an  opponent.  But  few 
could  have  believed  even  then  that  this  fact  had  any 


ELECTION  AS  GOVEENOE  127 

bearing  upon  his  political  or  financial  uprightness, 
or  upon  his  qualifications  for  acting  as  governor  of 
the  state.  To  put  the  charge  baldly  shows  its  ab 
surdity  :  the  voters  of  Chautauqua  County,  the 
persons  most  involved,  paid  no  attention  to  it,  ex 
cept  formally  as  a  matter  of  politics.1 

There  was  another  subject  which  to  the  historian 
is  of  greater  interest  than  any  of  these  attempts  to 
gain  a  point  or  so  in  the  political  game.  There 
were  now  enough  anti -slavery  men  in  the  state  to 
be  politically  considerable.  Whether  Seward  would 
have  given  them  careful  attention  on  that  ground 
one  cannot  say :  he  usually  preferred  to  throw  his 
influence  where  he  could  see  its  effect.  But  the 
Anti-Slavery  Society  sent  inquiries  to  the  Whig 
candidates  asking  certain  questions.  Seward' s  first 
inclination  was  to  answer  them.  He  wrote  to 
Weed : 

"I  have  studied  the  Abolition  matter  well. 
What  say  you  to  this  course  f 

"1st.  Answer  that  I  am  in  favor  of  trial  by 
jury. 

"3rd.  Shall  not  object  to  a  repeal  of  nine 
months'  slavery  [i.  e.,  of  the  law  that  allowed 
slaves  to  be  brought  into  New  York,  and 
kept  as  such  for  nine  months]. 


!"The  Maysville  Sentinel  of  last  week  copied  not  a  word 
[from  the  Argus]  nor  had  a  word  of  its  own.  The  editor,  per 
sonally  friendly  and  well  convinced  of  the  rank  injustice  of  this 
warfare,  cannot,  however,  resist  any  longer.  If  he  come  out 
this  week  ray  answer  may  find  its  place  in  the  Censor  afterward 
and  that  will  be  about  the  right  time."  Seward  to  Weed,  Oct. 
1,  1838.  Hollister  MSS. 


128  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

"  2d.     Opposed  to  giving  free  negroes  right  to 

vote. 

This  would  be  true.     Heaven  knows   whether  it 
would  suit  either  side."  1 

The  election  cauie  on  November  7th  and  the  two 
days  following.  Seward  feared  defeat : 2  he  was 
afraid  of  the  Abolitionist  vote.  It  was  thought  that 
in  New  York  City  and  the  neighborhood  votes  would 
be  lost  to  the  Whigs  because  Bradish  went  too  far  in 
his  anti-slavery  ideas,  while  in  the  central  part  of 
the  state  Seward  would  lose  with  the  anti-slavery 
men  because  he  did  not  go  far  enough.  The  candi 
date  would  have  felt  more  comfortable  had  he  trusted 
to  Thurlow  Weed,  who  prophesied  victory  and  gave 
figures  which  the  result  showed  to  be  singularly  ac 
curate.  He  considered  the  whole  state.  First,  New 
York  City  and  the  Hudson  River  counties  which  had 
been  carried  by  Marcy  in  1834  ;  Weed  said  that  in 
some  counties  majorities  would  be  reduced  while 
others  would  favor  Seward.  The  Argus  called  this  a 
"game  of  brag"  but  the  Journal  replied  that  it 
was  as  certain  as  election  day.3  He  gave  close 


1  Sept.,  1838.     Hollister  MSS.     He  subsequently  wrote  a  let 
ter,  declining   to   make  any   pledges,  but  stating  his  opinions 
practically  as  above. 

2  "Well,  my  dear  friend,  we   are  on  the  eve  of  the  contest. 
Shall  we  compare  notes  ?     My  mind  is  made  up  that  the  state  is 
lost  to  us."     Seward  to  Weed,  Nov.  5th.     Hollister  MSS. 

3  Evening  Journal,  Oct.  22,  1838.     Weed  said  of  New  York 
City,  which  had  been  Marcy's,  that  it  would  favor  Seward  ;  it 
did  so  by  800  majority.     Westchester,  Rockland,  and  Putnam 
would  give  Marcy  only  1,400  majority  ;  they  did  give  him  1,500. 
Dutchess  had  given  Marcy  a  majority  in  1834  but  would  now 
yield  500  for  Seward  ;  the  majority  was  523.     Columbia  had 
been  Marcy's  in  1834  but  the  vote  would  now  be  about  even  ;  it 


ELECTION  AS  GOVEKXOK  129 

estimates  011  the  other  counties  on  which  Marcy  was 
counting. 

The  poll  showed  that  he  had  been  well  informed. 
Seward  was  astonished  at  the  result.1  The  Whigs 
were  jubilant  as  they  might  well  be  :  they  had  a 
majority  of  10,000.  They  elected  their  governor 
and  lieutenant  governor,  five  senators  out  of  eight, 
80  out  of  128  members  of  the  Assembly.  The  week 
closed  for  Seward  with  a  salute  of  one  hundred  guns 
to  celebrate  the  victory  and  the  next  week  began 
with  another  salute,  to  celebrate  the  vote  of  Chau- 
tauqua.  Eejoicings  of  all  sorts  followed :  con 
gratulations  were  too  tame ;  festivals,  bonfires, 
illuminations,  public  meetings  bespoke  the  rapture 
of  freemen.  A  Whig  citizen  of  New  York  was 
hailed  as  a  brother  and  claimed  as  a  guest  by  the 
true-hearted  and  patriotic  throughout  the  emanci 
pated  republic.2  The  Whig  newspapers  of  every 
county  vied  with  one  another  in  elaborate  and 
humorous  accounts  of  the  voyage  of  the  Eegency  up 
Salt  Eiver,  nor  was  their  delirious  joy  all  froth  : 
the  Whigs  held  the  state  government  except  for  a 
Democratic  majority  in  the  Senate  and  this  they 
felt  sure  they  would  gain  (as  they  actually  did)  the 
next  year. 

Seward  himself  had  little  taste  for  such  long- 


gave  Marcy  57  majority.  In  the  other  river  counties  he  was 
inexact  only  because  he  underestimated  Seward's  strength.  It 
was  by  such  knowledge  as  this  that  Weed  was  considered  a 
political  wizard. 

luYou  see  I  was  struck  dumb  when  the  election  com 
menced."  Seward  to  Weed,  Nov.  11,  1838.  Hollister  MS. 

2  Evening  Journal,  Nov.  16,  1838. 


130  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

drawn-out  festivities  and  Lad  also  much  else  to  do. 
Almost  at  once  he  turned  to  the  duties  of  writing 
his  inaugural  message  and  making  his  appoint 
ments.  When  the  first  flush  of  pleasure  had  passed, 
he  may  still  have  looked  forward  to  his  term  of 
office  with  a  glow  of  pride.  It  was  but  sixteen 
years  since  he  had  settled  in  Auburn,  and  now  he 
was  summoned  by  the  citizens  of  the  state  to  the 
care  of  its  public  affairs.  And  he  had  come  to  this 
position  in  spite  of  the  determined  opposition  of  a 
powerful  political  party,  guided  by  as  powerful  a 
political  machine  as  could  be  found  in  the  country. 
Despite  the  hostility  of  the  Albany  Eegency,  whose 
members  held  the  chief  positions  not  only  in  the 
state,  but,  so  far  as  New  York  was  concerned,  in 
the  United  States,  he  had  succeeded  in  his  appeal 
to  the  voters  and  had  been  chosen  governor  by  a 
handsome  majority. 

His  rise  to  this  distinguished  office  he  may  well 
have  ascribed  to  his  faithful  adherence  to  his 
original  principles  of  public  life.  From  the  very 
beginning  he  had  taken  the  position  of  one  who 
would  serve  the  state,  not  as  an  office-holder,  but  in 
the  much  more  useful  capacity  of  the  public-spirited 
private  citizen,  the  man  who  without  being  an 
office-holder  or  a  candidate  for  office,  will  yet  keep 
a  constant  interest  in  public  affairs  and  a  constant 
supervision  over  the  acts  of  public  men.  From 
this  position  he  had  been  drawn  by  the  unsolicited 
nomination  and  election  to  the  Senate.  But  his 
status  as  a  member  of  a  small  opposition  was  not  so 
very  different  from  that  of  a  mere  private  citizen. 


ELECTION  AS  GOVERNOR  131 

And  at  the  close  of  his  term  as  senator  he  had 
returned  to  private  life. 

Undoubtedly  Seward  had  also  been  a  practical 
politician,  and  had  had  the  help  and  service  of  one 
of  the  most  brilliant  practical  politicians  of  the 
time.  He  had  certainly  used  his  best  efforts  to 
manage  public  affairs,  according  to  the  universal  cus 
tom  of  public  men  of  the  day.  He  had  not  thought 
it  necessary  to  leave  matters  to  manage  themselves, 
or,  more  correctly,  to  leave  the  management  of 
affairs  to  those  whom  he  thought  less  scrupulous 
than  himself.  He  had  taken  every  means  of  associ 
ating  himself  with  those  who  had  at  heart  interests 
similar  to  his  own.  And  it  must  be  remembered 
that  while  the  methods  of  an  opposition  may  be  un 
scrupulous,  or  even  corrupt,  they  are  far  less  likely 
to  be  so  than  are  the  methods  of  men  who  fight 
year  after  year  to  maintain  themselves  in  places 
of  honor  or  profit.  Seward  and  Weed  may  have 
been  in  method  as  much  machine  politicians  as 
they  thought  Marcy  and  Croswell  were,  but  the 
chances  were  against  it,  for  they  had  never  had  any 
thing  to  give  their  friends,  while  Marcy  and  Cros 
well  had  for  years  controlled  the  patronage  of  the 
state. 

Seward  may  fairly  have  looked  upon  his  election 
as  a  triumph  for  the  principles  he  had  early  es 
poused,  and  for  his  own  faithful  prosecution  of 
them.  So  far,  those  principles  had  exhibited 
themselves  chiefly  in  opposition  to  Jackson  and  the 
Regency,  because  Jackson  and  the  Regency  had 
been  opposed  to  those  ideas  of  national  and  state 


132  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

development  which  Seward  conceived  to  be  abso 
lutely  essential  to  prosperity.  Now,  however,  the 
time  was  come  to  put  his  ideas  into  positive  form 
and  we  may  easily  imagine  the  interest  with  which 
he  composed  his  message  and  awaited  the  first  op 
portunity  that  should  occur  for  actual  executive  ac 
tion. 

When  Seward  became  Governor  of  New  York, 
the  state  was  smaller  than  she  is  now  in  population 
and  resources,  and  in  other  important  respects. 
Relatively  her  position  was  different.  In  the  mat 
ter  of  population,  the  United  States  had  increased 
immensely  in  the  half  century  that  had  followed  the 
establishment  of  the  Federal  government :  in  1840 
it  was  four  times  as  great  as  it  had  been  in  1790.  * 
But  the  state  of  New  York  had  grown  faster  still 
and  had  almost  doubled  the  rapid  rate  of  increase 
in  the  country  at  large.  From  being  the  fifth  in 
rank,  with  340,120  inhabitants  spread  up  the 
Hudson  Eiver  and  along  the  Mohawk,  she  had  be 
come,  when  Seward  was  governor,  as  she  has  since 
remained,  the  state  with  the  largest  population  in 
the  union  (namely  2,428,921).  But  though  still 
largest,  New  York  is  not  relatively  so  large  as  she 
was  then,  for  while  now  she  has  one-tenth  of  the 
population  of  the  whole  country,  in  1840  she  had 
one-seventh. 

This  vast  increase  of  population  had  taken  place 

mainly  in  the  Mohawk  Valley  and  in  the  western 

part  of  the  state  reached  by  it.     This  great  passage 

through  the  mountains,  almost  the  only  real  passage 

1  Following  the  figures  in  the  census  of  1900. 


ELECTION  AS  GOVEENOE  133 

in  the  whole  length  of  the  United  States,  had 
turned  much  of  the  tide  of  Western  emigration 
that  way.  The  emigration  at  first  stopping  in 
New  York,  had  soon  gone  beyond  and  poured  itself 
out  into  the  country  now  included  in  the  states  of 
Ohio,  Indiana,  Illinois,  and  those  adjoining.  By 
the  time  of  Seward's  administration,  the  rapid 
growth  of  New  York  had  been  equalled  and  ex 
ceeded  by  the  growth  of  the  states  beyond.  What 
we  may  loosely  call  the  North  Central  States,  had 
at  the  beginning  of  the  century  only  51,000  inhabit 
ants  scattered  here  and  there  over  vast  tracts  of 
forest  and  prairie,  about  one  per  cent,  of  the  whole 
population.  In  1810  they  had  about  five  per  cent. 
But  in  1840  they  had  3,351,542  or  nearly  twenty 
per  cent,  within  their  borders  and  their  subsequent 
growth  was  even  more  rapid.  For  this  great  terri 
tory  and  population,  New  York  furnished  the  most 
obvious  and  easy  outlet. 

This  was  plainly  seen  :  in  fact,  it  was  recognized 
even  at  a  time  when  there  was  practically  no  popu 
lation  to  demand  either  ingress  or  outlet.  Wash 
ington  noted  it  at  Oriskauy  in  1783.1  "  As  yet," 
said  Gouverneur  Morris  somewhat  later,  ' l  we  only 
crawl  along  the  outer  shell  of  our  country.  The 
interior  excels  the  part  we  inhabit  in  soil,  in  cli- 

1  Of.  Reward's  Speech  at  the  Erie  Railroad  Jubilee,  Works, 
Vol.  Ill,  p.  323.  "How  came  that  secret  [of  New  York's  com 
mercial  opportunity]  to  break  itself  to  the  Father  of  our  Coun 
try?  I  will  tell  you  how.  He  was  seeking  security  for  the  union 
of  the  states  which  was  so  soon  to  cover  this  continent.  He 
found  that  guaranty  in  commercial  union,  and  he  saw  that 
commercial  union  rising  out  of  the  canals  and  roads  which  New 
York  might  construct  across  the  isthmus  on  which  he  stood." 


134  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

mate,  in  everything."  The  Erie  Canal  was  early 
thought  of.  Sevvard,  a  senior  in  college  at  a  time 
when  it  was  still  under  construction,  viewed  the 
canal  with  little  favor.  But  shortly  after  leaving 
college  and  looking  over  the  state  seriously  with 
the  purpose  of  settling  in  life,  he  changed  his 
opinion.  His  practical  study  of  the  country  led 
him  to  perceive  its  possibilities  and  when  at  Buffalo 
he  saw  the  plans  for  the  new  harbor  and  heard  the 
promises  of  Western  trade,  his  mind  was  made  up. 
He  became  an  earnest  supporter  of  the  Erie  Canal 
and  the  general  principles  of  internal  improvement. 
His  life  since  that  time  had  been  a  consistent 
development  of  such  views.  His  professional  in 
terests  were  in  Auburn  ;  his  business  interests  were 
in  Chautauqua  County.  His  political  backing  came 
largely  from  west  of  Cayuga  Bridge.  His  political 
opinions  were  of  necessity  in  the  direction  of  inter 
nal  improvements,  not  merely  because  such  matters 
were  favorable  to  his  interests  and  to  those  of  his 
constituents,  but  because  in  choosing  his  interests 
aud  his  constituents  he  had  followed  out  definitely 
formed  ideas.  So  as  to  politics  :  though  beginning 
as  a  Bucktail,  he  had  soon  turned  to  Adams  and 
Clinton.  When  the  death  of  Clinton  and  the  defeat 
of  Adams  had  set  adrift  the  discordant  elements 
making  up  their  support,  he  became  an  Anti- 
Mason,  taking  the  "Hobson's  choice"  of  their 
political  organization  to  press  his  own  political 
opinions.  When  the  Anti-Masonic  party  came  to 
nothing  in  New  York,  he  welcomed  the  advent  of 
the  Whig  party  as  a  means  to  his  desired  end.  He 


ELECTION  AS  GOVERNOR  135 

had  now  been  chosen  governor  by  that  party  and  it 
was  not  remarkable  that  a  great  deal  of  his  first 
message  was  devoted  to  the  subject  of  internal  im 
provements,  and  especially  to  the  matter  of  trans 
portation. 

The  chief  means  of  transportation  at  this  time 
were  the  turnpike  and  the  canal.  Seward,  when  he 
traveled  from  Auburn  to  Albany  as  state  senator, 
went  by  the  stage-coach.  It  took  him  about  as  long 
a  time  as  it  now  takes  a  senator  from  California  to 
get  to  Washington.  The  great  mass  of  freight, 
however,  went  by  the  Erie  Canal,  of  which  the  tolls 
had  so  largely  exceeded  the  estimates  that  already 
the  debt  incurred  for  its  construction  had  virtually 
been  paid,  and  an  enlargement  was  under  way. 
But  during  these  years  had  appeared  the  railroad 
and  the  steam  locomotive.  The  steamboat  had  for 
some  time  been  seen  on  rivers  and  lakes,  but  these 
furnished  a  very  insufficient  means  for  communica 
tion.  Hence  railroads  early  came  into  use  :  the  first 
built  in  New  York  was  that  from  Albany  to 
Schenectady.  This  railroad,  however,  did  not  im 
mediately  employ  steam  :  the  passengers  took  seats, 
the  driver  cracked  his  whip,  and  one  horse  pulled 
the  load  between  the  cities.  By  1839,  however, 
steam  had  been  very  generally  introduced. 

In  his  annual  message,  then,  Seward  devoted  a 
good  deal  of  attention  to  the  question  of  canals  and 
railroads.  "  Thirteen  years'  experience,"  he  wrote, 
meaning  since  the  opening  of  the  Erie  Canal,  "has 
proved  the  inadequacy  of  all  our  thoroughfares  for 
the  transportation  of  persons  and  property  between 


136  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

the  frontier  and  tide- waters."  He  advocated  the 
completion  of  the  enlargement  of  the  canal.  Then 
turning  to  the  application  of  steam  locomotion  to 
laud,  he  advised  the  prosecution  of  the  important 
railroad  enterprises  already  undertaken.  Three 
great  lines  of  communication  seemed  clear  ;  one 
through  the  northern  counties  to  Lake  Ontario  and 
the  St.  Lawrence,  one  through  the  Mohawk  Valley 
and  westward,  one  through  the  southern  counties  to 
Lake  Erie.  The  last  two  were  already  being  ex 
ploited  and  Seward  urged  that  the  legislature  in 
quire  at  once  into  the  condition  of  the  main  projects 
and  grant  them  such  aid  as  might  be  necessary  to 
their  rapid  prosecution. 

Seward  had  views  on  internal  improvement,  but 
also  went  to  Albany  with  the  hope  of  doing  some 
thing  to  improve  the  financial  situation.  The  panic 
of  1837  had  passed,  but  there  were  still  matters  that 
called  for  adjustment,  especially  the  Small  Bill  Law, 
which  had  done  much  to  give  Seward  his  election. 
The  act  that  prohibited  the  issue  of  bills  lower  than 
five  dollars  had  been  suspended  for  two  years  ;  this 
in  Se ward's  mind  was  not  satisfactory,  and  he  there 
fore  recommended  its  entire  repeal.  He  also  ex 
pressed  himself  in  regard  to  the  general  financial 
condition.  "The  experimental  situation  of  the 
country,"  he  said,  meaning  Jackson7 s  attack  on  the 
United  States  Bank,  had  not  only  been  highly 
calamitous  in  itself,  but  it  had  brought  about  in 
the  different  states  extraordinary  legislation,  such  as 
the  Small  Bill  Law.  The  state  of  New  York  was 
not,  of  course,  in  a  position  to  remedy  this  failure  in 


ELECTION  AS  GOVERNOR  137 

national  legislation.  Yet  New  York,  as  much  as 
auy  other  state,  needed  financial  security.  Seward 
ventured  ironically  to  hope  that  " since  the  govern 
ment  has  ascertained  that  its  financial  business  can 
be  conducted  without  a  bank,  it  will  speedily  adopt 
some  fixed  and  permanent  system  for  the  collection 
and  disbursement  of  its  revenues."  As  for  New 
York,  he  remarked  that  in  her  efforts  to  promote 
the  prosperity  and  welfare  of  her  citizens,  u  she  asks 
of  the  Federal  government  to  be  let  alone." 

Another  topic  which  Seward  had  in  mind  in  con 
sidering  the  possibilities  of  the  governor's  office, 
though  one  which  had  not  made  much  appearance 
in  what  is  called  politics,  was  the  reform  of  legal 
procedure.  He  also  contemplated  some  changes  in 
the  administration  of  the  public  schools.  All  these 
matters,  and  others  as  well,  he  embodied  in  a  mes 
sage  which  he  wrote  and  revised  with  the  great 
est  care,  taking  the  advice  of  Judge  Miller,  who 
was  skilful  in  pruning  down  eloquence  ;  of  Thurlow 
Weed  of  course  ;  of  Dr.  Nott  on  the  subject  of  edu 
cation  ;  of  Samuel  B.  Ruggles,  who  was  subse 
quently  named  canal  commissioner  ;  and  of  others. 
The  result  was  satisfactory  as  a  statement  of  prin 
ciple,  and  was  allowed  to  be  written  in  an  easy  and 
elegant  style.  The  only  fault  alleged  against  it  by 
Hammond,  the  contemporary  Democratic  historian, 
was  that  (like  some  other  good  things)  it  was  too  long. 

On  one  thing  Seward  and  Weed  may  well  have 
congratulated  themselves  :  they  had  at  last  beaten 
the  Regency.  After  an  opposition  of  sixteen  years, 
they  had  succeeded  in  putting  that  body  out  of 


138  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

power  and  as  it  happeued  finally.  The  old  Regency 
never  came  together  again.  Van  Buren  at  *  *  Linden - 
wald"  and  Marcy  at  Washington  were  practically 
out  of  New  York  politics.  Talcott,  Knower,  and 
Roger  Skinner  were  dead.  Silas  Wright,  Flagg, 
Croswell,  John  A.  Dix  and  others  often  acted  to 
gether  after  this  time,  but  they  were  frequently 
divided  by  faction,  and  though  the  Democratic 
party  had  powerful  leaders  from  Horatio  Seymour 
to  Samuel  J.  Tildeu,  whose  names  have  been  as 
sociated  with  the  Regency,  yet  that  compact  and 
influential  body,  which  had  first  brought  Seward 
and  Weed  into  opposition,  really  came  to  an  end 
when  they  attained  to  power.1 

It  had  had  a  remarkable  career  :  for  sixteen  years 
it  had  ruled  the  state  with  the  partial  exception 
of  the  years  in  which  Clinton  was  governor.  Its 
leaders  had  been  governors,  when  it  had  seemed 
best,  or  United  States  senators,  and  its  chief  had  be 
come  President  of  the  United  States,  while  its  con 
trol  of  the  state  and  Federal  patronage  had  given 
its  other  members  and  their  friends  what  offices  they 
wished  to  take.  They  had,  so  far,  succeeded  in 
their  appeals  to  the  people.  Yates,  Van  Buren, 
Throop,  Marcy,  had  all  been  easily  elected  and  they 
had  had  a  large  and  almost  unvarying  majority  in 
the  legislature. 

1  Note  the  humorous  remark  of  Marcy  :  ' '  Even  before  the 
ballot-boxes  were  closed,  I  had  partly  persuaded  myself  to  en 
gage  in  a  work  for  my  posterity,  by  writing  the  history  of  the 
rise,  progress,  and  termination  of  the  Regency." — Alexander, 
Political  History  of  Nwc  York,  Vol.  II,  p.  30.  It  would  have 
been  a  most  interesting  work. 


ELECTION  AS  GOVEENOE  139 

Now  the  Whigs  were  in  the  saddle.  They  had 
the  governor  and  the  Assembly  ;  they  were  soon  to 
have  the  Senate  and  the  state  officers.  It  must 
have  occurred  to  Thurlow  Weed,  the  Dictator, 
as  he  was  humorously  called,  that  it  was  one  thing 
to  be  in  opposition  and  another  to  be  in  office. 
Nowhere  does  the  weakness  of  the  Whigs  appear 
more  strongly  than  in  their  success.  Seward  was 
too  large  a  man  to  govern  the  state  for  the  ad 
vantage  of  party.  And  beside  the  Governor  and 
the  Dictator,  there  were  few  leaders  of  power. 
John  C.  Spencer  was  chosen  Secretary  of  State. 
He  was  a  strong  man  but  he  had  not  always  been 
in  accord  with  his  party  and  he  would  not  be  in 
the  future.1  For  Comptroller  Fillmore  was  thought 
of  but  he  preferred  his  place  in  Congress  and  Bates 
Cooke,  an  old  Anti-Mason,  was  chosen.  The  new 
Attorney-General  was  Willis  Hall,  who  became 
a  prominent  man  in  the  party.  As  senator,  N.  P. 
Tallmadge  was  reflected.  He  had  been  leader  of 
the  Eegency  majority  in  the  state  Senate  when 
Seward  was  there  and  had  been  elected  to  the 
United  States  Senate  as  a  Eegency  candidate,  but 
he  had  gone  over  to  the  Whigs  on  the  bank  ques 
tion.  There  were  undoubtedly  Whigs  of  ability  in 
and  out  of  office,  but  though  they  had  a  greater 
statesman  as  leader  and  a  greater  practical  politician 
as  manager,  than  the  Eegeucy  could  produce,  yet 
they  failed  as  a  party.  They  were  no  stronger  at 
the  end  of  Seward' s  administration  than  at  the 
beginning ;  in  fact,  they  were  easily  defeated. 
1  He  was  for  Jackson  in  earlier  days  aod  for  Tyler  later. 


140  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

There  were  many  reasons,  doubtless,  but  the  chief 
one  was  that  the  Whigs  were  really  mere  oppor 
tunists,  a  party  of  opposition.  They  did  not  stand 
for  what  their  leaders  thought  most  important. 
When  men  felt  ready  to  stake  all  on  the  issue 
that  they  saw  was  absolutely  paramount,  the  Whig 
party  passed  out  of  existence,  and  a  new  one  was 
formed. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

GOVERNOR  SEWARD 

THE  Whigs  lost  no  time  in  carrying  out  their 
election  pledges.  On  the  first  day  of  the  term  Mr. 
Taylor  gave  notice  that  he  would  bring  in  a  meas 
ure  for  the  repeal  of  the  Small  Bill  Law,  and  as  the 
Democrats,  who  controlled  the  Senate,  were  favor 
able,  it  quickly  passed.  Other  Whig  measures 
did  not  fare  so  well.  It  will  be  remembered  that 
the  Senate  was  made  up  of  members  chosen  from 
eight  districts  for  terms  of  four  years :  its  political 
complexion  therefore  changed  but  slowly.  In 
1834,  when  Se ward's  term  expired,  it  had  been 
almost  entirely  Democratic.  When  Seward  became 
governor,  the  Whigs  had  got  thirteen  members 
and  naturally  hoped  to  increase  their  number  at 
the  next  election  when  the  terms  of  several  Demo 
crats  would  expire.  Their  expectation  was  real 
ized,  for  the  following  year  they  elected  seven 
senators  to  the  Democrats'  three,1  which  gave 
them  nineteen,  or  a  good  working  majority.  At 
present,  however,  there  was  a  Democratic  majority, 
which  declined  to  act  with  the  governor  except  in 
cases  of  necessity.  The  Whigs  could  not  elect 
their  candidate  to  the  United  States  Senate.  When 
it  came  to  the  state  officers  who  were  chosen  on 
joint  ballot,  they  easily  carried  the  day. 
1  There  were  two  additional  vacancies. 


142  WILLIAM  H.  SEWABD 

Beyond  these  proceedings,  however,  the  strictly 
political  aspects  of  the  session  were  not  of  much 
moment,  A  reading  of  the  laws  of  the  state  of  New 
York  for  1839  discloses  no  measure  of  political  im 
portance,  among  the  mass  of  acts  allowing  men  to 
change  their  names,  tax  collectors  to  hand  in  reports 
late,  charters  to  be  amended,  money  to  be  loaned 
to  towns  or  counties,  except  the  Small  Bill  Law. 
There  was  one  interesting  matter  arising  from  na 
tional  politics.  The  Democratic  majority  in  the 
House,  vexed  at  the  persistence  with  which  John 
Quiiicy  Adams  presented  petitions  concerning 
slavery,  had  resolved  not  to  consider  any  such  peti 
tions.  This  high-handed  proceeding,  beside  being 
an  entirely  undemocratic  act,  seemed  very  unwise 
from  a  political  standpoint.  It  gave  the  Whigs  a 
chance  to  take  to  themselves  the  honor  of  being  the 
defenders  of  the  right  of  petition,  and  the  Assembly 
of  New  York  promptly  adopted  resolutions  de 
nouncing  the  ' '  Athertou  gag, ' y  as  it  was  called.  Yet 
in  a  larger  view  the  position  was  not  very  impolitic, 
for  it  was  entirely  sincere.  The  Democratic  party, 
now  and  long  afterward,  did  not  wish  any  agitation 
on  the  subject  of  slavery  that  would  break  up  its 
organization  in  North  and  South.  The  Whigs  who 
protested  against  this  action,  were  in  the  same  situ 
ation,  but  they  did  not  choose  to  acknowledge  it. 

The  matter  is  clear  now  when  we  read  the  dis 
cussion  that  took  place  concerning  the  presidency. 
Henry  Clay  was  without  a  rival  in  a  personal  popu 
larity  well  deserved  for  sound  ability.  Webster  was 
even  a  greater  statesman.  Yet  the  leaders  of  the 


GOVERNOR  SEWARD  143 

party  were  able  to  consider  the  "  availability"  of  so 
weak  a  personality  as  General  Harrison,  because 
Clay  was  a  slaveholder  and  might  lose  votes  at  the 
North,  while  Webster  was  a  declared  Unionist  and 
might  lose  votes  at  the  South.  They  allowed  them 
selves  to  be  carried  away  by  the  experience  of 
Jackson,  which  had  shown  them  that  a  general  was 
a  good  candidate.  A  party  which  can  do  this  is 
hardly  to  be  called  a  party  :  it  is  more  like  an 
organization  for  plunder,  as  Harrison  discovered 
to  his  cost.  It  was  eminently  characteristic  that  the 
Whig  convention,  held  during  this  winter,  nomi 
nated  Harrison  and  Tyler,  but  adjourned  without 
adopting  any  resolutions  or  address,  which  should 
state  their  principles,  or  pointing  out  any  reasons 
why  people  should  vote  for  their  candidates. 

These  things,  however,  were  not  immediately  ef 
fective  :  in  the  election  of  1839  the  Whigs  were  still 
successful.  Although  their  majority  in  the  As 
sembly  was  somewhat  lessened,  they  gained  the  ma 
jority  in  the  Senate.  Seward  in  his  message  of  1840 
addressed  a  legislature  which  was  finally  in  political 
accord  with  him.  He  recommended  advancement 
in  the  directions  which  seemed  to  him  most  impor 
tant  ; — internal  improvements,  law  reform,  the  school 
system.  On  these  subjects  progress  was  made, 
though  by  no  means  rapidly.  The  legislature  was 
much  more  expeditious  in  some  matters  which  the 
muse  of  history  will  deem  less  important.  They 
speedily  elected  N.  P.  Tallmadge  to  the  United 
States  Senate,  and  Thurlow  Weed  to  the  position  of 
State  Printer  in  place  of  Edwin  Croswell,  who  had 


144  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

held  it  worthily  and  profitably  for  a  period  of  sev 
enteen  years.  They  elected  a  new  canal  board,  all 
Whigs,  instead  of  the  Democratic  board.  They 
passed  a  bill  for  the  registration  of  voters  in  New 
York  City,  which,  though  founded  on  the  right 
principle,  was  so  clearly  a  party  measure  that 
Seward  prepared  to  veto  it,  and  was  dissuaded  from 
so  doing  only  by  urgent  political  considerations. 
He  was  wrong  in  approving  it,  however,  for  the  bill 
proved  so  impracticable  that  it  was  repealed  the 
next  session. 

But  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  give  the  idea  that 
the  Whigs  were  so  absorbed  in  party  politics  that 
they  made  no  effort  to  sustain  Seward  in  the  meas 
ures  which  he  deemed  of  vital  interest.  They  gave 
attention  to  the  question  of  canals  and  railroads  and 
carried  out  efficaciously  the  governor's  plans.  The 
legislation  for  the  year  1840  shows  acts  for  the  ex 
tension  of  many  canals  now  almost  forgotten,  as 
well  as  for  the  aid  and  encouragement  of  many 
railroads  which,  though  disguised  under  such  un 
familiar  names  as  the  Albany  and  West  Stockbridge 
Eailroad,  or  the  Buffalo  and  Batavia  Eailroad,  are 
clearly  parts  of  the  great  system  of  transportation 
now  so  necessary. 

On  some  matters,  however,  Seward  found  it  more 
difficult  to  secure  party  support.  During  the  first 
year  of  his  administration,  he  had  become  more 
solicitous  than  before  on  the  subject  of  popular  edu 
cation.  In  the  fall  of  1839  he  visited  the  city  of 
New  York,  and  there  gained  some  practical  knowl 
edge  of  the  workings  of  the  school  system.  At  that 


GOVERNOE  SEWAED  145 

time  the  public  schools  were  not  managed  by  the 
city  itself,  but  by  the  Public  School  Society  which 
received  aud  expended  the  public  money.  In  spite 
of  the  best  efforts  of  this  society, — and  it  was  ac 
knowledged  to  be  well  administered, — there  were 
great  numbers  of  children  who  did  not  go  to  school  ; 
— about  25,000,  it  appeared,  in  a  population  of 
600,000.  The  matter  seemed  to  Seward  most  im 
portant  aud  he  sought  the  advice  of  Dr.  Nott, 
the  president  of  his  alma  mater,  and  of  Dr. . 
Luckey,  of  the  Methodist  Church.  The  result  of 
this  consideration  was  a  passage  in  the  message  of 
1840  as  follows  : 

"The  children  of  foreigners,  found  in  great  num 
bers  in  our  populous  cities  and  towns,  and  in  the 
vicinity  of  our  public  works,  are  too  often  deprived 
of  the  advantages  of  our  system  of  public  education 
in  consequence  of  prejudices  arising  from  difference 
of  language  or  religion.  It  ought  never  to  be  for 
gotten  that  the  public  welfare  is  as  deeply  concerned 
in  their  education  as  in  that  of  our  own  children. 
I  do  not  hesitate,  therefore,  to  recommend  the  estab 
lishment  of  schools  in  which  they  may  be  instructed 
by  teachers  speaking  the  same  language  with  them 
selves  and  professing  the  same  faith."  l 

This  recommendation  was  not  accepted  by  the 
Whigs  as  a  whole,  largely  because  the  foreigners  in . 
question  were  chiefly  Irish,  who  were  commonly 
Democrats.  Seward,  however,  pressed  the  idea  in 
the  next  session,  so  that  the  Secretary  of  State, 
John  C.  Spencer,  made  an  elaborate  report  on  the 
1  Works,  Vol.  II,  p.  215. 


146  WILLIAM  H.  SKWARD 

school  system,  proposing  the  extension  to  New  York 
City  of  the  district  system  which  prevailed  in  the 
rest  of  the  state.  The  Senate  believed  that  this 
plan  would  be  entirely  destructive  of  good  order  and 
management,  and  declined  to  pass  that  part  of  the 
bill  which  embodied  it,  on  grounds  that  would  to- 
day  be  very  generally  considered  proper.  Seward 
thought  otherwise.  He  felt  that  he  had  taken  upon 
himself  the  cause  of  the  foreigner, — in  this  case  the 
Irish  Catholic  of  New  York  City.  If  his  general 
ideas  of  justice  had  not  led  him  to  this  opinion,  his 
ideas  of  the  importance  of  education  to  the  mass  of 
immigrants  now  coming  to  America  would  have 
done  so.  His  views  on  internal  improvement  were 
beginning  to  broaden  out,  as  he  saw  that  the  couu- 
try,  as  a  whole,  needed  not  only  transportation  but 
free  labor  and  plenty  of  it.  The  great  number  of 
immigrants  in  New  York  were  opposed  to  him  polit 
ically,  but  he  felt  strongly  that  the  country  could 
not  prosper  unless  they  had  an  opportunity  for  as 
good  an  education  as  could  be  had.  For  his  part, 
he  saw  no  way  for  them  to  get  it  save  in  schools 
where  they  might  be  instructed  by  teachers  of  their 
own  language  and  their  own  faith,  and  this  he 
thought  could  be  brought  about  only  by  the  district 
system.  He  returned  to  the  matter  at  the  next  ses 
sion  (1842),  calling  attention  to  it  in  his  last  annual 
message. 

In  the  very  considerable  agitation  that  arose, 
Seward  was  in  principle  right  and  consistent,  al 
though  the  moans  that  lie  advocated  is  not  now 
thought  the  best.  His  phrase  about  speech  and  re- 


GOVERNOR  SEWARD  147 

ligion  was  widely  misunderstood  :  it  was  represented- 
as  meaning  that  instruction  might  be  in  foreign  lan 
guages  ;  that  religious  teaching  should  find  a  place 
in  the  schools.  Seward  had  neither  of  these  ideas. 
The  Irish  Catholics,  he  saw,  were  kept  away  by  the 
priests  from  schools  with  Protestant  teachers.  The 
German  children,  he  saw,  often  had  a  very  poor 
chance  with  teachers  who  had  no  knowledge  of  their 
language.  He  thought  that  if  the  various  districts 
of  a  city  could  regulate  their  own  school  conditions, 
the  matter  could  be  adjusted.  It  is  true  that  Sew- 
ard's  position  is  not  now  deemed  wise,  but  he  took 
it  and  maintained  it  conscientiously  and  in  oppo-. 
sition  to  his  own  political  party.  In  writing  to 
Bishop  Hughes  in  1841  after  having  declined  a  re- 
nomination  in  1842  he  says:  "I  am  not  now  a 
candidate,  nor  can  I  foresee  an  occasion  when  I  shall 
either  find  it  my  duty,  or  have  a  desire,  to  offer  my 
self  for  the  suffrages  of  my  fellow  citizens.  What 
ever  may  have  been  thought  before,  I  can  afford 
now,  at  least,  to  be  frank  and  honest.  I  reaffirm 
all  I  have  before  promulgated  concerning  the  policy 
of  this  country  in  regard  to  foreigners  and  the  edu 
cation  of  their  children." 

Seward  now  had  an  opportunity  to  stand  up  to  the 
glittering  generalities  of  earlier  days.  In  a  Fourth 
of  July  oration  at  Syracuse  in  1831,  he  had  spoken 
of  the  United  States  as  a  country  where  "  universal^ 
education  enables  every  man  to  understand  the  con 
stitution,  laws,  interests  of  the  state."  But  on  a 
later  Fourth  (1839),  speaking  at  a  Sunday-school 
celebration  at  Stateu  Island,  with  the  conditions  of 


148  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

New  York  City  fresh  in  his  mind  he  candidly  says : 
"  Our  institutions,  excellent  as  they  are,  have 
hitherto  produced  but  a  small  portion  of  the  benefi 
cent  results  they  are  calculated  to  confer  on  the 
people. "  He  made  his  best  efforts  to  correct  the 
inconsistency  :  he  was  not  very  successful  in  a  prac 
tical  way,  and  politically  the  evil  results  pursued 
him  through  life.  Immediately  they  were  bad. 

1  Seward's  measures  alienated  from  him  the  Whigs 
who  disapproved  of  his  plans  and  did  not  gain  the 
political  support  of  those  whom  he  sought  to  aid. 
The  point  was  characteristic  and  important :  no 
other  position  of  Seward's  was  more  prejudicial  to 
his  own  interests.1  If  we  look  for  one  thing  more 
than  any  other  that  stood  in  the  way  of  Seward's 
final  attainment  of  the  highest  object  of  his  political 
ambition,  we  shall  find  nothing  more  apparent  than 

xthis  espousal  of  the  cause  of  the  foreign  immigrant. 
Seward  could  not  have  seen  the  future  possibilities 
of  his  actions,  but  if  he  had,  he  could  hardly  have 
had  other  opinions  ;  and  when  he  later  observed  the 
political  necessities  of  his  views,  he  still  refused  to 
change  his  position.  With  a  mind  set  upon  the 
prosperity  of  the  country,  he  saw  clearly  that  slave 
labor  was  a  drawback,  and  that  a  free  labor  system 
must  prevail.  But  free  labor  meant  immigration 
and,  to  be  healthy,  immigration  demanded  the  best 
education. 

Another  case  in  which  Seward  felt  himself  called 

1  Exception  will  perhaps  be  made  by  some,  of  Seward's  anti- 
slavery  opinions.  But  these  were  not  in  the  main  prejudicial  to 
his  interests  because  he  made  them  practically  the  mainspring 
of  his  political  life,  and  stood  or  fell  with  them. 


GOVEENOK  SEWAED  149 

on  to  act  for  himself,  though  not  embroiling  him 
with  his  own  party,  was  yet  one  which  called 
for  firmness.  He  had  long  felt  that  the  adminis 
tration  of  justice  in  the  state  was  not  what  it 
should  be.  While  in  the  Senate,  he  had  given  time 
and  effort  to  the  abolition  of  imprisonment  for  debt, 
and  with  general  success.  Something  still  remained 
to  be  done  in  applying  the  principle  to  those  who 
were  held  by  process  in  the  United  States  courts. 
He  recommended  also  that  the  district  judges  should 
be  relieved  of  the  appointment  of  certain  county 
officials  as  treasurers,  superintendents  of  the  poor- 
house,  and  others.  These  propositions  met  with  no 
objection  to  speak  of.  When,  however,  he  proposed 
to  reduce  legal  fees  and  to  simplify  legal  proceed 
ings,  he  found  very  serious  opposition.  He  per 
severed,  however,  and  Senator  Mayuard,  from 
Seward's  own  district,  introduced  a  bill  which  was 
carried  through  during  the  session  of  1839.  In  addi 
tion  to  these  things,  there  was  of  course  an  immense 
number  of  matters  that  made  demands  upon  his  time 
and  strength.  The  applications  to  the  executive 
for  pardon  are  always  difficult  to  decide.  Seward 
investigated  carefully  and  did  his  best  to  use  the 
powers  given  him  for  the  right.  At  the  end  of  his 
first  term  he  was  charged  with  reckless  and  un 
worthy  bestowal  of  pardon,  but  when  the  facts  were 
known,  it  appeared  that  he  had  granted  in  all  only 
13(5  pardons  in  two  years,  while  none  of  his  predeces 
sors  had  in  that  time  fallen  short  of  200,  and  some 
had  reached  the  number  of  600.  There  was  also  an 
interesting  element  in  the  relation  of  the  governor 


150  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

of  the  state  with  the  various  Iiidian  tribes  still 
within  its  borders.  Se ward's  first  official  dinner 
was  given  to  a  delegation  of  Oneida  and  Stockbridge 
Indians,  who  had  come  to  lay  before  him  certain 
grievances  and  claims.  Another  matter  which 
caused  him  great  difficulty  was  what  was  called  the 
Helderberg  Anti-Kent  War.  Headers  of  Cooper's 
Chainbearer,  and  more  particularly  The  Indians, 
will  remember  the  possibilities  offered  by  the  large 
colonial  grants  of  land  for  great  misunderstandings 
on  the  subject  of  rent.  The  Helderberg  war  was  a 
misunderstanding  that  arose  on  the  death  of  the 
patroon,  General  Stephen  Van  Eensselaer,  at  the 
attempt  of  his  heir  to  collect  his  rents.  Seward 
was  able  to  deal  with  the  open  lawlessness  that  was 
threatened,  but  the  real  difficulties  at  issue  were 
not  settled  until  long  afterward. 

Beside  these  matters  of  considerable  importance, 
there  were  unnumbered  matters  of  all  kinds,  most 
of  which  could  have  been  attended  to  by  any  up 
right,  intelligent,  and  kind-hearted  man,  as  well  as 
by  the  governor  of  the  state.  There  was  the  going 
to  dinners,  and  to  Fourth  of  July  and  commence 
ment  celebrations ;  the  attending  to  scientific  or 
literary  departments  of  the  government,  and  other 
tasks  of  that  kind.  Seward  felt  that  he  had  too 
much  to  do,  but  he  often  enjoyed  these  miscellaneous 
occupations  as  much  as  any  of  his  more  important 
duties.  Not  least  among  these  official  occasions  did 
he  enjoy  his  annual  visit  to  Union  College  at  com 
mencement,  in  the  capacity  not  merely  of  old 
graduate,  but  also  of  ex-officio  trustee  as  governor 


GOVERNOR  SEWARD  151 

of  the  state.  He  had  kept  up  his  relations  with  the 
college,  and  often  turned  to  Dr.  Nott  for  advice, 
retaining  through  life  his  affection  and  respect  for 
his  old  president,  whose  picture  hung  over  the 
mantel  of  Seward's  study  in  his  house  at  Washing 
ton  long  afterward. 

As  his  first  term  drew  to  an  end,  there  arose  the 
question  of  renomination.  As  a  private  matter, 
Seward  would  probably  have  inclined  to  withdraw, 
if  only  for  financial  reasons.  His  salary  did  not  go 
far  toward  defraying  the  large  expense  that  he  was 
compelled  to  incur  and  he  had,  of  course,  no  time 
to  earn  anything  more.  He  had  had  small  savings 
when  he  was  elected,  and  his  partnership  in  the  Hol 
land  land  business  was,  at  this  time,  rather  a  burden 
than  a  help.  Nevertheless,  as  his  political  friends 
considered  it  essential,  he  consented  to  a  renomina 
tion,  although  it  was  certain  that  there  were  definite 
elements  in  the  state  that  would  join  the  Democrats 
in  opposition  to  him. 

It  could  not,  however,  have  been  thought  that 
there  was  much  risk  of  defeat.  The  campaign  of 
1840  was  one  which  has  become  famous  in  the  his 
tory  of  the  country.  It  was  the  "  Hard  Cider," 
"Log-Cabin,"  "Tippeeauoe"  campaign.  Those 
names  very  properly  describe  it  because  they  have 
in  themselves  no  particular  meaning  as  applied  to 
politics.  It  is  difficult  to  believe  that  any  man 
could  have  voted  intelligently  for  Harrison,  either 
because  he  drank  hard  cider,  or  had  lived  in  a  log- 
cabin,  or  had  been  victor  in  the  battle  of  Tippeca- 
noe.  We  might  also  add  that  one  would  hardly 


152  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

have  voted  for  him  for  any  other  good  reason,  for 
though  a  perfectly  worthy  and  respectable  man,  he 
was  by  no  means  so  deserving  of  the  presidency  as 
Henry  Clay  or  Daniel  Webster,  the  great  leaders  of 
the  Whig  party.  But  this  was  a  campaign  of  en 
thusiasm.  The  Whigs  were  a  growing  party  ;  they 
were  the  friends  of  liberty  and  were  bound  to  tri 
umph  ;  in  fact,  their  minds  were  chiefly  set  on 
triumphing.  They  were  confident  that  if  there  were 
no  accident,  they  could  be  successful  against  Van 
Buren  ;  and  as  they  had  never  yet  had  a  national 
victory,  they  felt  that  they  could  not  miss  the 
present  chance.  If  they  could  win  in  1840,  they 
would  then  be  hopeful  for  1844.  Hence  so  shrewd 
an  observer  as  Thurlow  Weed  writes:  "  Though 
warmly  attached  to  Mr.  Clay,  and  preferring  him 
over  all  others  for  President,  I  did  not  believe  he 
could  be  elected.  I  was  influenced  by  two  consider 
ations  :  First,  that  Mr.  Clay  himself  should  not  be  sub 
jected  to  the  mortification  of  defeat ;  and  second,  that 
the  Whig  party  should  not  lose  its  opportunity. "  1 

The  Whigs  did  not  lose  their  opportunity.  They 
nominated  Harrison  for  purely  opportunist  reasons, 
went  about  electing  him  with  a  rush,  made  a  whirl 
wind  campaign,  and  were  appropriately  rewarded  a 
month  after  his  inauguration  by  the  accession  of 
Tyler,  who  having  never  lived  in  a  log-cabin  or 
drunk  hard  cider  or  fought  at  Tippecanoe,  proved 
to  be  a  President  very  disagreeable  to  them. 

With  all  this  Seward  had  very  little  to  do.  He 
had  been  nominated  at  Utica  at  a  vast  mass-meeting 

1  Life  of  Weed,  Vol.  I,  p.  480. 


GOVERNOR  SEWAED  153 

of  25,000  people,  with  plenty  of  log-cabiiis  and  so 
on.  But  these  inspiring  adjuncts  had  little  connec 
tion  with  Seward,  and  were  of  small  aid  to  him  in 
his  canvass  against  William  C.  Bouck,  the  Demo 
cratic  candidate.  Mr.  Bouck  was  one  of  the  canal 
commissioners  whom,  the  Whigs  had  removed  to 
give  place  to  men  of  their  own  party.  He  was 
therefore  as  available  as  Seward,  so  far  as  internal  im 
provements  were  concerned.  The  Small  Bill  issue, 
so  important  two  years  before,  had  been  successfully 
settled  by  Seward  himself.  He  had  lost  some  of  his 
strong  cards,  and  also  held  some  rather  weak  ones. 
His  position  on  the  school  question  had  given  a 
means  of  opposition  :  the  Protestants  were  told  that 
he  meant  to  hand  over  the  school  system  to  the 
Pope  ;  the  Catholics  were  told  that  however  favor 
able  to  their  views  Seward  might  be,  the  Whig 
party  was  opposed  to  him  in  that  respect.  A  cer 
tain  hostility  also  had  been  stirred  up  by  Seward' s 
attempts  at  legal  reform,  on  the  part  of  those  who 
had  more  interest  in  maintaining  things  as  they 
were  than  in  idealistic  notions  for  the  future.  His 
avowed  anti- slavery  views  were  prejudicial  to  him 
at  the  polls,  because  many  Whigs  were  thereby  led 
to  vote  against  him  ;  while  those  who  approved  his 
opinions,  voted  for  the  anti-slavery  candidate, 
James  G.  Birney.  Here  Seward  was  only  half 
heartedly  Whig :  he  saw  how  the  party  stood 
on  the  question  of  slavery  and  therefore  could 
not  consent  to  the  nomination  of  Clay.1  But  he 

1  "So  long  ago  as  1838,   1839,   1840,  it  was  certain  that  the 
abolition  of  slavery  had  become  an  element  of  the  Whig  party 


154  WILLIAM  H.  BBWABD 

also  could  not  see  any  wisdom  in  the  nomination  of 
Harrison. 

It  was  a  Whig  year,  however,  and  Seward  was  re- 
elected.  He  came  in  with  a  majority  less  than  his 
own  of  two  years  before  and  about  half  that  of  Har 
rison,  who  ran  somewhat  ahead  of  his  ticket  as 
Seward  ran  somewhat  behind  it.  There  were  a 
good  many  Democrats  who  would  not  vote  for  Van 
Bureu,  but  there  were  as  many  Whigs  who  would 
not  vote  for  Seward.  He  was  held  to  be  too  theo 
retical.  His  general  principles  in  education  are 
now  taken  for  granted.  His  legal  reforms  were 
carried  the  next  session  of  the  legislature  and  have 
never  been  repealed.  His  anti-slavery  ideas  were 
fought  out  in  the  Civil  War.  Seward  was  wiser  in 
these  respects  than  many  who  supported  Harrison. 
But  in  1840  wisdom  was  not  so  seductive  a  voice  in 
the  streets  as  "  Hard  Cider, "  the  "  Log  -Cabin,"  and 
"  Tippecanoe." 

in  the  North,  an  element  of  great  power  for  the  strength  and 
exhaustion  of  the  party.  Many  of  us  knew  in  1840  that  the 
nomination  of  Mr.  Clay  would  expel  Abolitionism  from  the 
party,  and  our  advice  to  the  contrary  prevailed.  The  Whig 
party  succeeded."  Seward  to  Mrs.  Schuyler,  Nov.  13,  1844. 
Schuyler  MSS. 


CHAPTER  IX 

SECOND    TERM    AS  GOVERNOR 

WITH  the  death  of  Harrison  came  no  real  check 
upon  the  plans  and  hopes  of  the  Whig  party.  Har 
rison  himself  had  not  been  essential  to  their  cam 
paign  ;  Tyler  promised  to  carry  out  his  principles, 
and  at  first  retained  his  cabinet ;  Congress  had  a 
Whig  majority  in  each  house.  But  it  soon  appeared 
that  Tyler  was  not  precisely  the  man  he  had  been 
supposed  to  be.  Seward's  experience  with  him 
arose  from  correspondence  with  the  general  gov 
ernment  in  the  McLeod  case,  which  had  arisen 
some  time  before. 

This  matter  grew  out  of  the  excitement  that  had 
prevailed  a  few  years  previously  in  New  York,  as 
well  as  in  other  states  bordering  upon  Canada, 
on  the  occasion  of  an  insurrection  in  that  province. 
As  is  very  likely  to  happen  in  such  cases,  great 
sympathy  was  expressed  in  New  York  with  the 
insurgents,  and  all  sorts  of  efforts  were  made  to 
render  assistance,  which  were  repressed  as  far  as 
possible  by  the  officials  of  the  state  and  of  the 
United  States.  In  the  course  of  these  proceedings 
the  Caroline,  a  steamer  which  was  asserted  to  be 
owned  or  chartered  by  people  who  meant  to  help 
the  Canadian  insurgents,  was  attacked  by  a  party 
sent  out  by  the  Canadian  government  and  burned. 
The  attack  took  place  while  the  Caroline  was  iu 


156  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

an  American  port.     All  this  occurred  before  Seward 
became  governor. 

In  November,  1840,  however,  Alexander  McLeod, 
a  Canadian  who  happened  to  be  in  Niagara,  N.  Y., 
admitted  or  boasted  that  he  had  been  concerned 
in  the  Caroline  affair,  and  was  therefore  arrested 
on  the  charge  of  arson,  and  put  in  jail  in  Lockport. 
The  incident  at  once  aroused  international  excite 
ment.  Great  Britain  avowed  herself  to  be  re 
sponsible  for  it,  whereby,  in  her  view,  it  ceased 
to  be  a  personal  matter,  and  demanded  that  McLeod 
be  released.  The  United  States  government  re 
plied  that  whether  that  view  were  to  be  taken  or 
not,  the  case  was  at  present  in  the  hands  of  the 
judiciary  of  the  state  of  New  York  for  examination 
and  that  the  Federal  government  could  not  inter 
fere.  Popular  feeling  was  such  that  when  bail  was 
offered  for  McLeod,  the  bondsmen  thought  best  to 
withdraw  it.  Shortly  afterward  he  was  indicted  for 
murder ;  namely,  of  one  of  those  killed  on  the  Caroline. 

Such  cases  are  most  delicate :  no  state  can  have 
any  direct  dealings  with  a  foreign  power,  so  that 
all  negotiations  have  to  pass  through  the  general 
government.  On  the  other  hand,  a  foreign  country 
rarely  understands  why  the  Federal  government 
cannot  compel  one  of  the  United  States  to  do  as  it 
desires.  In  this  case  there  was  no  real  friction 
between  the  state  and  the  general  government, 
until  a  curious  accident  arose.  Ambrose  Spencer, 
who,  it  happened,  had  accepted  a  retainer  to  de 
fend  McLeod,  was  appointed  United  States  district 
attorney  for  the  northern  district  of  New  York. 


SECOND  TEEM  AS  GOVERNOR        157 

He  saw  fit  to  continue  his  services  to  McLeod  after 
his  appointment.  In  the  trial,  therefore,  the 
public  was  presented  with  the  curious  spectacle 
of  a  prisoner  prosecuted  by  the  attorney -general 
of  the  state  and  the  district  attorney  of  the  county, 
and  defended  by  the  United  States  district  attorney. 
Seward  wrote  to  President  Tyler,  calling  his  at- 
tention  to  the  matter,  but  the  President  answered 
that  the  affair  was  a  part  of  Mr.  Spencer's  private 
business  and  that  he  would  not  interfere.  It  ap 
peared  as  if  the  politicians  would  be  able  to  make 
an  issue  out  of  the  case.  The  trial  took  place  in 
October,  1841,  and  resulted  in  the  acquittal  of 
McLeod  on  the  ground  of  an  alibi.  The  British 
commandant  of  the  Caroline  expedition  sent  a 
deposition  to  the  effect  that  he  neither  knew  nor 
believed  McLeod  to  have  been  concerned  in  the 
incident,  while  other  persons  testified  that  he  had 
been  elsewhere.  He  was  therefore  released  and 
sent  to  Canada,  and  the  affair  was  dropped.  But 
its  impression  upon  Seward  was  by  no  means  satis 
factory.  He  was  thought  to  have  acted  with 
wisdom  and  firmness,  but  the  attitude  of  the  Presi 
dent  and  the  general  government  had  been  not  at 
all  what  he  might  have  expected  or  hoped.1 

1  "  Nothing  could  have  been  more  unkind  or  unwise  than  the 
course  pursued  toward  me  by  the  general  government  in  re 
lation  to  the  McLeod  affair.  ...  It  has  been  somewhat 
oppressive  upon  me  personally,  to  have  Mr.  Webster  roll  over 
upon  us  the  weight  of  his  great  name  and  fame  to  smother 
me."  To  Morgan  in  Life,  Vol.  I,  p.  552.  But  he  also  wrote 
home:  "The  Supreme  Court  has  maintained  all  my  posi 
tions  and  overthrown  Mr.  Webster's  in  the  McLeod  case." 
Vol.  I,  p.  552. 


158  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

As  he  had  his  difficulties  with  the  general  govern 
ment  in  this  case,  so  in  another  case  did  Governor 
Seward  come  in  contact  with  the  government  of 
another  state.  If  his  experience  with  Tyler  had 
given  him  new  ideas  on  the  subject  of  general 
politics,  his  experience  in  the  Virginia  case  must 
have  caused  him  to  think  far  more  seriously  than 
ever  before  on  the  subject  of  slavery.  Anti- 
slavery  was  forcing  itself  upon  the  public  mind  in 
many  ways.  We  have  already  mentioned  its  in 
fluence  during  Seward' s  first  election,  and  seen 
how  he  had  feared  that  it  would  wreck  his  canvass. 
After  the  election  occurred  some  practical  cases  of 
more  importance  than  the  theoretical  ones  pro 
pounded  by  the  anti-slavery  men. 

The  first  of  these  arose  on  the  demand  of  the 
governor  of  Virginia  for  the  return  of  three  negro 
sailors  who  were  accused  of  helping  a  slave  to 
escape  from  Norfolk,  Va.  There  was  no  disagree 
ment  about  the  main  facts,  which  were  these  :  A 
negro  slave  named  Isaac  had  been  employed  upon 
a  schooner  from  New  York  then  lying  in  Norfolk 
harbor.  On  the  schooner  were  three  negro  sailors, 
one  of  whom,  according  to  Isaac's  testimony,  had 
told  him  he  was  foolish  to  stay  in  Virginia  when 
he  could  get  good  wages  in  the  North.  However 
that  was,  Isaac  was  missed  when  the  ship  left.  His 
owner  sent  to  New  York,  and  he  was  found  concealed 
in  the  schooner  and  carried  back  to  Virginia.  The 
governor  of  Virginia  now  applied  to  the  governor 
of  New  York  for  the  delivery  of  the  three  negroes 
who  had,  it  was  alleged,  helped  Isaac  to  escape. 


SECOND  TEHM  AS  GOVEENOK        159 

The  matter,  although  not  of  great  intrinsic  im 
portance  (except  to  the  three  men  involved),  was 
one  that  brought  up  several  delicate  questions.  It 
would  have  been  easy  enough  to  have  at  once  de 
livered  the  sailors,  as  an  act  of  comity  between  sister 
states.  But  Seward  seems  to  have  thought  this  an 
impossibility.  For  one  thing  he,  doubtless,  felt  the 
natural  right  of  everybody  to  remain  free  unless  he 
had  committed  some  crime,  which  in  his  view  did 
not  appear  in  the  premises.  Next,  there  was  the 
feeling  about  slavery  common  at  the  North  and  the 
dislike  to  be  domineered  over  by  the  slave  power. 
And  finally  there  was  the  reluctance  to  extend  the 
principle  of  the  return  of  fugitive  slaves  a  step 
farther  than  was  absolutely  necessary.  So  Seward 
wrote  to  the  governor  of  Virginia,  first  that  the 
papers  in  the  case  were  deficient,  and  when  he  had 
received  fuller  information,  he  declined  to  do  as  the 
governor  asked.  His  ground  for  such  refusal  was 
the  simple  view  that  the  case  did  not  come  under 
the  article  of  the  Constitution  which  authorizes  and 
enjoins  the  delivery  of  persons  "charged  in  any 
state  with  treason,  felony,  or  other  crime."  l  Aid 
ing  a  slave  to  escape  was  a  crime  in  Virginia,  so 
that  the  governor  of  that  state  thought  that  he  was 
charging  the  three  sailors  with  a  crime,  and  so 
bringing  the  case  under  the  Constitution.  But 
aiding  a  slave  to  escape  was  not  a  crime  in  New 
York,  so  that  the  governor  of  that  state  did  not 
view  the  specified  act  as  such,  and  therefore  did  not 
regard  the  case  as  coming  under  the  Constitution. 

1  Article  IV,  Sec.  II,  p.  2. 


160  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

"  The  true  question,"  said  Seward,  "  is  whether  the 
state  of  which  they  [the  sailors]  are  citizens  is  under 
a  constitutional  obligation  to  surrender  its  citizens 
to  be  carried  to  the  offended  state,  and  there  tried 
for  offenses  unknown  to  the  laws  of  their  own  state." 
There  were  no  precedents  that  Seward  knew  of,  and 
he  declined  to  make  the  delivery.  In  fact,  the  men 
had  already  been  released  by  the  recorder  of  the 
city  of  New  York  and  had  gone  their  ways.  But 
that  did  not  end  the  matter.  The  governor  of 
Virginia  dissented  from  Seward' s  view  and  wrote 
several  letters,  to  which  Seward  replied  with  re 
statements  of  his  own  position. 

The  question  was  one  which  seemed  of  impor 
tance  only  because  it  had  a  bearing  upon  slavey. 
Not  very  long  before,  demands  had  been  made 
upon  Seward  for  the  delivery  of  fugitives  from 
other  states,  charged  with  offenses  that  were  not 
crimes  by  the  laws  of  New  York.  Seward  had 
denied  those  requests  and  nothing  further  was 
heard  of  them.  But  this  case  lasted  through  his 
two  terms.  Lieutenant-Governor  Hopkins  of  Vir 
ginia,  with  whom  it  had  originated,  left  it  to  his 
successor.  Governor  Gilmer  referred  it  to  the 
Virginia  legislature  which  had  it  examined  by  a 
special  committee,  and  then  sent  a  request  to 
Seward  to  refer  it  to  the  legislature  of  New  York. 
Seward  did  so,  with  the  remark  that  the  case  was 
an  executive  matter,  but  that  he  should  be  glad  to 
have  any  advice  that  the  legislature  cared  to  give. 
The  legislature  of  Virginia  also  asked  the  governor 
to  send  copies  of  the  Virginia  report  to  the 


SECOND  TEEM  AS  GOVEENOE        161 

executive  of  each  state  with  the  request  that 
they  be  laid  before  the  legislatures,  and  to  ask 
especially  each  of  the  slaveholding  states  to  co 
operate  with  Virginia.  When  these  measures  did 
not  succeed  in  changing  Seward's  position,  Gov 
ernor  Gilmer,  in  his  annual  message,  urged  the 
legislature  to  consider  whether,  if  no  other  remedy 
could  be  found,  it  might  not  become  their  "  im 
perative  and  solemn  duty  to  appeal  from  the 
canceled  obligations  of  the  compact  to  original 
rights  and  the  law  of  self-preservation."  Some 
months  afterward,  when  a  person  named  Curry, 
charged  with  forgery  in  New  York,  had  been 
arrested  in  Virginia,  a  request  for  his  delivery  was 
made.  The  governor  ordered  that  he  be  given  up 
when  the  three  negro  sailors  were  given  up  by  the 
state  of  New  York  ;  but  subsequently  he  receded 
from  the  position  and  surrendered  the  man.  The 
Virginia  legislature  passed  a  law  establishing  an 
inspection  of  vessels  sailing  for  ports  in  New  York, 
with  a  view  to  detecting  those  who  should  assist 
slaves  to  escape,  and  punishing  them  with  a  fine 
of  $500  or  four  months'  imprisonment.  The  mat 
ter  lasted  longer  still,  into  the  administration  of 
Seward's  successor,  who,  being  a  Democrat,  had 
rather  different  views  upon  the  subject.  All  this 
time  the  three  negro  sailors,  having  been  released 
upon  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  walked  the  streets  or 
sailed  the  seas,  without  again  intruding  upon  his 
tory. 

Seward,  however,  had  received  an  intimation  on 
the  subject  of  slavery  which  must  have  made  a  last- 


162  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

ing  impression.  He  had  previously  considered  the 
slavery  question  on  several  occasions.  He  had 
lived  in  Georgia  and  traveled  in  Virginia  and  had 
formed  some  opinions  from  his  own  observation. 
He  had  further  been  led  to  go  over  the  subject 
theoretically  and  had  come  to  the  conclusion  that 
slavery  was  a  bar  to  the  progress  of  the  country, 
which  the  Democratic  party  was  very  unlikely  to 
remove  or  lessen.  Perhaps,  as  time  went  on,  he 
saw  that  the  Whig  party  was  not  very  likely  to  re 
move  it,  either.  But,  however  those  things  stood 
in  his  mind,  here  was  a  practical  case,  something 
that  brought  very  close  to  him  the  true  nature  of 
the  conflict  involved.  For  he  must  have  seen  that 
though  his  own  view  seemed  correct  to  himself,  the 
view  of  the  governor  of  Virginia  was  a  very  natural 
one.  Certainly  Seward  could  not  think  it  right  to 
give  up  men  who  were  accused  of  what  to  him  and 
as  regards  the  laws  of  New  York,  was  no  crime  at 
all.  But  on  the  other  hand,  the  state  of  Virginia 
was  not  extravagant  in  its  desire  that  those  who 
were  accused  of  a  serious  crime  should  not  easily 
find  asylum  in  another  state.  If  the  men  had  been 
legally  accused  of  stealing  any  other  kind  of  prop 
erty,  New  York  would  readily  have  sent  them  back 
to  Virginia.  They  were  accused  of  stealing  what 
was  property  to  the  Virginian,  and  because  New 
York  had  a  different  view,  the  quest  was  refused. 
Until  this  different  way  of  looking  at  things  ceased, 
there  were  sure  to  be  cases  of  dispute,  and  probably, 
as  time  went  on,  in  matters  of  far  more  importance  than 
the  return  of  three  negro  sailors  charged  with  felony. 


SECOND  TERM  AS  GOVERNOR        163 

In  other  ways  we  must  note  Seward's  position  ID 
this  respect.  He  felt  that  as  the  state  of  New  York 
did  not  acknowledge  the  existence  of  slavery  within 
its  borders,  it  was  inconsistent  to  have  laws  which 
recognized  the  institution.  Accordingly  he  pro 
cured  the  repeal  of  the  measure  that  permitted  a 
master  traveling  through  the  state  with  slaves,  to 
retain  them  nine  months.  He  procured  the  passage 
of  a  law  that  granted  a  jury  trial  to  persons  accused 
of  being  fugitive  slaves,  and  of  another  law  that 
prohibited  state  officers  from  having  any  connection 
with  proceedings  looking  to  the  recovery  of  fugitive 
slaves.  Finally,  he  urged  an  amendment  to  the 
state  constitution  by  which  the  suffrage  should  be 
extended  to  the  negro  on  the  same  ground  as  the 
white  man.  In  these  respects  New  York  could  act 
for  herself,1  and  when  that  was  the  case,  Seward  de 
sired  that  she  should  consistently  take  the  position 
necessitated  by  justice  and  humanity. 

His  handling  of  the  controversy  with  Virginia, 
while  it  had  made  him  friends,  had  also  made  him 
enemies.  Lord  Morpeth,  afterward  the  Earl  of 
Carlisle,  who  was  at  this  time  traveling  in  the 
United  States,  says  of  Seward  that  he  was  the  first 
person  he  had  met  (it  was  in  the  earlier  part  of  his 
travels  in  America)  who  did  not  speak  slightingly 
of  the  Abolitionists  ;  he  thought  they  were  gradually 
gaining  ground.  "  He  had  already  acted  a  spirited 
part,"  he  goes  on,  "  in  points  connected  with  slav 
ery,  especially  in  a  contest  with  the  legislature  of 

lrThe  laws  mentioned  with  regard  to  fugitive  slaves,  bow- 
ever,  were  later  declared  unconstitutional. 


164  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

Virginia,    concerning    the    delivery     of    fugitive 
slaves."  ' 

Early  in  his  second  term  Seward  had  announced 
that  he  would  not  be  a  candidate  for  reelection. 
"Few,"  he  said  at  the  time,  "  will  understand  the 
grounds  of  this  decision."  The  main  consideration 
was  that  he  no  longer  felt  himself  the  actual  leader 
of  the  Whig  party  in  the  state.  The  party  would 
not  follow  him  on  the  issues  that  he  considered  es 
sential.  On  the  main  point  of  his  policy  for  state 
and  country, — that  of  internal  improvements, — they 
were  in  sympathy.  But  on  other  points  which  to 
Seward  seemed  necessary  developments  of  his  fun 
damental  idea  of  national  growth,  he  was  in 
disagreement  with  many  of  his  political  friends. 
He  considered  the  cause  of  free  labor  as  important 
as  that  of  internal  improvement,2  and  therefore  he 
pressed  his  ideas  on  popular  education,  on  natural 
ization,  and,  in  general,  on  other  measures  for  the 
advantage  of  the  immigrant.  Therefore  also  he  was 
an  anti-slavery  man.  In  March,  1842,  he  wrote  to 
Lewis  Tappan,  concerning  the  address  of  the  Liberty 
party's  state  convention  in  Ohio:  "I  am  right 
glad  to  see  the  argument  for  abolishing  slavery 
placed  upon  the  impregnable  and  yet  popular 
ground  of  the  evils  resulting  to  the  whole  country 
from  the  maintenance  of  a  system  of  compulsory 
labor  in  the  South."  This  may  not  have  been  a 
correct  view  ;  we  can  see  that  it  was  not  entirely  so 
from  what  follows  :  u  Every  day  will  win  listeners 

Carlisle  :     Travels  in  America,  p.  26. 
3  See  his  first  message. 


SECOND  TEKM  AS  GOVEBNOB        165 

and  favor  convictioD,  under  such  arguments  as 
these,  while  the  moral  question  encounters  preju 
dices,  the  growth  of  centuries."  The  anti-slavery 
movement  did  not  work  itself  out  on  these  lines, 
but  such  a  passage  shows  how  Seward  harmonized 
his  anti-slavery  views  with  the  general  policy  which 
he  had  pursued  from  the  beginning  of  his  public  life. 

The  Whig  party,  however,  did  not  agree  with 
him  in  these  matters.  They  would  not  commit 
themselves  on  the  anti-slavery  question  for  obvious 
reasons.  They  would  not  commit  themselves  on 
the  school  and  naturalization  questions,  because 
the  great  mass  of  immigrants  were  Democrats. 
There  were  also  plenty  of  people  in  the  state  who 
opposed  these  last  measures  because  the  great  mass 
of  immigrants  were  Irish  and  usually  Catholics. 
A  curious  exhibition  of  the  confusion  of  ideas  and 
principles  in  this  matter  is  shown  by  the  feeling 
excited  at  just  this  time  by  the  Eepeal  agitation  of 
Daniel  O'Connell. 

The  movement  aroused  great  sympathy  in 
America.  Seward  was  much  interested  in  it,  al 
though  when  asked  to  take  an  active  part  in  Eepeai 
meetings  or  Eepeal  associations,  he  declined  on  the 
ground  that  so  long  as  he  held  an  official  position  he 
could  not  properly  do  so.  But  his  feelings  were 
well  known  and  he  was  often  in  communication 
with  Irish-Americans  who  were  politically  opposed 
to  him.  O'Connell  himself,  however,  was  not 
wholly  to  the  mind  of  the  Democratic  party  to  which 
the  Irish  commonly  belonged,  because  of  his  vigorous 
denunciation  of  slavery. 


WILLIAM  H.  SEWABD 

In  these  various  ways,  therefore,  Seward  was  not 
in  harmony  with  his  party.  Even  in  the  McLeod 
case,  which  had  nothing  to  do  with  such  matters,  he 
found  himself  opposed  by  the  general  government, 
so  that  at  one  time  he  was  supported  only  by  the 
Democratic  party  in  the  state,  while  the  Whigs 
were  against  him.  During  the  last  year  of  his  term, 
Jiis  position,  from  one  standpoint  at  least,  became 
rather  easier,  for  the  Democrats  carried  a  majority 
of  seats  in  the  Assembly,  and  even  gained  a 
majority  in  the  Senate.  They,  therefore,  elected 
Democratic  state  officers,  and  Seward  found  him 
self  a  Whig  governor  with  a  hostile  majority. 
Though  this  relieved  him  from  the  responsibility  of 
differing  with  his  own  party,  it  put  him  in  the  more 
painful  position  of  having  contributed  to  its  defeat. 
He  was  therefore  glad,  on  all  accounts,  that  he  had 
not  considered  the  possibility  of  another  term. 
There  were  other  Whigs  who  had  claims  upon  the 
office.  Of  these  Luther  Bradish,  the  lieutenant- 
governor,  was  the  chief,  but  Fillmore  and  Collier 
were  also  named.  Mr.  Bradish  was  nominated  though 
the  result  was  unfavorable  to  the  Whigs.  Will 
iam  C.  Bouck,  an  61d  and  tried  Democrat,  was 
elected. 

Seward  closed  his  term  of  office  in  no  burst  of 
splendor  and  wilh  little  recognition.  Yet  he  had 
governed  the  state  well,  if  not  as  a  party  man,  cer 
tainly  as  a  public-spirited  citizen.  He  made  a 
great  impression  on  the  popular  mind  by  his  admin 
istration.  There  is  an  apocryphal  story  of  how  he 
once  told  a  stage  driver  that  he  was  governor  of  the 


SECOND  TEEM  AS  GOVEENOE        167 

state  and  was  amused  to  find  the  man  very  doubt 
ful.  "Let  us  leave  it  to  the  next  innkeeper,"  said 
Seward.  The  next  innkeeper,  who  was  something 
of  a  humorist,  was  appealed  to  as  to  whether  Seward 
were  not  governor.  "  Ko,"  said  he,  "  you  are  not." 
"Well,"  said  Seward  with  interest,  "  if  I  am  not 
governor  of  the  state,  who  is  f  "  "  Thurlow  Weed  ! ' ' 
was  the  reply.  There  is  another  story  that  tells  how 
Seward  appointed  Judge  Sackett  of  Seneca  Falls 
commissioner  to  consider  the  Helderberg  grievances. 
One  day  Sackett  asked  Seward  to  drive  out  to  the 
Helderberg  on  some  business.  When  they  stepped 
from  the  carriage,  the  crowd  at  once  surrounded 
Judge  Sackett,  who  was  a  fine-looking  man  over 
six  feet  in  height,  with  a  very  dignified  bearing  and 
a  gold-headed  cane,  and  gave  three  cheers.  Sackett 
corrected  their  mistake,  but  many  of  them,  he  re 
ported,  refused  to  believe  that  the  little  man  was 
governor  of  the  state.  In  spite  of  such  facts  and 
such  stories,  however,  Seward  was  the  real  governor, 
and  few  governors  were  longer  remembered.  Years 
after  he  had  gained  other  titles  of  honor,  the  name 
" Governor  Seward"  stuck  to  him,  not  only  in  the 
state  itself,  but  in  national  fields.  \Ve  can  think  of 
no  one  of  his  predecessors  or  successors  to  whom 
the  title  clung  so  persistently. 


CHAPTER  X 

NEW   ISSUES 

ONCE  before  when  Seward  departed  from  Albany 
for  Auburn,  it  had  seemed  that  he  was  leaving  the 
proud  world  and  going  home.  And  when  he  had  got 
to  his  family  and  friends,  his  house  and  his  office, 
he  had  often  felt  that  he  was  in  his  true  place,  the 
place  that  he  liked  and  was  meant  for.  He  looked 
out  from  "  the  loopholes  of  his  retreat"  on  Thurlow 
Weed  and  Francis  Granger,  on  Maynard  and  Whit- 
tlesey  and  Tracy  and  the  rest  as  senseless  gladiators 
in  a  dusty  arena.  In  fact,  he  had  often  dreamed  of 
the  pleasure  of  retiring  from  the  law  to  a  farm 
that  would  yield  him  enough  to  keep  him  and  his 
family,  without  troubling  himself  about  public  or 
private  business.1 

Now  at  the  end  of  his  administration,  the  feeling 
came  upon  him  more  strongly  than  ever,  and  there 
was  less  temptation  to  shake  it  off,  and  less  outside 
activity  to  dispel  it.  Almost  for  the  first  time  he 
returned  to  Auburn  without  real  political  occupa 
tion.  He  was  still  an  adviser,  but  not  exactly  a 
worker  in  the  Whig  party.  His  political  friends  of 
earlier  days  were  scattered.  Maynard  was  dead, 

1  "  By  and  by,  I  too  shall  get  at  ease  and  then,  oh  then,  for 
long  letters,  books,  philosophy  and  La  Grange  letters. "  Seward 
to  Weed,  1836.  Hollister  MSS. 


NEW  ISSUES  169 

Tracy  had  retired  to  private  life,  Whittlesey  was 
now  a  judge,  Granger  was  in  Washington.  New 
men  were  becoming  important  in  the  party.  Even 
Thurlow  Weed,  relieved  of  his  duties  as  State  Printer, 
was  about  to  leave  the  scene  of  action  and  go  abroad. 
Seward  himself  felt  a  little  estranged  from  his  party. 
He  had  been  governor  of  the  state  for  four  years 
and  his  ideas  of  duty  had  often  carried  him  along 
lines  which  his  political  allies  would  not  follow, 
fie  had  insisted  on  changes  in  the  judicial  system 
that  had  borne  heavily  on  friend  as  well  as  foe  ;  he 
had  involved  the  state  in  difficulties  with  a  sister 
state  which  made  political  action  hard  and  offered 
no  corresponding  return.  Even  in  the  school  ques 
tion  he  had  extended  to  political  opponents  sym 
pathy  and  assistance  by  which  his  political  friends 
could  gain  nothing  and  might  lose  much.  And 
further  there  was  another  point  on  which  he  and 
his  party  differed  :  the  subject  of  slavery.  He  saw 
that  the  question  of  its  abolition  had,  as  he  ex 
pressed  it  later,  "become  an  element  of  the  Whig 
party  in  the  North."  Hence  he  had  opposed  the 
nomination  of  Clay.  But  now,  looking  forward  to 
1844,  he  saw  no  second  Harrison  to  save  the  party 
from  this  time  making  the  choice.  The  nomina 
tion  of  Clay  would  cost  thousands  of  Whig  votes  in 
New  York.  But  the  party  would  not  listen  to  him, 
would  not  even  strive  for  the  conciliation  of  the 
Abolitionists. 

So  on  his  return  to  Auburn  he  was  really  retiring 
from  politics  more  truly  than  had  been  the  case  be 
fore.  When  he  had  left  the  Senate,  he  had  almost 


170  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

immediately  become  a  candidate  for  governor. 
Though  defeated  iu  that  campaign,  it  had  been 
clear  that  his  turn  would  come  soon.  Now  it  had 
come  to  him,  and  the  experience  was  at  an  end. 
He  felt  that  his  family  and  his  business  had  claims 
upon  him.  The  latter  had,  of  course,  almost 
gone  to  pieces.  While  he  had  been  governor, 
he  had  been  unable  to  keep  up  even  the  form  of 
legal  partnership  at  Auburn.  Now  he  must  start 
over  again,  as  if  from  the  very  beginning  :  to  hang 
up  his  sign  and  wait  for  clients  or  go  out  and  look 
for  them.  Nor  were  his  other  affairs  in  much  better 
condition.  In  earlier  days  he  had  invested  in  some 
real  estate  in  Auburn,  which  in  the  growth  of  the 
city  had  somewhat  appreciated  in  value.  But  his 
larger  land  dealings  in  Chautauqua  County  had  not 
proved  so  successful.  Before  going  to  Albany, 
when  he  could  give  his  time  to  the  management  of 
such  matters,  he  had  become  a  special  partner  with 
his  old  friend  Trunibull  Gary  in  the  land  venture. 
But  having  been  unable  to  look  after  that  business 
now  for  a  long  time,  he  had  found  himself  more  and 
more  involved  and  finally  seriously  embarrassed. 
In  fact,  when  he  returned  to  Auburn  in  1843,  he 
faced  a  load  of  debt  which  he  compared  with  that  of 
Sir  Walter  Scott,  and  which  he  set  about  raising  in 
the  same  way  as  Sir  Walter,  but  fortunately  with 
happier  result. 

He  nailed  up  an  old  tin  sign  that  he  had  and  put 
a  notice  in  the  paper,  saying  that  he  would  attend 
to  legal  business.  The  first  client  was  a  former 
whose  fences  had  been  broken  down  by  a  neighbor's 


NEW  ISSUES  171 

oxen.  He  did  not  at  once  find  much  to  do,  ex 
cept  giving  advice  gratis  to  old  friends.  But  as 
time  went  on  bis  practice  increased,  so  that  in  March 
he  writes  to  Weed,  "  My  little  law  business  has  so 
engrossed  nie  that  I  have  been  unable," — as  so  often 
for  other  reasons, — to  answer  a  letter.  He  began 
to  earn  as  much  as  his  salary  as  governor  and  that 
with  an  expenditure  largely  reduced.  He  was 
happy,  so  he  wrote,  much  more  so  than  while  in 
Albany,  because  he  had  recovered  a  sense  of  pecu 
niary  independence.1 

His  law  business  was  chiefly  in  the  state  courts, 
especially  the  Court  of  Chancery,  in  which  he  felt 
himself  particularly  at  home  because  it  seemed  to 
give  him  more  of  an  opportunity  to  consider  mat 
ters  from  the  standpoint  of  pure  equity.  With  his 
easy  power  of  expression,  he  was  a  master  in  the 
drawing  up  of  bills  in  chancery,  and  the  carrying 
on  of  this  part  of  his  work  occupied  a  great  deal  of 
his  attention,  though  he  also  often  went  into  court. 
At  this  time,  however,  he  turned  his  efforts  to  a 
wholly  different  kind  of  law  business,  which,  al 
though  it  seemed  at  first  to  have  no  connection  at 
all  with  his  earlier  occupations  and  special  abilities, 
proved,  as  a  fact,  to  be  something  for  which  he  was 
particularly  well  fitted.  This  was  patent  law. 
James  G.  Wilson,  the  owner  of  patent  rights,  offered 
him  a  retainer  on  the  strength  of  hearing  him  plead 
a  case  on  some  very  different  subject.  Seward  wjis 
doubtful  of  accepting.  But  he  did  accept  and  was 

1  JAfe,  Vol.  I,  p.  649.  He  goes  on,  "  I  suffered  more  from  the 
privation  of  that  than  anybody  knew  while  I  was  in  Albany." 


172  WILLIAM  II.  SEWAKD 

so  successful  that  he  very  soou  drew  to  himself  a 
great  deal  of  such  business,  which  made  quite  a 
change  iu  his  life,  for  patent  cases  are  tried  in 
the  United  States  courts,  and  necessitated  his  travel 
ing  all  over  the  country.  It  was  essential  for  him 
to  become  familiar  with  the  patent  law,  and  with 
the  general  principles  of  machinery.  But  when 
these  matters  were  mastered,  he  found  a  very  great 
satisfaction  in  the  new  branch  of  his  profession,  be 
cause  it  brought  him  into  contact  with  the  efforts  of 
man  to  use  the  forces  of  nature  in  ways  that  had 
hitherto  been  quite  unfamiliar  to  him.  He  had  al 
ways  been  keenly  interested  in  the  prosperity  of  the 
country,  and  his  earlier  political  positions,  as  has 
been  seen,  had,  in  the  main,  been  decided  by  his  atti 
tude  on  canals  and  railroads  and  other  internal 
improvements,  because,  living  where  and  when 
he  did,  transportation  was  the  great  necessity 
for  material  prosperity.  Now  he  began  to  see  a  lit 
tle  of  a  side  of  industrialism  that  he  had  hitherto 
known  nothing  about,  and  with  his  ready  curiosity 
he  found  it  exceedingly  absorbing.  Fortunately  it 
proved  profitable,  too,  and  he  began  to  think  se 
riously  of  being  able  to  pay  off  his  debts,  and  the  in 
terest,  with  perhaps  the  principal,  of  his  obliga 
tions  in  Chautauqua  County. 

Less  profitable,  when  it  came  to  laying  up  treas 
ures  on  earth,  were  two  criminal  cases  that  Seward 
undertook.  The  first  was  that  of  Wyatt,  who  was 
on  trial  for  murder.  The  facts  were  admitted  and 
there  seemed  no  reason  why  there  should  not  be  an 
immediate  conviction.  But  Seward,  who  became 


NEW  ISSUES  173 

interested,  was  led  to  believe  that  Wyatt  had  been 
insane  when  he  committed  the  crime.  He  sent  for 
specialists  to  examine  the  man,  undertook  his  de 
fense,  and  though  he  could  not  secure  an  acquittal, 
succeeded  in  bringing  about  a  disagreement.  Not 
very  long  afterward  another  murder  was  committed 
by  a  negro  named  Freeman,  a  most  cruel  and  unex- 
plainable  act ;  four  people,  a  farmer  and  his  family 
near  Auburn,  were  butchered  by  the  negro  for  no 
reason  that  could  be  conceived.  Public  feeling 
arose  at  once,  and  demanded  punishment.  People 
were  not  slow  in  imagining  that  the  disagreement  of 
the  jury  in  Wyatt7 s  case  had  encouraged  Freeman 
to  the  murder.  Seward,  who  was  at  the  time 
absent,  was  held  responsible  for  the  suggestion  of 
insanity.  No  one  seemed  to  remember  that,  as  the 
law  took  account  of  insanity,  it  was  surely  the  duty 
of  somebody  at  least  to  suggest  the  possibility ; 
many  regarded  Seward  as  a  public  enemy.  The 
case  of  Wyatt,  coming  up  for  a  second  trial,  was 
hurried  through  rapidly.  Before  it  was  completed, 
Freeman  was  arraigned.  He  was  deaf  and  seemed 
idiotic  :  he  had  been  wrongfully  imprisoned  shortly 
before  and  in  jail  had  been  abused.  He  gave  no 
intelligible  answers  to  any  question.  Seward  moved 
that  he  be  examined  before  a  jury  as  to  his  sanity 
before  he  was  brought  for  trial.  He  was  so  ex 
amined,  and,  after  long  consultation,  a  verdict  was 
given  that  the  prisoner  was  sane  enough  to  dis 
tinguish  between  right  and  wrong.  It  is  hard  to 
present  an  idea  of  the  popular  excitement  in  the 
case  :  it  was  creditable  that  the  man  was  not  imine- 


174  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

diately  lynched.  As  it  was,  the  trial  was  continued. 
When  Freeman  was  brought  before  the  court,  he 
apparently  understood  nothing  of  what  was  going 
on.  The  judge  asked  if  he  had  any  counsel,  but  he 
had  neither  counsel  nor  any  comprehension  of  what 
counsel  might  be.  Seward  undertook  the  case.  He 
was  convinced  that  Wyatt  was  insane,  and  still 
more  now  that  Freeman  was  insane.  There  was  no 
denial  of  the  facts  of  the  killing :  all  that  could  be  done 
was  to  argue  once  more  the  question  of  sanity  when 
the  act  was  committed.  The  trial  lasted  a  fortnight 
or  more  and  ended  with  a  verdict  of  guilty.  Seward 
had  expected  nothing  else,  but  he  was  deeply 
pained  at  the  irrational  state  of  the  public  mind. 
He  had,  however,  done  his  duty,  though  at  the  ex 
pense  of  enormous  unpopularity.  He  was  regarded 
as  an  enemy  of  justice,  an  enemy  of  peaceful  living, 
an  enemy  of  the  human  race. 

Besides  these  very  practical  matters,  there  were 
others  quite  as  absorbing.  During  the  four  years 
that  Seward  had  been  in  Albany,  the  wind  and  the 
worms  had  played  havoc  with  the  many  trees  around 
his  house  in  Auburn.  He  counted  over  a  hun 
dred  that  had  been  destroyed.  He  had  set  out  fruit 
trees,  and  had  lost,  through  neglect,  almost  one- 
third  of  their  number.  As  soon  as  the  snow  had 
gone,  he  began  to  repair  the  damage.  He  went  out 
into  the  woods  and  got  elms  and  mountain -ashes  and 
evergreens  in  large  quantities.  By  the  middle  of 
May  he  summed  up  one  hundred  and  seventy  trees 
that  he  had  set  out  in  place  of  the  old  ones,  besides 
great  numbers  of  gooseberries  and  raspberries.  To 


NEW  ISSUES  175 

his  intense  delight  he  was  aided  in  these  efforts 
by  the  appearance  of  the  red-headed  woodpecker, 
hitherto  somewhat  of  a  stranger  at  Auburn.  The 
worst  enemy  of  the  trees  had  been  a  black  worm 
that  destroyed  the  beautiful  locusts,  then  very 
common  in  Cayuga  County.  This  worm,  how 
ever,  was,  in  turn,  destroyed  by  the  woodpeckers 
who  this  season  gathered  in  Auburn  in  large  num 
bers. 

Of  course  Seward  was  not  out  of  politics.  He 
had  given  time  and  attention  to  public  affairs  for 
twenty  years  ;  he  had  been  sent  by  his  district  to 
represent  it  in  the  Senate ;  he  had  been  chosen 
by  the  state  as  chief-executive  for  four  years.  He 
had  early  resolved  not  to  look  for  or  accept  ap 
pointive  office  and  the  condition  of  his  own  affairs 
forbade  his  thinking  of  politics  with  a  view  to  tak 
ing  an  active  part.  Still  he  had  been  one  of  the 
founders  of  the  Whig  party  in  New  York  :  he  had 
been  its  first  leader  in  early  failure  and  its  chief 
figure  in  days  of  success.  Its  general  national  prin 
ciples, — internal  improvements,  a  bank,  a  protect 
ive  tariff, — he  thoroughly  believed  in.  They  had 
long  been  the  foundation  of  his  political  creed.  Its 
state  policy  of  canal  and  railroad  extension  he  him 
self  had  done  much  to  form.  It  is  true  that  the 
party  was  not  precisely  what  he  wished  any  more 
than  he  was  what  the  party  wished.  The  Whigs 
would  rather  have  had  somebody  who  would  have 
confined  his  attention  to  the  particular  matters  that 
made  a  necessary  part  of  his  political  creed.  Seward 
had  found  himself  forced  beyond  his  party  in  various 


176  WILLIAM  H.  SKWAKD  ' 

ways.     Still  he  believed  iu  it,  and  its  active  leaders 
believed  iu  him. 

It  was  a  serious  time  for  this  political  organiza 
tion.  The  death  of  Harrison  and  the  treachery  (so- 
called)  of  Tyler  had  showed  the  emptiness  of  the 
Log-Cabin  campaign.  The  elections  of  1842,  which 
had  mostly  gone  against  the  Whigs,  indicated  that 
a  great  effort  would  be  called  for  in  the  presidential 
campaign  of  1844,  if  their  original  plans  and  hopes 
were  to  come  to  anything.  In  one  respect,  how 
ever,  though  defeated,  they  stood  in  an  excellent 
position :  they  were  entirely  at  one  in  favor  of 
Henry  Clay.  They  were  not  only  unitedly  for  Clay, 
but  events  seemed  to  be  turning  in  favor  of  the  re- 
noniiuation  by  the  Democrats  of  Van  Buren ;  and 
Van  Buren  had  so  many  enemies  in  his  own  party 
that  the  Whigs  confidently  felt  that  if  he  were 
named,  it  was  hardly  possible  that  they  should  not 
beat  him.  In  New  York  State,  also,  the  Whigs, 
though  routed  in  the  election  of  1842,  had  something 
in  their  favor.  The  victorious  Democrats  fell  out 
with  Governor  Bouck  "  sooner  than  the  Whigs  fell 
out  with  his  unlucky  predecessor."  l  Bouck  had 
been  for  many  years  a  canal  commissioner :  now, 
though  elected  on  the  ground  of  retrenchment  in 
canal  policy,  he  proposed  the  continuance  of  work 
on  the  Black  Biver,  the  Genesee,  and  the  enlarged 
Erie  Canals.  A  good  proportion  of  the  Democratic 
party  opposed  him.  Here  Croswell  and  Flagg  of 
the  old  Eegeucy  separated.  Croswell  agreed  with 
Governor  Bouck  and  the  general  policy  of  the  party, 

1  Life,  Vol.  I,  p.  648. 


NEW  ISSUES  177 

while  Flagg  led  the  Eadicals,  who  not  only  pro 
posed  new  financial  ideas,  but  also  demanded  the 
holding  of  a  convention  for  the  revising  of  the 
constitution. 

This  disagreement  in  the  Democratic  party  was, 
however,  counterbalanced  by  certain  movements 
which  threatened  to  weaken  the  Whigs,  and  that  in 
ways  of  great  interest  to  Seward.  In  New  York 
City  there  arose  a  political  party  which  called  itself 
the  Native  American  party.  Its  principles  will  be 
gathered  from  the  name  :  it  was  opposed  to  the 
granting  of  political  privileges  to  new  immigrants, 
and  here  its  adherents  naturally  came  into  con 
flict  with  the  Irish.  They  did  not  oppose  Seward, 
for  he  was  not  a  candidate  for  any  office,  but  his 
position  was  well  understood,  and  during  the 
summer  he  found  himself  the  central  figure  of 
political  excitement.  "Here  are  abusive  Native 
American  letters,"  he  wrote  to  Weed,1  "and  in  the 
same  bundle  glowing  grateful  letters  from  Irishmen 
unknown."  The  school  question  came  up  again 
and  Seward's  friends  republished  his  statement 
of  the  case  in  the  message  of  1841.  The  agitation 
was  not,  of  necessity,  hostile  to  the  Whigs,  for  they 
had  not  as  a  party  supported  Seward' s  policy  in 
this  matter.  Many  of  them,  indeed,  had  opposed 
it,  and  there  were  now  Whigs  who  thought  that 
this  movement  would  turn  to  their  advantage.2 


1  July  26,  1844.     Holliater  MSS. 

2 "  On  the  whole  I  believe  onr  friends  look  for  salvation 
through  a  miracle,  to  be  worked  by  the  Native  Americans  in 
New  York."  Seward  to  Weed,  Oct.  22,  1844.  Hollister  MS^ 


178  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

This  was  not  the  case :  the  Native  Americans 
elected  their  candidate  for  mayor  in  New  York, 
but  they  took  away  from  the  Whig  strength,  rather 
than  added  to  it.  Seward,  however,  resolute  in 
his  opposition  to  them  and  firm  in  his  friendship 
for  the  Irish,1  was  thereby  more  and  more  a  detri 
mental  influence  in  the  eyes  of  many  in  his  own 
party. 

Another  matter  was  of  even  greater  political 
importance ;  namely,  the  anti-slavery  movement. 
Seward  was  an  open  anti-slavery  man,  but  he  felt 
that  his  true  place  was  with  the  Whig  party. 
There  were  others,  however,  and  more  and  more  as 
time  went  on,  who  thought  otherwise. 

Though  there  is  little  evidence  of  it,  anti-slavery 
was  now  a  real  issue  in  the  state :  Seward  had 
feared  that  it  might  defeat  him  in  his  first  canvass 
for  the  governorship.  We  have  noted  his  state 
ment  2  that  so  early  as  1839  anti- slavery  had  become 
1 '  an  element  of  the  Whig  party  ...  of  great 
power  for  the  strength  or  exhaustion  of  the  party. " 
At  that  time,  anti -slavery  men,  even  Abolition 
ists,  were  content  to  vote  for  whichever  candidate 
best  suited  their  ideas.  In  1840,  however,  2,662 
Abolitionists  voted  for  Gerrit  Smith  for  governor  ; 
in  1842,  7,263  voted  for  Alvin  Stewart.  In  1844 
Stewart  was  nominated  again.  An  enthusiastic 

1  "  I  am  writing  a  letter  to  the  Young  Friends  of  Ireland  in 
New  York,  but  shall  take  care  to  exhibit  no  unbecoming  spirit, 
if  I  know  how."  Seward  to  Weed,  Nov.  11,  1844.  Hollister 

MS:S. 

5  In  a  letter  to  Mrs.  Schuyler,  Nov.  13,  1844.  Schuyler  MSS. 
See  note  to  page  180. 


NEW  ISSUES  179 

Abolitionist  begged  Seward  to  be  the  Abolition 
nominee  for  President,  but  he  thought  it  an  im 
possibility.  Now  came  up  a  matter  which  put 
things  in  a  new  light ;  namely,  the  Texan  question. 
The  sentiment  of  the  South  favored  immediate 
annexation  ;  Tyler  sent  an  annexation  treaty  to  the 
Senate  on  April  22,  1844.  Van  Buren  and  Clay 
both  put  themselves  on  record  as  opposed  to  this 
course.  Van  Buren' s  chance  for  the  presidency 
vanished  at  once.  In  the  nominating  convention 
he  received  practically  all  the  Northern  votes, 
while  the  South  was  resolutely  opposed  to  him. 
Polk  was  chosen.  The  Whigs  nominated  Clay  by 
enthusiastic  acclamation  before  it  was  clear  just 
what  his  position  would  be. 

In  New  York  these  matters  made  Whig  success  in 
the  state  impossible.  Fillinore  had  been  pushed 
for  Vice-President  and  when  Freliughuysen  was 
nominated  instead,  he  became  a  natural  candidate 
for  governor.  Without  other  distractions,  he  might 
have  been  elected,  for  although  Silas  Wright  was  the 
strongest  man  the  Democrats  could  have  brought 
against  him,  yet  dissensions  in  their  party  might 
have  lessened  his  vote.  But  here  were  the  Aboli 
tionists  ;  voters  who  ought  to  have  been  Wrhigs. 
They  would  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  slave 
holder,  Henry  Clay,  but  (with  others)  nominated 
Birney,  while  they  opposed  Fillinore,  and  Wright 
as  well,  with  Stewart.  In  1842  Stewart  had  polled 
seven  thousand  votes  :  this  year  he  polled  twice  as 
many.  If  his  votes  had  gone  to  the  Whig  ticket, 
it  would  have  been  victorious ;  as  it  was,  Fillniore 


180  WILLIAM  H.  8BWABD 

was  beaten  by  a  majority  of  teii  thousand,  and 
Henry  Clay  by  much  the  same  vote.  The  vote  of 
the  state  went  to  Polk  and  gave  him  a  majority. 
"Mr.  Clay's  defeat  is  a  sad  and  fearful  event," 
wrote  Seward  shortly  afterward.1  It  certainly 
was  to  those  who  thought  with  Seward  ;  but  the 
result  made  it  clear  that  anti-slavery  was  a  power. 
A  visit  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  his  old  leader,  im 
pressed  the  same  idea  on  his  mind.  Still,  though 
he  definitely  thought  of  himself  as  an  an ti -slavery 
man,2  he  remained  a  Whig. 

The  year  after  a  presidential  election  gives  a 
breathing  space  as  far  as  national  politics  are  con 
cerned.  In  New  York  the  popular  interest  was 
turned  to  the  constitutional  convention.  As  the 
Democrats  were  in  a  majority  in  the  Assembly 
districts,  the  convention  was  made  up  largely  of 
their  party.  Seward  was  not  a  member  nor  was 
Thurlow  Weed.  Seward  was  of  the  opinion  that 
he  would  be  a  better  influence  out  of  the  con 
vention  than  in  it.  Neither  he  nor  Weed  could 
have  brought  about  the  particular  reforms  as  to 
canals  and  suffrage  that  he  had  at  heart,  and,  as 
he  saw  clearly,  their  presence  might  arouse  factious 
opposition.  But  it  was  probable  that  he  could 
not  have  been  elected  as  a  delegate  from  Auburn, 
for  he  was  in  the  high-tide  of  his  unpopularity  in 
the  Freeman  case.  He  was  asked  to  stand  in 
Chautauqua  and  other  districts  but  did  not  wish 

1  Seward  to  Mrs.  Schuyler,  Nov.  13,  1844.     Schuyler  MSS. 
a  Life,  Vol.   I,   p    70fi.     "Look  at  the  Whig  party   to-day: 
everybody  knows  that  I  am  an  anti-slavery  man." 


NEW  ISSUES  181 

to  do  so.  The  convention  acted  in  the  main  in 
accordance  with  his  ideas,  though  not  going  quite 
so  far  as  he  would  have  advised  :  the  suffrage  was 
made  almost  universal ;  the  judiciary  was  made 
elective  ;  internal  improvements  were  helped  by 
financial  arrangements  ;  corporation  laws  were  made 
general. 

About  this  time  Seward  began  to  be  called  to 
Washington  on  business  before  the  Supreme  Court, 
and  these  visits  were  always  of  great  interest  to 
him,  for  they  enabled  him  to  keep  his  finger  upon 
the  major  strategies  of  public  life.  In  1847  he  was 
called  there  in  the  Van  Zandt  case,  where  he  was 
associated  with  Salmon  P.  Chase  in  the  defense  of 
an  Ohio  farmer  who  had  been  sued  for  helping 
fugitive  slaves.  At  Washington  at  this  time  all 
political  views  were  obscured  or  clouded  by  the 
Mexican  War.  The  successes  of  the  army  were 
arousing  popular  enthusiasm  and  it  was  clear  that 
the  returning  heroes  were  to  be  a  considerable  ele 
ment  in  the  politics  of  1848.  In  fact,  in  Seward' s 
view,  both  Whigs  and  Democrats  appeared  eager 
to  seize  upon  "Old  Hough  and  Ready"  as 
soon  as  he  should  have  laid  down  his  victorious 
sword. 

In  New  York,  however,  events  occurred  that 
seemed  to  render  such  a  capture  needless, — at  least 
for  the  Whigs.  The  Wilmot  Proviso,  which  stipu 
lated  that  there  should  be  no  slavery  in  any  of  the 
territory  gained  from  Mexico,  suddenly  became  an 
issue.  The  Whigs  of  New  York  declared  in  favor 
of  it,  but  the  Democrats  could  not  do  so.  The  re- 


182  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

suit  was  that  the  party  divided  on  the  lines  that 
had  been  beguii  under  Bouck,  and  that  had  been 
drawii  together  only  to  elect  Silas  Wright.  The 
Radicals  or  Barnburners  declared  for  the  Wilmot 
Proviso  ;  the  Conservatives  or  Hunkers  would  not 
do  so.  Each  faction  sent  a  delegation  to  the  national 
convention.  But  the  convention  would  grant  com 
plete  recognition  to  neither,  and  the  Barnburners 
withdrew.  They  held  a  meeting  in  New  York  City 
and  subsequently  joined  with  others  in  a  conven 
tion  in  Buffalo,  in  which  they  formed  the  Free  Soil 
party  and  presented  Van  Buren  as  a  candidate  for 
the  presidency. 

This  was  certainly  a  strange  turn  of  affairs.  It 
may  have  seemed  possible  that  the  anti-slavery 
Whigs,  perhaps  under  Seward,  would  some  time 
have  been  able  to  control  their  party,  but  who 
would  have  expected  the  Democrats  to  place  them 
selves  in  an  attitude  of  opposition  to  slavery  ?  From 
the  simple  view  of  party  politics  for  the  year, 
things  were  admirable.  There  could  now  be  no 
question  that  the  Whigs  would  be  able  to  elect 
Taylor  over  a  divided  Democracy,  even  though  Van 
Buren  took  from  them  all  the  Liberty  men.  But 
how  would  it  do  for  the  Whigs  to  allow  a  third 
party — a  Liberty,  An  ti -slavery,  Free  Soil  party — to 
be  formed  in  the  state  ?  It  was  widely  felt  that 
the  occasion  demanded  a  man  and  Seward  was  evi 
dently  the  man  demanded.  He  was  an  anti-slavery 
advocate  and  always  had  been, — no  Northerner 
with  Southern  principles  one  election  and  a  Free 
Soiler  the  next, — and  yet  he  was  an  out-and-out 


NEW  ISSUES  183 

Whig,  one  of  the  first.  So  Seward  was  called  on 
and  be  came  out  upon  the  stump  not  only  in  New 
York,  wherever  it  seemed  that  there  was  a  leaning 
toward  Van  Bureu,  but  throughout  New  England. 
Everywhere  he  gave  reasons  for  the  faith  that  was 
in  him,  no  longer  feeling  apologetic  to  the  Whigs 
because  he  had  anti-slavery  leanings,  but  appealing 
to  those  who  were  agreed  to  see  with  him  the  im 
portance  of  holding  up  the  hands  of  the  Whig  party. 
The  results  were  favorable.  New  York  was  easily 
carried  for  Taylor  as  was  New  England  also. 

And  now  as  the  Whigs  in  New  York  reflected 
upon  their  victory,  a  new  consideration  appeared. 
A  United  States  senator  was  to  be  elected  and  he 
was  to  be  a  Whig.  There  was  no  one  who  in 
standing  or  principle  could  compare  with  Seward. 
Among  the  older  public  men  he  was  the  only  one  of 
those  prominent  in  the  twenties,  to  preserve  his  posi 
tion.  Weed  entirely  declined  office;  Spencer  had 
become  a  Democrat  ;  Granger,  Tracy,  and  not  a  few 
others  had  retired  from  politics,  some  to  private  life, 
some  to  the  bench.  The  only  figure  comparable  to 
Seward  was  that  of  Fillmore,  who  had  just  been 
elected  Vice-President.  Seward  and  Fillmore  were 
undoubtedly  the  chiefs  of  the  party ;  in  fact,  they 
might  almost  be  called  the  chiefs  of  rival  factions. 
With  some  such  idea  in  mind,  it  was  suggested  that 
the  senator-ship  should  go  to  John  C.  Collier,  the 
second  in  command,  as  one  might  say,  of  the  Fill- 
more  wing.  He  was  really  the  only  other  candidate 
thought  of  by  the  many  wh*o  did  not  like  the  idea 
of  an  anti-slavery  senator.  There  was  no  question  of 


184  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAISD 

any  one  else  :  some  unauthorized  persoii  offered  the 
nomination  to  the  governor,  Hamilton  Fish.  He 
declined  to  consider  it :  "  As  a  true  Whig,"  said 
the  Tribune,  "he  could  do  nothing  else."  l  Seward 
received  an  overwhelming  majority  in  the  party 
caucus  and  was  elected  January  31,  1849. 

He  stood  in  a  curious  position  :  a  Whig  senator 
from  New  York  of  indubitably  anti-slavery  princi 
ples.  Everything  had  somehow  come  around  to 
that.  He  had  made  his  first  steps  in  politics  on  the 
ground  of  internal  inijariigejnj^ite  and  an  ext( 
of  the  franchise.  He  had  beerrelected  to  the  state 
Senate  to  advocate  internal  improvements  and  the 
freedom  of  politics.  He  had  been  elected_goierupr 
on  the  platform  of  internal  improvements^ and  a 
sound  financial^systemi  NowyTowever,  those 
things  were  accepted :  even  among  the  Democrats 
there  were  enough  advocates  of  the  canal  to  assure 
prosperity,  while  the  electoral  and  legal  reforms  of 
the  constitution  of  1846  had  accomplished  all  that 
Seward  had  thought  of.  There  still  remained, 
however,  the  anti-slavery  question.  No  one  had 
thought  of  it  in  Seward' s  early  political  life:  few 
had  thought  of  it  even  as  late  as  when  he  was 
governor.  But  he  had  become  more  and  more  con 
vinced  of  its  importance,  and  finally  the  times  had 
come  around  to  him.  The  North,  at  the  end  of  the 
Mexican  War,  began  to  see  that  the  forces  against 
slavery  must  be  put  in  some  kind  of  order,  and  he 
was  the  obvious  leader  for  this  work. 
1  Jan.  23,  1849. 


CHAPTER  XI 

UNITED  STATES  SENATOR 

DURING  the  winter  of  1848-1849,  Seward  was  in 
Washington  on  law  business  before  the  Supreme 
Court.  Everything  seemed  as  it  should  be  :  "  A 
Whig  party  dominant,  El  Dorado  discovered  at 
last,  and  perpetual  summer."  l  The  political  oc 
cupation  of  the  moment  was  Cabinet-making,  in 
which  Seward  was  but  mildly  concerned  ;  so,  as  he 
left  his  own  senatorial  interests  to  his  record  and 
his  friends,  he  spent  his  spare  time  with  political 
acquaintance  and  in  political  writing  and  thinking. 
On  December  22d  he  delivered2  a  carefully  pre 
pared  oration  on  the  "True  Greatness  of  Our 
Country,"  which  was  highly  admired  by  many  of 
his  friends  as  the  best  statement  of  his  position  and 
his  principles.  One  will  perhaps  wonder  how  at 
such  a  time  and  place  Seward  could  discuss  the  evils 
of  slavery  and  that  he  should  have  spoken  of  the 
possibilities  of  secession.  However  that  may  be, 
the  oration  caused  no  surprise :  he  was  already 
pretty  well  known  for  the  opinions  which  it  ex 
pressed.  In  January  and  February  he  returned 
once  or  twice  to  Auburn.  The  news  of  his  election 


1  To  Mrs.  Seward,  Dec.,  184H,  Life,  Vol.  II,  p   93. 

9  Before  the  Young  Catholic  Friends'  Society  of  Baltimore. 


186  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

as  senator  he  received  in  Kew  York  City,  and  by  the 
end  of  February  was  in  Washington  again,  ready 
for  the  beginning  of  a  new  administration,  and  the 
opportunities  of  a  new  field  of  activity. 

All  seemed  propitious.  President  Taylor  was  not 
a  partisan,  not  even  a  politician  ;  but  a  man  of 
strong  sense  and  determination  to  do  right,  a  man 
of  "good-nature,  patriotism,  and  integrity,"  as 
Seward  thought.  There  was,  however,  the  pos 
sibility  of  serious  disagreement.  While  a  member 
of  Congress,  Fillmore  had  shown  himself  to  be 
more  of  an  anti-slavery  man  than  was  Seward  at 
that  time.  He  had  generally  supported  Adams  in 
his  efforts  to  defend  the  right  of  petition.  Later 
when  anti-slavery  began  to  connect  itself  definitely 
with  questions  of  territory,  he  had  become  some 
what  conservative,  and  he  now  represented  a 
frankly  different  section  of  the  Whig  party  from 
Seward' s.  So  far  as  Vice-President  and  senator ! 
were  concerned,  an  understanding  on  the  question 
of  appointments  was  reached  by  the  mediation  of 
Thurlow  Weed,  and  later  it  was  resolved  to  refer 
cases  of  difference  to  the  party  leaders  at  Albany. 
The  session  was  short  and  unimportant,  no  great 
difficulties  arose  over  the  patronage,  and  Seward 
was  soon  at  home  again. 

In  the  fall  he  was  once  more  in  Washington, 
ready  for  serious  work.  The  question  of  the  ad 
mission  of  California  had  aroused  the  subject  of 
slavery.  The  political  situation  was  acute,  the 

1  The  other  senator  from  New  York  at  this  time  was  Dieken 
son,  a  Democrat. 


UNITED  STATES  SENATOR  187 

r* 

actors  well  kiiowu.  ^The  Seuate  was  a  noteworthy 
body.  Webster,  Calhouu,  Clay,  were  there  together 
once  again  and  for  the  last  time.  Others  of  lesser 
fame  but  still  well  known  were  Bentou,  Douglas, 
Foote,  Jefferson  Davis,  Corwin,  Cass,  Houston. 
Among  the  new  senators  the  most  interesting  to 
Seward  was  Salmon  P.  Chase  of  Ohio,  with  whom 
he  had  been  associated  in  the  Van  Zandt  casej 
The  Senate  was  Democratic,  the  House,  Whig.  But 
with  the  organization  of  the  latter,  it  became  ap 
parent  that  discordant  elements  were  about  to  give 
things  a  new  aspect.  Tlmrlow  Weed  said  that  the 
country  had  every  appearance  of  a  revolution.1 
Seward,  though  he  did  not  take  quite  the  same  view,2 
saw  that  matters  had  reached  a  crisis.  Affairs 
had  been  a  little  difficult  in  the  spring,  but 
merely  on  the  partisan  basis :  now,  however,  more 
important  elements  were  beginning  to  come  in  con 
tact.  They  had  long  existed  but  only  lately  had 
they  assumed  a  position  of  prominence.  The  last 
Congress  had  expired  with  violent  disagreements  on 
the  subject  of  slavery  in  the  territories  won  from 
Mexico.  The  new  Congress  opened  in  the  same 
way.  The  Whigs  had  a  majority  in  the  House,  but 
because  Robert  C.  Winthrop,  of  Massachusetts,  was 
nominated,  some  Southern  Whigs  would  not  sup 
port  him  and  after  a  long  deadlock,  Howell  Cobb 
of  Georgia,  a  Democrat,  was  chosen.  In  the  Senate 
the  anti-slavery  feeling  blazed  up  on  the  slight 

1  Life  of  Weed,  Vol.  I,  p.  596. 

2  A  few  months  later,  at  least,  he  wrote,  "  I  discover  no  omens 
of  a  revolution,"  March  11,  1850. 


188  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

occasion    of    admitting    Father    Matthew    to    the 
floor. 

But  the  main  cause  for  the  prominence  of  the  is 
sue  was  California.  The  discovery  of  gold  there 
the  previous  year,  only  a  few  days  before  the  treaty 
which  had  concluded  the  Mexican  War,  had  given 
to  a  part  at  least  of  the  territories  gained  in  that 
proceeding  a  value  which  no  one  could  have  ex 
pected.  California  had  at  once  attracted  a  great 
crowd  of  adventurers  and  had  soon  attained  a  popu 
lation  which  made  it  seem  advisable  to  form  a  stale. 
The  President,  shortly  after  his  inauguration,  had 
said  that  it  was  his  policy  to  invite  the  citizens  t« 
draw  up  a  constitution  and  apply  for  admission  to* 
the  Union.  This  had  been  donej:  a  constitution  was 
adopted  in  October ;  the  next  mouth  a  legislature 
had  met ;  and  by  December  senators  had  beeii^ 
elected.  Such  was  the  natural  order  of  events  to 
be  objected  to  by  nobody  in  the  ordinary  course. 
But  one  circumstance  was  of  immediate  importance  : 
the  constitution  included  a  clause  forbidding^lav- 
^ry.  The  subject  of  the  admissioiTof  California  at 
once  became  a  battle-ground  for  the  anti-slavery 
question.  The  first  joining  of  forces  occurred  in 
the  election  of  the  Speaker  of  the  House.  Not  till 
the  House  was  organized,  could  the  President  send 
his  message  to  Congress,  reciting  his  own  acts  and 
the  proceedings  of  the  Californians.  All  that  was 
needed  was  the  confirmation  of  that  body.  This 
confirmation  it  would  not  give  and  here  arose  a 
political  situation  in  which  Seward  saw  himself 
called  upon  to  play  a  more  difficult  part  than  had 


UNITED  STATES  SENATOR  189 

yet  come  to  him  in  all  his  public  experience.1  It 
might  not  have  been  so  very  hard  to  have  played 
the  part  of  an  anti-slavery  senator  in  ordinary  times, 
but  now  that  an ti -slavery  was  somehow  the  chief 
issue  between  two  parties,  neither  of  which  was 
willing  to  favor  it,  the  case  was  certainly  difficult. 

The  President's  plan  met  with  opposition  and 
many  modifications  were  suggested  ;  these  all  passed 
out  of  immediate  view  when  on  January  29,  1850, 
Henry  Clay  proposed  in  the  Senate  the  famous  Com 
promise  measures  which  he  strongly  felt  offered  the 
only  solution  possible  for  the  safety  of  the  Union. 
They  were  eight  in  number,  but  three  only  need  be 
noted  here.  They  were  : 

1.  The  admission  of  California  with  her  free 
constitution. 

2.  The  erection    of  territorial  governments  in 
other  lands  ceded  by  Mexico,  without  any  provi 
sions  as  to  slavery. 

3.  A  new  law,  making  more  certain  the  return 
of  fugitive  slaves. 

From  a  practical,  or  at  least  a  superficial  stand 
point,  there  was  nothing  here  to  alarm  the  North. 
The  admission  of  California  was  simple  right  and 
justice.  The  leaving  of  the  question  of  slavery  to 
settle  itself  in  the  new  territories  was  not  only  prac 
ticable,  but  also  such  as  the  North  might  desire  ; 
for  it  was  becoming  generally  understood  that  the 


1  "  My  entrance  into  the  executive  office  in  Albany  bewil 
dered  me,  but  that  experience  was  nothing  compared  to  my 
trials  here."  Seward  to  Weed,  Feb.  2,  1850.  Life,  Vol.  II, 
p.  121. 


190  WILLIAM  H.  SEWABD 

climate  and  the  geographical  conditions  of  New 
Mexico  were  such  as  to  give  no  encouragement  to 
slave  labor.  It  therefore  followed  that  if  she  be 
came  a  state,  she  would,  like  California,  make  for 
herself  a  free  constitution.  A  law  concerning  fugi 
tive  slaves  was  not,  on  the  face,  unjust,  not  such 
as  necessarily  to  offend  the  North,  for  fugitive  slaves 
had  been  returned  since  the  establishment  of  the 
nation.  Nor  was  the  South  especially  favored  : 
some  of  the  minor  points  in  the  Compromise  satis 
fied  its  demands,  as  the  refusal  to  abolish  slavery  in 
the  District  of  Columbia,  but  the  others  were  not  so 
satisfactory.  The  exclusion  of  slavery  from  Cali 
fornia  and  New  Mexico,  though  founded  on  a  law 
of  nature,  rather  than  upon  a  law  of  the  United 
States,  was  "  deeply  regretted  "  by  some.  Even  a 
Fugitive  Slave  Law  was  of  vital  importance  to  the 
" border  states"  only. 

But  the  trend  of  public  opinion  at  this  time 
favored  neglect  of  such  considerations  as  these,  and 
the  Senate  at  once  became  a  battle-ground  on  which 
for  seven  months  the  subject  of  slavery  was  debated 
with  vigor  and  with  acrimony.  It  was  a  fortunate 
opportunity  for  Seward.  He  had  been  moving  on 
anti-slavery  lines  for  some  time,  but  the  question, 
although  important,  had  never  been  so  predominant 
as  now.  "  Did  it  ever  fall  to  the  lot  of  any  man," 
he  wrote  to  Weed,1  "  in  such  a  conjuncture  of  his 
own  fame  and  interests,  to  fall  into  the  Senate  of 
the  United  States  in  such  a  national  and  legislative 
crisis  as  this?7' 

1  Life,  Vol.  II,  p.  121. 


UNITED  STATES  SENATOK  191 

Very  shortly,  however,  he  began  to  see  clearly 
and  to  feel  himself  on  firm  ground.  The  great 
leaders  announced  themselves.  Clay  had  presented 
the  advantage  of  the  plan  he  had  proposed.  Cal- 
houn,  in  one  of  the  last  acts  of  his  public  life,  op 
posed  it.  Webster,  after  long  deliberation,  acceded 
in  a  speech  that,  in  the  minds  of  many,  closed 
his  career  as  a  statesman.  A  few  days  afterward 
Seward  gained  the  floor,  and  defined  his  position. 
He  was,  however,  already  well  known,  and  the 
mark  for  violent  denunciation  on  the  part  of  the 
South.  Mrs.  Seward,  who  was  sometimes  in  the 
gallery,  wondered  that  her  husband  could  restrain 
himself  under  such  attacks.  Clay,  she  said,  in 
speaking  of  one  instance,  occasionally  smiled,  Web 
ster  looked  grave,  and  the  Vice -President  was 
fidgety,  sometimes  thinking  he  would  interrupt  the 
speaker,  sometimes  giving  up  the  idea  as  hopeless. 
Seward  now  most  certainly  represented  the  anti- 
slavery  element  of  the  North. 

His  speech  was  more  a  statement  of  principles 
than  an  attempt  to  persuade.  One  can  hardly  im 
agine  anybody  in  favor  of  the  Compromise  being  led 
to  oppose  it  by  listening  to  him  on  this  occasion. 
But  the  address  was  probably  meant  as  a  pamphlet 
rather  than  a  speech, — as  a  definition  of  his  position. 
It  was  a  position  that  he  shared  with  few.  On  the 
floor  of  the  Senate  Chase  of  Ohio  and  Hale  of  New 
Hampshire  were  the  only  members  who  were  ready 
to  support  him.  Outside  of  Congress,  even  at  the 
North,  public  feeling  began  to  tend  more  and  more 
in  favor  of  the  Compromise. 


192  WILLIAM  II.  SEWAKD 

Begiuning  by  pointing  out  that  California  ought 
of  right  to  be  admitted,  Seward  then  took  ground 
against  the  Compromise  :  all  legislative  compro 
mises  were  wrong  (except  when  necessary;  and  here 
the  demands  of  the  slave  party  were  entirely  un 
warranted.  The  speech  was  wholly  unyielding  in 
tone,  and  if,  as  has  been  thought,  it  indicated  thus 
early  Se  ward's  course  in  the  ten  years  that  followed, 
it  perhaps  shows  why  that  course  did  not  serve  to 
avert  the  Civil  War.  Seward  could  see  nothing  in 
the  position  of  his  opponents  that  ought  not  give 
way  to  his  own  careful  reasoning. 

JThe  speech  is  a  most  noteworthy  event  in  the  life 
of  Seward,  in  that  it  marked  him.  for  all  time  as  an 
out-and-out  anti-slavery  man  ; — indeed,  as  almost 
an  Abolitionist.  Garrison  and  others  had  aroused 
the  antagonism  of  many  good  people  by  their  rejec 
tion  of  the  Constitution  or  anything  else  that  stood 
in  the  way  of  doing  their  duty  by  their  consciences. 
Seward  rather  by  accident  emulated  them.  In 
speaking  of  the  duties  of  Congress  to  the  national 
domain,  he  said  that  i  i  the  Constitution  regulates 
our  stewardship."  He  then  went  on:  "  But  there 
is  a  higher  law  than  the  Constitution  which  regu 
lates  our  authority  over  the  domain,  and  devotes  it 
to  the  same  noble  purposes."  He  did  not  in  any 
wise  point  out  or  assume  that  this  higher  law  was 
contrary  to  the  Constitution  :  in  fact,  his  idea  was 
that  the  Constitution  and  the  higher  law  pointed 
the  same  way.  But  the  expression  fixed  itself  iu 
the  popular  mind,  and  at  once  Seward  became 
known  as  one  who  held  that  the  Constitution  and 


UNITED  STATES  SENATOR  193 

the  laws  of  the  laud  were  binding  only  when  they 
were  in  accord  with  the  laws  of  God.  Of  course,  he 
had  not  propounded  such  a  view,  though  we  may 
guess  what  he  would  have  said  if  some  one  had  pro 
pounded  it  to  him,  or  wonder  what  his  objectors 
would  have  said  if  the  real  alternative  had  been 
presented  to  them.  The  outcry  made  even  Thurlow 
Weed  apprehend  evil.  But  Seward  felt  that  of  all 
his  speeches,  with  the  exception  of  that  in  defense 
of  Freeman,  this  was  the  only  one  containing  nothing 
which  he  would  like  to  strike  out. 

The  Compromise  debate  continued  through  the 
spring.  Various  substitutes  were  suggested  and 
Clay's  proposition  was  not  acted  upon  just  as  he  had 
offered  it.  A  committee  of  thirteen  was  appointed, 
composed  of  Clay  as  chairman  and  six  Whigs  and 
six  Democrats,  so  arranged  as  to  give  the  North 
and  the  South  each  six  senators.  It  was  to  pro 
pose  some  plan  of  settlement  of  ' i  all  pending  differ 
ences  growing  out  of  the  institution  of  slavery." 
Needless  to  say,  Seward  was  not  a  member  of  this 
committee. 

It  was  an  exciting  session  :  no  one  could  predict 
the  outcome.  May  arrived  before  the  committee 
reported  a  bill,  which  had  so  much  in  it  that  the 
President  called  it  the  "Omnibus  Bill."  Taylor, 
meanwhile,  clung  to  his  own  plan.  He  had  invited 
California  to  form  a  constitution  and  apply  for  ad 
mission  to  the  Union,  and  California  had  done  so. 
To  his  direct  and  soldierly  mind  nothing  remained 
but  to  make  California  into  a  state  without  hamper 
ing  the  measure  by  connection  with  extraneous 


194  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

matters.  His  relations  with  Seward  were  close,  as 
they  were  with  Thurlow  Weed,  who  was  occasion 
ally  in  Washington.  Taylor  was  in  a  position 
where  he  needed  friends.  He  had  been  elected  as  a 
Whig,  but  he  had  never  been  very  close  to  the  politi 
cians  of  the  party,  and  indeed,  before  the  election, 
he  had  announced  himself  willing  to  receive  a  nomi 
nation  from  the  Democrats  as  well.  When  he  be 
came  President,  although  a  Southern  man,  he  was 
soon  brought  to  understand  that  he  could  not  ally 
himself  with  the  supporters  of  Southern  principles  ; 
— at  least,  not  with  the  more  advanced  wing.  Indeed, 
some  of  them  he  roundly  pronounced  traitors.  He 
was  thus  in  no  very  strong  position,  when  Clay  and 
Webster,  the  leaders  of  his  own  party,  came  out 
definitely  with  a  plan  on  the  main  issue  very  differ 
ent  from  his  own,  and  indeed  attacked  his  plan 
violently  and  even  arrogantly.  He  had  troubles 
also  in  connection  with  his  Cabinet.  Still  his  pro 
posal  grew  in  public  esteem,  and  Seward,  who  be 
lieved  in  it,  began  to  be  regarded  as  the  leader  of 
the  administration  forces  in  Congress.  On  July  2d 
he  made  a  second  speech  against  the  Compromise 
and  in  favor  of  the  President's  plan. 

On  July  6th  Seward  called  on  Taylor  and  learned 
that  he  was  ill :  the  next  day  lie  was  no  better.  On 
the  9th  Seward  wrote  to  his  wife  :  "  I  cannot  omit 
to  speak  my  dreadful  apprehensions  about  the  Pres 
ident.  He  is  in  extreme  danger. "  That  same  day 
General  Taylor  died. 

The  event  was  indeed  a  sad  and  fearful  one. 
Aside  from  personal  considerations, — and  the  better 


UNITED  STATES  SENATOR  195 

Seward  knew  Taylor  the  more  he  liked  him— the 
President's  death  at  just  this  time  produced,  or,  at 
any  rate,  hastened,  ominous  political  consequences. 
Fillmore  at  the  outset  was  by  no  means  clear  re 
garding  his  course  :  "  All  is  dark  for  him  and  for 
the  country,"  wrote  Seward,1  u  and  there  is  not  a 
ray  of  light  to  enable  me  to  see  through  it."  It 
soon  began  to  be  plain,  and  to  Seward  perhaps 
among  the  first,  that  the  new  President  did  not  pro 
pose  to  follow  the  policy  of  his  predecessor.  Taylor 
had  been  a  slaveholder,  but  he  had  surprised  all  by 
his  attitude  in  regard  to  the  Compromise.  Fillmore 
was  an  anti-slavery  man  and  he  surprised  the  coun 
try  no  less. 

The  first  event  after  the  death  of  Taylor  was  the 
resignation  of  his  Cabinet.  All  but  one  member 
were  desirous  of  retaining  their  positions,  in  Sew 
ard' s  view,  and  he  advised  Fillmore  to  retain  them. 
Weed  came  to  Washington  in  the  emergency.  One 
thing  was  clear.  Fillmore  was  a  Whig,  like  Seward 
an  old  Anti-Mason,  who,  in  the  lapse  of  Anti-Ma 
sonry,  had  found  a  field  for  greater  activity  in  the 
new  Whig  party.  There  was  a  fine  chance  at  this  mo 
ment  for  such  a  man  to  make  a  name  for  himself. 
Conditions  were  in  favor  of  a  gathering  together 
of  the  sentiment  of  the  North  and  presenting  a 
strong  and  just  anti-slavery  policy.  Seward,  had 
he  been  in  Fillmore' s  place,  might  have  done  much 
in  this  direction,  but  Fillmore  did  nothing  of  the 
kind.  After  some  hesitation  he  decided  to  support 
the  Compromise  and  offered  the  position  of  Secretary 

1  Life,  Vol.  II,  p.  144. 


196  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

of  State  to  Daniel  Webster.  "They  do  not  see  that 
a  seam,  once  opened,  will  let  in  the  flood  and  sink 
the  ship,"  wrote  Seward.1  What  ship  he  had  in 
mind  is  not  wholly  clear.  If  he  meant  the  Whig 
party,  he  was  entirely  right.  The  action  of  Fill- 
more  did  create  a  rupture  which  led  to  its  destruction. 

The  party  was  at  this  moment  at  best  in  a  doubt 
ful  situation.  Like  the  Democratic  party,  it  had 
been  drawn  together  by  political  ideas  and  condi 
tions  in  which  slavery  had  no  part.  It  had  within 
it  anti-slavery  men,  like  Seward,  and  pro-slavery 
men  like  his  fellow-collegian  Toornbs 2 :  slavery  was 
a  matter  aside  from  its  policies.  But  slavery  or' 
anti-slavery  was  fast  getting  to  be  a  matter  which, ' 
though  aside  from  Whig  policies,  could  not  be  cast 
from  the  consciences  of  public  men.  We  have  seen 
in  Seward7 s  life  how  gradually  he  had  come  to  a 
position  where  slavery  was  an  active  political  factor,  . 
something  which  could  not  be  neglected  in  political 
thinking  and  political  acting.  He  was  not  the  only 
public  man  in  that  position  and  he  was  not  without  « 
following.  We  have  seen  how  far  he  was  able  to 
carry  the  Whig  party  of  his  own  state. 

The  Democratic  party,  more  frankly  pro -slavery, 
had  met  with  the  same  difficulty  in  a  more  aggravated 
form,  and  the  Free  Soil  movement  had  been  the  re 
sult.  In  New  York  it  had  divided  the  party  almost 
equally ;  in  the  election  of  1848  Cass  had  114,318, 
and  Van  Buren  120,511  votes.  In  New  England 

1  Life,  Vol.  II,  p.  146. 

8  Toombs  was  in  the  class  of  1828  at  Union,  some  years  after 
Seward. 


UNITED  STATES  SENATOB  197 

and  Ohio  the  Free  Sellers  had  gained  in  strength, 
and  it  had  been  Seward' s  task  to  hold  the  Whig 
party  together  in  the  face  of  this  distraction. 
He  had  endeavored  to  show  that  anti-slavery  men 
would  do  better  to  unite  with  the  Whigs,  than  at 
tempt  to  form  a  third  party.  On  that  issue  he  had 
gone  to  the  Senate.  And  that  principle,  in  spite  of 
Clay  and  Webster  and  the  Compromise,  he  had  al 
most  been  able  to  carry  one  important  step  farther  : 
Taylor  in  the  fifteen  months  of  his  administration 
had  gone  many  steps  in  the  anti-slavery  direction. 
But  with  his  death  came  a  decided  change.  Fill- 
more  considered  the  political  situation.  The  elec 
tion  of  1852  was  not  far  distant :  the  older  chiefs  of 
the  Whig  party  gained  an  ascendency  over  him ; 
there  was  a  considerable  element  of  the  party  even 
in  his  own  state  which  would  surely  support  him. 
Fillmore  made  Webster  Secretary  of  State,  and 
Henry  Clay  became  his  spokesman  in  the  Senate. 

The  effect  of  this  was  to  throw  Seward  and  men 
of  his  way  of  thinking  into  greater  opposition. 
Hitherto  he  had  been  the  target  for  the  frank  pro- 
slavery  abuse,  but  so  long  as  he  stood  for  the  plan 
of  the  administration  he  had  a  support  by  no  means 
despicable.  Now  the  administration  was  changed, 
and  he  was  left  to  his  own  devices.  There  followed 
an  exciting  and  exhausting  summer  both  in  Wash- 
iDgton  and  New  York.  Not  till  the  middle  of 
September  was  an  end  made  to  the  legislation  which 
constituted  the  Compromise.  One  of  the  last  meas 
ures  to  be  passed  was  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law. 

Seward  returned  to  Auburn  in  the  midst  of  the 


198  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

state  canvass.  Statesmanship  was  for  the  moment 
at  a  standstill :  he  had  for  seven  or  eight  mouths 
used  all  the  means  in  his  power  on  the  floor  of  the 
Senate  to  oppose  this  "  final  settlement  of  the  slavery 
question,"  which  was  not  a  settlement  and  not  final, 
Now  the  time  for  such,  activities  was  over.  There 
was,  however,  yet  a  chance  for  other  things.  The 
state  of  New  York  could  be  organized  to  give  her 
voice  more  effectively  for  the  right.  She  could 
organize  and  let  her  strength  be  seen.  She  could 
take  her  true  place  in  the  councils  of  the  nation. 
In  Seward7  s  mind  these  ends  were  to  be  attained 
through  the  Whig  party.  The  Democrats  were 
pretty  definitely  arrayed  on  the  side  of  the  Com 
promise.  It  is  true  that  the  Free  Soil  agitation  of 
1848  had  divided  them  and  brought  about  the  elec 
tion  of  Taylor.  But  in  1850  the  party  was  gather 
ing  its  forces  again,  and  it  was  becoming  apparent 
to  the  Liberty  men  that  they  should  not  find  their 
help  here.  Was  it  with  the  Whigs?  Seward  was 
by  this  time  clearly  an  anti-slavery  man  :  but  was 
he  the  leader  of  his  party  or  was  he  in  this  respect 
merely  an  individual  I  He  was  a  senator  from 
New  York,  and  having  been  more  recently  elected, 
he  expressed  the  political  sentiment  of  the  state 
more  accurately  than  Dickinson,  his  colleague. 
But  the  President  also  was  from  New  York,  and  he 
was  in  favor  of  the  Compromise. 

It  was  necessary  that  some  settlement  should  be 
reached,  and  it  seemed  as  though  Fillmore's  rela 
tions  with  Seward  and  Weed  would  render  it  im 
possible  for  them  to  establish  cordial  feeling.  It 


UNITED  STATES  SENATOR  199 

soon  became  evident  that  a  test  of  strength  was  to 
be  made  at  the  state  convention  in  the  fall.  Seward, 
of  course,  was  not  a  candidate  for  any  office,  but  the 
occasion  was  one  on  which  it  would  be  natural  for 
the  party  at  large  to  pronounce  upon  his  position. 
Late  in  August  the  Republic  of  Washington,  an  ad 
ministration  newspaper,  began  to  print  articles  re-  V 
fleeting  upon  Seward.  Advances  were  made  to  men 
of  standing  in  the  party  to  see  whether  approval  of 
his  course  could  be  prevented,  and  whenever  pos 
sible  at  the  primaries  delegates  definitely  opposed  to 
him  were  chosen.1  The  convention  met  September 
26th  and  nominated  Washington  Hunt  for  governor. 
He  was  a  man  of  standing  among  the  Whigs,  a 
friend  both  of  Fillmore  and  of  Seward,  and  was 
clearly  the  nominee  of  both  sections  of  the  party. 
The  contest  arose  on  the  resolutions.  A  committee 
of  eight  was  appointed,  of  whom  five  were  friends  of 
Fillmore  and  three  of  Seward,  although  the  conven 
tion  was  supposed  to  be  made  up  in  reverse  propor 
tion.  This  committee  reported  resolutions  which  V 
declared  that  the  Whigs  were  opposed  to  the  exten 
sion  of  slavery  but  recommended  a  liberal  spirit  of 
toleration  in  regard  to  the  conflicting  opinions  in  the 
party.  They  further  expressed  confidence  in  the 
honest  purpose  and  patriotic  motives  that  had 

1  "  At  several  polls  a  clamor  was  kept  up  against  '  Seward  ' 
and  '  Sewardism,'  as  if  our  Whig  senator  had  been  an  aspirant 
to  the  governorship."  New  York  Tribune,  Sept.  19,  1850. 
*;The  way  the  custom-house  officials  made  themselves  con 
spicuous  therein  [at  primary  meetings]  will  not  soon  be  for 
gotten."  Ibid.,  Sept.  30th.  In  the  same  article  is  an  account 
of  how  Greeley  was  approached  by  the  anti-Seward  party. 


200  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

actuated  the  Whig  senator  and  representatives,  but 
made  no  mention  by  name  of  any  one  save  Fillmore. 
This  was  not  to  the  mind  of  the  convention,  which 
reported  the  resolutions  back  to  the  committee,  and 
the  next  day  adopted  a  series  which  mentioned 
Seward  by  name  and  commended  his  action  highly. 
On  this  William  Duer,  who  had  marshaled  the 
Fillmore  forces,  arose  and  left  the  convention, 
with  a  considerable  number  of  others.1  Francis 
Granger,  its  president,  made  a  short  speech  in  which 
he  resigned  the  chair  and  followed  them.  The 
bolters  met,  called  another  convention,  which  ac 
cepted  the  regular  nominations,  but  dissented  from 
the  resolutions.  They  became  known  as  "  Silver 
Grays. ' '  The  election  was  close  and  when,  after  days 
of  doubt,  Hunt  was  seen  to  be  elected,  it  was  by  a 
very  small  majority  over  Horatio  Seymour. 

But  a  beginning  had  been  made.  In  1830 
Francis  Granger  had  written  to  an  anti-slavery 
meeting,  approving  of  its  views.  In  1844  the 
Whig  state  convention  had  voted  in  opposition  to 
the  annexation  of  Texas  on  the  ground  of  its  being 
slave  territory.  In  1847  the  state  convention  had 
resolved  against  the  extension  of  slavery,  with  Fill- 
more  at  the  head  of  the  ticket  as  comptroller.  But 
now  the  situation  was  too  acute.  The  Compromise, 
the  Fugitive  Slave  Law,— these  were  beyond  the 


1  About  one-third  of  the  convention.  Greeley  in  the  Tribune, 
Sept.  30,  1850,  said  that  Seward  had  usually  received  the  sup 
port  of  two  thirds  of  the  Whigs.  He  had  been  nominated  for 
the  eenatorship  by  a  vote  of  88  in  the  Whig  caucus,  out  of  121 
votes. 


UNITED  STATES  SENATOR  201 

bounds  of  academic  opinion.  The  Whig  party 
was  beginning  to  see  what  Seward  had  seen  ten 
years  before  ; — that  one  must  take  definite  ground 
on  the  subject  and  hold  it.  The  party  disagreed 
as  to  what  ground  to  occupy,  although  Seward  was 
still  able  to  control  a  majority,  in  spite  of  the 
Silver  Grays.  The  state  was  with  him :  the 
Assembly  was  Whig  and  after  long  delay  the 
legislature  elected  Hamilton  Fish,  an  anti-slavery 
man,  to  the  place  in  the  Senate  which  had  been 
held  by  Dickinson.  At  about  the  same  time 
Charles  Sumuer  was  chosen  from  Massachusetts, 
and  Benjamin  Wade  from  Ohio,  so  that  there  were 
now  six  anti-slavery  senators  :  Chase,  Fish,  Hale, 
Seward,  Sumner,  and  Wade.  The  course  of  events 
had  carried  Seward  into  a  new  period  of  his  career  ; 
he  was  becoming  less  and  less  a  leader  of  the  New 
York  Whigs. 

At  the  time  of  his  election  as  senator,  Seward 
had  received  a  letter  from  Dr.  Nott,  his  old  col 
lege  president,  a  man  for  whom  he  always  had 
affection  and  esteem.  The  letter  was  remarkable 
for  its  insight  into  the  political  situation,  and  its 
knowledge  of  Seward.  It  urged  him  to  be  true 
to  his  principles,  with  due  regard  to  the  Consti 
tution,  and  ended  as  follows  : 

* '  Whether  for  better  or  worse,  Freedom  will  on 
ward — at  least  I  think  so.  But  whether  it  will  or 
not,  you  have  no  other  way  but  to  continue  its  calm, 
courteous,  but  unflinching  advocate.  With  you  the 
die  is  cast — you  have  crossed  the  Eubicon — and 
there  is  no  recrossing  it.  Whether  you  will  be 


202  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAlID 

able  to  bring  the  party  with  which  you  have  acted 
(up  or  down,  shall  I  call  it?)  to  the  standpoint  you 
have  taken,  I  know  not  :  but  some  party  will  be 
brought  there,  and  it  will  become  the  predominant 
party  ;  and  with  such  a  party  only  can  you  be  in 
harmony."  It  needed  less  than  ten  years  to  ac 
complish  the  fulfilment  of  this  prophecy. 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE  NEBRASKA   BILL 

u  THE  Democrats  are  in  power  in  Congress,  the 
Silver  Grays  in  the  administration."  So  wrote 
Seward  as  he  returned  to  Washington  for  the  session 
of  1851-1852.  This  meant  a  peaceful  time  in  the 
government,  whatever  might  befall  elsewhere,  for 
both  were  alike  committed  to  the  finality  of 
the  Compromise.  It  had  put  an  end  to  the  dis 
cussion  of  slavery,  and  the  Democrats  and  the 
administration  were  determined  that  the  dispute 
should  not  be  revived.  It  was  a  difficult  task,  be 
cause,  though  there  was  no  disposition  to  disturb 
the  peace  in  Congress,  there  were  many  out  of 
Congress  who  were  not  so  well  satisfied  with  the 
Compromise.  These  people  were  at  the  North  and 
consisted  chiefly  of  those  who  could  not  endure  the 
Fugitive  Slave  Law.  It  doubtless  seemed  to  South 
ern  statesmen  very  unjust  and  unfair,  when  the 
North  had  been  given  a  free  California  and 
freedom  in  the  territories,  in  exchange  for  a  Fugi 
tive  Slave  Law,  that  Northerners  should  not  ac 
quiesce  in  the  bargain.  But  the  people  are  individ 
uals.  The  Northern  Abolitionist  had  had  nothing 
to  do  with  the  bargainings  of  the  Compromise,  ex 
cept  to  condemn  them.  It  was  nothing  to  him 
that  the  Southern  statesmen  were  willing  to  allow 


204  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

California  to  be  free  :  California  was  already  free 
by  her  own  vote.  It  was  nothing  to  him  that  they 
were  willing  to  allow  New  Mexico  and  Utah  to  be 
free :  they  were  practically  free  already  by  the 
conditions  of  climate  and  soil.  That  side  of  the 
bargain  amounted  to  no  more  than  allowing  the 
sun  to  rise.  But  it  was  something  to  the  Aboli 
tionist  to  be  forced  to  send  back  into  slavery  any 
black  man  that  any  Southerner  chose  to  swear 
had  been  his  slave.  Even  if  he  actually  had  been 
his  slave,  as  was  generally  the  case,  it  was  wrong 
to  do  it ;  and  if  he  were  not  his  slave,  it  was  in 
tolerable.  So  thought  the  Northern  Abolitionist, 
and  so  in  these  years  there  was  a  lengthening  list 
of  cases  of  riot  and  disturbance  over  the  return  of 
fugitives.  Such  cases  were  not  at  all  to  the  minds 
of  the  Democratic  and  Silver  Gray  politicians. 
Just  what  the  most  advanced  of  either  party  really 
thought  of  them,  it  is  hard  to  say.  The  out-and- 
out  Abolitionist,  of  course,  belonged  to  no  party 
and  was  glad  to  do  his  best  to  break  up  either  or 
both.  But  Free  Soil  Democrats  and  anti-slavery 
Whigs  must  have  seen  that  they  were  grad- 
tUally  being  confronted  with  the  alternative  of 
severing  their  party  ties  or  giving  up  their  prin 
ciples.  Se ward's  position  was  perhaps  simpler. 
He  believed  in  party  :  he  believed  that  if  he 
was  to  accomplish  anything,  he  must  accomplish 
it  by  means  of  the  Whig  party.  He  was  a  Whig 
senator,  and  if  he  had  looked  for  instructions  to  the 
Whig  party,  he  would  have  found  a  series  of  reso 
lutions  in  the  party  platforms  in  which  they  had 


THE  NEBRASKA  BILL  205 

declared  themselves  opposed  to  the  extension  of 
slavery,  and  nowhere  would  he  have  found  any  ap 
proval  of  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law  or  the  finality  of 
the  Compromise.  In  fact,  his  own  course  was  coni- 
nieuded.  He  had  but  to  go  on  as  before,  and 
that  with  Hamilton  Fish  as  a  colleague,  elected 
by  Whigs  whom  the  electors  of  the  state  had  sent 
to  the  legislature  on  this  very  issue. 

Such  was  the  formal  view.  But  actually  affairs 
were  somewhat  different,  and  this  real  difference  bid 
fair  to  split  the  Whig  party.  It  was  not  merely  a 
question  whether  Fillmore  or  Seward  should  con 
trol  the  Whig  convention  or  the  Whig  legislature, 
or  even  the  Whig  electorate  of  New  York.  It  was 
a  question  whether  there  were  enough  people  in 
the  country  to  support  the  old  Whig  principles, 
when  this  matter  of  slavery  was  in  everybody's 
mind  and  everybody's  mouth.  The  Democrats  as 
a  party  were  frank  about  it :  they  said,  "  Some  of 
us  do  not  like  slavery,  but  we  do  not  think  that 
such  dislikes  ought  to  color  our  political  action  any 
more  than  it  did  that  of  our  fathers.7'  Those 
Democrats  who  did  not  feel  so  left  the  party  011 
the  Free  Soil  issue  of  1848.  But  the  Whigs  could 
not  go  quite  so  far.  The  Northern  Whigs,  as  we 
have  seen,  were  made  up  largely  of  elements  of  op 
position.  They  at  first  were  au  ant  i- Jackson  party. 
As  to  the  tariff  and  iuternal  improvements,  policies 
which  the  Whigs  stood  for,  they  were  policies  that, 
even  in  early  days,  had  not  really  been  party  ques 
tions.  The  bank  and  the  financial  situation  had 
been  the  matters  of  importance.  Now,  however, 


206  WILLIAM  H.  SEWABD 

the  country  had  lived  through  the  excitement 
about  the  bank,  and  suddenly  wholly  different 
issues  had  arisen  with  the  acquisition  of  Texas,  the 
settling  of  California,  the  opening  of  new  terri 
tories.  The  "Mammoth,"  the  moneyed  aristoc 
racy,  the  "Old  Hero,"  had  passed  out  of  recollec 
tion  ;  the  overland  route,  the  argonauts,  "  Fifty  - 
four  forty  or  fight," — these  were  the  things  now  in 
every  one's  iniud. 

They  were  the  real  interests  of  the  people  and 
they  involved  slavery.  We  can  see  the  case  clearly 
when  we  review  Seward's  course.  Thirty  years  be 
fore  he  had  looked  upon  the  settlement  of  western 
New  York,  and  the  states  of  the  Northwest  Terri 
tory  and  had  declared  for  internal  improvements. 
Why  not  now,  when  the  great  West  was  to  be 
settled,  continue  to  see  in  internal  improvements 
the  paramount  issue  ?  Why,  when  there  were  rail 
ways  to  be  built,  mines  and  farms  to  be  exploited, 
great  deserts  to  be  irrigated  and  vast  plains  to  be 
forested, — why,  in  the  face  of  such  enormous  possi 
bilities  in  the  West,  stop  to  quarrel  with  the  South 
over  slavery?  Seward  would  have  agreed  with 
Horace  Greeley  who  said,  at  about  this  time,  of  some 
-Whig  resolutions  in  Kentucky  :  "  The  primary  in 
ternal  improvement  needed  by  Kentucky  is  the 
abolition  of  slavery,  and  the  consequent  moral  and 
social  elevation  of  labor.  That  accomplished,  other 
works  of  internal  improvement  would  become  easy. 
But  schools,  canals,  and  railroads  make  slow  prog 
ress  within  the  shadow  of  human  slavery."  l 

1  New  York  Tribune. 


THE  NEBRASKA  BILL  207 

That  had  been  Seward' s  view  of  slavery  at  the 
very  beginning  of  his  political  career,1  but  in  those 
days  just  after  the  Missouri  Compromise,  amid  the 
insistencies  of  current  conditions  in  New  York, 
anti-slavery  had  not  called  with  a  very  compelling 
voice.  Now,  however,  the  objects  for  which  he  had 
striven  in  his  own  state  were  largely  attained  : 
canals  and  railways,  schools  and  law-courts,  the 
right  to  vote  and  the  extra-legal  preliminaries  to 
voting.  And  Seward  himself,  having  passed  from 
state  to  national  politics,  saw  the  United  States  as 
a  whole  where  New  York  had  been  thirty  years  be 
fore,  with  the  difference  that  in  the  new  domain 
now  open  for  settlement  and  improvement,  there 
was  the  possibility  of  slavery.  So  Seward  felt  his 
chief  duty  to  lie  in  opposition  to  its  extension.2 

Unfortunately,  he  could  not  induce  the  Whig 
party  to  think  with  him.  The  political  event  of 
importance  at  the  moment  was  the  nomination  of 
a  President.  Each  party,  as  a  matter  of  course, 
now  held  a  national  convention.  The  Democratic 
nomination  was  a  surprise  to  many  :  Cass,  Marcy, 
Buchanan,  Douglas  were  all  passed  over  in  favor  of 

1  Life,  Vol.  I,  p.  54. 

1 A  matter  which  brings  out  the  essence  of  the  situation  is 
that  of  the  Pacific  Railway.  In  the  summer  of  1849  Seward 
was  invited  to  be  present  at  a  convention  at  St.  Louis  in  favor 
of  the  project.  It  was  just  the  sort  of  enterprise  to  enlist  his 
interest  and  his  sympathies,  and  although  he  could  not  go  to 
St.  Louis,  he  sent  a  letter  expressing  his  confidence  in  the  plan. 
As  a  fact,  however,  the  greater  number  of  those  who  favored  a 
Pacific  railroad  at  this  time  were  in  Missouri  or  Iowa,  and  the 
case  was  so  complicated  with  settlement  of  the  territories  and 
bringing  slaves  into  them,  that  Seward  never  could  have  acted 
with  its  projectors,  even  if  nothing  else  had  interfered. 


208  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

Franklin  Pierce.  Of  more  immediate  interest  to 
Seward,  however,  was  the  Whig  nomination.  There 
were  three  candidates  so  prominent  as  to  eclipse  all 
others.  Fillmore  naturally  desired  to  receive  at 
the  hands  of  the  people  the  office  to  which  he  had 
succeeded  at  the  death  of  Taylor.  His  ambition 
ran  athwart  the  wide- spread  feeling  that  Daniel 
Webster,  indubitably  the  greatest  man  in  the  Whig 
party,  was  its  proper  representative  in  a  national 
election.  But  Seward  and  many  who  thought 
with  him  could  not  act  with  Fillmore  or  Webster, 
for  both  had  strongly  favored  the  Compromise 
and  since  its  passage,  had  stood  for  its  finality. 
Their  candidate  therefore  was  General  Winfield 
Scott. 

In  1847  Seward  had  found  himself  in  somewhat 
the  same  position.  "  You l  made  General  Harrison 
President,"  said  John  Quincy  Adams  to  him. 
"You  can  make  the  next  President.  Will  you 
give  us  a  man  who  is  not  for  slavery  I  "  2 

At  that  time  Seward  wrote,  on  April  4,  1847  : 
"General  Taylor's  last  brilliant  battles  have  pro 
duced  a  conviction  among  Whigs,  and  I  think 
among  Democrats,  that  he  will  be  nominated  and 
elected  President."  Earlier,  however,  when  Gen 
eral  Scott  was  mentioned  as  a  candidate,  Seward  on 
January  6,  1846,  wrote:  "General  Scott  is  the 
Whig  congressional  candidate  for  President."  But 
he  advised  strongly  against  the  nomination,  seem 
ing  still  to  have  in  mind  Henry  Clay,  the  defeated 

1  More  probably  it  was  Thurlow  Weed.    See  p.  162. 
3  Life,  Vol.  II,  p.  38. 


THE  NEBRASKA  BILL  209 

candidate  of  1844,  as  had  many  others  of  both 
parties. ' 

Now,  however,  Taylor  was  dead,  and  Clay  was  at 
the  very  end  of  his  long  and  distinguished  career. 
Even  had  it  not  been  so,  Seward  could  not  have 
gone  with  Clay  more  consistently  than  with  Webster 
or  Fillinore.  He  had  for  some  time  known  General 
Scott  well,  and  while  it  nowhere  appears  that  he 
deemed  him  very  admirably  fitted  for  the  presi 
dency,  yet  he  did  think  him  a  brave  and  an 
honorable  gentleman.  Although  a  Virginian,  the 
general  was  opposed  to  the  extension  of  slavery. 
Seward  therefore  pronounced  for  Scott.2 

New  York  was  an  important  state  in  determining 
the  result.  Webster  might  have  been  nominated  if 
he  could  have  added  to  his  New  England  votes  the 
votes  of  New  York,  plus  a  number  in  the  South. 
But  the  New  York  delegation  hung  between  Fill- 
more  and  Seward.  By  the  end  of  May  it  was 
evident  that  the  Silver  Grays  were  discomfited 
and  that  the  state  favored  Scott.  The  New  York 
Tribune  was  at  great  pains  to  urge  that  the  choice 
of  a  Scott  delegation  was  not  a  Free  Soil  triumph  ; 
that  "  those  who  have  worked  to  secure  the  present 
result  in  the  state  have  from  the  first  and  throughout 
contended  against  mixing  the  slavery  question  in 

1  Life,  Vol.  I,  pp.  772,  782. 

3Thurlow  Weed  was  at  this  time  abroad.  He  did  not  believe 
in  nominating  Scott.  He  was  sure  that  the  Whigs  would  be 
beaten  in  1852,  and  he  would  have  preferred  that  Fillmore 
should  have  been  nominated,  that  the  people  might  have  a 
chance  to  pronounce  on  his  record.  Life  of  Weed,  Vol.  II, 
p.  215. 


210  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

either  the  nomination  or  election. "  l  If  Greeley  here 
spoke  for  Seward,  we  may  well  wonder  why  Webster 
was  not  a  better  candidate  than  Scott.  Whatever 
Seward  himself  thought,  a  Scott  delegation  went  to 
Baltimore.  The  first  vote  showed  that  he  and  Fill- 
more  were  nearly  even  in  strength,  with  W^ebster  a 
bad  third  in  the  race.  After  forty  ballots  had  been 
cast,  it  began  to  be  clear  that  the  Scott  men  would 
not  come  over  to  Fillmore.  Arrangements  were 
then  made  between  the  friends  of  Webster  and  of 
Fillmore  to  the  effect  that  if  Webster  could  get 
sixty  votes  in  the  North,  the  South  would  give  him 
enough  for  the  nomination.  The  Webster  mana 
gers  could  count  upon  twenty -five  votes  in  New 
England  :  with  New  York's  in  hand  they  would 
have  had  a  triumphant  majority.  But  Seward  con 
trolled  the  New  York  delegation  and  it  remained 
firm  for  Scott,  who  was  nominated  on  the  fifty -third 
ballot  by  159  votes,  to  112  for  Fillmore  and  twenty- 
one  for  Webster. 

Here,  as  well  as  in  New  York,  the  question  of  a 
platform  was  important,  and  here  the  spirit  of  con 
ciliation  led  to  resolutions  which  practically  en 
dorsed  the  great  Compromise  :  indeed,  the  nomina 
tion  of  General  Scott  had  been  brought  about  only 
by  the  reading  of  a  letter  from  him  to  Mr.  Archer, 
in  which  he  was  made  to  appear  to  add  his  personal 
endorsement.  Seward,  in  spite  of  his  influence  in 

*New  York  Tribune,  May  21,  1852.  Greeley  may  have  prop 
erly  spoken  for  himself,  but  hardly  for  Weed,  who  understood 
that  the  slavery  question  would  mix  itself  in  the  election  and 
that  the  Whigs  would  therefore  be  beaten. 


THE  NEBRASKA  BILL  211 

the  Domination,  was  sick  at  heart  at  the  result. 
"I  see,  now,  no  safe  way  through,  but  anticipate 
defeat  and  desertion  in  any  event."  "I  see  the 
outburst  of  a  spirit  that  comes  periodically  to  mar 
the  hopes  of  wise  men."  "The  wretched  platform 
contrived  to  defeat  Scott  in  the  nomination,  or  to 
sink  him  in  the  canvass," — so  he  wrote1  to  those 
with  whom  he  was  intimate. 

The  canvass  entirely  justified  his  worst  fears.  In 
spite  of  the  effort  of  the  New  York  Tribune,  prob 
ably  the  most  influential  paper  in  the  country,  to 
conduct  it  on  the  lines  of  protection,  of  river  and 
harbor  improvement,  of  development  of  national 
industry,  the  slavery  question  gained  a  predominat 
ing  place  in  the  campaign.  It  was  clear  that  Pierce 
would  take  a  pro-slavery  view.  But  it  was  not 
clear  that  Scott  would  be  any  better  ;  he  would 
certainly  follow  the  party  platform,  for  to  it  he 
held  that  he  was  in  honor  bound.  The  Whigs 
were  utterly  defeated  ;  they  carried  four  states  only. 
In  New  York  the  Democrats  were  successful  by  a 
small  plurality  and  elected  Horatio  Seymour  as 
governor. 

There  had  been  no  such  defeat  since  the  Whigs 
had  been  a  party.  Even  when  they  elected  Harri 
son  in  a  whirlwind  of  enthusiasm  in  1840,  Van 
Buren  had  received  more  electoral  votes  than  did 
Scott  in  1852.  But  it  was  not  so  much  the  over 
whelming  character  of  the  defeat  that  was  important, 
as  it  was  the  impossibility  of  united  action  after 
ward.  It  was  not  merely  the  difficulty  of  recoucil- 

lLife,  Vol.  II,  pp.  187,  188. 


212  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

ing  factions  like  the  Seward  men  and  the  Silver 
Grays  ;  it  was  the  greater  difficulty  of  principle. 
How  could  North  and  South  act  together  on  the 
question  of  slavery  I  Assent  to  it,  said  the  Demo 
crats,  according  to  the  compromises  of  the  Con 
stitution  and  of  1850 ;  the  most  extreme  slavery 
men  will  ask  no  more  and  no  true  Union  man  can  re 
fuse  so  much.  But  the  Whigs,  as  a  party,  could  not 
go  even  so  far  as  that.  Some  of  them  felt  that 
slavery  was  right,  and  that  they  owed  it  to  them 
selves,  their  neighbors,  and  their  states  to  defend 
it.  Some  felt  that  it  was  wrong  and  that  they 
owed  it  to  their  country  to  do  away  with  it  by 
whatever  lawful  means  offered.  Between  such, 
what  compromises  were  possible?  Neither  side 
would  be  satisfied  with  any  compromise  except  one 
based  on  its  own  view.1 

What  possibility  was  there  for  a  political  party 
formed  of  such  materials  ?  As  long  as  slavery  had 
been  practically  only  an  academic  question,  Francis 
Granger  could  vote  for  anti-slavery  resolutions  and 
still  be  a  candidate  for  governor  ;  Millard  Fillrnore 
could  assent  to  anti-slavery  measures  and  still  be  a 
Whig  in  good  standing  ;  Seward  could  even  refuse 
to  send  the  three  sailors  to  Virginia,  and  still  be  a 
leader  of  his  party.  But  now,  when  the  far  West 
was  being  populated,  the  question  was  no  longer 

1  In  the  Compromise  of  1850  (treating  it  as  a  bargain)  slavery 
really  gave  nothing  and  got  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law.  The 
North,  on  the  other  hand,  relied  upon  the  laws  of  nature  in 
California  and  New  Mexico  and  objected  to  making  any  conces 
sions  at  all.  The  North,  of  course,  had  nature  on  her  side,  and 
must  have  won  in  the  end. 


THE  NEBRASKA  BILL  213 

academic :  every  new  state  meant  two  new  senators 
against  slavery  ;  if  nothing  were  done,  its  extinction 
was  only  a  matter  of  time. 

The  year  1853  seemed  to  be  marked  by  no  polit 
ical  event  of  significance  except  the  enforcement 
of  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law.  But  though  noth 
ing  of  an  outwardly  exciting  nature  took  place, 
there  was  something  else  worth  noting  and  that  was 
the  formation  of  the  Know- Nothing  or  Native 
American  party.1  This  political  force  appeared  un 
heralded.  Old-time  politicians,  Whig  or  Democrat, 
found  the  election  of  1853  so  different  from  their 
calculations,  that  it  seemed  as  if  some  new  factor 
must  be  present.  But  whatever  political  force  had 
come  into  existence,  it  was  certainly  secret.  If  any 
one  who  might  be  supposed  to  be  concerned,  were 
asked,  he  said,  "I  know  nothing  about  it."  The 
phrase  was  so  common  that  the  new  organization 
was  quickly  named  the  Kuow-Nothiug  party. 
Very  definite  principles  were  soon  announced,  the 
chief  of  which  was  opposition  to  immigration  and 
naturalization,  the  enforcement  of  the  principle  of 
America  for  the  Americans. 

I  find  nowhere  any  early  expression  of  Seward's 
views  on  this  subject.  Those  who  have  followed  his 
course  so  far  will  be  sure  that  such  a  party  and  such 
a  man  would  have  regarded  each  other  with  mutual 
detestation.  Seward  opposed  secret  organizations 

1  A  Native  American  party  had  existed  before  this  time,  in 
1844-1845  (see  p.  177),  and  even  before  that.  It  had  had  no  con- 
tinned  existence  as  such,  however,  though  doubtless  many  con 
cerned  in  the  earlier  movement  took  part  in  this  one,  and  per 
haps  the  organization  was  reformed. 


214  WILLIAM  H.  SKWABD 

in  politics  arid  lie  favored  immigration.  The  great 
though  not  the  only  objects  of  attack  were  the  Irish 
Catholics  who,  as  a  rule,  at  least  in  New  York,  were 
Democrats.  The  Native  American  party,  there 
fore,  drew  most  of  its  strength  from  the  Whigs. 
But  its  feeling  toward  the  Whig  party  of  New 
York  was  especially  a  feeling  of  opposition  to 
Seward,  because  he  had  always  advocated  the  freest 
and  most  liberal  policy  toward  the  immigrant. 
Here,  as  before,  his  real  breadth  of  view  and  toler 
ance  was  a  poor  political  asset,  for  his  record  as 
governor  in  the  matter  of  schools  and  immigration 
turned  Know-Nothing  Whigs  away  from  him,  while 
it  gained  him  no  strength  among  the  Democrats. 
Indeed,  his  position,  even  among  the  Democrats, 
was  liable  to  easy  misconception  in  the  hands  of  any 
one  who  wanted  a  weapon.  Thus  Brady  in  the  cam 
paign  of  1853  excoriated  Seward  before  the  Irish 
of  New  York  City,  because  he  had  tried  to  be  use 
ful  to  them  ten  or  twelve  years  before,  by  urging 
that  they  should  have  in  the  public  schools  teachers 
of  their  own  faith  and  language.  "  What  an  ad 
vantage,"  said  the  ingenuous  Irishman,  "to  sit  on 
a  school-bench  with  future  fellow  citizens  of  all 
nations  !  And  this  groveling  creature  would  have 
deprived  us  of  this  privilege  !  "  1 

The  Native  American  party,  however,  filled  an 
immediate  need  :  there  were  plenty  of  people  tired 
of  both  Whigs  and  Democrats.  Both  parties  had 
approved  the  Compromise,  and  it  was  not  every 
one  who,  like  Seward,  would  hold  on  in  single  op- 
1  New  York  Tribune,  Nov.  2,  1853. 


THE  NEBEASKA  BILL  215 

position,  gaining  an  aid  here  and  another  there,  in 
the  secure  faith  that  time  would  bring  an  oppor 
tunity  for  redress.  To  the  average  voter  in  the 
]STorth,  if  he  were  dissatisfied  with  Whigs  and 
Democrats  alike,  the  Native  American  party  was  a 
matter  of  some  interest,  though  it  offered  no  solu 
tion  of  the  question  of  slavery.  But  this  apathetic 
condition  of  things  was  broken  by  an  event  of  prime 
importance.  On  January  23, 1854,  Senator  Douglas, 
from  the  Committee  on  Territories,  reported  a 
measure  that  almost  instantly  absorbed  the  atten 
tion  of  all  minds.  This  was  the  famous  Nebraska 
Bill. 

Of  the  country  west  of  the  Alleghanies  a  great 
part  had  formed  the  Northwest  Territory,  includ 
ing  the  present  states  of  Ohio,  Indiana,  Illinois, 
Michigan  and  Wisconsin.  From  this  area,  by  the 
Ordinance  of  1787,  slavery  was  perpetually  ex 
eluded.  In  the  next  great  accession,  the  Louisiana 
Territory  between  the  Mississippi  and  the  Eocky 
Mountains,  the  Missouri  Compromise  in  1820  had 
excluded  slavery  north  of  the  line  of  36°  30'.  The 
status  of  the  remaining  portion,  the  Southwest  and 
the  Pacific  slope,  had  been  arranged  by  the  Com 
promise  of  1850.  It  had  in  general  been  felt  that 
the  distracting  question  was  settled  forever  in  the 
whole  territory  of  the  United  States,  and  those  who 
desired  new  fields  for  the  extension  of  slavery  looked 
to  Cuba  or  to  Southern  California.  The  bill  of 
Senator  Douglas  appeared  with  the  purpose  of  or 
ganizing  the  territory  of  Nebraska,  which  included 
practically  all  that  was  left  of  the  Louisiana  Pur- 


216  WILLIAM  H.  SEWABD 

nhase,  and  as  shortly  amended,  provided  that  it 
should  be  divided  into  two  territories,  Kansas  and 
Nebraska,  and  that  each  should  admit  or  exclude 
slavery  as  its  people  should  decide.  The  point  that 
the  Missouri  Compromise  clearly  prohibited  slavery 
in  all  the  new  territory  was  met  by  the  view  that  the 
Compromise  of  1850  in  legislating  for  slavery  south 
of  the  line  of  36°  30'  had  practically  superseded  the 
older  rule  of  adjustment.1 

The  first  feeling  on  the  part  of  the  anti-slavery 
North  was  an  astonishment  amounting  almost  to 
prostration.  "  I  am  heart-sick  of  being  here, ' '  wrote 
Seward  in  a  letter  in  which  he  announced  the 
original  form  of  the  Douglas  bill.2  And  later : 
"You  see  this  infamous  Nebraska  Bill.  It  is  an 
administration  move."  But  soon  it  began  to  be 
clear  that  it  was  no  mere  political  move.  What 
ever  the  result  in  the  new  territories,  the  principle 
of  this  bill  implied  not  only  the  repeal  of  the 
Missouri  Compromise,  but  also  the  repeal  of  any 
other  of  those  principles  that  had  been  thought 
settled  for  all  time.  The  North,  said  Seward,  would 
before  1857  be  "  brought  to  a  doubtful  struggle  to 
prevent  the  extension  of  slavery  to  the  shores  of  the 
Great  Lakes  and  Pugct  Sound."  3  Again  he  wrote  : 
"  Southern  men  begin  to  talk  of  repealing  the  pro 
hibition  of  the  African  slave  trade.4  It  would  be  no 


1  The  bill,  though  fathered  by  Douglas,  was  the  expression  of 
a  feeling  very  common  among  Western  Democrats. 
*  Life,    Vol.  II,  p.  216. 

3  Letter  to  New  York  meeting.     Life,  Vol.  II,  p.  218. 

4  By  Act  of  Congress,  in  1808. 


THE  NEBRASKA  BILL  217 

more  surprising  to  nie  to  see  that  done  than  it  is  to 
see  what  I  am  now  seeing." 

When  the  true  character  of  the  Nebraska  Bill  be 
came  evident,  there  was  an  outburst  of  feeling 
throughout  the  North  in  newspaper,  petition, 
memorial,  and  public  meeting.  The  South,  in  the 
main,  was  in  favor  of  the  measure.  In  the  Senate 
Houston  of  Texas  and  Bell  of  Tennessee  opposed  it. 
The  North,  however,  was  not  entirely  hostile  to  it : 
in  fact,  when  the  bill  finally  passed  the  Senate,  there 
were  recorded  in  the  negative,  beside  the  two  men 
tioned,  only  Seward  and  Fish  of  New  York,  Chase 
and  Wade  of  Ohio,  Suniner,  and  subsequent^ 
Everett,  of  Massachusetts,  Smith  of  Connecticut,  and 
Fessenden  of  Maine.  When  the  bill  came  to  the 
House,  after  much  discussion  it  was  passed  by  a  ma 
jority  of  thirteen.  So  approved,  however,  it  was 
not  the  same  as  had  been  approved  by  the  Senate, 
which  therefore  again  had  an  opportunity  to  debate 
the  subject,  passing  the  measure  this  time  by  a  vote 
of  thirty-five  to  thirteen. 

The  Nebraska  Bill  served  one  good  purpose :  it 
made  the  situation  clear.  The  Fugitive  Slave  Law 
had  been  the  only  measure  of  real  importance  in  the 
Compromise  of  1850,  which  bore  harshly  upon  the 
North.  But  that  law,  at  its  worst,  was  only  a  carry 
ing  out  (often  in  a  rough  and  an  unjust  way)  of  a  pro 
vision  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  which 
called  explicitly  for  a  return  of  fugitive  slaves. 
Those  who  thought  it  wrong  to  return  them  were  at 
least  led  to  a  serious  consideration  of  the  fundamen 
tal  conditions  governing  North  and  South.  Those 


218  WILLIAM  H.  SEWABD 

who  disapproved  of  the  means  provided  by  statute 
for  such  return,  might  always  bring  the  matter  be 
fore  Congress  for  adjustment.  But  the  settling  of 
the  country  on  a  free  or  a  slave  basis,  the  admis 
sion  to  the  Union  of  free  or  slave  states,  was  some 
thing  that,  once  done,  could  never  be  undone  by  the 
ordinary  means  within  the  reach  of  men  and  parties. 
The  keen  appreciation  of  the  true  position  led  to 
the  true  remedy.  Heretofore  the  North  had  rested 
on  paper  guarantees.  The  Northwest  Territory  had 
been  declared  free,  but  it  had  also  been  settled  by 
freemen,  and  no  question  had  therefore  arisen. 
California,  and  later  Oregon,  had  followed  the 
other  course  ;  they  had  been  settled  by  freemen  and 
had  then  declared  themselves  free.  If  the  Missouri 
Compromise  had  proved  itself  but  a  paper  prohibi 
tion,  it  was  apparent  that  the  Nebraska  Law,  while 
it  was  only  a  law,  was  no  stronger.  i  i  Boston  has 
suggested  a  practical  plan,"  wrote  Thurlow  Weed 
in  the  Evening  Journal.1  "  Let  Kansas  and  Nebraska 
be  immediately  settled  by  freemen."  So  also  said 
Seward  in  the  Senate  a  few  days  later :  "  Come  on, 
then,  gentlemen  of  the  slave  states  !  Since  there  is 
no  escaping  your  challenge,  I  accept  it  in  behalf  of 
the  cause  of  freedom.  We  will  engage  in  competi 
tion  for  the  virgin  soil  of  Kansas,  and  God  give  the 
victory  to  the  side  which  is  stronger  in  number,  as 
it  is  in  the  right !  " 

1  May  26,  1854.     Quoted  in  his  Life,  Vol.  II,  p.  229. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE  REPUBLICAN   PARTY 

THE  election  of  1854  in  New  York  was  very 
close :  party  lines  were  disregarded,  and  the  result 
was  not  certainly  known  for  two  weeks,  during 
which  time  the  returns  fluctuated  and  hopes  rose 
and  fell.  On  November  9th,  when  it  seemed  as  if 
the  Whigs  had  been  beaten,  Horace  Greeley  wrote 
in  the  New  York  Tribune  : 

"The  South  took  ground  for  Douglas's  bill  :  the 
North  very  generally  rose  against  it.  In  state  after 
state  the  antagonists  of  slavery  extension  set  aside 
the  old  party  differences  and  party  organizations, 
and  united  on  the  Eepublican  platform  to  insist  on 
the  legal  exclusion  of  slavery  from  the  territories. 
And  wherever  that  ground  was  promptly  and 
frankly  taken,  the  people  have  emphatically  said, 
Amen.  New  York  almost  alone  among  the  free 
states  hesitated  and  hung  back.  Her  people  wished 
to  join  in  the  general  movement,  but  too  many  of 
her  politicians  were  not  ready. 

a  The  man  who  should  have  impelled  and  guided 
the  general  uprising  of  the  free  states  lives  in  Au 
burn,  and  his  name  is  William  H.  Seward.  In 
stead,  however,  of  taking  the  position  which  cir 
cumstances  and  his  own  antecedents  seemed  to 
require,  Mr.  Seward,  adhering  to  the  vacated  shell 


220  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

of  Whiggery,  lias  stood  aside  and  allowed  the  great 
movement  of  the  free  states  to  go  forward  without  a 
word  of  bold  aud  hearty  encouragement  or  sympathy 
from  its  national  leader.  The  result  is  recorded  in 
the  returns  of  this  election."  l 

The  story  of  the  rise  of  the  Republican  party  has 
often  been  told.  There  had  been,  for  some  years, 
a  feeling  that  the  times  called  for  the  organization 
of  a  new  Northern  party 2  to  champion  the  real  in 
terests  of  the  country  attacked  by  the  slave  power. 
The  defeat  of  Scott  in  1852  showed  that  the  Whig 
party  was  not  to  be  that  party.  With  the  passage 
of  the  Nebraska  Bill  the  feeling  began  to  crystallize, 
and  in  all  the  Northern  states  the  Anti-Nebraska 
men,  -whether  Whigs  or  Democrats,  began  to  under 
stand  that  the  tie  which  bound  them  together  might 
be  stronger  than  the  tendencies  which  would  keep 
them  apart.  Their  minds  turned  to  fusion  on  the 
anti-Nebraska  issue.  It  was  in  Michigan,  at  Jack- 

1  It  was  at  this  time  that  Greeley  sent  to  Seward  the  well- 
knowii  letter  of  Nov.  11,  1854  (to  be  found  in  Recollections  of  a 
Busy  Life,  p.  239,  and   elsewhere),  in  which   he  announced  the 
dissolution  of  political  relations  between  himself  and  Seward 
aud    Weed,  on  and  after  the  coming  senatorial  election.     Sew- 
ard's  comment,  in  a  letter  which  he  advised  Weed  to  burn, 
was  :  "  I  judge,  as  we  might  indeed  well  know,  from  his,  at 
bottom,  nobleness  of  disposition,  that  he  has  no  idea  of  saying 
anything  wrong  or  unkind,  but  it  is  sad  to  see  him  so  unhappy. " 
Life,  Vol.  II,  p.  239.     Greeley  had  a  very  great  desire  for  pub 
lic  office:  he  had  wished  to  be  nominated  for  governor  in  this 
campaign,  and   failing    that,  to   be  nominated  for  lieutenant- 
governor.     Instead   the  Whigs  had  elected  Henry  J.  Raymond, 
the  editor  of  the  N,ew  York  Times. 

2  At  the  time  of  the  Scott  campaign  the  Tribune  wrote,  "  What 
can  slavery  hope  to  gain     .     .     .     by  thus  doing  its  utmost  to 
cause  the  organization  of  a  great  Northern  party?"    June  17, 


THE  BEPUBLICAN  PAETY  221 

sou,  July  5,  1854,  that  the  name  Bepublican  was 
formally  adopted. 

This  feeling  existed  iu  New  York  as  elsewhere. 
The  Tribune,  as  we  have  seeu,  had  expressed  the 
idea  for  two  or  three  years.  But  the  time  seemed 
not  yet  ripe.  New  York,  more  than  most  states, 
was  absorbed  in  party  differences,  and  also  dis 
tracted  by  the  temperance  question  in  the  form  of 
the  so-called  Maine  Law.  Greeley  wrote  on  July 
24th  :  "  We  ha\7e  seen  no  indications  that  the  great 
body  of  auti- Nebraska  voters  are  prepared  for  this 
step  [the  forming  of  a  new  political  party]  and  we 
are  very  sure  that  it  has  not  been  contemplated  by 
a  majority  of  the  signers  to  the  state  call  for  the 
Saratoga  [Whig]  convention."  After  the  con 
vention,  on  August  15th,  he  wrote:  "  As  to  the 
proposed  fusion  of  parties,  the  previous  question  is 
plainly  this — Are  the  great  body  of  the  people  pre 
pared  for  such  a  fusion  ?  If  they  are,  then  the  time 
for  it  has  come.  But  while  nobody  doubts  that  a 
great  majority  of  our  voters  are  immovably  hostile 
to  the  principles  and  aims  of  the  Nebraska  Bill,  in 
so  far  as  it  affects  the  Missouri  restriction,  yet  it  is 
not  so  clear  that  any  majority  at  all  are  ready  to 
abandon  their  old  associations,  forget  their  chronic 
differences,  and  unite  for  this  one  issue."  It  is 
probable  that  this  is  a  fair  view  of  the  state  of 
opinion  in  New  York  at  the  time.  Greeley  would 
have  liked  to  have  seen  such  a  party  ;  he  was  ready 
to  head  its  ticket  and  lead  its  fight  as  candidate  for 
governor,  but  he  felt  sure  that  the  great  mass  of 
Whigs  and  Democrats  were  too  closely  held  by  their 


222  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

party  bonds.  Nor  did  he  know  much,  at  this  time, 
of  the  strength  of  the  Know-Nothing  movement. 
After  the  election  was  over,  however,  he  thought 
that  Seward  should  have  aroused  the  feeling  which 
he  himself  had  not  been  able  to  detect.1 

It  is  certainly  a  noble  and  an  inspiring  picture  for 
admirer  or  biographer, — Seward  arousing  the  re 
sistance  of  the  freedom -loving  North  to  a  sense  of 
the  aggressions  of  slavery,  and  leading  the  united 
freemen  of  New  England  and  New  York  to  join  the 
enthusiastic  West.  But  political  judgment  seems 
to  have  interfered  even  with  the  attractive  visions 
of  Horace  Greeley,  as  did  also  a  cold  view  of  the 
public  mind.  For  the  moment  the  cause  of 
freedom  in  New  York  had  to  be  content  with  a 
Whig  governor  and  legislature. 

Seward  himself  believed  that  the  public  senti 
ment  there  was  too  much  absorbed  in  minor  mat 
ters  and  selfish  interests  to  be  able  to  make  a 
strong  front  against  slavery.  On  June  20th,  writ 
ing  to  his  wife,  he  speaks  of  himself  as  "uusus- 
taiued  by  sympathy,  among  a  people  who  cannot  be 
recalled  from  trivial  objects  to  look  deliberately 
and  sternly  in  the  face  at  the  means  adopted  for 
their  own  undoing  by  their  own  agents."  And 
subsequently,  when  speaking  of  Know-Nothingism, 

*So  thinks  Rhodes,  History  of  the  United  States,  Vol.  II, 
pp.  68,  69,  who  believes  that  Seward  might  have  done  it  with  a 
few  speeches.  The  next  year,  Nov.  8,  1855,  the  Tribune  said  : 
"  Last  year  those  who  resisted  the  nomination  of  a  distinct  Re 
publican  state  ticket,  at  Saratoga  Springs,  alleging  that  the 
people  were  not  ripe  for  such  a  movement,  were  severely 
blamed  for  their  timidity  and  mistrust.  The  result  of  the  late 
canvass  is  their  justification." 


THE  REPUBLICAN  PARTY  223 

he  says  :  '  *  We  shall  probably  have  a  year  of  *  No 
Popery '  extravaganza ;  and  then  the  contest  be 
tween  freedom  and  slavery  will  be  resumed."  It 
should  be  added  that  when  he  got  to  New  Haven 
early  in  the  summer,  where  he  was  to  address  the 
Phi  Beta  Kappa,  he  felt  "  the  uprising  of  the  free 
spirit  of  the  North."  J  But  judging  from  what  is 
otherwise  known  of  him,  of  Thurlow  Weed,  and  of 
the  political  conditions  of  the  time,  there  is  little 
doubt  his  opinion  was  that  the  organizing  of  the 
Republican  party  in  New  York,  at  least  by  him,  was 
impracticable.  There  was  a  strong  anti- Nebraska 
element  among  the  Whigs,  and  something  of  that 
element  among  the  Democrats.  There  was  also 
the  Native  American  faction,  and  though  Seward 
called  it  a  danger  to  no  one  but  himself,  the  fact 
that  it  was  such  imperiled  any  cause  which  he 
might  lead.  Seward  was  certainly  admired  by 
multitudes,  in  and  out  of  his  party  in  New  York 
and  elsewhere.  But  then  he  was  more  heartily  dis 
liked  by  a  large  element  of  his  own  party  than  any 
other  public  man  in  the  state,  both  for  political 
and  for  public  reasons.  The  Fillmore  men  were 
political  enemies  ;  the  Native  Americans  detested 
his  public  attitude.  These  two  groups  would  cer 
tainly  unite  to  oppose  him.  Probably  Seward  and 
Weed  thought  it  better  to  gain  a  Whig  victory  and 
be  sure  of  an  anti -Nebraska  senator  in  1855,  before 
beginning  a  movement  which  ought  to  lead  directly 
to  the  presidential  campaign  of  1856. 
Such  at  least  was  the  course  of  events.  Myron 

1  Life,  Vol.  II,  pp.  234,  236. 


224  WILLIAM  H.  SBWAED 

Clark  was  elected  governor  by  the  slight  majority 
of  277,  because  the  vote  of  the  state  was  divided 
among  four  candidates.  Of  these  Clark,  the  Whig 
candidate,  had  a  majority  in  twenty-nine  counties  ; 
Seymour,  of  the  * '  Soft ' '  faction  of  the  Democrats, 
had  carried  fifteen  ;  and  Ullmau,  the  Native  Amer 
ican,  who  came  third  in  the  popular  vote,  had  carried 
fourteen.  It  was  most  noteworthy  that  those  coun 
ties  which  gave  Ullmau  a  majority  were  situated  in 
the  western  part  of  the  state  and  were  the  very  coun 
ties  which  twenty  years  before  had  been  Anti-Ma 
sonic.  From  being  intensely  excited  in  opposition 
to  secret  societies  in  politics,  they  had  become  the 
strongest  supporters  of  a  secret  institution,  avowedly 
political,  which  even  Masonry  never  was. 

The  complexion  of  the  Assembly  was  very  com 
plicated.  More  than  half  of  the  members  had  been 
chosen  by  combinations.  The  condition  of  affairs 
is  exhibited  in  the  following  table,  which  notes  the 
elements  supposed  to  be  there  represented.  It  is 
worth  looking  at,  if  only  to  get  an  idea  of  the 
problem  offering  itself  to  Seward's  mind.  It  must 
be  remembered  that  these  figures  stand  more  or 
less  accurately  for  actual  facts  that  were  vital  to 
a  correct  determination  of  policy. 

MEMBERS  OF  THE  ASSEMBLY  IN  1855  ! 

Whigs 38 

Maine  Law  and  Whig 25 

1  This  table  is  made  up  from  the  returns  printed  in  the  New 
York  Tribune  of  Nov.  13,  1854.  A  comparison  with  the  official 
list  in  the  Red  Book  shows  those  returns  to  he  not  absolutely 
correct.  Probably  the  Know-Nothing  strength  is  underesti 
mated,  but  the  error  is  not  of  real  importance. 


THE  REPUBLICAN  PAETY  225 

Anti-Maine  Law  and  Whig 6 

Know-Nothing  and  Whig 8 

Anti-Nebraska  and  Whig 1 

Republican  and  Whig 1 


79 


Independent  and  Maine  Law *  4 

Republican  and  Maine  Law 3 

Know-Nothing 1 

Free  Soil 1 

Free  Soil  and  Know-Nothing 1 


10 


Softshell  Democrats 12 

Soft  and  Know-Nothing 6 

Soft  and  Maine  Law 2 

Soft  and  Anti-Maine  Law 1 

Hardshell  Democrats 7 

Hard  and  Know- Nothing 6 

Hard  and  Maine  Law 1 

Hard  and  Independent 1 

Democrats 3 

39 
Total 128 

As  the  Whig  leaders  examined  these  confused 
conditions,  it  was  not  at  all  clear  that  Seward  could 
command  a  majority  in  the  senatorial  election.  He 
needed  one  in  each  house :  the  Senate,  elected  the 
year  before,  had  a  Whig  majority,  but  nobody  could 
predict  the  vote  of  the  Assembly.  Though  Seward 
could  not  feel  sure  of  a  majority  even  in  the  party 
caucus,  there  was  no  one  else  in  either  party  to 
measure  up  against  him.  The  Democrats  naturally 


226  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

opposed  him  and  would  have  liked  to  have  sent 
Dickinson  back  to  the  Senate.  The  Silver  Grays 
also  were  hostile,  largely  under  the  guise  of  Know- 
Nothings,  for  reasons  clear  to  all.  But  neither 
Silver  Grays  nor  Native  Americans  had  any  candi 
date  who  could  hold  his  own  party  or  appeal  to  the 
people  as  could  Seward.  When  it  came  to  a  choice, 
therefore,  he  had  seventy-four  votes  to  eighty  in  the 
Whig  caucus,  and  the  next  day  was  elected  by 
Senate  and  Assembly  in  joint  session.  He  received 
eighty-seven  votes  out  of  a  total  of  160,  of  whom 
157  were  present,  or  a  majority  of  seventeen  over  all 
others.  Of  the  opposition  votes  about  forty  were 
cast  by  the  Democrats,  the  rest  by  Native  Ameri 
cans.  "Thus,"  said  the  New  York  Herald,1  "after 
the  severest  contest  ever  known  in  the  political 
annals  of  this  country,  has  William  H.  Seward 
barely  escaped  political  annihilation."  The  rea 
son  for  this  contest  and  opposition  and  danger 
of  annihilation  is  very  significant.  It  was  pro 
claimed  by  F.  W.  Palmer  in  the  Assembly,  on 
February  5th,  that  he  was  for  Seward  on  the  slavery 
question;  "but,"  he  went  on,  "that  question  is 
not  now  open — while  the  other  one,  Americanism, 
is  of  paramount  importance."  When  men  could 
not  only  so  think,  but  so  declare  in  the  legislature, 
it  was  perhaps  as  well  that  Seward  had  not  come 
forward  to  put  himself  at  the  head  of  a  united 
Eepublican  party.  It  would  seem  that  the  North 
needed  a  little  more  persuasion.  It  was  still  a  little 
too  much  like  Hamlet,  spurred  up  to  intense  ex- 
1  Feb.  7,  1855. 


THE  REPUBLICAN  PARTY  227 

citemeut  and  unpacking  its  heart  with  words,  and 
then  becoming  much  interested  in  something  else. 

The  needed  persuasion  was  supplied  in  various 
ways,  rather  more  effectively  by  the  acts  of  the 
Southern  leaders  than  by  the  arguments  of  the 
North  ; — by  the  Osteud  Conference  of  the  Ministers 
to  England,  France,  and  Spain  ;  by  the  arrest  of 
Anthony  Burns ;  by  the  Missouri  intervention  in 
Kansas  elections.  One  of  the  most  important  ele 
ments  in  the  plan  of  action  of  the  North  was  to  fill 
Kansas  with  free  settlers,  and  when  it  came  to  plain 
facts  (instead  of  talk  and  bluster),  it  was  pretty 
clear  that  the  North  must  win  in  that  particular 
struggle.  It  had  many  thousands  who  were  will 
ing  to  emigrate  to  Kansas,  and  their  willingness 
was  efficiently  stimulated  and  often  aroused  by 
the  Emigrant  Aid  Society  and  by  other  private 
agencies.  Settlers  were  sent  to  Kansas  from  all 
over  the  North  :  in  the  South  no  such  general  effort 
was  made.  There  were  a  number  who  came  from 
Missouri,  some  of  them  with  their  slaves,  as  they 
had  a  perfect  right  to  do  ;  but  it  was  not  so  easy  for 
a  slaveholder,  presumably  owning  a  plantation  as 
well  as  slaves,  to  emigrate,  as  it  was  for  a  Northern 
farmer.  The  result  was  that  in  the  long  run,  in 
spite  of  obstruction  and  violence,  Kansas  would  be 
settled  by  the  North. 

The  winter  passed  without  important  political 
event.  Blue  Lodges  and  Emigrant  Aid  Societies 
strove  with  each  other  in  Kansas,  but  in  Washing 
ton  not  much  was  done.  It  was  the  end  of  a 
Congress  and  although  there  was  plenty  of  work, 


228  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

there  was  little  accomplished  pertaining  to  slavery 
or  anti-slavery.  The  session  closed  on  March  4th, 
and  Seward  returned  to  New  York. 

The  leading  question  was  the  organization  of  the 
Republican  party,  and  Seward' s  position  in  this 
matter  was  largely  conditioned  by  the  aspect  of 
politics  in  New  York.  Here  the  situation  was  one 
of  great  delicacy :  the  Whigs  had  carried  the  elec 
tion  in  the  fall,  but  their  vote  for  Clark  had  been 
much  less  than  that  for  the  two  Democratic  candi 
dates  together,  while  the  Know-Nothing  candidate 
had  polled  a  very  large  vote.  The  senatorial  elec 
tion  had  shown  that  the  Know-Nothing  influence 
was  clearly  against  Seward.  One  or  two  incidents 
indicated  the  general  tendency.  In  the  senatorial 
election  Littlejohn,  the  Speaker  of  the  House,  had 
taken  the  floor  to  advocate  Seward' s  cause.  He  had 
been  elected  by  a  combination  of  Whigs  and  Know- 
Nothings.  Shortly  afterward  he  was  hanged  in 
efligy  in  Poughkeepsie. l  At  about  the  same  time 
Moses  Eames,  a  member  of  the  Assembly,  was  a 
delegate  to  a  meeting  of  the  Native  American 
Grand  Council.  Being  upon  the  stage,  he  was 
asked  how  he  had  voted  :  when  he  answered  for 
Seward,  he  was  violently  attacked,  and  had  to  be 
hustled  out  of  the  building  by  a  back  staircase.  It 
was  clear  that  any  Seward  movement  would  be 
strongly  opposed  by  the  Know-Nothings.  When 
the  senator  himself  returned  from  Washington  in 
the  spring,  it  was  to  the  cheering  news  that  the 

1(The  effigy  was  cut  down,  very  appropriately,  by  two  Irish 
men. 


THE  KEPUBLICAN  PAKTY  229 

KDOW- Nothings  had  carried  Auburn.  "It  is  well 
enough,"  was  his  comment.1  "  The  surest  cure  for 
a  fever  of  that  kind  is  to  let  it  burn  out."  A  little 
later  it  seemed  that  the  Know- Nothing  strength 
was  failing.  The  spring  elections  appeared  to  show 
that  in  the  choice  of  county  supervisors,  the  Native 
Americans  were  generally  falling  behind  the  other 
parties.  In  many  counties  they  were  now  in  a 
minority.  Even  in  Erie  County,  where  the  year 
before  a  whole  anti-Seward  delegation  had  gone  to 
the  Assembly,  there  were  now  sixteen  anti-Know- 
Nothiugs  to  six  Know-Nothings.2  The  position  of 
the  Know-Nothing  party  was  one  of  very  great 
interest.  The  movement  had  now  spread  all  over 
the  country.  In  the  North  there  was  a  rumor  that 
Fillmore  had  joined  a  lodge  :  it  had  been  long  un 
derstood  that  Know-Nothingism  in  New  York  was 
under  Silver  Gray  influence,  at  least  so  far  as  the 
slavery  question  was  concerned.  In  the  South  the 
order  was  having  a  hard  time  over  the  matter.  In 
general,  the  plan  was  to  put  it  entirely  aside,  but 
in  the  Southern  states  the  leaders  were  forced  to 
take  some  sort  of  position,  and  by  refusing  to  come 
out  definitely  in  favor  of  slavery,  they  lost  Vir 
ginia  in  a  hot  election.  In  June  occurred  a  very 
significant  event :  the  Know-Nothings'  National 
Council  met  at  Philadelphia.  Ostensibly  it  was  a 
secret  conclave,  — the  secret  meeting  of  the  ruling 

1  Life,  Vol.  II,  p.  249. 

'New  York  Tribune,  March  12,  1855.  It  must  be  noted, 
however,  that  the  so-called  anti-Know-Nothing  vote  was  often 
half  Whig,  half-Democratic,  and  not  by  any  necessity  all  anti- 
Nebraskau. 


230  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

body  of  a  great  secret  order.  Practically,  it  was 
the  national  convention  of  a  political  party.  Al 
though  at  first  no  one  knew  even  where  it  was 
meeting,  yet  reports  of  its  action  were  daily 
published  to  the  great  disgust  and  auger  of  the 
members.  After  a  long  session  the  important 
question  was  reached.  The  committee  presented 
resolutions,  and  among  them  one  declaring  that  the 
order  wished  "  to  abide  by  and  maintain  the  exist 
ing  laws  upon  the  subject  of  slavery,  as  a  final  and 
conclusive  settlement  of  the  subject  in  spirit  and 
substance."  A  minority  resolution  of  a  very  dif 
ferent  character  was  also  introduced,  protesting 
against  slavery  in  the  territories. 

Discussion  at  once  became  active  and  violent. 
Mallory  of  New  York  asked,  "if  every  one  would 
not  submit  to  the  majority."  Governor  Gardner  of 
Massachusetts  rejoined  that  if  the  majority  resolu 
tion  were  passed,  neither  he  nor  any  other  North 
erner  would  accept  it.  Many  bitter  things  were 
said,  among  them  the  remark  of  Senator  Wilson  of 
Massachusetts  to  the  effect  that  "  William  H.  Seward 
had  his  heel  upon  the  necks  of  the  dough-faces  of 
New  York,  and  would  crush  them  out,  so  soon  as  the 
people  could  get  a  chance  at  them."  On  the  other 
hand,  James  W.  Baker  noted  that  New  York  had 
expelled  thirty  thousand  of  the  order  for  voting  for 
Seward  men,  and  had  a  hundred  and  eighty  thou 
sand  left.1  The  convention  passed  the  resolutions, 

1  He  was  uot  far  wrong  :  the  Know-Nothing  vote  in  the  fall 
was  141,000  in  an  election  where  the  other  parties  polled  only 
about  three-fourths  of  their  usual  strength. 


THE  REPUBLICAN  PARTY  231 

and  the  next  day  the  delegations  from  all  the  North 
ern  states,  except  New  York,  walked  out  of  the  hall. 

This  decision  cleared  the  air.  It  left  the  Know- 
Nothings  of  New  York  a  distinctly  Silver  Gray 
party  :  it  no  longer  had  any  appeal  to  the  man  who 
held  anti-slavery  to  be  an  important  issue.  There 
was  then  nothing  to  oppose  the  welding  of  all  anti- 
slavery  men  into  one  organization,  whether  Aboli 
tionists,  Free  Soil  Democrats,  or  Anti-slavery 
Whigs.  It  no  longer  seemed  right,  however,  that 
this  organization  should  be  the  Whig  party,  for 
many  who  wished  to  join  it  might  differ  from  the 
Whigs  upon  questions  of  the  tariff,  the  banking 
system,  internal  and  harbor  improvements.1  Nor 
did  it  seem  right  to  nominate  a  straight  Whig 
ticket.  Perhaps  the  party  leaders  had  thought  over 
Horace  Greeley's  comment  on  their  action  of  the 
previous  summer.  "The  Whig  convention,"  said 
the  Tribune,  November  9,  1854,  "passed  capital 
resolves  all  pointing  to  fusion  and  proceeded  to 
nominate  an  entirely  Whig  ticket.  This  was  like 
asking  a  friend  to  join  you  on  a  picnic,  and  yourself 
eating  all  the  mutually  supplied  viands,  before  he 
could  arrive. " 

As  the  summer  went  on,  there  were  all  sorts  of  in 
harmonious  and  conflicting  occurrences  of  which  one 
can  now  hardly  see  the  right  relation.  In  Cleveland 
in  June  there  was  organized  a  body  called  the  Know- 
Somethings,  an  American  order  which  took  strong 
auti- Nebraska  ground.  Its  political  power  was  quite 

1  Matters  which  the  Tribune,  in  the  campaign  of  1852  had  tried 
to  make  the  true  Whig  doctrine. 


232  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

unknown,  although  it  appeared  in  New  York l  and 
Massachusetts,  as  well  as  in  Ohio.  It  was  appar 
ently  in  favor  of  Seward,  but  it  made  no  nomina 
tions.  In  July,  Ohio  and  Indiana  held  state  con 
ventions  which  adopted  the  name  Kepublican.  In 
the  same  month  the  body  appointed  the  year  before 
at  Auburn,  as  the  Kepublican  General  Committee, 
called  a  convention  in  September  of  "  all  citizens 
opposed  to  the  legislation  admitting  slavery  into 
Nebraska  and  Kansas."  The  Abolitionists  held 
their  convention  and  took  up  a  collection  for  John 
Brown.  Washington  Hunt,  who  had  been  elected 
governor  in  1850  by  the  Seward  Whigs,  wrote  a 
letter  advising  against  fusion  with  the  Republicans. 
The  Know-Nothing  convention  in  August  tried  to 
straddle  the  Nebraska  question.  The  Softshell 
faction  of  the  Democratic  party  aimed  to  put  it  to 
one  side.2 

Seward  was  still  doubtful.  He  thought  it  by  no 
means  certain,  and  even  hardly  probable,  that  the 
plan  would  work  out  completely  and  safely  even  in 
1856.  He  saw  that  he  would  be  an  obvious  candi 
date  for  the  presidency.8  He  was  not  sure  that  he 
wished  to  be  President  and  was  quite  sure  that  he 
did  not  wish  to  be  a  candidate.  Still  he  felt  that 

1  July  31st,  at  Rochester. 

2  The  New  York  Tribune  said  on  Sept.  1st,  "  The  Know-Noth 
ings  resolve  that  it  should   not  be.     The  'Softs'  resolve  that 
they  don't  like  it.     The  People  resolve  that  they  won't  stand 
it." 

3  Thus  in  1854  the  New  York  Times  (June  1st,  cited  by  Rhodes, 
Vol.   II,  p.  68)  declared  that  he  would   probably  be   elected 
President  "  by  the  largest  vote  from  the  free  states  ever  cast  for 
any  candidate." 


THE  REPUBLICAN  PARTY  233 

the  Whigs  were  impossible  companions  for  him  any 
longer  and  that  there  was  nothing  to  do  but  go 
ahead.  And  the  course  was  certainly  the  course  of 
right,  even  if  also  of  danger. 

Arrangements  were  therefore  made  for  a  joint 
convention.  Whig  delegates  were  chosen  to  one 
body  and  Republican  delegates  to  another.  Each 
convention  met  separately,  and  nominated  a  ticket : 
then  the  Whigs  marched  into  the  Republican 
convention,  where  it  was  jointly  resolved  that  the 
ticket  be  presented  to  the  state  as  Republican,  and 
that  the  new  party  take  that  name.  Of  the  candi 
dates  four  were  Whigs  and  five  Democrats.  It 
was  twenty-one  years  since  the  convention  of  1834 
in  which  the  Whig  party  in  New  York  had  or 
ganized  for  its  first  campaign.  They  had  six  times 
elected  their  governor  in  eleven  elections.  Seward 
had  been  their  standard-bearer  in  their  first 
campaign,  and  although  not  successful  then,  he  had 
four  years  later  led  the  party  to  victory.  He  was 
still  the  party  leader,  though  he  had  passed  from 
the  field  of  state  interests  to  the  larger  field  of 
national  politics.  But  so  had  everybody  else  by 
this  time,  and  if  Seward  was  now  standing  for  poli 
cies  very  different  from  those  of  1834,  it  was  be 
cause  the  development  of  national  ideas  had  finally 
brought  to  the  front  essential  questions  of  policy. 
But  here  as  formerly  Seward  was  still  a  leader,  in 
fact  as  well  as  in  theory. 

So  soon  as  the  fusion  was  completed,  he  was 
called  upon  to  speak  for  and  to  the  new  party. 
Among  the  many  ratification  meetings  was  one 


234  WILLIAM  H.  SEWABD 

held  at  the  Capitol  at  Albany  iii  which  Seward  for 
the  Whigs  and  General  Jaines  Nye  for  the  Demo 
crats,  made  addresses.  In  spite  of  the  pouring 
rain,  a  crowd  was  present  to  listen  with  interest 
and  enthusiasm  to  Seward' s  views.  It  was  a  sound, 
well-reasoned  speech,  but  most  characteristically 
confined  itself  to  the  economic  and  political  aspects 
of  the  case.  Beginning  with  a  reminder  of  the 
memories  of  the  political  past  that  hung  about  the 
place  wherein  they  were  assembled,  he  turned  di 
rectly  to  his  subject.  "You,  old,  tried,  familiar 
friends,'7  said  he,  "ask  my  counsel  whether  to 
cling  yet  longer  to  traditional  controversies  and  to 
dissolving  parties,  or  rise  at  once  to  nobler  aims, 
with  new  and  more  energetic  associations."  He 
began,  then,  with  an  analysis  of  the  situation.  The 
question  was,  should  a  privileged  class  of  men  be 
permitted  to  take  to  themselves  the  control  of  the 
greater  part  of  the  nation  ?  That  privileged  class 
was  the  slaveholders.  He  traced  the  growth  of 
their  power.  Clearly  they  should  have  no  privi 
leges  beyond  others  :  the  present  evil,  which  pointed 
to  more  to  come,  was  intolerable. 

But  no  revolution  can  be  carried  out  except  by 
organization.  And  what  organization  is  possible 
here?  We  must  have  a  national  party.  Shall  we 
take  one  that  exists  :  the  Know-Nothing,  the  Demo 
cratic,  the  Whig  ?  None  can  satisfy  us  :  but  true 
Democrats  and  true  Whigs  are  ready  to  unite  on 
the  sound  principles  common  to  both.  The  Ke- 
publican  party  is  the  party  for  us. 

The  time  and  the  subject,   however,   called  for 


THE  REPUBLICAN  PARTY  235 

something  more  than  speeches.  The  Republicans 
were  beaten  at  the  polls  and  the  Democrats  as  well. 
There  was  only  a  small  vote,  but  the  Know-Nothings 
came  out  about  10,000  ahead. 

A  careful  analysis  of  the  returns  shows  some  of 
the  causes.  In  New  York  City  the  Republicans 
had  but  6,000  to  the  Know-Nothings'  20,000,  a  vote 
in  itself  enough  to  settle  the  election.  Elsewhere 
in  the  state  the  result  was  unexpectedly  favorable. 
The  year  before  the  western  counties  had  almost  all 
been  Know-Nothing  :  this  year  they  were  almost 
all  Republican.  In  the  eastern  part  of  the  state, 
with  a  few  Democratic  exceptions,  there  was  a 
string  of  Know-Nothing  majorities.  "Sam,"1 
though  beaten  out  of  his  stronghold,  had  been  able 
to  open  up  new  territory. 

Seward,  his  mind  fixed  upon  senatorial  struggles, 
viewed  the  defeat  with  philosophy.  "A  year  is 
necessary  to  let  the  cheat  wear  off,"  he  wrote. 
"  The  Know- Nothings  will  inevitably  disappear  in 
the  heat  of  the  great  national  contest."  "  The 
heart  of  the  country  is  fixed  on  higher,  nobler 
things.  Do  not  distrust  it."  2 

The  time  has  u  fully  come,"  wrote  Greeley  in  the 
Tribune  of  November  8th,  u  for  laying  aside  all  old 
party  distinctions  until  we  settle  the  question." 

1  Know-Nothing  party  was  so  called. 
1  Life,  Vol.  II,  p.  259. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE  PRESIDENCY 

As  Seward  returned  to  Washington  in  December, 
1855,  he  felt  the  sort  of  relief  that  comes  when  all 
final  preparations  are  made,  and  one  is  ready  for 
work.  With  the  formation  of  the  Republican  party 
a  definite  point  was  won  :  a  period  of  transition  was 
passed,  a  new  period  of  activity  begun.  In  1850 
Seward  had  stood  almost  alone  among  the  Whigs  in 
the  Senate,  opposed  not  only  by  the  Democrats,  but 
also  by  Webster  and  Clay,  the  senatorial  leaders  of 
his  own  party,  and  shortly  by  Fillmore  and  the 
whole  strength  of  the  administration.  The  Com 
promise  of  1850  had  passed,  but  instead  of  being  a 
settlement,  it  had  led  to  more  disturbance.  The 
Whig  party  in  New  York  had  split  upon  it,  Sew 
ard' s  own  action  being  the  immediate  rock  that 
caused  disaster.  He  found  himself  and  Chase  joined 
by  others, — Wade,  Hale,  Sumner,  Fish, — but  still 
he  could  not  carry  the  Whig  party  with  him  either 
in  Senate  or  House :  he  was  an  ultra,  a  radical, 
a  bugbear  to  the  conservative  souls  who  wished  to 
pursue  their  ways  with  the  least  friction.  The  Ne 
braska  Bill  had  given  strength  to  the  an  ti- si  a  very 
cause  in  the  country  and  to  the  auti -slavery  group 
in  the  Senate,  so  that  now  Seward  saw  the  minority 


THE  PRESIDENCY  237 

rise  to  thirteen,  but  the  political  conditions  of  five 
years  before  could  not  be  restored.  The  turmoil 
was  increased  by  the  Know -Nothings,  who  offered 
the  very  means  of  confusion  needed  by  conserva 
tives  at  the  North, — a  chance  to  cloud  the  true  issue 
with  some  other  matter  that  had  enough  good  in  it 
to  attract  many  conscientious  men,  who  might  thus 
be  used  by  the  unscrupulous.  And  to  Seward  this 
appearance  was  doubly  evil  because  it  was  directed 
especially  against  him.  By  means  of  it  he  occupied 
the  position  of  the  most-hated  man  in  the  country  : 
hated  at  the  South  for  his  sympathy  with  the  slave  ; 
hated  at  the  North  for  his  sympathy  with  the  immi 
grant.  He  had  been  without  a  party  behind  him. 
The  Southern  Whigs  had  become  his  most  violent 
opponents. 

Now  the  situation  had  been  cleared  of  all  this 
confusion.  There  was  the  Republican  party  and 
its  plainly -stated  issue  :  opposition  to  the  extension 
of  slavery.  That  wag  Seward' s  own  position,  and 
although  the  Whigs  had  been  unable  to  come 
up  to  it,  there  had  gathered,  after  the  wreck  and 
dissolution  of  old  political  associations,  enough  to 
make  him  feel  that  he  was  no  longer  an  unaided 
knight-errant,  but  rather  a  trusted  champion  of 
thousands  of  his  fellow  citizens.  The  feeling  of  the 
country  was  right :  all  that  was  needed  was  to  or 
ganize  to  meet  possibilities  that  could  be  foreseen, 
and  to  await  the  course  of  events. 

With  such  ideas  Seward  returned  to  Washing 
ton,  where  he  now  had  a  house  on  G  and  21st 
Streets.  This  made  a  great  change  in  his  life,  for 


238  WILLIAM  H.  SEWABD 

he  could  have  his  family  with  him.  His  library 
began  to  take  on  a  more  familiar  air  j  his  writing- 
chair  on  one  side  of  the  fire,  the  portrait  of  Dr. 
Nott  over  the  mantle,  recalled  old  habits  and  cus 
toms  and  gave  a  temper  and  an  atmosphere  to  his 
work. 

It  is  during  these  years  of  his  term  as  senator  that 
Seward  stood  more  definitely  before  the  country  as 
a  great  man  than  at  any  other  period  in  his  career, 
though  in  reality  he  was  not  so  much  himself  then 
as  he  was  at  times  before  or  afterward.  He  was  a 
successful  leader  of  what  had  once  seemed  a  forlorn 
hope,  but  which  gradually  became  a  victorious 
march.  Not  the  only  leader,  however,  and  often 
not  in  sympathy  with  his  colleagues  or  his  followers, 
he  stood  somewhat  apart  from  both,  to  be  regarded 
with  admiration  rather  than  affection.  It  was  al 
most  a  commonplace  that  he  was  not  understood. 
His  personal  letters  show  that  he  often  felt  himself 
alone.  Two  persons,  about  this  time,  have  recorded 
impressions  of  him  that  are  worth  remembering. 
Carl  Schurz,  coming  to  Washington  in  his  earlier 
days  in  America,  looked  eagerly  for  Seward  as  he 
watched  the  debates  in  the  Senate.  "  There  was  to 
me  something  mysterious  in  the  slim,  wiry  figure, 
the  thin,  sallow  face,  the  overhanging  eyebrows, 
and  the  muffled  voice,"  he  writes,  and  goes  on  later  : 
u  But  he  made  upon  me,  as  upon  many  others,  the 
impression  of  a  man  who  controlled  hidden  occult 
powers  which  he  could  bring  into  play  if  he  would. 
Indeed,  I  heard  him  spoken  of  as  a  sort  of  political 
wizard  who  knew  all  secrets  and  who  commanded 


THE  PRESIDENCY  239 

political  forces  unknown  to  all  the  world,  except 
himself  and  his  bosom  friend,  Thurlow  Weed,  the 
most  astute,  skilful,  and  indefatigable  political 
manager  ever  known. "  l  There  is  no  doubt  that 
Seward  was  a  politician  and  understood  many  po 
litical  secrets,  but  a  reading  of  his  intimate  letters 
to  Thurlow  Weed  fails  to  convey  any  such  impression 
of  him  as  that  of  Carl  Schurz.  He  once  wrote  to 
Weed,  "  You  see  the  politicians,  I  only  the  people."  2 
He  may  have  referred  to  the  current  circumstances 
only  ;  he  may  to  some  degree  have  been  self-de 
ceived.  Yet  his  own  view  of  himself  was  more  cor 
rect  than  that  of  Jefferson  Davis  with  whom  in  1858 
he  became  intimate.  Mrs.  Davis  says  that  his  was 
"a  problematical  character,  full  of  contradictions, 
but  a  very  attractive  study  to  us."  Perhaps  she 
was  here  right,  but  she  had  certainly  misunderstood 
him  when  she  added,  '  *  He  frankly  avowed  that  the 
truth  should  be  held  always  subsidiary  to  an  end, 
and  if  some  other  statement  could  subserve  that  end, 
he  made  it."  3  It  is  hard  for  us  to  believe  anything 
of  the  sort ;  we  know  that  Seward  was  only  too  will 
ing  to  sacrifice  for  what  he  held  to  be  right  and 
true. 

When  Congress  assembled,  Seward  renewed  his 
oath  of  office  as  senator  from  New  York.  But  he 
now  stood  in  the  Senate  in  a  new  character  :  he  had 
been  a  Whig  of  anti-slavery  opinions  ;  he  was  now 
a  leader  of  the  Eepublicau  party.  That  party,  in 

'Carl  Schurz,  Reminiscences,  Vol.  II,  p.  34. 

5  July  27,  1844.     Hollister  MSS. 

3  Mra.  Davis,  Life  of  Jefferson  Davis,  Vol.  I,  p.  583. 


240  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

the  Senate,  was  not  strong  but  Seward  had  more 
with  him  than  six  years  ago  when  he  and  Chase 
stood  alone.  The  House,  however,  reflected  national 
sentiment  more  accurately,  and  showed  a  consider 
able  anti-Nebraska  majority.  The  anti-Nebraska 
men  unfortunately  were  not  all  Eepublicans,  and  it 
was  not  merely  days,  but  weeks  and  almost  months 
before  they  managed  to  elect  their  candidate  for 
speaker.  It  was  February  before  N.  P.  Banks  was 
chosen,  and  throughout  the  winter  with  an  un 
organized  house,  little  public  business  could  be 
done. 

Outside  the  legislative  chambers,  however,  there 
was  much  to  be  managed  in  a  political  way.  It  was 
the  year  of  the  presidential  election  and  the  leaders 
of  the  new  party  and  every  one  else  were  careful  in 
their  consideration  of  available  candidates.  The 
Native  Americans  early  declared  for  Fillmore.  But 
they  were  no  longer  the  power  that  they  had  been  : 
it  was  certain  that  many  would  join  the  new  party. 
In  Seward' s  mind  the  matter  had  perhaps  more  im 
portance  than  with  any  other.  From  the  simple, 
ideal  standpoint,  he  himself  was  the  most  obvious 
candidate  for  the  ^Republicans.  He  had  great 
powers  and  great  experience,  greater  indeed  in  gen 
eral  opinion  on  these  matters  than  any  other  man 
in  the  party.  He  was  further  and  indubitably 
pointed  out  as  leader  by  the  fact  that  for  six  years 
he  had  been  the  acknowledged  representative  of 
anti-slavery  ideas  in  the  upper  house  of  Congress. 
No  one  else  could  be  thought  of  as  a  candidate  from 
such  a  standpoint,  with  the  exception  of  Chase,  who 


THE  PRESIDENCY  241 

had  stood  side  by  side  with  Seward  on  their  first  ap 
pearance  in  the  Senate.  If  the  Republican  party 
meant  to  go  before  the  country  simply  on  the  anti- 
slavery  issue,  on  the  immediate  issue  of  preventing 
further  extension  of  slavery  in  the  territories,  then 
Seward  was  clearly  the  man.  This  he  himself  felt, 
and  it  was  a  very  general  feeling.  But  could  the 
party  go  before  the  country  upon  that  one  issue  1 
If  it  were  necessary  to  present  a  ticket  that  would 
attract  Democrats  on  the  one  hand,  and  Native 
Americans  on  the  other,  then  it  would  be  wiser  to 
offer  some  one  who  had  not  a  record  which  would 
repel  them  both.  Seward  felt  this,  and  so  did  Thur- 
low  Weed.  It  appeared  best  to  make  the  nomina 
tion  on  the  ground  of  expediency.  Victory  with 
Seward  was  possible  only  if  the  party  could  carry 
the  whole  North  :  with  him  as  candidate  every 
Southern  vote  was  lost  before  the  election,  and 
many  Northern  votes  were  in  doubt.  It  is  not 
known  just  what  he  himself  thought  at  this  time. 
His  intimate  letters, — for  instance,  those  to  his  wife 
and  Thurlow  Weed, — show  that  while  he  saw  the 
political  expediency  of  another  nomination,  he  yet 
half  wished  for  a  chance  to  head  the  Repub 
lican  army  himself,  even  if  he  must  be  defeated 
at  the  first  attack.  Weed  probably  felt  sure  that 
Seward  could  not  be  elected  :  it  is  possible  that 
he  believed  strongly  and  honestly  that  his  chief 
was  more  truly  himself  as  a  senatorial  leader,  than 
he  could  be  as  President.  However  they  felt, 
neither  made  any  effort  to  solidify  the  Seward  in 
fluence  in  the  party,  and  public  affairs  soon  made 


242  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

such  advance  as  rendered  him  less  available  than 
before.1 

The  chief  object  of  interest  in  public  affairs  was, 
of  course,  Kansas.  The  Republicans  called  them 
selves,  or  had  been  called,  an ti -Nebraska  men,  from 
the  original  bill  proposed  by  Douglas  :  but  by  this 
time  Nebraska  had  ceased  to  be  a  subject  of  im 
mediate  interest  and  the  question  before  the  coun 
try  was  Kansas,  slave  or  free.  A  free  state  consti 
tution  had  been  adopted  at  Topeka  the  year  before. 
But  it  had  been  impossible  to  carry  out  peaceably 
the  terms  of  this  constitution,  and  the  territory 
was  the  scene  of  continued  violence.  The  Demo 
cratic  party,  by  the  voice  of  the  President,  con 
demned  the  free  state  activity  as  revolutionary,  and 
urged  a  policy  of  military  repression.  The  greater 
part  of  the  session  in  the  Senate  was  taken  up  by 
debate  of  the  terms  under  which  Kansas  might  be 
admitted  as  a  state  :  Douglas  made  the  administra 
tion  proposal  and  Seward  offered  a  substitute  pro 
viding  for  the  immediate  admission  of  Kansas 
under  the  Topeka  constitution.  Events  in  the  terri 
tory  proceeded  with  more  vigor,  reaching  the  high- 
water  mark  of  excitement  in  the  attack  on  the  town 
of  Lawrence  and  the  sacking  and  burning  of  the  free 
state  property  in  the  place.  This  event  occurred 
toward  the  end  of  May,  not  long  before  the  conven- 

1  The  situation  was  in  some  respects  like  Seward 's  position  in 
1834.  Then  the  Whigs  were  a  new  party,  yet  Weed  decided 
that  Seward  had  better  run  for  governor,  even  though  pretty 
sure  to  be  beaten.  He  did  run,  was  beaten,  and  four  years  after 
was  elected  by  a  large  majority,  and  that  over  his  early  oppo 
nent. 


THE  PRESIDENCY  243 

tioii.  It  aroused  deep  feeling  all  over  the  North, 
but  the  increased  excitement  failed  to  improve 
Seward' s  standing.  It  tended  the  other  way  :  men 
saw  the  results  of  taking  extreme  positions  and 
feared  Tvjs^tno  n.fl va.nr.ftd  vip.wft-^  He  was  the  logical 
caudidateof  the  backbone  of  the  party,  but  it  was 
necessary  to  be  cautious.1  The  New  York  Tribune 
put  the  case  in  a  nutshell  on  June  6th.  If  the  op 
ponents  of  slavery  extension  could  carry  all  the  free 
states,  then  Seward,  Chase,  or  Suuiner  would  be 
the  man  ;  if  they  could  carry  all  the  free  states 
"only  in  concurrence  with  other  influences, "  then 
Fremont,  McLean,  Bissell  or  Banks.  They  them 
selves  favored  Fremont,  who  was  nominated.  As 
candidate  for  Vice- President  the  convention  chose 
Dayton  of  New  Jersey,  although  the  West  in  gen 
eral  desired  Abraham  Lincoln. 

Seward's  name  was  not  presented.  Personally 
he  would  have  preferred  to  have  directed  the  fight.2 
If  the  Eepublicans  were  to  be  beaten,  it  would  have 
been  a  satisfaction  to  have  held  up  the  colors  in  the 
contest ;  he  would  have  still  been  the  leader.  If 
the  Eepublicans  were  to  be  defeated  with  another 


1  How  entirely  Seward  was  the  representative  of  the  Black 
Republicans  will  be  noted  everywhere  in  the  newspaper  litera 
ture  of  the  time.  After  Brooks's  attack  on  Sumner,  there  was 
published  in  the  Tribune  of  May  31st  an  account  (presumably 
invented  in  Washington)  of  an  absurd  conversation  about 
Brooks,  in  which  the  Southerner  says,  "  He  swears  he'll  get  a 
bill  passed,  making  an  appropriation  for  cotton  landings  on  the 
Mississippi,  and  then  he'll  have  Sumner  and  Seward  sent  to 
drive  the  piles.  He  sits  there,  with  his  pistols  under  his  coat, 
like  an  old  eagle,  by  G ." 

1  Life,  Vol.  II,  p.  276. 


244  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

candidate,  he  himself  might  be  the  logical  successor 
ill  I860,  but  then  there  would  be  that  other  to 
consider.  So  also  if  the  Eepublican  party  should 
not  be  beaten,  but  should  be  victorious  under  an 
other.  The  worst  of  a  nomination  would  be  that  a 
defeat  of  the  Kepublicaus  under  him  might  lead  to 
the  feeling  that  they  might  have  been  successful 
under  another.  Considerations  like  these  may  seem, 
selfish,  and  perhaps  petty,  but  when  men  have  long 
looked  upon  the  affairs  of  the  country  from  the 
standpoint  of  party,  they  naturally  believe  that  the 
success  of  the  country  is  bound  up  in  its  success. 
The  Republicans,  so  largely  a  party  of  principle,  a 
party  formed,  in  the  main,  to  carry  a  certain  definite 
policy,  had  this  feeling  very  strongly.  And  any 
party  leader, — indeed,  any  leader  at  all,  by  virtue 
of  the  very  qualities  that  make  him  a  leader,  comes 
to  think  that  the  success  of  the  party  depends  on 
the  prevalence  of  his  own  ideas.  Seward  almost  of 
necessity  felt  that  no  one  but  himself  .could  stand 
successfully  for  the  ideas  for  which  he  had  so  long 
striven.  But  he  understood  the  question  of  "avail 
ability,"  as  he  calls  it.1  On  June  14th  he  wrote : 
'  *  The  understanding  all  around  me  is  that  Greeley 
has  struck  hands  with  enemies  of  mine,  and 
sacrificed  me  for  the  good  of  the  cause,  to  be  ob 
tained  by  a  nomination  of  a  more  available  can 
didate."  Though  Seward  speaks  thus  of  a  avail 
ability,"  he  must  have  known  that  the  position  of 
Pennsylvania  alone  made  his  election  practically 

'On  June  11th,  probably  with  the  passage  just  quoted  from 
the  Tribune  in  mind.     Life,  Vol.  II,  p.  277. 


THE  PKESIDENCY  245 

impossible  j  he  would  have  needed  the  vote  of  that 
state.  But  the  Democrats  had  nominated  a  Penn- 
sylvauian,  James  Buchanan,  so  that  there  would  be 
strong  opposition  on  that  ground.  Seward  under 
stood  perfectly  well  that  he  himself  was  very  weak 
iu  the  state  and  had  been  for  a  dozen  years  on  ac 
count  of  his  position  on  the  public  school  question. 
He  believed  in  that  position  and  had  taken  it  as 
governor  because  he  thought  it  to  be  the  best  work 
ing  out  of  a  great  and  important  problem.  But  he 
knew  quite  well  that  from  that  simple  beginning 
had  developed  a  strong  "  Native  American"  opposi 
tion  which  would  have  cost  him  thousands  of 
votes  not  only  in  New  York,  where  they  could  have 
been  overcome,  but  also  in  Pennsylvania,  where 
they  could  not.1 

Seward  was  at  times  impatient  that  men  would 
not  come  together  on  the  main  issues,  and  put  minor 
matters  to  one  side.  But  ' '  Native  Americanism  ' ' 
with  him  was  not  a  minor  matter  :  it  was  in  reality 
one  of  the  fundamentals.  He  believed  slavery  to 
be  a  moral  wrong  ;  by  the  necessities  of  life  as  a 
public  man,  however,  he  always  (save  in  private) 
made  his  opposition  rest  upon  economic  or  political 
grounds.  As ^n__economistT_he^  believed  in  free 
labor :  _ag_aLj3tatesman,  be  believed  in  universal 
suffrage.  Slavery  was  opposed  to  both  ;  he  saw 
that  it  must  be  done  away  with  before  the  United 

1  Seward  had  been  well  aware  of  the  position  of  Pennsylvania 
for  many  years.  As  early  as  1844  he  attributed  the  defeat  of 
the  Whigs' to  the  fact  that  they  had  allowed  the  canvass  in  that 
state  to  become  mixed  with  Native  American  questions. 


246  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

States  as  a  nation  was  safe,  and  he  was  convinced 
that  it  would  be  done  away  with  in  a  manner  con 
templated  by  the  framers  of  the  Constitution,  if 
it  could  be  restricted.  We  have  seen  how  this 
view  only  gradually  took  a  leading  position  in  his 
mind.  He  came  into  the  anti-slavery  movement 
late  :  he  had  formed  his  political  principles,  his 
political  methods,  his  political  associations  before 
anti-slavery  became  a  public  matter.  The  founda 
tion  of  his  political  system  was  what  had  been 
called  internal  improvements.  But  measures  for 
internal  improvement  demanded  sound  politics 
and  sound  finance,  so  Seward  opposed  the  Kegency 
and  Jackson  ;  and  he  became  successively  an  Anti- 
Mason  and  a  Whig.  Then  came  the  great  decade 
of  immigration.  Seward  at  this  time  saw  as  clearly 
as  ten  years  afterward,  that  immigration,  if  rightly 
dealt  with,  must  kill  slavery.  Hence  as  governor 
he  became  unpopular  on  the  public  school  issue. 
But  here  he  aroused  the  Native  American  feeling 
which  reached  a  head  in  1844  and  beat  Henry  Clay  * 
in  Pennsylvania  and  now  was  ready  to  beat  Seward 
himself. 

So  the  campaign  for  Fremont  began,  and  Seward, 
as  often  before,  took  the  stump  and  did  what  he 
could  to  bring  about  the  election  of  the  party 
leader.  Fremont  was  not  elected  but  he  showed 
that  the  Eepublican  party  was  the  party  of  the 
future.  fPThe  Whigs  were  memories  only  ;  the  Native 
Americans  carried  but  one  state  ;  the  Democrats 
carried  the  whole  South  and  six  of  the  free  states. 
1  In  Seward's  opinion. 


THE  PRESIDENCY  247 

With  the  election  came  a  lull  in  political  excite- 
meiit.  Had  Fremont  been  chosen,  the  result  four 
years  afterward  might  have  been  very  much 
changed.  But  with  the  election  of  Buchanan,  the 
Democratic  party  North  and  South  felt  that  at  least 
the  status  quo  would  be  maintained,  while  the  Re 
publicans  were  willing  to  stop  a  moment  for  breath 
before  continuing  the  struggle. 

An  event  of  importance  occurred  this  year  in  the 
passing,  under  Se  ward's  introduction,  of  a  bill  for 
giviug  government  support  to  the  project  of  laying 
an  Atlantic  cable.  Though  our  interest  is  much 
absorbed  in  Seward's  position  on  the  great  question 
which  for  so  long  divided  the  nation,  yet  he  him 
self  in  those  days  did  much  to  forward  other  pro 
jects.  As  Greeley  had  said,  the  greatest  internal 
improvement  the  country  could  have  was  the  aboli 
tion  of  slavery.  Seward  was  beginning  to  think  so 
too,  but  there  were  other  internal  improvements  of 
the  kind  to  which  he  had  pledged  his  earlier  inter 
ests,  and  had  lent  a  ready  aid.  He  was  a  member  * 
of  the  Committee  on  Rivers  and  Harbors  and  we 
often  see  him  in  the  Senate  explaining  bills  for 
improvements  along  these  lines,  sometimes  com 
ing  into  curious  companionship  with  such  men  as 
Stephen  A.  Douglas. 

Soon  after  the  inauguration  of  Buchanan  occurred 
an  event  of  equal  or  greater  importance,  the  de 
cision  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  case  of  Dred 
Scott.  This  decision,  while  it  stated  that  the  case  was 
out  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  added  the  view 
of  the  court  to  the  effect  that  a  descendant  of  negro 


248  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

slaves  could  not  be  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  : 
that  the  Constitution  recognized  the  right  to  hold 
slaves  ;  and  that  therefore  the  Missouri  Compromise 
was  unconstitutional  because  it  had  forbidden  slavery 
in  the  territories.1  This  opinion  was  clearly  seen 
to  be  political  rather  than  j  udicial.  Seward  believed 
it  to  be  part  of  a  carefully  contrived  plan  of  the 
slavery  leaders.  He  devoted  himself  to  considering 
"a  political  program,  with  a  view,  if  it  shall  be 
wise,  to  bring  it  out,  at  some  time  during  the  season, 
as  a  relief  and  direction  rendered  necessary  by  the 
Dred  Scott  case."  Some  concerted  action  appeared 
to  be  necessary,  for  at  first  sight  it  rather  seemed 
as  if  the  Supreme  Court  had  taken  away  the  foun 
dation  of  the  Republican  party.  That  party  had 
been  formed  in  opposition  to  the  extension  by 
Congress  of  slavery  in  the  territories.  This  decision 
declared  that  Congress  had  no  power  at  all  to  deal 
with  slavery  in  the  territories.  The  Democrats,  in 
cluding  even  Douglas,  approved  of  this  view.  It 
might  seem  that  he  would  have  looked  with  regret 
upon  the  destruction  of  his  theory  that  the  territories 
themselves  should  decide  either  for  or  against  slavery. 
If  Congress  had  no  power  over  slavery  in  the  terri 
tories,  neither  had  the  territorial  governments  which 
were  creations  of  Congress.  But  Douglas  held  that 
there  was  nothing  in  the  decision  inconsistent  with 
"the  great  principle  of  popular  sovereignty." 

1  More  accurately  the  decision  pronounced  the  Compromise 
(which  had  already  been  repealed)  to  be  unconstitutional  be 
cause  the  Constitution  recognized  property  in  slaves,  and  gave 
Congress  no  more  power  to  deal  with  this  than  with  any  other 
kind  of  property. 


THE  PKESIDENCY  249 

Other  eyes  than  his,  however,  were  viewing  what 
seemed  an  inconsistency,  as  appeared  when  he 
met  Lincoln  in  the  debates  in  Illinois  a  year 
afterward. 

Douglas  found  that  though  his  favorite  principle 
could  weather  even  the  disapproval  of  the  Supreme 
Court,  it  had  a  less  fortunate  course  with  the  ad 
ministration.  The  Lecoinpton  constitution  had  been 
drawn  up  and  was  to  be  submitted  to  the  vote  of 
the  people  of  Kansas  in  such  a  way  that  they  could 
accept  it  with  slavery,  or  without  slavery.  Those 
who  wished  to  reject  the  constitution  itself,  however, 
had  nothing  at  all  to  say.  The  President  determined 
to  recognize  such  submission.  Clearly  this  was  not 
popular  sovereignty,  and  Douglas  was  manful 
enough  to  say  so,  though  he  were  against  his  party. 
"  The  President,"  wrote  Seward,  "has  avowed  his 
purpose  of  betraying  freedom  in  Kansas.  Douglas, 
Stewart,  and  others  intimate  their  purpose  to  resist, 
although  indirectly,  and  on  very  narrow  ground. 
The  friends  of  freedom  see  room  to  save  it  through 
this  division."  The  next  day,  December  10th, 
matters  were  clearer  and  Seward  was  astonished. 
Douglas,  who  had  been  the  cause  of  the  triumph 
of  slavery  by  his  Nebraska  Bill,  was  now  to  join  the 
opposition  which  Seward  and  at  first  only  a  few 
others  had  maintained.  "  Henceforth,"  he  wrote, 
"  Douglas  is  to  tread  the  thorny  path  I  have  pur 
sued."  With  these  and  other  such  ideas  in  mind, 
Seward  prepared  a  speech  for  the  chief  debate  of 
the  season.  On  March  3,  1858,  he  spoke  to  crowded 
galleries. 


250  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

Eight  years  ago,  be  said,  in  spite  of  the  Wilmot 
Proviso,  we  passed  the  Compromise  of  1850.  Four 
years  ago  we  gave  up  our  previous  mode  of  govern 
ing  the  territories  and  adopted  the  doctrine  of  popu 
lar  sovereignty.  To-day  we  have  the  same  question 
once  more.  "Thus,"  he  went  on,  "  an  old  and  un 
alterable  lesson  is  read  to  us  anew.  The  question 
of  slavery  in  the  Federal  territories,  which  are  the 
nurseries  of  future  states,  independently  of  all  its 
moral  and  humane  elements,  involves  a  dynastical 
struggle  of  two  antagonistic  systems,  the  labor  of 
slaves  and  the  labor  of  freemen."  This  was  Sew- 
ard's  position  in  a  nutshell.  We  shall  not  suppose 
that  he  was  blind  to  the  evils  of  slavery  on  more 
general  grounds.  But  he  had  long  been  a  public 
man  and  he  had  long  been  accustomed  to  view  these 
matters  from  the  standpoint  of  public  law.  The 
public  law  of  the  United  States  permitted  slavery 
to  exist  in  such  states  as  desired  it.  That,  in  Sew- 
ard's  mind,  did  not  make  slavery  right,  but  it  did 
estop  him  from  trying  to.  interfere  with  it  in  those 
states  by  such  means.  He  did  not,  like  Garrison, 
wish  to  do  away  with  the  Constitution,  because  it 
allowed  slavery  ;  he  did  not,  like  John  Brown,  wish 
to  attack  slavery  where  the  Constitution  allowed  it. 
For  his  whole  active  lifetime,  he  had  sought  na 
tional  good  through  the  forms  of  the  law  of  the 
land.  And  that  law  usually  concerned  economic  or 
political  conditions.  Hence  Seward  always  dealt 
with  slavery  as  an  economist  or  a  statesman,  recog.- 
nizing  higher  law  but  moving  along  the  path  of 
constitution  and  statute. 


THE  PKES1DENCY  251 

So  this  speech  gave  a  history  of  the  Federal 
policy  in  regard  to  the  territories,  and  looked  to 
the  future  with  the  significant  remark  that  "the 
white  man  needs  this  continent  to  labor  upon." 
What  Seward  said  in  this  address,  as  in  others,  was 
well  founded  and  generally  wise  ;  it  was  based  on 
history  and  principle,  and  avoided  political  per 
sonalities.  He  rarely  aroused  hard  feeling  by  what 
he  said,  and  where  he  failed  to  persuade,  it  was 
usually  because  by  the  circumstances  in  the  case  he 
spoke  to  deaf  ears. 

Speeches  of  this  sort  were  appropriate  to  Con 
gress,  where  the  business  of  men  is  to  make  laws 
for  such  definite  conditions  as  may  arise.  Out 
side,  men  can  properly  talk  more  freely.  It  was 
with  this  feeling,  perhaps,  that  Abraham  Lincoln 
shortly  afterward  stated  his  long  and  well-consid 
ered  view  of  the  slavery  question  in  the  telling 
figure  of  "a  house  divided  against  itself."  The 
country  could  not  exist  half  slave  and  half  free  :  he 
believed  that  it  would  eventually  become  all  free, 
for  slavery,  he  said,  was  too  great  a  moral  wrong  to 
continue.  In  the  debates  with  Douglas  that  fol 
lowed,  the  " Little  Giant"  attacked  this  idea  and 
Lincoln's  expression  of  it  over  and  over  again,  but 
Lincoln  had  considered  it  well  and  defended  it.  In 
the  fall  Seward  stated  his  own  view  in  a  way 
equally  telling  and  equally  characteristic.  Lincoln 
in  his  Scriptural  phrase  summed  up  the  question  in 
what  seemed  a  sort  of  moral  conception.  Seward 
spoke  as  a  statesman  when  he  called  it  the  "irre 
pressible  conflict,"  and  as  an  economist  when  he 


252  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

pronounced  it  a  strife  between  two  systems  of  labor. 
Free  labor  and  slave  labor,  said  he,  have  for  ages 
struggled  with  each  other.  Now,  just  as  Napoleon 
viewed  Eussia  and  said  that  ultimately  Europe 
would  be  either  all  Eepublican  or  all  Cossack,  and 
indeed  viewing  exactly  the  same  conflict  in  this 
country,  Seward  said,  with  Lincoln,  that  in  time  it 
must  be  either  all  slave  or  all  free. 

The  events  of  the  winter  revealed  another  lull  in 
political  activity.  The  Eepublicaus  might  well 
have  been  satisfied  with  the  elections,  for  they 
showed  a  considerable  gain  over  1856.  The  Demo 
crats,  on  the  other  hand,  saw  a  breach  in  their 
ranks.  The  Amistad  case,  though  arousing  some 
excitement,  was  clearly  a  side  issue.  The  bill  for 
acquiring  Cuba  was  entirely  in  the  line  of  South 
ern  policy ;  but  it  necessitated  no  immediate  at 
tention. 

Seward  was  more  concerned  with  the  Pacific 
Eailroad  bill,  the  Homestead  bill,  the  establishment 
of  the  overland  mail,  the  appropriations  of  land  for 
state  universities.  These  were  the  things  he  was 
positively  interested  in :  these  things  were  for  the 
advantage  of  the  people.  Slavery  was  a  negative 
matter.  He  fought  against  it  with  his  whole  heart : 
but  were  that  fight  over,  what  would  be  the  result  ? 
Merely  that  the  great  West  would  be  where  it  would 
have  to  begin,  as  Seward  had  seen  western  New 
York  begin,  to  build  up  its  civilization  from  the 
forest  and  the  prairie.  As  he  had  long  since  at 
Buifalo  pictured  in  his  imagination  the  growth  of 
the  states  around  the  Great  Lakes,  the  Erie  Canal 


THE  PKESIDENCY  253 

being  in  a  manner  the  symbol  of  thafc  growth,  so 
now  he  would  have  gladly  looked  across  the  prai 
ries,  and  the  Eocky  Mountains,  to  the  Pacific  slope, 
and  indeed  beyond  the  Pacific  Ocean,  to  face  the 
problem  of  civilization  and  progress  there.  His 
chief  powers  were  expended  in  the  slavery  struggle, 
but  he  welcomed  the  opportunity  to  help  forward 
these  other  plans,  as  important  in  the  present  gen 
eration  as  the  Erie  Canal  and  the  Erie  Eailroad  had 
been  to  New  York  the  generation  before.  Most  par 
ticularly  did  the  Pacific  railroad  attract  his  atten 
tion.  A  bill  for  a  railroad  to  the  Pacific  had  been 
before  Congress  since  1852  :  Seward  had  introduced 
one  himself  and  had  voted  for  several  others.  He 
had  been  a  member  of  the  committee  to  which  those 
bills  had  been  referred.  One  or  two  extracts  from 
the  speeches  he  made  in  favor  of  these  projects  are 
worth  quoting.  On  April  18,  1858,  in  discussing 
Dr.  G win's  plan,  he  remarked:  "It  is  by  means 
of  a  Pacific  railroad  and  telegraph  that  we  are  to 
realize  ...  a  republican  government  extending 
itself  across  a  continent  and  maintaining  its  sway 
peaceably  and  justly."  Later  in  the  year,  on  De 
cember  21st,  he  said  :  "Let  us  not  deceive  our 
selves.  There  is  no  destiny  that  secures,  and  will,  in 
despite  of  our  own  errors,  vices  or  crimes,  perpetu 
ate  this  inestimable  Union."  He  went  on  to  point 
out  that  without  a  railway  the  country  stood  in 
danger  of  division  into  two  republics,  one  on  the 
Atlantic  and  one  on  the  Pacific. 

In  the  spring  of  1859  Seward  took  advantage  of 
the  vacation  for  a  tour  abroad.     He  traveled  over 


254  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

Europe,  Egypt  and  Syria,  enjoying  and  observing 
widely.     He  was  greeted  everywhere  with  distiu 
guished  respect. 

While  Seward  was  still  away,  though  about  to  re 
turn,  there  occurred  an  event  of  very  great  impor 
tance.  On  October  19,  1859,  the  country  was 
startled  by  the  news  that  there  was  a  slave  insur 
rection  in  Virginia,  and  that  the  insurrectionists 
had  seized  the  arsenal  at  Harper's  Ferry.  Quickly 
the  report  spread  that  the  leaders  were  John  Brown 
of  Kansas  and  a  few  followers,  and  that  their  object 
was  to  free  the  slaves  ;  then  it  was  learned  that  John 
Brown  and  his  men  were  besieged  in  the  railroad 
roundhouse,  and  later  that  they  had  been  captured. 
The  excitement  was  intense,  but  it  was  not  long  at 
fever  heat.  It  soon  appeared  that  there  was  no 
wide-spread  conspiracy  ;  that  John  Brown  was  but 
an  individual  aided  by  a  few  other  individuals  ;  that 
the  slaves  in  general  had  no  idea  of  rising  ;  that  the 
North  in  general  had  no  idea  of  helping  them  to  do 
so.  John  Brown  was  tried  and  executed.  The 
half-disapproving,  half-sympathizing  view  that 
many  in  the  North  had  of  this  wild  breaking  in 
upon  the  conventional  notions  of  order  and  common 
sense,  began  to  settle  into  a  grim  feeling  that  per 
haps  some  such  drastic,  if  fanatical,  remedies  would 
be  necessary  before  the  slavery  question  could  be 
done  away  with.  At  this  time,  of  course,  the  poli 
ticians  laid  hold  of  the  matter.  It  was  clear  that 
John  Brown  had  had  friends  at  the  North,  notably 
Gerrit  Smith  of  New  York.  It  transpired,  too,  that 
"  J.  B.  G."  had  taken  stock  in  the  enterprise,  and 


THE  PRESIDENCY  255 

Joshua  E.  Giddiugs  was  naturally  accused.  In 
deed,  all  Black  Eepublicans  were  under  suspicion. 
In  the  fall  appeared  the  letters  of  Forbes,  which 
seemed  to  indicate  that  Seward  had  been  sounded  as 
to  the  plan  as  early  as  the  spring  of  1858. 

These,  however,  were,  for  the  most  part,  merely 
election  rumors.  The  struggle  this  year  was  over 
some  state  officers.  The  Eepublicans  had  nomi 
nated  a  ticket  and  so  had  the  Democrats.  The 
Know-Nothings  had  endorsed  four  of  the  Eepublicau 
and  five  of  the  Democratic  nominees.  The  Eepub 
licans  hoped  to  defeat  the  combined  opposition 
and  nearly  succeeded.  They  elected  six  officials, 
all  those  who  had  been  endorsed  by  the  Know- 
Nothings,  and  one  of  the  four  who  had  run  against 
the  Know-Nothings  and  the  Democrats.  But  for 
the  first  three  names  on  their  ticket  they  fell 
about  one  thousand  votes  behind  the  combined 
opposition. 

Congress  met  on  December  1st.  Little  business 
was  transacted,  for,  as  upon  several  previous  occa 
sions,  the  House  came  to  a  deadlock  on  the  election 
of  speaker.  On  December  28th  Seward  arrived  at 
New  York.  One  hundred  guns,  the  usual  political 
salute,  were  fired  in  the  Park.  Friends  went  down 
to  meet  him  in  spite  of  the  severe  weather  ;  he 
spent  a  day  at  his  favorite  Astor  House.  As  he 
journeyed  home  on  the  Central,  he  was  warmly 
greeted  at  every  station  by  crowds  of  citizens,  and 
in  a  few  days  he  was  back  in  Washington. 

Here  he  could  not  but  notice  a  difference  of  feel 
ing.  Seward  had  heretofore  always  been  on  pleas- 


256  WILLIAM  H.  SEWA1ID 

ant  terms  with  his  political  opponents.1  Now  it 
was  remarked  that  the  Southern  senators  held  aloof 
and  would  hardly  speak  to  him.  Washington  was 
full  of  John  Brown  excitement,  for  the  Senate  had 
appointed  a  committee  to  investigate  the  matter  and 
every  day  brought  forth  something  that  stirred 
men's  feelings.  The  South  was  outspoken,  as  it 
had  been  once  or  twice  before  ;  the  Eepublican  at 
tempt  at  coercion  would  break  up  the  country. 
"You  may  elect  Seward  to  be  President  of  the 
North,"  said  some  one,  ubut  of  the  South  never  !" 
Seward  waited  for  a  good  opportunity,  and  finally 
on  February  29th  spoke  on  the  admission  of  Kansas 
under  the  Wyandotte  constitution. 

The  address  was  recognized  by  all  as  an  impor 
tant  one.  Congress  and  the  political  world  crowded 
the  Senate  chamber.  Seward  himself  felt  the  sig 
nificance  of  the  occasion.  It  was  said  that  he 
trembled,  as  he  spoke,  with  the  sense  of  responsibil 
ity.  The  speech  aroused  different  feelings.  The 
Abolitionists  were  disappointed :  they  appealed 
from  Seward  in  the  Senate  to  Seward  on  the  stump, 
from  Washington  in  1860  to  Kochester  in  1857,  from 
"  union  and  liberty  "  to  the  "  irrepressible  conflict." 
The  South  was  not  reconciled  :  it  was  still  felt  that 
even  though  Seward  might  have  had  nothing  to  do 
with  John  Brown  personally  or  with  his  raid,  yet 


1  At  the  time  of  the  Nebraska  agitation.  Carl  Scburz,  looking 
from  the  gallery,  said  that  "as  he  moved  about  the  floor  of 
the  Senate  chamber,  [he]  seemed  to  be  on  hardly  less  friendly 
terms  with  the  Southern  senators  than  with  the  Northern." 
Reminiscences,  Vol.  II,  p.  33. 


THE  PRESIDENCY  257 

that  he  was  the  prime  instigator  and  director  of  the 
movement  which  made  John  Brown  possible.  The 
Republicans,  in  general,  however,  warmly  approved 
of  the  speech:  "Whether  Governor  Seward  shall 
this  year  or  ever  be  a  candidate  for  the  presidency 
is  not  for  us  to  decide,"  said  the  Tribune  ;l  u  but 
whether  he  shall  be  or  not,  it  is  of  vital  consequence 
to  the  Republican  party  that  it  be  universally  read." 
The  writer  urged  the  distribution  of  one  million 
copies,  and  subsequently  about  half  that  number 
were  circulated  by  the  paper  itself. 

A  few  days  before,  the  Tribune  had  given  a  very 
favorable  account  of  another  speech  ;  namely,  that 
delivered  at  the  Cooper  Union  on  February  27th  by 
Abraham  Lincoln.  "  No  man,"  it  said,  "  ever 
made  such  an  impression  on  his  first  appeal  to  a 
New  York  audience."  Lincoln  had  been  spoken  of 
as  a  candidate  for  the  presidency  :  indeed,  many 
persons  were  mentioned  at  this  time,  the  Tribune 
itself  being  non-committal,  but  inclined  to  favor 
the  candidacy  of  Edward  Bates  of  Missouri.  As  to 
Seward  as  a  candidate,  that  paper  was  very  du 
bious.  What  was,  in  truth,  revolving  in  the  mind 
of  its  editor,  no  one  knows.  He  had  four  years  be 
fore  dissolved  what  he  had  called  the  political  firm 
of  Seward,  Weed  and  Greeley,  but  the  fact  was  not 
made  public,  nor  do  the  other  so-called  partners 
seem  to  have  taken  serious  thought  of  the  matter. 
Whatever  Greeley ys  opinion,  what  the  Tribune  said* 
was  this  : 

1  March  1,  1860. 

2  Dec.  26,  1859. 


258  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

u  While  we  should  like  right  well  to  elect  a 
President  of  his  [Seward's]  stamp,  we  have  never 
favored  his  nomination  for  that  post,  because  we 
have  never  been  able  to  figure  up  with  any  con 
fidence  the  votes  wherewith  he  had  been  elected. 
As  yet,  according  to  cool  calculation  it  has 
not  been  within  the  power  of  Governor  Se ward's 
friends  to  make  him  President,  wherefore  we  have 
resisted  his  nomination." 

It  is  very  probable  that  this  expressed  a  part  at 
least  if  not  all  of  Greeley's  views  at  this  time.1 

Thurlow  Weed,  however,  thought  differently. 
He  had  in  1850  advised  against  Seward's  candidacy, 
but  now  circumstances  were  changed.  The  Kepub- 
lican  party  was  no  longer  an  experiment  :  it  had 
taken  the  place  of  the  Whigs  in  national  opposition 
to  the  Democratic  party,  and  it  showed  signs  of 
greater  power  than  its  rival.  It  had  grown  in  in 
fluence  in  New  York  State,  as  we  have  seen,  and  in 
the  country  in  general,  its  strength,  though  certainly 
not  superior  to  that  of  the  Democrats,  was  yet  con 
siderable.  It  was  further  probable  that  its  oppo 
nents  could  not  muster  their  full  numbers.  They 
were  divided  between  Senator  Douglas  and  the 
South.  It  seemed  impossible  for  the  conflicting 
elements  to  be  reconciled,  and  the  course  of  events 
led  to  the  expected  result.  The  Democratic  con 
ventions  divided  and  two  candidates  were  nomi 
nated  ;  Douglas,  on  the  one  hand,  and  Breckiuridge 

1  Greeley  was  as  cautious  about  nominating  Seward  for  Presi 
dent  in  1860,  as  Weed  had  been  about  nominating  Greeley  for 
Governor  in  1855. 


THE  PRESIDENCY  259 

on  the  other.  In  spite  of  the  nomination  of  Bell  by 
the  Union  party,  it  appeared  that  neither  Demo 
cratic  candidate  could  overcome  the  vote  of  the 
united  Republican  party. 

The  convention  was  held  in  Chicago.  New  York 
sent  a  strong  Seward  delegation  :  the  New  England 
states  were  chiefly  for  him,  Michigan,  Wisconsin, 
Minnesota,  Kansas  (still  a  territory)  and  California, 
were  entirely  so.  Pennsylvania  was  largely  for 
Cameron  ;  Ohio  for  Chase ;  Indiana  and  Illinois  for 
Lincoln  ;  Missouri  for  Bates.  The  result  is  well 
known.  On  the  first  ballot  Seward  stood  far  above 
a  number  of  favorite  sous,  though  without  a  major 
ity.  His  support  increased  but  slightly  and  on  the 
third  ballot  the  convention  nominated  Abraham 
Lincoln. 

This  was  a  very  great  surprise  and  disappoint 
ment  to  Se ward's  political  friends  and  to  himself. 
It  was  ascribed  to  a  number  of  causes,  notably  the 
course  of  Horace  Greeley,  who  had  attended  the 
convention  with  a  view  of  supporting  Bates  on  the 
ground  that  Seward  could  not  be  elected.  The  mis 
understanding  of  1855,  between  Greeley  and  Seward 
and  Weed,  now  came  to  public  knowledge  and  was 
angrily  discussed  and  criticized.  Such  matters  are 
the  minor  strategies  of  politics  and  they  disturbed 
Seward  but  little  ;  the  defeat  itself,  however,  was  a 
very  great  blow. 

Though  disappointed,  he  bore  up  finely.  He  had 
seen  such  things  before,  had  even  anticipated  them, 
sometimes,  in  his  own  case.  He  had  seen  Henry 
Clay  put  aside  for  Harrison  in  1840,  and  again 


260  WILLIAM  H.  SEWABD 

for  Taylor  in  1848,  and  Webster  for  Scott  in  1852, 
and  in  each  instance  he  had  approved, — indeed,  had 
been  an  active  factor  in  the  result.  He  had  yet 
later  seen  Van  Buren  and  Marcy  and  Cass  stand 
aside  for  more  "available"  candidates.  He  had 
observed  these  things  and  commented  on  them,  and 
had  fortified  his  resolution  and  strengthened  his 
courage  when  he  himself  in  1856  had  given  place  to 
Fremont.  And  now  that  the  blow  had  come  to  him 
with  final  force,  he  found  himself  able  to  rise  above 
his  defeat  and  still  to  view  the  future  cheerfully. 

Yet  in  spite  of  his  personal  attitude,  we  cannot 
fail  to  see  that  he  and  his  political  friends  had  more 
than  personal  feeling  in  their  disappointment  and 
chagrin.  The  occasion  was  a  crucial  one  :  the  elec 
tion  of  the  Republican  candidate  was  probable,  and 
the  results  of  the  election  might  be  most  serious. 
Threats  of  secession  had  been  made  for  a  long  time, 
in  case  a  Republican  President  should  be  elected. 
No  Republican  President  had  been  elected,  but  now 
there  would  probably  be  an  opportunity  for  the  fire- 
eaters  to  make  their  promises  good.  And  in  such  a 
juncture  it  is  not  remarkable  that  Seward  should 
have  felt  that  he  was  the  man  for  the  hour.  He 
had  had  much  political  experience,  and  after  many 
years  of  public  life,  he  was  known  as  a  man  in 
whom  wisdom  and  principle  were  the  ruling  powers. 
He  had  long  stood  for  the  ideas  that  had  brought 
the  Republican  party  together.  There  was  no  one 
living  who  had  preceded  him  as  the  champion  of 
anti-slavery  in  national  public  life.  And  he  had 
long  been  a  recognized  leader.  He  naturally  felt 


THE  PRESIDENCY  261 

that  he  was  the  man  to  cope  with  the  situation.  It 
nowhere  appears  that  there  was  the  wide-spread 
feeling  of  confidence  in  the  ability  of  Lincoln,  which 
seems  to  us  a  matter  of  course.  He  was,  indeed, 
almost  an  unknown  quantity,  for  though  he  had  sat 
in  the  state  legislature  and  in  Congress,  it  had  not 
been  for  long,  and  his  service  had  done  little  to 
establish  public  confidence  in  him.  He  had  been 
spoken  of  for  Vice-President  in  the  convention  of 
1856,  and  had  come  into  wide  public  notice  in  his 
debates  with  Douglas.  It  was  then  natural  that  it 
should  have  been  regarded  as  a  wholly  proper  step 
when  Lincoln,  shortly  after  his  election,  offered  the 
position  of  Secretary  of  State  to  Seward,  who  in 
this  place  doubtless  felt,  and  many  of  his  political 
friends  with  him,  that  he  would  still  be  an  im 
portant  element  in  determining  the  policy  of  the 
administration. 


CHAPTER  XV 

CIVIL,  WAR 

WE  have  formed  some  idea  of  Se ward's  state  of 
mind  arid  heart  on  receiving  and  considering  the 
news  from  Chicago,  and  his  accommodation  of  his 
own  hopes  and  ambitions,  and  his  thoughts  on 
public  policy  to  the  inevitable  necessities  of  fact.1 
The  presidential  nomination  had  gone  to  another, 
and  he  had  acquiesced  in  the  opinion  of  the  ma 
jority.  But  he  probably  recognized  that  the  deci 
sion,  though  not  designedly,  was  yet  in  fact,  an  end 
to  his  hopes.  Under  ordinary  circumstances  his 
course  would  have  been  plain  :  he  would  have  re 
tired  to  private  life  on  the  conclusion  of  his  term 
in  the  Senate.  He  felt  that  he  had  done  good 
service  for  the  party  and  the  country.  The  ideas 
for  which  he  stood  had  become  accepted  principles. 
His  work  was  practically  done  and  he  could  ask  for 
his  discharge. 

But  the  time  was  not  an  ordinary  time  ;  it  was 
one  of  the  greatest  tension  and  danger  and  very 
probably  these  ideas  never  occurred  to  him.  The 
Southern  leaders  in  and  out  of  Congress  had 
threatened  secession  if  a  Eepublicau  President 

1  He  wrote  to  Weed,  Nov.  18,  1860,  "  I  am  without  schemes, 
or  plans,  hopes,  desires,  or  fears  for  the  future,  that  need 
trouble  anybody  in  so  far  as  I  am  concerned."  Life,  Vol.  II, 
p.  478. 


CIVIL  WAK  263 

should  be  elected.  Now  that  a  Republican  Presi 
dent  was  elected,  South  Carolina  took  the  lead  in 
carrying  out  these  threats.  Immediate  arrange 
ments  were  made  for  the  election  of  delegates  to 
a  convention  ;  the  convention  assembled,  and  on 
December  20th  an  ordinance  of  secession  was 
passed.  It  was  clear  that  other  states  would  follow 
her  example.  An  extraordinary  situation  was 
hereby  created,  unlocked  for  by  the  makers  of 
the  Constitution.  The  President  whose  election 
had  caused  these  events  would  not  be  at  the  head 
of  affairs  for  several  months,  and  in  the  meantime 
the  government  was  in  the  hands  of  his  defeated 
opponents.  These  were  not  slow  to  use  every  op 
portunity  in  their  power.  It  was  necessary  then 
that  the  President-elect's  political  friends,  and  in 
this  case  all  friends  of  the  Union,  should  make  up 
by  wisdom  and  activity  for  the  advantages  that 
were  held  against  them.  Of  Lincoln's  political 
friends,  Seward  was  the  obvious  leader  ;  he  was 
the  chief  Republican  senator  and  already  selected 
as  Secretary  of  State.  It  was  natural  that  he  should 
feel  it  his  duty  to  return  to  Washington  as  soon  as 
possible,  to  effect  whatever  he  could  by  way  of  direc 
tion  and  advice. 

For  the  moment  he  had  no  plan  of  action,  al 
though  he  was  beginning  to  decide  upon  one.1 
Thurlow  Weed  had  proposed  a  convention  of  the 
people  to  consider  the  demands  of  both  sides,  but 

'December  1st:  "I  begin  to  see  my  way  through."  De 
cember  2d  :  "  I  am  busily  engaged  in  study  and  gathering  my 
thoughts  for  the  Union." 


264  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

the  idea  came  to  nothing  ;  even  Seward  spoke  of  it 
as  "impulsive"  and  would  not  commit  himself  to 
it.  The  House  of  Bepresentatives  appointed  a 
compromise  committee  of  thirty- three,  and  the 
Senate,  for  the  same  purpose,  one  of  thirteen,  on 
which  were  placed  the  chief  senators  of  their  re 
spective  sections  and  parties  ; — Seward  and  Wade, 
Toombs  and  Davis,  Douglas  and  Crittenden.  But 
neither  committee,  though  various  plans  were 
offered  to  them,  was  able  to  come  to  agreement 
upon  any  compromise.1  Buchanan  in  his  message 
considered  the  condition  of  affairs,  showing  con 
clusively,  as  Seward  with  unaccustomed  satire  wrote 
to  his  wife,  "  that  it  is  the  duty  of  the  President  to 
execute  the  laws — unless  somebody  opposes  him — 
and  that  no  state  has  a  right  to  go  out  of  the  Union 
— unless  it  wants  to."  As  the  winter  went  on, 
other  states  followed  the  example  of  South  Carolina, 
and  passed  ordinances  of  secession.  Seward  became 
aware  that  the  movements  for  breaking  up  the  Union 
in  the  country  at  large  were  aided  and  abetted  in 
the  Cabinet.  Events  in  South  Carolina  or  Missis 
sippi  were  before  the  public  :  not  so  well  known 
were  the  official  acts  of  Floyd,  the  Secretary  of  War, 
and  others,  whereby  the  army  and  the  navy  of  the 


1  The  most  important  was  that  of  Crittenden  which  practi 
cally  agreed  upon  36°  30'  as  a  line  separating  slavery  in  the 
territories  and  left  new  states  to  settle  the  matter  as  they 
chose.  The  radical  Republicans  would  have  nothing  to  do  with 
this  plan,  nor  did  Seward  ever  support  it,  although  it  was 
long  hoped  that  he  might  agree  to  it.  Like  Lincoln,  he  prob 
ably  thought  that  it  would  accomplish  nothing  save  a  present 
accommodation. 


CIVIL  WAR 

country,  with  its  military  possessions  and  stores, 
were  put  iii  a  position  where  they  would  be  most 
useful  to  the  secessionists  and  least  useful  to  the 
incoming  administration.  But  these  latter  steps 
went  rather  farther  than  even  Buchanan  could 
justify,  and  in  January  occurred  changes  in  the 
Cabinet  whereby  definitely  Union  men,  Dix,  Stan- 
ton,  and  Holt,  were  given  positions,  and  with  them 
Seward  soon  got  into  cordial  relations. 

While  he  used  every  effort  to  counteract  the  ex 
ertions  of  the  enemies  of  the  Union  and  to  help  its 
supporters  both  in  office  and  about  to  be  in  office, 
he  also  addressed  himself  to  the  country  at  large. 
In  his  speech  in  the  Senate  on  January  12th,  he  said 
especially  that  he  spoke  less  to  the  senators  than  to 
his  countrymen  in  general.  To  them  he  presented 
the  history  and  the  necessity  of  the  Union.  The 
time  for  discussion  of  slavery  was,  in  his  opinion, 
passed  for  the  present  :  it  had  brought  about  a  crisis 
in  which  the  question  became  that  of  national  ex 
istence.  Some  form  of  government  for  the  people 
of  America  was  necessary.  He  showed  that  that 
form  must  be  the  Union,  one  government  rather 
than  several.  What  occasion  had  arisen  for  de 
manding  that  that  Union  should  be  dissolved  ?  The 
election  of  Lincoln.  But  was  this  one  event  in  any 
wise  unconstitutional,  illegal,  or  even  extraordi 
nary  ?  By  no  means  :  it  was  such  an  event  as  was 
provided  for  by  the  Constitution,  one  which  if  dis 
agreeable  to  the  majority  could  be  reversed  in  the 
future  in  a  constitutional  way  ;  and  as  dissatisfac 
tion  with  the  election  was  based  wholly  upon  the 


266  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

opinions  which  were  thought  to  have  become  domi 
nant,  he  would  consider  some  possibilities  of  better 
understanding.  He  affirmed,  then,  that  slavery 
within  the  states  and  the  return  of  fugitive  slaves 
were  constitutional  j  that  mutual  invasions  of  stales 
by  citizens  of  other  states  should  be  made  definitely 
illegal.  As  to  other  matters  in  dispute,  such  as 
slavery  in  the  territories,  it  would  be  well  in  the 
near  future  when  present  passions  had  subsided,  to 
consider  whether  constitutional  amendments  could 
not  be  made.  Lastly  he  urged  that  whatever  phys 
ical  bonds  were  possible,  "  such  as  highways,  rail 
roads,  rivers  and  canals,"  should  be  improved  and 
encouraged,  as  for  instance,  the  Pacific  Railroad. 

The  plan  was  in  some  ways  very  characteristic. 
But  although  Seward's  address  was  listened  to  with 
attention,  it  pleased  nobody.  A  fortnight  after 
ward,  as  he  was  speaking  in  the  same  tone,  he  was 
asked  what  offer  he  could  make,  if  such  a  proposi 
tion  was  not  accepted,  and  even  his  most  concilia 
tory  words  could  not  veil  the  fact,  which  was  clearly 
put  forward  by  a  senator  from  Virginia,  that  the 
only  alternative  was  war. 

The  last  months  before  the  inauguration  of  Lin 
coln  were  confused  and  anxious.  The  states  which 
had  already  seceded  were  inclined  to  rest  on  their 
arms  and  await  the  action  of  the  new  administra 
tion.  If  it  should  attack  them,  they  could  fight  for 
their  liberties  ;  if  it  should  not  attack  them,  their 
object  was  accomplished  in  their  own  way.  The 
Southern  states  which  had  not  seceded,  the  so-called 
border  states,  were  still  in  doubt  :  in  several  the 


CIVIL  WAR  267 

disuuiouists  had  had  very  little  success.  The  ad 
ministration  of  Buchanan  had  no  policy  except  to 
defend  the  property  and  maintain  the  positions  of 
the  United  States  until  the  government  should  be 
assumed  by  the  new  administration.  The  latter  did 
not  exist  in  any  definite  form  :  its  members  were 
designated  and  ready  to  act,  but  they  had  no  agree 
ment  or  coherence,  no  real  power  even  of  consulta 
tion.  Seward  could  do  little  more  than  maintain 
his  own  hopes  of  a  peaceful  solution  and  as  far  as 
.possible  encourage  others.  A  "  peace  convention  " 
was  gathered  at  Washington,  with  representatives 
of  most  of  the  states  which  had  not  seceded,  among 
them  some  eminent  men.  Its  general  plan  was  cer 
tain  further  concessions  to  slavery.  The  conven 
tion  offered  the  outcome  of  its  deliberations  in  the 
form  of  an  amendment  to  the  Constitution,  but 
nothing  at  all  resulted.  Seward  would  gladly 
have  had  it  continue  its  sessions,  for,  though  he 
had  no  confidence  in  its  power  to  recommend  any 
suggestion  of  value,  he  said  that  at  least  during  its 
deliberations  things  remained  as  they  were. 

It  was  an  anxious  and  a  nervous  time  for  those 
who  wished  to  maintain  the  Union  ; — a  time  in 
which  no  one  knew  what  to  do,  though  every  one 
had  some  plan  ;  a  time  when  nobody  had  any 
real  responsibility,  although  everybody  wished  to 
do  something.  Nobody  made  a  reputation  ;  the 
wisest  were  at  fault.  Nobody  could  control  the 
situation.  Seward's  object  was  to  reach  the  fourth 
of  March  without  an  outbreak  :  lie  called  himself 
a  bridge-builder.  His  hopes  were  realized.  On 


268  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

February  9th  Jefferson  Davis  and  Alexander  H. 
Stephens  were  elected  President  and  Vice-President 
of  the  Confederate  states  of  America ;  on  February 
18th  they  were  inaugurated  and  entered  upon  the 
discharge  of  their  duties.  But  Fort  Sumter  and 
Fort  Pickens  still  remained  in  the  hands  of  the 
government  and  it  seemed  that  no  overt  act  would 
occur  on  either  side. 

The  inauguration  came  at  last  and  Lincoln  took 
the  oath  of  office  as  President.  He  delivered  an 
inaugural  address  in  which  he  stated  that  slavery, 
in  the  states  was  not  to  be  interfered  with  and  that 
the  Fugitive  Slave  Law  was  to  be  enforced.  But 
the  Union  he  held  to  be  perpetual ;  no  state  could 
lawfully  secede.  The  next  day  the  President  sent  to 
the  Senate  his  nominations  for  the  Cabinet.  They 
were  at  once  confirmed.  The  newly  appointed  offi 
cers  took  the  oath  and  held  their  first  meeting. 

The  membership  of  the  Cabinet  had  been  long  in 
the  President's  mind,  though  not  all  of  the  number 
had  been  long  definitely  chosen.  Seward  had 
from  the  first  been  thought  of  as  Secretary  of  State. 
His  old  senatorial  companion,  Chase,  was  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury.  The  War  and  Navy  portfolios 
were  given  to  Cameron  of  Pennsylvania  and  Welles 
of  Connecticut.  The  Secretary  of  the  Interior  was 
Smith  of  Indiana.  The  President  had  desired  to 
appoint  some  representative  of  the  South,  but  it  was 
hard  to  find  a  prominent  man  who  was  not  an  op 
ponent  of  his  policy.  Edward  Bates  of  Missouri 
and  Montgomery  Blair  of  Maryland  were  named 
Attorney-General  and  Postmaster-General  with 


CIVIL  WAR  269 

something  of  this  idea  in  inind.  Of  these  seven, 
three, — Seward,  Smith  and  Bates, — had  been 
Whigs  before  the  formation  of  the  Eepublican 
party  :  the  others  had  been  Democrats.  If  the 
Cabinet  was  representative  of  different  parts  of  the 
country  and  different  phases  of  political  feeling,  it 
had  in  it  also  other  elements  of  political  discord 
that  perhaps  could  not  have  been  avoided.  Before 
Lincoln  had  been  nominated,  Seward  and  Chase 
(not  to  mention  Cameron  and  Bates)  had  been  rival 
candidates ;  they  were  leaders  of  different  ele 
ments  in  the  party.  Now  that  they  found  them 
selves  together  in  the  Cabinet,  there  was  a  good  deal 
of  the  old  rivalry.  It  could  hardly  have  been 
otherwise.  The  two  men  were  former  leaders  of 
anti- slavery  sentiment  in  the  Senate  :  leaders  in  the 
formation  of  the  Eepublican  party.  Even  had  they 
themselves  been  wholly  without  personal  ambition 
or  feeling,  they  were  each  representative  of  a  dif 
fering  disposition,  conservative  or  radical,  that  was 
very  wide-spread  throughout  the  country. 

In  beginning  any  administration  there  is  an  im 
mense  amount  of  official  routine  which  must  always 
be  gone  through  with,  from  presenting  foreign 
ministers  to  appointing  postmasters.  All  this  had 
somehow  to  be  accomplished  by  the  new  President 
and  his  advisers,  while  they  were  determining  what 
was  best  for  the  nation  in  the  very  critical  condition 
in  which  they  were  placed.  Things  were  still  hang 
ing  in  the  balance :  the  border  states  had  not 
seceded  ;  the  flag  still  floated  over  Sumter.  But 
this  balance  couid  not  be  long  kept. 


270  WILLIAM  H.  SEWABD 

Clearly  the  first  question  of  importance  was  that 
of  Fort  Suinter.  It  was  now  three  mouths  since 
Anderson  had  been  practically  in  a  state  of  siege  : 
the  rebels  in  Charleston  had  not  attacked  him,  but 
he  had  advised  the  War  Department  that  he  had 
supplies  to  hold  out  only  a  short  time.  As  Lincoln 
turned  from  the  hopes  of  his  inaugural  address  to 
the  facts  presented  in  his  office,  he  learned  at  once 
that  Fort  Suniter  could  be  maintained  but  a  few 
weeks  at  most ;  that  an  attempt  to  provision  or  re 
lieve  the  garrison  would  be  a  doubtful  possibility, 
unless  an  expedition  on  a  large  scale  were  planned, 
which  would  undoubtedly  arouse  the  strongest  re 
sistance  not  only  in  South  Carolina,  but  throughout 
the  seceded  and  border  states.  On  March  9th  the 
matter  was  laid  before  the  Cabinet  to  the  astonish 
ment  of  some  who  could  not  understand  how  such  a 
condition  of  things  had  been  allowed  to  arise. 

It  seemed  that  the  only  possibility  was  the 
abandonment  of  the  fort,  which  was  the  advice 
of  General  Scott,  who  was  much  depended  upon  at 
this  juncture.  On  the  other  hand,  the  President 
could  admit  this  possibility  only  as  a  last  resort. 
No  one  would  understand  the  circumstances,  and  it 
would  appear  mere  feebleness.  The  friends  of  the 
Union  would  be  disheartened  and  its  foes  en 
couraged.  The  Confederacy  would  gain  its  ends 
and  still  be  on  the  defensive.  Lincoln  asked  the 
advice  of  his  Cabinet.  Chase  and  Blair  agreed 
with  him  that  an  attempt  to  reinforce  ought  to  be 
made.  Seward,  however,  could  not  agree :  to 
make  such  an  attempt  would  begin  a  civil  war,  and 


CIVIL  WAE  271 

that  at  just  the  moment  when  the  border  states 
were  hanging  in  the  balance.  The  true  policy  was 
conciliation.  Cameron,  Welles,  Smith,  and  Bates 
coincided  with  Seward,  though  not  for  the  reasons 
that  seemed  important  to  him.  Lincoln  had  on  foot 
a  plan  for  temporary  relief,  but  did  not  want  to 
push  it  in  the  face  of  this  advice.  He  contented 
himself,  therefore,  with  sending  messengers  to 
determine  the  feeling  of  Anderson  himself  and  of 
the  authorities  at  Charleston. 

Seward  was  led  to  his  opinion  partly  by  his  great 
desire  for  peace ;  partly  by  his  overrating  the 
Union  sentiment  in  the  border  states  which  made 
him  think  peace  possible;  partly  by  his  feeling 
that  the  question  of  slavery  could  and  should  be 
for  the  present  put  out  of  consideration.  He  had 
for  some  time  made  clear  his  view  that  it  must  be 
set  aside  while  the  Union  was  in  danger.  He 
would  not  concede  anything  beyond  what  was  pro 
vided  by  the  Constitution,  but  he  thought  that  it  was 
foolish  to  discuss  whether  there  should  be  slavery 
in  remote  territories  still  uninhabited,  when  some 
of  the  oldest  states  of  the  Union  had  withdrawn 
from  what  they  called  the  "  Federal  Compact." 

At  this  time  there  were  in  Washington  certain  com 
missioners  of  the  Confederate  states.  They  rather 
counted  on  being  able  to  come  to  some  understand 
ing  with  Seward.  They  inquired  of  him  through 
Mr.  Hunter,  a  senator  from  Virginia  who  still  re 
tained  his  place  in  the  Senate,  whether  he  would 
give  them  a  formal  interview.  Seward,  after  con 
sulting  the  President,  sent  word  that  he  could  not 


272  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

receive  ' l  the  gentlemen  of  whom  we  conversed  yes 
terday.  "  Those  gentlemen  then  sent  a  formal  note 
to  the  State  Department,  asking  for  an  official  in 
terview.  This  note  Seward  would  not  answer  :  he 
prepared  instead  a  memorandum  which  he  filed  in 
the  department.  In  this  memorandum  he  stated 
the  obvious  fact  that  the  Confederacy  was  not  a 
foreign  power  and  that  the  commissioners  had, 
therefore,  no  standing  and  no  reason  for  either  see 
ing  or  being  seen  by  him.  He  thus  talked  to  him 
self,  as  it  were,  and  allowed  the  gentlemen  to  listen. 
They  listened,  through  their  secretary,  and  being 
politicians  with  a  good  idea  of  the  nature  of  the  ad 
ministration,  they  thought  that  there  was  still  op 
portunity  for  some  action  ;  in  fact,  they  believed 
that  there  was  such  misunderstanding  in  the  Cabinet 
as  might  enure  to  their  advantage.  They  therefore 
remained  in  Washington,  trying  by  various  means 
to  gain  recognition.  They  carried  on  with  Seward 
through  third  persons,  a  good  deal  of  negotiation  in 
which  they  declared  that  he  shamefully  deceived 
them.  It  seems  that  he  was  not  quite  the  monster 
of  guile  that  they  pictured  him,  although  things  did 
not  go  as  they  thought  he  had  led  them  to  believe. 
In  Virginia  a  convention  was  still  deliberating 
upon  the  question  of  secession.  So  also  in  the  other 
border  states  :  even  Arkansas  was  undecided.  It 
was  important  that  these  states  be  retained  in  the 
Union.  But  of  course  the  Southern  party  was  influ 
ential  in  every  one,  and  how  to  strengthen  the  hands 
of  the  Union  party  was  a  difficult  problem.  It  was  a 
time  for  diplomacy,  it  seemed,  rather  than  for  action. 


CIVIL  WAR  273 

By  the  end  of  the  mouth  as  Seward  revolved  all 
these  occurrences  in  his  mind,  he  carne  to  the  con 
clusion  that  in  spite  of  the  change  of  administration, 
things  were  by  no  means  as  they  should  be.  lie 
had  been  in  Washington  for  four  months,  a  season 
of  unexampled  nervous  tension,  at  first  using  all  his 
efforts  to  hold  off  decisive  action  until  the  new  ad 
ministration  should  begin.  Now  the  new  adminis 
tration  was  well  installed,  but  what  had  been  ac 
complished  I  It  is  probable  that  at  this  time  Seward 
had  not  come  to  an  accurate  knowledge  of  the  char 
acter  and  methods  of  the  President. 

Accordingly,  he  noted  down  his  view  of  the  case 
in  a  paper  which  he  left  for  Mr  Lincoln's  considera 
tion.  He  pointed  out  that  almost  a  month  had 
passed  and  yet,  though  unavoidably,  no  definite 
plan  for  home  or  foreign  affairs  had  been  adopted. 
He  offered  his  advice  on  each  topic.  He  urged  that 
the  administration  should  for  the  moment  set  aside 
the  question  of  slavery  and  take  the  definite  position 
of  maintaining  the  Union.  In  carrying  out  this 
idea,  he  suggested  preparation  for  a  blockade,  and 
a  maintenance  of  "  every  fort  and  possession  iu  the 
South."  ' 

Respecting  the  attitude  of  foreign  powers,  he 
would  demand  explanations  from  France  and  Spain, 
standing  ready,  if  these  were  not  satisfactory,  to  de- 

1  It  is  not  clear  that  be  included  Fort  Snrater.  The  case  of 
Fort  Suniter,  he  said,  was  universally  regarded  as  a  party 
issue  :  he  would  "  terminate  it,  as  a  safe  means  of  changing  the 
issue."  He  does  not  say  just  how  he  would  terminate  it,  and 
it  is  hard  to  see  how  occupation  would  have  made  it  less  a 
party  issue. 


274  WILLIAM  H.  SEVVARD 

clare  war  against  them.  Explanations  were  to  be 
asked  also  of  England  and  Kussia.  To  pursue  such 
a  policy,  however,  there  must  be  agreement  and 
leadership.  The  paper  closed  with  these  remark 
able  words  : 

"But  whatever  policy  we  adopt,  there  must  be  an 
energetic  prosecution  of  it. 

"  For  this  purpose  it  must  be  somebody's  business 
to  pursue  and  direct  it  incessantly. 

14  Either  the  President  must  do  it  himself,  and  be 
all  the  while  active  in  it,  or  devolve  it  upon  some 
member  of  the  Cabinet.  Once  adopted,  debates  on 
it  must  end,  and  all  agree,  and  abide. 

u  It  is  not  my  especial  province. 

"But  I  neither  seek  to  evade  nor  assume  respon 
sibility.  " 

The  two  points  of  importance,  the  taking  up  of  a 
Union  position  in  home  affairs  and  the  adoption  of 
a  jingo  foreign  policy,  were  suggestions  of  very  dif 
ferent  value.  The  first  was  the  position  which 
Seward  had  assumed  for  the  past  twelve  mouths  and 
that  which  Lincoln  himself  held,  so  that  it  is  hard  to 
see  how  the  Secretary  of  State  should  have  con 
sidered  it  to  be  singular,  or  why  he  should  have 
thought  it  worth  especial  mention.  It  was  indeed 
becoming  more  and  more  necessary  every  day,  and 
shortly  was  unconsciously  adopted  by  almost  every 
body  under  the  pressure  of  events.1  The  second 


1  Thus  the  New  York  Tribune  for  two  or  three  days  after  the 
firing  on  Fort  Sumter  headed  its  Avar  news  as  "  The  Pro- 
Slavery  War. "  Before  the  week  was  up,  however,  it  had  become 
14  The  War  for  the  Union." 


CIVIL  WAK  275 

proposition,  the  idea  of  declaring  war  upon  France 
and  Spain,  and  apparently  upon  England,  too,  for 
the  course  advised  in  Canada  would  have  this  result, 
was  such  a  plan  as  now  seems  so  wholly  impossible 
that  we  cannot  easily  think  of  Se  ward's  reasons  for 
seriously  recommending  it.1  His  idea  was  that  the 
pressure  of  a  foreign  war  would  rally  to  the  Union 
all  the  doubtful  states  and  perhaps  even  some  of  the 
seceding  slates  or  parts  of  them.2  If  this  were  his 
thought,  it  can  be  explained  only  by  the  fact  that 
he,  like  many  others,  had  far  too  high  an  estimate  of 
loyalty  to  the  Union  in  the  seceded  and  border 
states.  The  foreign  nations  that  he  now  had  chiefly 
iu  mind  were  Spain  and  France.  Spain  was  at  this 
time  taking  possession  of  St.  Domingo,  and  France 
was  considering  the  question  of  interference  in 
Mexico.  Granted  the  idea  of  a  united  South  and 
Xorth,  it  is  doubtful  if  a  defensive  war  against  these 
two  foreign  countries  would  have  been  worse  than 
a  war  between  the  states. 

The  wisdom  or  unwisdom  of  his  particular  advice 
is  a  minor  matter  compared  with  the  proposal  with 

1  It  had  been  talked  of  before  in  1854  in  the  Ostend  Manifesto 
of  which  one  object  was  to  withdraw  the  public  mind  from 
Nebraska.     It  came  forward  again  in  1858  :  see  Ogden's  Life  of 
E.    L.   Godkin,    Vol.    I,    p.    175.       "Yet    the  three    [Seward, 
Toombs,  and  Douglas]  raved  against  England,  and  shrieked  for 
war  with  an  absurdity  of  which  nobody  but  schoolboys  should 
be  guilty."     It  was  talked  of  once  more  in  1865  in  the  confer 
ence  of  F.  P.  Blair,  Sr.,   which  led  to  the  Hampton  Conference. 
The  idea  was  clearly  not  unheard  of,  though  none  the  better  for 
that. 

2  Gideon   Welles   afterward    speaks   of    "the   bugaboo   of   a 
foreign  war,  a  bugbear  which  Seward  well  knows  how  to  use." 
Diary,  Aug.  12,  1862. 


276  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

which  the  paper  closes.  With  the  wonderful  career 
of  Lincoln  in  our  minds,  we  may  be  able  to  see  no 
possible  reason  for  imagining  that  Seward  was  any 
better  fitted  than  the  actual  incumbent  to  fulfil  the 
duties  of  the  President's  office.  But  at  this  time 
Lincoln  was  entirely  unknown  as  an  executive  and 
not  well  known  in  any  capacity  whatsoever.  Sew 
ard  was  a  man  of  long  experience  in  affairs  of  state. 
There  is  nothing  in  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  that  points  to  any  such  policy  as  Seward' s 
proposal  seems  to  contemplate,  but  the  procedure  in 
his  mind  was  the  government  of  England,  in  which 
the  chief  minister  was  the  responsible  head.1  Per 
haps  Seward,  who  had  seen  several  weak  Presidents 
and  strong  Secretaries  of  State,  thought  it  was  really 
his  duty  to  take  up  the  reins  of  authority  and  di 
rect  affairs  as  he  himself  had  begun  to  direct  them 
under  Taylor.  The  idea  of  the  Secretary  of  State 
as  the  controlling  officer  of  the  administration  had 
certainly  been  in  his  head.2 

Whatever  his  views,  they  did  not  commend  them 
selves  to  the  President.  Lincoln  answered  his  mem 
orandum  the  same  day.  He  said  that  it  seemed  to 
him  that  the  policy  announced  in  the  Inaugural, 
which  Seward  had  approved,  had  been  maintained  : 

1  Seward,  according  to  Welles'  Diary,  Sept.  15,  1862,  liked  to 
be  called  Premier,  a  title  unknown  to  general  usage  in  the 
United  States.  The  present  republic  of  France  offers  an  ex 
ample  of  Seward's  idea  put  into  practical  form,  for  there  the 
President,  although  the  head  of  the  state,  is  not  responsible 
for  the  policy  of  the  government. 


2  For  instance,  in  1843,  in  looking  forward  in  some  specula- 
ions  about  Webster,  he  writes  :  "  Indeed,  the  secretary  will 
ie  premier."  Life,  Vol.  I,  p.  669. 


tions 
be 


CIVIL  WAR  277 

he  could  not  see  that  Be  ward's  plan  was  essentially 
different.  As  to  foreign  matters,  he  perceived  no 
reason  for  not  contiuuiog  the  instructions  to  foreign 
ministers,  which  were  at  the  time  in  course  of  prep 
aration.  As  to  the  final  proposition,  he  wrote : 
u  If  this  must  be  done,  I  must  do  it." 

That  this  was  exactly  the  way  to  deal  with  such  a 
case  was  shown  by  the  results.  So  far  as  is  known, 
neither  Seward  nor  Lincoln  ever  mentioned  the 
matter,  which  came  to  public  knowledge  only  some 
time  after  both  were  dead.1  The  proposal  was  ab 
solutely  dropped  and  practically  forgotten.  Sew 
ard  gained  a  confidence  in  Lincoln  which  he  never 
lost,  and  through  the  four  years  of  work  and  auxiety 
that  lay  before  them,  he  used  every  power  to  carry 
out  and  maintain  the  policy  of  his  chief,  which,  as 
a  fact,  was  practically  his  own. 

One  of  the  results  that  Seward  wished  to  accom 
plish  by  his  "Thoughts"  was  far  more  effectually 
managed  by  the  course  of  events.  About  the  end 
of  March,  arrangements  had  been  made  for  expedi 
tions  of  relief  to  Forts  Sumter  and  Pickens.  But 
there  was  some  confusion,  arising  from  Lincoln's  and 
Se ward's  doing  things  very  much  by  themselves, 
often  without  consultation  with  the  Xavy  Depart 
ment  and  sometimes  without  consulting  each  other. 
The  plans  were  not  entirely  carried  out  and  much 
of  the  aid  meant  for  Sumter  went  to  Pickens.  The 
latter  fort  was  relieved  and  remained  in  the  hands 
of  the  government  throughout  the  war.  But  the 
expedition  for  the  relief  of  Sumter  did  not  get  off 
1  It  was  first  published  in  Hay  and  Nicolay's  Lincoln  in  1888. 


278  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

to  Charleston  harbor  till  April  12th  and  by  that 
time  the  fort  was  already  under  fire  from  the  Con 
federate  batteries.  The  expedition  was  unable  to 
relieve  the  garrison,  which  surrendered  on  April 
13th. 

The  news  of  the  firing  on  Fort  Sumter  aroused 
the  North  to  a  passion  of  humiliation  and  auger  and 
patriotism.  Lincoln,  it  may  be  supposed,  received 
it  with  resignation  :  he  had  probably  foreseen  its 
necessity.  Necessary  or  not,  the  event  had  placed 
him  in  the  position  in  which  he  desired  to  stand. 
The  government  had  been  attacked  :  it  must  now 
appeal  to  all  that  were  still  loyal  to  come  to  its  sup 
port.  Congress  was  summoned  and  a  call  for 
troops  was  sent  to  every  state.  The  war  had  begun. 
There  was  now  a  definite  policy.  The  issue  had 
been  changed  from  slavery  to  the  support  of  the 
Union. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

THE  DANGER  OF  FOREIGN  INTERVENTION 

EVEN  before  the  war  was  actually  begun,  it  was 
clear  that  a  very  delicate  situation  would  be  created. 
At  first  Seward  was  so  unwilling  to  acknowledge 
the  possibility  of  a  war  between  the  states  that  it  is 
doubtful  if  he  had  been  able  to  form  a  foreign  policy. 
During  the  winter  his  mind  had  been  absorbed  in 
efforts  to  deal  with  the  domestic  problem.     When 
he  did  think  of  a  possible  war,  he  conceived  it  as 
a  mere  insurrection,  a  domestic  or  a  "  municipal " 
matter,  one  in  which  other  nations  had  no  concern. 
When  it  started  to  develop  on  so  vast  a  scale,  how 
ever,  it  was  clearly,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  no  mere 
insurrection    but  really  a  public  war.     Other   na 
tions  were  concerned  in  it  because  they  could  not 
help     themselves.      Their     citizens     in    America, 
whether  in  the  North  or  the  South,  were  liable  to 
unjust  treatment.     Their    citizens    at    home  were 
liable  to  find  their  business  interfered  with,  as  for 
instance  and  especially,  thole  who  had  anything  to 
do  with  the  cotton  trade.     There  were  also  sure  to 
be  questions  arising  from  the  use  of  some  foreign 
country  as  a  base  of  action  or  supply.     These  were 
all  points  in  which  the  Confederacy  would  no  doubt 
gain  much  and  lose  little.     But  there  was,  further, 


280  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

a  point  in  which  the  Confederates  stood  a  chance  of 
gaining  even  more  and  that  was  the  possibility  of 
foreign  intervention.  Any  civil  strife  gives  oppor 
tunity  for  intervention,  formal  or  informal,  and 
there  are  always  likely  to  be  motives.  There  were 
several  special  reasons  in  this  case  why  foreign 
nations  should  be  tempted  to  interfere. 

Seward  had  had  in  mind  thoughts  of  a  foreign 
war  even  before  the  firing  on  Sumter  :  it  had  ap 
peared  to  him  that  a  foreign  war  would  have  the 
effect  of  binding  together  the  conflicting  elements 
of  a  country  in  the  face  of  a  common  danger.  This 
notion  of  his  has  been  deemed  by  some  an  unex- 
plaiuable  aberration.  When  one  thinks,  however, 
of  all  the  wars  in  history  that  have  been  provoked 
for  the  purpose  of  arousing  the  national  spirit,  the 
idea,  though  it  appears  no  wiser  or  better,  seems 
not  so  absolutely  extraordinary.  We  do  not  know 
the  reasons  which  brought  Seward  to  this  view,  nor 
is  it  at  all  certain  how  definite  a  place  it  had  in  his 
mind  or  how  much  it  influenced  his  action.1  He 


1  F.  W.  Seward  who  had  the  best  opportunity  of  knowing  his 
father's  views  at  this  time,  writes  :  "  One  of  the  curious  delu 
sions  assiduously  fostered  by  the  Confederate  agents  abroad, 
and  the  press  in  their  interest,  was  the  notion  which  appeared 
to  have  gained  lodgment  in  the  British  mind,  that  the  Federal 
government  was  seeking  a  quarrel  with  England  as  a  means  of 
extricating  itself  from  its  troubles.  Absurd  as  was  the  idea 
that  the  sorely  pressed  Union  wanted  any  more  enemies,  it  was, 
nevertheless,  seriously  believed  "  (Life,  Vol.  II,  p.  628).  This 
passage,  however,  appears  to  refer  to  the  autumn  of  1861,  at 
which  time  Seward  undoubtedly  had  no  idea  of  the  sort.  The 
evidence  that  he  had  such  an  idea  earlier  is  to  be  found  in  the 
"  Thoughts  "  of  April  1st,  where  though  war  with  France  and 
Spain  is  mentioned,  war  with  England  is  implied  ;  in  his  con- 


DANGER  OF  FOREIGN  INTERVENTION    281 

was,  of  course,  familiar  with  cases  in  history  in 
which  a  foreign  war  had  quelled  domestic  dissension. 
He  may  have  thought  of  the  position  of  the  Feder 
alist  party  as  a  result  of  the  factious  opposition 
ascribed  to  it  in  the  War  of  1812-1814. l  In  com 
mon  with  many  other  people,  he  overestimated  the 
Union  sentiment  at  the  South  ;  or  rather,  he  under 
estimated  the  power  of  state  pride. 

But  had  Seward  been  correct  in  his  estimate,  it  is 
hard  to  see  how  he  could  have  conceived  that  it  was 
right  to  provoke  a  foreign  war,  even  though  certain 
that  the  result  would  have  been  to  bind  the  North 
and  South  together.  He  may  have  reasoned  that  if 
there  must  be  war,  it  was  better  to  have  a  foreign 
war  and  a  united  nation,  than  to  have  a  nation 
divided  by  all  the  miseries  of  civil  strife.  He  may 
have  supposed  that  a  war  entered  into  for  such 
slight  causes  as  might  at  this  time  influence 
European  powers  could  not  have  been  protracted, 
though  possibly  severe.2  Whatever  the  reasons  for 
such  a  view,  it  seems  clear  that  it  had  a  consider 
able  place  in  his  mind,  as  he  meditated  a  foreign 
policy. 

In  the  more  practical  matters  of  the  department, 

versations  with  Doctor  Russell,  the  correspondent  of  the  Times 
(My  Diary,  Chap.  VII)  ;  despatch  to  Adams  of  May  21st,  with 
the  comments  and  criticisms  of  Lincoln  (Hay  and  Nicolay, 
Vol.  IV,  p.  270).  The  letters  to  his  wife  of  May  17th  and  to 
Thurlow  Weed  on  May  23d  show  clearly  that  he  thought  that  a 
war  with  England  might  be  a  necessity. 

1  For  his  impreasions  on  this  subject  early  in  life,  see  his 
Autobiography,  Life,  Vol.  I,  p.  27. 

2Seward  to  his  wife,  May  17th,  "It  will  be  dreadful,  but  the 
end  will  be  sure  and  swift." 


282  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

lie  also  found  great  difficulties.  The  foreign  service 
was  naturally  disorganized  by  the  necessity  of  ap 
pointing  new  representatives  in  foreign  courts  in 
place  of  those  of  the  Democratic  parly.  This  was 
no  easy  task  ;  the  Republican  party  had  heretofore 
been  in  opposition,  while  the  last  Whig  adminis 
tration  had  ended  eight  years  before,  so  that  men 
of  diplomatic  experience  were  rare.  Seward  him 
self  knew  no  more  of  the  forms  of  business  required 
in  carrying  on  foreign  affairs,  than  had  chanced  to 
come  to  his  notice  duriug  his  service  as  senator,  and 
yet  he  knew  as  much  as  any  one  else  who  was 
likely  to  be  appointed  to  a  foreign  mission.1  There 
were  further  difficulties  arising  from  political  con 
siderations.  Lincoln  desired  William  L.  Dayton 
as  minister  to  England  :  Seward  wished  Charles 
Francis  Adams  to  have  the  position.  Lincoln  de 
sired  that  Fremont  should  go  to  Paris  and  Carl 
Schurz  to  Madrid.  It  was  finally  arranged  that 
Adams  should  take  the  English  post,  and,  as  it 
turned  out,  his  services  were  of  the  highest  order 
and  absolutely  indispensable  to  the  country.  Day 
ton  was  sent  to  Paris,  where,  though  not  so  much 
of  a  diplomatist  as  others  who  were  there,  he  ren 
dered  effective  assistance.  Schurz  went  to  Madrid, 
remaining  at  the  post  only  a  short  time  :  he  had 
been  a  great  admirer  of  Seward  but  had  now  quite 
lost  confidence  in  him. 

The  point  of  immediate  interest  in  the  foreign 
policy  was  to  manage  so  that  the  Confederacy 
should  obtain  the  least  possible  benefit  from  the 

1  Charles  Francis  Adams,  Address,  etc.,  at  Albany,  p.  51. 


DANGER  OF  FOREIGN  INTERVENTION    283 

nations  of  Europe.  All  sorts  of  wild  rumor  and 
bravado  had  been  flying  about  as  to  foreign  assist 
ance  :  the  South  was  to  have  England  or  France  or 
Mexico  as  an  ally.  If  the  question  of  alliance  were 
absurd,  there  was  always  the  possibility  of  inter 
vention  or  mediation,  and  even  though  no  mediation 
were  offered,  there  were  substantial  advantages  in 
recognition.  The  situation  bristled  with  possibili 
ties.  Seward  studied  over  the  different  forms  of 
address  called  for  in  his  despatches  to  different  na 
tions.  Everywhere  he  based  the  representations  he 
would  have  the  American  ministers  make  upon 
the  necessity  of  the  integrity  of  the  Federal  Union, 
pointing  out  that  its  preservation  was  essential  to 
the  peaceful  interests  of  the  world.  In  accordance 
with  the  policy  of  the  administration,1  he  excluded 
slavery  from  consideration,  taking  the  ground  that 
it  was  a  domestic  matter  which  did  not  need  to  be 
discussed  with  foreign  powers. 

The  nations  of  the  greatest  importance  were  Eng 
land  and  France.  They  were  most  likely  to  be  con 
cerned  and  there  was  an  understanding  that  they 
would  take  the  lead  in  necessary  action.  France, 
at  this  time  governed  by  Napoleon  III,  was  not 
inclined  to  be  especially  friendly,  unless  it  were 
to  the  advantage  of  the  emperor  ;  but  there  was  no 
immediate  reason  why  she  should  be  openly  hostile. 
More  important  still  was  England.  England  was 
the  country  to  which  the  North  looked  at  least  for 
moral  support,  and  also  the  country  to  which  the 

1  As  shown,  for  instance,  in  Lincoln's  answer  to  his 
tk  Thoughts  "  tof  April  1st. 


284  WILLIAM  H.  BEWAED 

South  looked  for  material  support.  The  North 
had  a  general  feeling  that  as  they  were  fighting  a 
battle  for  freedom  against  slavery,  they  could  count 
upon  her  sympathy,  and  upon  as  strict  a  neutrality 
as  was  suggested  by  international  law.  Southerners 
had  a  very  definite  feeling  that  England  needed  cot 
ton  and  could  get  it  only  from  them,  and  that  to  get 
cotton  she  would  press  the  international  law  of  neu 
trality  as  far  as  it  would  go. 

Beside  a  general  acquaintance  with  political  con 
ditions  and  public  opinion  in  England,  Seward  had 
some  personal  knowledge  on  the  subject.  He  had 
for  years  been  an  intimate  friend  of  Lord  Xapier, 
who  had  preceded  Lord  Lyons,  the  present  British 
minister.  But  he  had  also  visited  the  country 
only  two  years  before  and  had  met  many  persons  of 
distinction.  He  knew  Lord  Palmerston,  the  Prime 
Minister.  He  also  knew  Lord  John  Eussell,  the 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  had  thought  him 
speculative  but  sincere  and  a  true  believer  in  prog 
ress.  He  had  become  acquainted  with  many  who 
had  been  earnestly  interested  in  the  auti  slavery 
,i  1  .niggle, — Lord  Lansdowue,  the  Duchess  of  Suther 
land,  Miss  Martiueau.  He  had  been  received  with 
much  attention  as  being  the  representative  of  the 
Eepublicau  party  in  the  United  States,  "  on  which 
the  hopes  of  freedom  rest."  He  had  received  par 
ticular  notice  from  the  Queen  and  the  Prince  Con 
sort  and  had  been  very  favorably  impressed  by 
them.  But  he  had  also  considered  the  industrial 
and  commercial  condition  of  the  country,  and  had 
come  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was  closely  connected 


DANGER  OF  FOREIGN  INTERVENTION    285 

with  Southern  slavery.1  He  must  have  uuderstood 
that  England  could  not  sympathize  very  deeply 
with  the  North  as  defenders  of  slavery,  when  that 
issue  was  kept  entirely  in  the  background.  He  un 
doubtedly  saw,  too,  that  the  cutting  off  of  the  cotton 
supply  by  the  blockade  would  exercise  a  tremendous 
pressure  upon  government  and  people.2 

Seward  was  more  doubtful  of  the  position  of  Eng 
land  than  many  persons. 3  Still  he  probably  thought 
that  her  proceedings  would  await  the  arrival  of 
Adams  who  would  reach  London  about  the  middle 
of  May.  Here,  however,  he  was  in  error,  for  the 
ministry  desired  to  settle  the  status  of  the  North 
and  the  South  before  Adams  should  arrive.  On 
May  2d  Lord  John  Russell  had  an  interview  with 
Yancey  and  Rost,  two  of  the  Southern  commission 
ers  :  his  lordship  said  little  but  listened  attentively. 
On  May  6th  he  announced  in  the  House  of  Commons 
that  a  proclamation  would  shortly  be  issued  in 
which  the  Southern  Confederacy  would  be  rec 
ognized  as  a  belligerent.  On  May  llth  the  proc 
lamation  was  issued  and  when  Adams  reached 
London,  he  read  it  in  the  newspapers. 


1  Life,  Vol.  II,  p.  385.  Personal  references  will  be  found  be 
fore  and  after. 

'-'  According  to  W.  H.  Russell,  who  presumably  informed 
Seward,  there  were  forty  millions  sterling  invested  in  the  cotton 
industry  directly  or  indirectly,  which  meant  a  very  large  pop 
ulation  dependent  upon  it. 

3  As  for  instance,  Greeley,  who  scouted  the  idea  of  any  sort  of 
recognition  as  late  as  May  25th.  "  Nothing  is  more  clear  than 
that  England  will  do  nothing  to  give  aid  or  comfort,  or  which 
has  the  appearance  of  giving  aid  and  comfort,  to  a  people  fight 
ing  for  slavery." 


286  WILLIAM  II.  SEWARD 

Seward  and  the  government  were  naturally 
chagrined  at  this  proceeding.  It  was  not  only  a 
sudden,  but  a  serious  obstacle  to  their  policy,  both 
in  itself  and  in  its  implications.  A  recognition  of 
belligerency  might  easily  be  followed  by  a  recogni 
tion  of  nationality  ;  by  the  offer  of  mediation,  or  even 
by  intervention.  Further,  this  possibility  lay  not 
with  England  alone,  but  with  England  and  France. 
These  two  powers  had  determined  to  act  together  in 
these  matters.  Indeed,  on  June  15th,  Lord  Lyons 
and  M.  Mercier,  the  ministers  of  England  and  of 
France,  called  upon  Seward  at  the  same  time.  Sew 
ard  instinctively  guessed  the  motive  for  so  unusual 
a  diplomatic  proceeding.1  He  courteously  regretted 
that  he  could  not  receive  a  joint  representation  and 
the  two  ministers  separated,  leaving  their  instruc 
tions  in  an  informal  manner.  Seward,  on  reading 
them,  replied  that  the  government  must  decline  to 
recognize  any  such  joint  arrangement,  but  must,  ac 
cording  to  its  habit,  communicate  with  each  govern 
ment  separately.  Whatever  the  formal  mode  of 
proceeding,  the  understanding  now  and  for  long 
afterward  was  that  England  and  France  acted  to 
gether. 

On  receiving  the  news  of  the  Queen's  Proclama 
tion,  Seward  wrote  to  Adams  the  views  of  the  ad 
ministration.  He  was  from  some  accounts  not  the 
best  person  to  negotiate  with  England,  for  he  did  not 
trust  her  and  he  was  not  trusted.  Perhaps  no  one 
would  have  been  much  better,  but  it  seems  generally 

1  This  is  the  expression  of  F.  W.  Seward  (Life,  Vol.  II,  p. 
581),  at  this  time  with  his  father  as  Assistant  Secretary  of  State. 


DANGER  OF  FOREIGN  INTERVENTION    287 

allowed  that  the  opinion  of  Seward  prevailing  in 
England  at  this  time  was  that  he  was  somewhat  un 
scrupulous  and  much  opposed  to  her  interests.  The 
bases  for  such  a  view  were  not  very  sound.  There 
was  a  vague  recollection  of  his  dealings  in  the 
McLeod  case  twenty  years  before,  possibly  some 
remembrance  of  his  pro-Irish  sympathies  during 
the  Repeal  agitation,  with  his  more  recent  sena 
torial  declamations  in  1858,  and  rumor  of  a  talk  of 
his  with  the  Duke  of  Newcastle  about  six  mouths 
previously.  There  was  probably  as  little  of  serious 
value  in  the  latter  case  '  as  in  the  former,  and  yet  as 
we  have  seen,  though  not  unscrupulous  as  a  public 
man,  Seward  did  have  strongly  anti-English  ideas. 
The  despatch  that  he  wrote  to  Adams  on  this  occa 
sion  was  much  what  England  would  have  expected 
from  a  politician  such  as  they  thought  him.  The 
President,  on  seeing  it,  counseled  changes  which 
modified  it  in  some  degree,  but  even  then,  it  was 
not  a  conciliatory  document. 

It  was  most  important  that  Europe  should  under 
stand  clearly  that  the  administration  had  the  power 
to  put  down  the  insurrection  which  had  arisen.  For 
that  end  the  necessary  means  was  the  power  itself. 
Hence  the  battle  of  Bull  Run  was  a  terrible  blow  to 
Se ward's  policy.  In  the  immense  disappointment 
following  that  disaster,  he  fully  shared,  but  he 

1  Seward  denied  such  rumors  in  a  signed  statement,  Feb.  8, 
1862.  Hollister  MSS.  4l  I  uttered  not  one  word  of  what  I  am 
represented  iu  those  statements  to  have  said,  and  the  spirit  of 
the  statements  is  exactly  the  reverse  of  all  I  said  on  the  occa 
sion  referred  to."  See  Pierce's  Sumner,  Vol.  IV,  p.  30,  for 
English  opinion  on  the  matter. 


288  WILLIAM  H.  SEWABD 

summoned  all  his  confidence  and  at  once  des 
patched  instructions  abroad  with  counsel  how 
best  to  meet  it.  "The  policy  of  the  government 
is  in  no  case  likely  to  be  changed,  whatever 
may  be  the  varying  fortunes  of  the  war  at  home," 
he  wrote  to  Adams,  "or  the  action  of  foreign  na 
tions." 

It  is  probable  that  Bull  Eun  had  a  useful  effect 
upon  Se  ward's  ideas  at  this  time.  He  must  have 
seen  that  if  the  proclamation  of  neutrality  had 
not  been  issued  when  it  was,  it  would  surely  have 
been  issued  later.  He  may  have  felt  that  war, 
whether  at  home  or  with  a  foreign  power,  was  a 
more  terrible  thing  than  he  had  imagined,  and  not 
to  be  lightly  undertaken.  Whatever  the  cause, 
his  foreign  policy  changed.  He  no  longer  thought 
a  foreign  war  to  be  a  possible  solution  :  for  the 
future  the  avoidance  of  such  a  war  became  the 
foundation  of  his  system.  In  this  way  he  finally 
got  on  the  right  line,  and  was  eventually  able  to 
make  his  foreign  policy  one  of  the  most  successful 
things  of  the  Lincoln  administration. 

But  he  did  not  succeed  in  some  of  his  first  efforts. 
When  the  war  was  imminent  and  the  possibility 
of  Southern  privateering  was  foreseen,  Seward 
thought  that  it  would  be  of  advantage  to  the  United 
States  to  join  in  the  Declaration  of  Paris,  by  which, 
after  the  Crimean  War,  the  powers  of  Europe  had 
stated  certain  questions  of  international  law  and 
had  abolished  privateering.  The  United  States 
had  not  acceded  to  this  declaration  in  1850,  al 
though  she  herself  had  proposed  two  of  the  priii- 


DANGER  OF  FOREIGN  INTERVENTION    289 

ciples  stated,  because  it  did  not  go  as  far  as  seemed 
right.  Now  Seward  proposed  to  the  powers  to  join 
in  the  declaration.  He  learned,  however,  that 
England,  while  offering  no  objection  to  this  action 
on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  would  not  engage 
to  consider  her  assent  to  have  any  bearing  upon 
relations  in  the  present  war.  The  President  then 
closed  the  negotiation.  The  slight  chagrin  which 
Seward  may  have  felt  at  this  refusal  (it  had  few 
practical  consequences,  as  there  was  almost  no 
privateering  in  the  war),  was  perhaps  somewhat 
relieved  by  the  case  of  Bunch  which  shortly  oc 
curred,  and  supplied  him  and  Lord  Russell  abun 
dant  material  for  correspondence  for  some  time  to 
come. 

Mr.  Bunch  was  the  British  consul  at  Charleston. 
The  British  government,  though  not  wishing  to 
see  the  United  States  a  party  to  the  Declaration  of 
Paris,  for  some  reason  desired  to  propose  partici 
pation  to  the  Confederacy.  Having  no  representa 
tive  at  the  Confederate  capital,  indeed  not  having  rec 
ognized  the  Confederacy  as  a  power,  they  forwarded 
their  communication  on  the  subject  to  the  British 
minister  at  \Yashington  who,  in  turn,  sent  it  to  Mr. 
Bunch  at  Charleston,  to  be  conveyed  by  him  to 
the  Confederate  government.  The  matter  came  to 
the  knowledge  of  Seward,  through  the  capture  in 
New  York  of  Mr.  Bunch's  despatches  to  England. 
The  case  was  fortunately  within  the  power  of  the 
United  States.  Consuls  are  commercial  officers 
and  have  no  diplomatic  privileges.  Mr.  Bunch 
had  been  discovered  corresponding  with  the  enemy 


290  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

of  the  country  to  which  he  was  accredited.  Entirely 
aside  from  the  particular  business  that  he  was  about, 
this  activity  was  offensive  and  the  President  re 
voked  his  exequatur.  As  this  is  the  privilege  of 
any  government  to  which  a  consul  is  accredited, 
for  any  reason  that  seems  good,  England  did  noth 
ing  except  to  correspond  freely  and  finally  to  take 
Mr.  Bunch  away. 

As  the  summer  passed  and  the  fall  came,  the 
public  opinion  of  England  and  France  was  obvi 
ously  unfavorable,  and  was  clearly  .fomented  by 
agents  of  the  Confederacy  abroad.  It  occurred, 
therefore,  to  Seward  that  it  would  be  useful  to 
send  to  England  and  to  France  unofficially  some 
men  of  position  to  do  whatever  they  could  to 
counteract  this  hostile  feeling.  Several  gentlemen 
were  asked,  and  finally  Archbishop  Hughes  and 
Bishop  Mcllvaine  accepted  the  invitation  :  it  was 
felt  that  they  could  be  influential  in  France  and 
England  respectively.  At  the  suggestion  of  Arch 
bishop  Hughes,  there  was  added  Thurlow  Weed. 
About  the  time  these  gentlemen  crossed  the 
Atlantic,  two  other  delegates  were  planning  the 
same  journey,  on  the  part  of  the  Confederacy. 
Mason  and  Slidell,  commissioned  as  ministers,  one 
to  England  and  the  other  to  France,  succeeded 
in  reaching  Havana  on  a  blockade- runner  and 
there  took  passage  on  the  English  mail-steamer 
Trent.  Their  actions  were  not  very  secret,  how 
ever,  and  a  knowledge  of  them  came  to  Captain 
Wilkes  of  the  San  Jacinto.  Wilkes  waited  for  the 
Trent,  stopped  her  by  a  shell  across  the  bows, 


DANGEK  OF  FOREIGN  INTERVENTION    291 

and  sent  a  lieutenant  with  a  force  of  marines  to 
take  the  Confederate  envoys.  This  was  done  and 
Mason  and  Slidell  were  shortly  lodged  in  Fort 
Warren,  Boston  harbor.  The  Trent  continued  her 
voyage. 

The  exploit  aroused  universal  joy  in  the  heart  of 
the  North.  Nobody  considered  whether  the  act  in 
itself  was  fine  or  whether  the  results  were  worth 
while.  A  brusque  and  by  no  means  impartial 
observer  remarked  that  he  could  see  no  advantage 
to  be  gained  by  it.  "It  surely  could  not  be  sup 
posed  that  the  addition  of  one  or  more  to  the 
number  of  persons  [Confederate  agents]  who  had 
been  already  some  time  in  London  on  the  same  er 
rand  would  be  likely  to  produce  any  change  in  the 
policy  adopted."  '  Such  considerations  were  in  the 
background.  Not  only  the  personality  of  the  en 
voys,  senators  who  had  plotted  disunion,  but  other 
matters, — the  Southern  effort  at  recognition,  the 
possibility  of  foreign  interference,  the  use  of  the  ter 
ritory  of  foreign  nations  as  a  base  of  operations, — 
these  things  had  so  irritated  the  North  that  a  chance 
to  do  something,  even  though  it  were  something 
slight,  was  delightful.  Wilkes  became  a  popular 
hero.  The  Navy  Department  commended  him  ;  the 
House  of  Representatives  thanked  him.  Seward, 
however,  was  the  person  whose  opinion  was  likely 
to  prevail,  for  the  matter  was  sure  to  be  taken  up 


1  So  Lord  Palraerston  said  to  Adams,  before  the  event. 
Adams,  Life  of  Adams,  p.  224.  See  also  Letters  of  Queen  Vic 
toria,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  467,  where  Palmerston  reports  the  interview 
of  Nov.  13th  to  the  Queen. 


292  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

aud  the  first  representations  would  be  made  to  the 
Secretary  of  State.  Doubtless  he  was  elated,  but  he 
kept  a  strict  silence.  The  British  Legation  and  the 
Department  of  State  were  the  only  places  in  Wash 
ington  where  one  could  hear  nothing  said  of  the 
Trent.  The  "  young  diplomatists"  at  the  former 
spot  were  "as  demure  and  innocent  as  if  nothing 
had  happened  :  at  the  latter  "  a  judicious  reserve  was 
maintained.1  In  spite  of  this  reserve,  however, 
Seward  cast  an  anchor  to  windward  :  he  wrote  to 
Adams  that  the  act  had  been  without  authorization. 
The  government  waited  to  learn  the  English  view  of 
the  case. 

The  English  government  did  not  wait  any  longer  to 
express  their  view  than  they  had  waited  in  the  mat 
ter  of  recognition.  They  had  considered  the  case 
before  the  event  took  place.  It  had  been  supposed 
that  Captain  Marchand  of  the  Adger,  which  lay  at 
Southampton,  would  try  to  stop  the  Trent  as  she 
neared  England  and  the  ministry  had  sought  the 
opinion  of  their  legal  advisers.  The  law  officers  of 
the  Crown  pointed  out  "that  according  to  the  prin 
ciples  of  international  law,  laid  down  in  our  courts 
by  Lord  Stowell,  practiced  and  enforced  by  us,  a 
belligerent  has  a  right  to  stop  and  search  any 
neutral  not  being  a  ship  of  war,  and  being  found  on 
the  high  seas,  and  being  suspected  of  carrying 
enemies'  despatches,  and  that  consequently  this 
American  cruiser  might  by  our  own  principles  of 
international  law  stop  the  West  India  packet, 
search  her,  and  if  the  Southern  men  and  their 

1  Russell,  My  Diary,  p.  213. 


DANGEE  OF  FOREIGN  INTERVENTION    293 

despatches  and  credentials  were  found  on  board, 
either  take  them  out  or  seize  the  packet  and  take 
her  back  to  New  York  for  trial."  l 

This  view  was  no  secret.  News  of  the  stopping  of 
the  Trent  reached  Liverpool  November  27th  at  about 
noon  :  at  three  o'clock  a  public  meeting  was  held  in 
which  a  resolution  was  offered,  calling  on  the 
government  to  assert  the  dignity  of  the  British  flag 
by  requiring  prompt  reparation  of  this  outrage. 
Little  was  said  or  reported  in  favor  of  the  resolu 
tion,  but  Mr.  John  Campbell  spoke  against  it,  refer 
ring  at  length  * i  to  the  opinions  of  the  law  officers 
of  the  Crown,  as  being  in  some  measure  inclined  to 
show  that  such  a  step  as  that  taken  was  justifiable 
under  the  existing  state  of  international  law."  Mr. 
Torr  also  spoke  against  it,  saying  that  he  had  seen  a 
letter  "  in  which  the  law  officers  of  the  Crown  had  in 
anticipation  expressed  a  decided  opinion  in  favor  of 
the  legality  of  a  proceeding  similar  to  that  which  had 
just  taken  place."  Mr.  J.  Turner  tried  to  continue 
this  argument,  but  he  was  not  allowed  to  go  on, 
and  the  resolution  was  passed.  Many  of  the  older 

1  Lord  Palmerston  to  Mr.  Delane.  Nov.  11,  1861.  Daspnt, 
Life  of  John  T.  Delane,  Vol.  II,  p.  36.  This  letter  gives  a 
wholly  different  view  of  the  English  position  from  that  which 
has  commonly  obtained.  Whether  the  view  were  maintained 
by  the  law  officers  or  not,  the  extract  shows  beyond  a  doubt  that 
there  was  some  ground  and  precedent  for  Captain  Wilkes' 
action.  The  passage  came  to  my  notice  as  quoted  in  an  article 
in  the  Contemporary  Review  for  Oct.,  1909,  "  Peace  or  War,"  by 
Lord  Courtney  of  Penwith,  who  appears  to  think  that  the  min 
istry  recognized  the  precedent,  but  decided  not  to  follow  it. 
He  suggests  reasons  for  their  not  accepting  the  opinion  of  the 
law  officers,  which  are  somewhat  different  from  those  in  the 
text. 


294  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

merchants  on  'Change  thought  the  meeting  prema 
ture.1 

The  next  day,  November  28th,  the  Times  said  in 
its  very  temperate  editorial  011  the  subject,  "Un 
welcome  as  the  truth  may  be,  it  is  still  nevertheless 
a  truth,  that  we  have  ourselves  established  a  system 
of  international  law  which  now  tells  against  us." 
Mr.  Delane,  as  we  have  seen,  was  aware  that  the 
action  of  Captain  Wilkes  was  justifiable  by  prece 
dent.  He  proceeded,  however:  "It  is,  and  it  al 
ways  has  been,  vain  to  appeal  to  old  folios  and  by 
gone  authorities  in  justification  of  acts  which  every 
Englishman  and  every  Frenchman  cannot  but  feel 
to  be  injurious  and  insulting." 

This  latter  sentence  expressed  the  view  of  the 
ministry.  The  country  was  excited;  "the  outrage 
savored  so  much  of  contemptuous  defiance,  that  the 
national  feeling  was  wounded  to  the  quick  ;  " 2  the 
ministry  did  not  feel  bound  by  the  opinion  given  a 
Cabinet  committee  a  fortnight  before,  but  deter 
mined  to  demand  the  return  of  Mason  and  Slidell. 
Palmerston,  who  had  for  years  practiced  "  a  policy 
of  bluff,"  3  was  precisely  the  man  to  carry  the  mat 
ter  through  with  a  high  hand.  The  ministry  pre 
cluded  discussion  by  sending  an  ultimatum,  and 
ordering  8,000  troops  to  Canada. 

Falmerstou  enclosed  the  draft  of  the  despatch  to 
the  Queen  in  a  letter,  adding  that  it  was  stated  that 


1  See   the   London  Times,  Nov.  28th,  for  an  account  of  the 
meeting. 

9  Martin,  Prince  Consort,  Vol.  V,  p.  347. 

3  Dasenfc,  Life  of  John  T.  Delane,  Vol.  II,  p.  21. 


DANGEK  OF  FOREIGN  INTERVENTION    295 

General  Scott  in  Paris  had  said  to  some  Americans 
that  "the  seizure  of  these  envoys  was  discussed  in 
the  Cabinet  at  Washington,  he  being  present,  and 
was  deliberately  determined  and  ordained  ;  that  the 
Washington  government  fully  foresaw  that  it  might 
lead  to  war  with  England"  l  and  more  rumor  of  the 
sort.  Why  Palmerstou  added  this  talk  of  the 
boulevards  to  the  draft  of  a  most  important  state 
paper  is  not  known.  On  December  5th,  the  Times 
published  a  denial  by  G'eueral  Scott  of  the  story, 
and  added  that  he  refuted  only  what  no  one  had 
ever  believed.  Lord  Palmerstou,  presumably, 
thought  that  there  was  something  in  the  report : 
otherwise  we  might  suppose  that,  in  his  opinion, 
the  rumor  would  help  bring  the  Queen  to  acquiesce 
in  the  brusque  despatch  which  he  submitted  to  her. 
He  did  not  vouch  for  this  hearsay,  but  commented 
upon  it  as  though  it  were  worthy  of  some  consider 
ation.  In  spite  of  this  vision  of  the  belligerent 
Cabinet  led  by  the  truculent  Seward,  the  Queen  and 
the  Prince  Consort,  even  then  in  his  last  illness, 
felt  that  the  despatches  were  harsh  and  the  Prince 
Consort  himself  modified  them.  The  Queen  re 
turned  them  to  Palmerston  with  a  note,  expressing 
her  desire  that  the  necessary  demand  should  be 
made  in  the  most  delicate  way.2  The  message  still 
had  somewhat  the  form  of  an  ultimatum  :  it  did  not 
argue  the  point,  but  hoped  that  the  seizure  of  the 


1  Letters  of  Queen  Victoria,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  468,  469. 

2  It   nowhere   appears  that  Palmerston  informed  the  Queen 
that  her  legal  advisers  had  pronounced  the  act  of  Wilkes  to  be 
in  conformity  with  English  precedent,  but  doubtless  he  did  so. 


290  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

envoys  had  been  unauthorized  and  that  they  would 
be  restored.  An  apology  was  also  desirable.  A 
second  despatch  ordered  Lord  Lyons,  if  the  British 
terms  were  not  answered  in  seven  days,  to  leave 
Washington.  A  private  letter  informed  him  that 
the  release  was  more  important  than  the  apology, 
and  that  he  might  say  nothing  about  withdrawing 
in  seven  days.1  These  demands  reached  Washing 
ton  the  19th  of  December. 

There  had  by  this  time  been  a  month  for  consid 
eration.  Charles  Surnner,  chairman  of  the  Senate 
Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs,  had  at  once  deter 
mined  that  Mason  and  Slidell  would  have  to  be  re 
leased.  Blair,  the  Postmaster-General,  was  of  the 
same  opinion.  Even  Lincoln,  who  much  desired  to 
retain  the  envoys,  thought  that  they  were  likely  to 
prove  "  white  elephants."  Still  popular  feeling 
was  strong  ;  the  North  was  unanimous  against  sur 
render  ;  the  "  nation  would  never  forgive  the  man 
who  should  give  them  up." 

It  was  not  known  how  Seward  would  act.  He 
seemed  to  Dr.  Russell,  who  met  him  several  times, 
to  be  in  a  good  humor  and  in  the  best  of  spirits. 
This  was  remarkable,  for  he  must  have  known  then 
of  the  English  demands,  which  would  certainly  put 
the  United  States  and  himself  more  than  any  one  else 
in  a  painful  predicament.  He  maintained  a  com 
plete  silence,  however,  and  so  did  Lincoln.  On 
December  20th  Lord  Lyons  called  upon  Seward 
and  informed  him  of  their  substance,  but  did  not  of 
fer  a  formal  statement  of  them ;  Seward  took  time 
1  Walpole's  Hussell,  Vol.  II,  p.  358. 


DANGER  OF  FOREIGN  INTERVENTION    297 

to  consider  and  by  December  25th  was  ready  with  a 
draft  for  discussion  at  the  Cabinet  meeting. 

Seward's  draft  offered,  certain  reasons  for  show 
ing  that  Wilkes  had  been  correct  in  each  step  which 
he  took,  except  the  final  one  of  removing  Mason 
and  Slidell  from  the  Trent.  In  that  point  the  sec 
retary  differed  from,  the  first  view  of  the  English 
law  officers,  but  acknowledged  their  later  position 
to  be  technically  proper  and  therefore  acceded  to 
the  demand  that  the  prisoners  be  released.  Of  the 
Cabinet  Bates,  the  Attorney-General,  agreed  to  the 
legal  doctrine,  in  which,  as  he  said,  all  Europe  was 
against  us.  He  further  thought  that  the  idea  of  war 
with  England  was  impossible.  Chase  agreed  that 
the  technical  right  might  be  with  England,  but  that 
a  great  nation  should  not  insist  upon  it.  There 
was,  in  fact,  a  general  feeling  that  Seward's  posi 
tion  was  necessary.  The  President  did  not  entirely 
agree,  and  as  it  was  decided  to  postpone  the  matter 
till  the  next  day,  he  considered  the  possibility  of 
another  answer.  He  was  unable  to  find  any  better 
ground  for  action  and  Seward's  draft  was  adopted 
with  the  assent  of  all.  The  prisoners  were  released 
and  the  incident  was  closed. 

When  the  matter  was  thought  over,  the  result  was 
seen  to  be  distinctly  favorable.  It  was  not  merely 
that  in  a  dangerous  predicament  Seward  had  had 
courage  to  do  the  necessary  thing  in  spite  of  public 
opinion.  It  was  not  merely  that  in  his  attitude  he 
showed  clearly  that  he  had  abandoned  his  earlier 
and  dangerous  ground  of  courting  or  considering  a 
foreign  War.  The  really  important  thing  in  Seward's 


298  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

despatch  was  a  matter  not  yet  mentioned.  After 
agreeing  with  the  doctrine  that  a  neutral  ship  en 
gaged  in  lawful  commerce  was  protection  to  anything 
not  contraband  of  war,  Seward  went  on  to  show  that 
such  had  been  the  traditional  position  of  the  United 
States  for  many  years  ;  that  it  was  clearly  indicated 
by  diplomatic  instructions  just  before  the  War  of 
1812  ;  and  that  in  restoring  the  prisoners  and  recog 
nizing  the  neutral  rights  claimed  by  Great  Britain, 
the  government  was  assenting  to  a  view  which 
America  had  always  believed  to  be  to  the  best 
interests  of  nations.  (  By  this  presentation  Seward 
did  two  things,  each  of  importance.  He  put  Eng 
land  on  the  ground  of  insisting  on  the  rights  of 
neutrals,  a  matter  to  which  in  the  past  America  had 
sometimes  thought  her  indifferent.  And  he  had 
put  America  right  in  her  own  idea  of  herself.  He 
had  brought  her  in  accord  not  only  with  Europe  but 
with  her  own  past.  The  result  of  the  settlement 
was  distinctly  good.  At  home,  where  the  original 
popular  delight  had  quieted  down,  it  showed  the 
course  of  right  and  honor  in  such  a  way  that  national 
feeling  was  satisfied ;  abroad,  it  greatly  improved 
the  position  of  the  United  States.  The  universal 
view  of  Europe1  had  been  that  the  act  was  illegal, 
but  it  was  widely  feared  that  public  opinion  would 
be  too  strong  to  allow  the  American  government  to 
proceed  in  a  discreet  or  correct  manner.2  It  was 
also  declared  that  the  Continental  powers  saw  with 
pleasure  that  Great  Britain  was  protesting  against 

1  Except,  it  would  seem,  of  the  English  Crown  lawyers. 

2  Pike  to  Seward,  Jan.  9th,  Dip.  Corr.,  1862,  p.  596. 


DANGER  OF  FOREIGN  INTERVENTION    299 

a  principle  which  she  herself  had  always  declared 
and  practiced  and  to  which  they  themselves  had  only 
reluctantly  yielded.1 

The  excitement  over  the  Trent  quieted  down  and 
in  a  short  time  the  battle  of  Pittsburg  Landing  gave 
a  favorable  turn  to  public  opinion.  But  as  the 
summer  of  1862  wore  on  with  no  further  decided 
military  successes,  the  leaders  of  the  English  ministry 
began  to  make  up  their  minds  that  the  time  was 
come  when  the  fruitless  struggle  should  end.  One 
of  the  first  to  reach  this  decision  was  Gladstone, 
then  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer.  By  the  end  of 
July  Lord  Palmerston  came  to  his  opinion  and  felt 
that  England  should  join  with  Russia  and  France 
for  an  offer  of  mediation.  By  the  middle  of  Sep 
tember  Lord  Russell  agreed  with  Palmerston  that 
joint  mediation  ought  to  be  attempted,  and  further 
believed  that  if  this  were  impossible,  England 
herself  should  acknowledge  the  Southern  states  as 
an  independent  power.2  At  about  this  time  Mr. 
Gladstone  was  given  a  reception  and  banquet  at 
Newcastle  in  honor  of  his  successful  management  of 
the  Budget.  As  he  was  ready  to  go  to  that  place, 
he  received  a  note  from  Lord  Palmerston,  saying 
that  he  and  Lord  Russell  thought  the  time  fast  ap 
proaching  when  an  offer  of  mediation  should  be 
made  by  England,  France,  and  Russia.  Following 
these  hints  and  his  own  thoughts  on  the  subject, 
Gladstone  in  his  speech  at  Newcastle  referred  to  the 

'  Sanford  to  Seward,  Jan.  9th,  14th,  Dip.  Corr.,  1862,  p.  596. 
Adams  to  Reward,  Dec.  27th,  Dip.  Corr.,  1862,  p.  12. 
'Morley's  Gladstone,  Vol.  II,  pp.  75-77. 


300  WILLIAM  H.  SEWABD 

American  situatioD.  ID  his  oratorical  way  he  said  : 
"  We  may  have  our  own  opinions  about  slavery  ; 
our  opinions  may  be  for  or  against  the  South  j  but 
there  is  no  doubt  that  Jefferson  Davis  and  the  other 
leaders  have  made  an  army  ;  they  are  making,  it 
appears,  a  navy  ; l  and  they  have  made  what  is  more 
than  either,  they  have  made  a  nation." 

The  remark  caused  an  immense  sensation.  It  was 
immediately  taken  as  indicating  the  policy  of  the 
ministry.  Such,  however,  was  not  the  case.  Lord 
Russell,  in  a  note  to  Gladstone  of  October  20th,2 
wrote  that  he  thought  Gladstone,  in  such  a  state 
ment,  had  gone  beyond  the  latitude  which  all 
speakers  must  be  allowed.  "  Recognition  would 
seem  to  follow,"  he  added,  "and  for  that  step  I 
think  the  Cabinet  is  not  prepared."  He  was  right : 
there  was  opposition  in  that  body  to  such  a  course. 
Lord  Russell  had  ascertained  that  Lord  Grauville 
would  not  favor  recognition,3  and  there  was  reason 
to  suppose  that  his  views  were  those  of  the  Queen. 
Other  members  of  the  Cabinet,  especially  Sir  George 
C.  Lewis,  Minister  of  War,  were  understood  to  be  in 
the  same  position. 

These  private  matters  were  unknown  to  the 
American  minister  and  secretary.  Adams  wrote  to 

1  Gladstone  was  good  authority,  for  of  course  the  ministry 
knew  that  the  Confederacy  was  building  a  navy  in  England. 

2  Walpole's  Russell,  Vol.  II,  p.  80. 

8  Lord  Granville  wrote  Oct.  1,  1862,  to  Lord  Stanley  of 
Alderley  :  "John  Russell  has  sent  me  a  message  announcing  a 
cabinet,  to  consider  whether  we  should  offer  to  mediate  .  . 
It  appears  to  me  a  great  mistake."  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Earl 
Granville,  Vol.  II,  p.  441.  Lord  Granville's  letter  to  Lord 
Kussell  is  given  on  p.  442. 


DANGER  OF  FOREIGN  LNTEEVENTION    301 

Seward  that  the  tone  of  Gladstone's  speech  might 
be  construed  as  indicating  the  course  to  be  taken 
by  Great  Britain,  and  considered  the  expediency 
of  asking  a  conference  with  Lord  Kussell  to  inquire 
whether  the  speech  were  to  be  regarded  as  con 
veying  to  the  public  the  views  of  the  government.1 
On  the  basis  of  this  letter,  Seward  wrote  to 
Thurlow  Weed  :  "I  think  it  will  be  wise  for  you 
to  return  to  London  to  watch  things  there.  Can 
you  go!"  Weed  hurried  to  Washington  and  after 
seeing  him  and  Lincoln,  returned  to  Albany  ready 
to  sail  at  once.  Before  he  could  take  ship,  how 
ever,  Seward  received  another  despatch2  from 
Adams  in  which  that  sagacious  diplomatist  gave  an 
account  of  an  interview  with  Lord  Russell.  After 
mentioning  other  matters,  Adams  skilfully  made 
allusion  to  "a  certain  speech."  Lord  Lyons  was 
about  to  return  to  Washington  :  Adams  hoped  he 
would  go  with  the  prospect  of  remaining  some 
time.  For  himself,  he  was  obliged  to  confess,  he 
had  been  lately  called  to  the  consideration,  "in 
certain  possible  contingencies,"  of  his  own  traveling 
equipage.  At  this  Lord  Eussell  seemed  rather  em 
barrassed  (not  unnaturally  as  we  can  see  with  a 
more  accurate  knowledge  of  affairs  than  Adams 
could  have  had)  and  in  the  ensuing  conversation 
said  that  Mr.  Gladstone's  speech  was  a  personal 
matter,  with  which  the  government  was  not  concerned, 
but  that  it  had  evidently  been  much  misunderstood. 
He  further  intimated  that  Lord  Palmerstou  and 

1  Adams  to  Seward,  Dip.  Corr.,  Oct.  10,  17,  1863. 
s  No.  248.     Adams  to  Seward,  Oct.  24,  1862. 


302  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

other  members  of  the  ministry  regretted  it,  and 
that  Mr.  Gladstone  was  inclined  to  correct  it. 
From  this  rather  guarded  language,  and  doubtless 
other  advice  to  the  same  effect,  Seward  was  rightly 
led  to  believe  that  any  idea  of  recognition  had 
for  the  moment  fallen  through.  He  wrote  to  Weed 
on  November  9th  to  give  up  the  thought  of 
going  abroad.  "The  reasons  you  can  imagine. 
All  is  well  and  cheerful  here  to-day.'7  To  Adams 
he  wrote  on  the  10th  in  official  language  :  "  It  is 
a  source  of  satisfaction  to  know  that  the  expecta 
tions  that  Great  Britain  would  speedily  give  her 
aid  to  sustain  the  failing  insurrection  here,  which 
disloyal  citizens  at  home  and  abroad  had  built  upon 
the  extra-official  speeches  of  the  British  Chancellor 
of  the  Exchequer,  were  unreal  and  purely  imagi 
nary."  In  his  letters  to  other  ministers,  he  main 
tained  his  confidence,  though  military  operations 
were  not  encouraging  and  the  fall  elections  appeared 
to  show  defection  in  popular  support.  Seward 
needed  all  his  optimism  and  all  his  determined 
resolution  to  carry  through  the  policy  that  he  had 
begun. 

The  immediate  danger  was  perhaps  not  yet  over. 
Lord  Eussell  had  informed  Adams  that  no  change 
was  contemplated  in  the  policy  of  England  and  no 
Cabinet  action  was  taken.  The  United  States  stood 
in  the  rather  advantageous  position  of  one  who  has 
called  a  bluff.  Palmerstou,  Eussell,  Gladstone, 
were  all  for  recognition,  but  they  would  not  make  a 
public  declaration  of  their  views.  Doubtless  they 
knew  that  they  would  not  be  sustained  by  their 


DANGER  OF  FOREIGN  INTERVENTION    303 

colleagues,1  and  presumably  that  they  would  not 
be  sustained  by  the  country.  However  it  might 
be,  it  put  them  rather  on  the  defensive  which,  in  the 
turn  of  events  the  next  month,  was  fortunate. 

When  asking  Weed  to  go  to  England,  Seward 
had  told  him  that  beside  affairs  in  London,  things 
in  Paris  were  in  such  a  position  that  Dayton  and 
Sauford  had  a  thousand  fears.  In  September  Mr. 
Dayton  had  had  an  interview  with  M.  Thouveuel, 
the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  in  which  he  had 
inquired  concerning  the  activity  of  Mr.  Slidell. 
M.  Thouvenel  said  that  he  had  had  but  two  inter 
views  with  that  gentleman,  both  some  time  since. 
It  seemed  probable,  however,  that  although  Mr. 
Slidell  had  had  no  recent  intercourse  with  the 
official  representative  of  the  ministry,  he  was  in 
communication  with  some  one  of  more  importance  ; 
namely,  the  Emperor.  Mr.  Slidell  was  a  man  of 
great  acuteness  and  it  was  supposed  that  the  result 
of  his  interviews  was  that  the  Emperor  proposed 
to  Russia  and  to  England  a  joint  mediation.  On 
November  6th  Mr.  Dayton  inquired  of  M.  Drouyn 
de  1'Huys,  who  had  succeeded  M.  Thouvenel, 
whether  such  action  was  contemplated.  The  min 
ister  replied  guardedly  that  a  desire  that  the  war 
should  come  to  an  end  had  been  spoken  of  and  was 
still  spoken  of,  but  that  no  action  was  in  prospect. 
Dayton,  who  appears  to  have  had  a  directness 

1  Sir  George  C.  Lewis,  Minister  of  War,  had  already  spoken 
in  public  in  answer  to  Gladstone.  The  Duke  of  Argyll,  the 
Duke  of  Newcastle,  Sir  George  Grey,  Mr.  Milner  Gibson, 
and  Mr.  C.  P.  Villiers,  were  the  other  so-called  Americans  in 
the  Cabinet. 


304  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

which  is  now  very  refreshing,  inquired  farther 
what  would  be  done  if  such  au  offer  were  made  and 
declined.  The  French  minister  replied  that  noth 
ing  would  be  done  ;  the  two  countries  would  be 
friends  as  before.  Dayton  then  informed  him 
"  unofficially  "  that  such  au  offer  would  come  to 
nothing.  He  was  right  but  the  matter  did  not  get 
so  far.  The  proposal  was  made  to  Eussia  and 
England.  Eussia  declined  to  act  with  the  others. 
When  the  matter  came  up  in  the  English  Cabinet, 
it  was  opposed  by  several,  and  even  Palmerston 
and  Eussell  were  backward  in  urging  acceptance. ' 
This  was  the  real  end  of  danger  of  intervention. 
It  is  true  that  the  Moniteur  spoke  of  the  English 
action  as  an  adjournment  rather  than  a  refusal,  but 
the  Proclamation  of  Emancipation,  the  increased 
supplies  of  cotton  from  India,  Napoleon's  em 
barrassments  in  Mexico,  joined  to  the  victories  of 
Vicksburg  and  Gettysburg,  the  firm  and  active 
position  of  the  Secretary  of  State  and  the  American 
ministers  aboard,  made  the  recognition  of  the 
Confederacy  more  and  more  improbable.  Seward 
might  have  breathed  freely  had  it  not  been  that 
other  possibilities  of  difficulty  had  come  up  and 
had  already  taken  alarming  form. 

1  Morley's  Gladstone,  Vol.  II,  p.  85. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

THE   BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS 

THE  affair  of  the  Trent  was  an  incident :  one  of 
those  matters  that  come  up  and  must  be  dealt  with 
and  may  be  finally  disposed  of.  There  were  many 
more  such  incidents,  though  of  less  importance,  aris 
ing  from  one  or  another  circumstance,  in  which  the 
general  policy  and  the  particular  skill  of  the  State 
Department  were  severely  tested.  The  relation  of 
neutral  and  belligerent  is  always  delicate,  even  un 
der  favorable  circumstances,  and  easily  gives  rise 
to  occasions  in  which  the  indiscretion  or  intrigue  of 
subordinates  may  involve  governments.  There  were, 
however,  in  addition  to  the  many  incidents  growing 
out  of  the  position  of  neutrals  in  general,  two  things 
which  called  for  continual  attention  from  the  State 
Department  as  well  as  from  other  departments  of  the 
government.  These  were  the  blockade  of  the  South 
ern  ports  and  the  Confederate  cruisers. 

One  of  the  first  acts  of  the  Confederacy  was  to 
offer  to  issue  letters  of  marque  and  one  of  the  first 
acts  of  war  of  the  North  was  to  declare  a  blockade 
of  the  Southern  ports.  The  two  acts  were  interde 
pendent.  The  South  had  no  navy,  nor  any  means 
of  building  one  :  she  could  therefore  plan  no  oppo 
sition  to  the  United  States  navy  which,  though  scat 
tered  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  was  yet  of  con- 


306  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

siderable  size.  But  the  United  States  bad  a  great 
commerce  and  carrying-trade,  almost  all  of  it  in  the 
hands  of  the  IsTorth,  aud  on  this  it  was  naturally 
thought  that  Southern  privateers  could  inflict  great 
injury.  As  the  South  had  no  carry  ing -trade,  the 
government  could  retaliate  only  by  a  blockade  of 
the  Southern  ports,  which  would  have  the  effect  of 
opening  to  capture  any  foreign  carry  ing -trade  that 
might  seek  to  make  up  the  deficiency  of  the  South. 
Both  these  proceedings  would  tend  to  implicate  for 
eign  powers,  for  their  harbors  would  naturally  be 
sought  by  Southern  privateers,  and  their  commerce 
and  industry  would  be  affected  by  the  blockade. 

The  blockade  is  said  to  have  been  suggested  to 
the  administration  by  Seward.  He  had  early  ad 
vised  that  naval  vessels  in  foreign  waters  should  be 
recalled  for  this  purpose,  whenever  such  a  step 
should  be  found  advisable.1  Another  plan  was 
merely  to  close  the  ports  of  the  states  in  insurrec 
tion,  but  this  being  a  matter  of  proclamation,  Sew 
ard  urged,  was  impractical  and  would  raise  constant 
trouble.  So  the  blockade  came  in  answer  to  the 
call  for  privateers. 

A  blockade  is  a  difficult  matter  :  to  be  respected 
it  must  be  effective.  But  the  United  States,  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war,  had  very  few  ships  at  imme 
diate  control,  much  less  enough  successfully  to  close 
the  ports  along  three  thousand  miles  of  coast.2  The 


1  Life,  Vol.  II,  p.  547. 

2  On    March  4,    1861,    there  were  only  three  steam-vessels 
"  in  Northern  ports  at  the  immediate  disposal  of  the  new  ad 
ministration."     Soley,  The  Blockade  and  the  Cruisers,  p.  14. 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS    307 

measure,  therefore,  did  not  become  operative  at  ouce 
aud  was  thus  often  a  source  of  great  annoyance  to 
foreign  powers,  because  it  did  not  really  prevent 
trade  as  it  pretended  to.  When  it  did  become  ef 
fective,  after  about  six  months,  it  was  the  source  of 
much  greater  annoyance.  The  ineffective  nature  of 
the  blockade  at  first  was  a  slight  matter  compared 
to  its  later  efficiency. 

The  chief  direction  in  which  it  concerned  foreign 
powers  was  in  the  matter  of  cotton.  Here  the 
North  suffered  somewhat,  but  England  and  France 
suffered  more.  The  French  cotton-spinning  in 
dustry  was  not  so  large  as  the  English,  but  still  it 
was  of  considerable  importance.  At  the  beginning 
of  the  war,  it  was  confidently  believed  at  the  South 
that  this  staple  would  prove  master  of  the  situation. 
England  and  France  must  have  cotton  :  no  govern 
ment  could  stand  the  pressure  that  would  be  put 
upon  it  to  get  a  supply. 

For  some  time,  however,  nothing  of  this  sort 
seemed  likely,  partly  because  there  was  a  fair  stock 
of  cotton  abroad,  and  partly  because  the  blockade 
was  at  first  not  very  effectual.  In  the  beginning 
of  1862,  Adams  was  able  to  inform  Seward  that  the 
supply  in  England  was  still  sufficient  for  a  good 
while  and  that  the  expectations  of  those  who  hoped 
that  the  blockade  might  be  raised  had  declined.1 
There  was,  on  the  other  hand,  allegation  that  the 
blockade  was  not  effective,  and  he  thought  steps 
might  be  taken  in  Parliament  based  on  such  a  view. 
Seward  replied  that,  in  his  opinion,  the  opposite 
lDip.  Corr.,  Jan.  17,  1862,  p.  16. 


308  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

was  the  case,  as  was  shown  by  the  fact  that  at 
Charleston  gold  was  as  scarce  as  cotton  was  at 
Liverpool.  But  he  suggested  that  Adams  should 
ask  Lord  Russell  whether  it  would  not  be  wiser  and 
better  for  England  to  remove  the  necessity  of  a 
blockade  by  withdrawing  her  recognition  of  the 
Confederacy  as  belligerents.  Then,  said  he,  the 
strife  would  end  to-morrow.1  In  a  few  days  he 
added  the  suggestion  that  the  blockade-running, 
which  was  becoming  a  regular  business  in  England, 
was  practically  "  a  combination  of  British  capitalists 
under  legal  authority  to  levy  war  against  the 
United  States."2 

The  British  ministry  began  to  find  themselves  in 
a  difficult  situation.  It  became  apparent  to  them 
that  Great  Britain  was  taking  a  position  of  enlarg 
ing  the  privileges  of  neutral  powers  which  was 
contrary  to  her  previous  practice.  She  had  hurried 
to  assume  neutral  rights  in  her  proclamation  of 
belligerency  ;  she  had  been  eager  to  assert  them  in 
the  case  of  the  Trent;  she  would  now  be  increasing 
them  should  she  disregard  the  blockade.  There 
was  an  uneasiness,  Adams  wrote,  in  Parliament, 
both  on  the  part  of  the  opposition  and  the  govern 
ment.  Seward  began  to  feel  more  definitely  the 
ground  on  which  he  stood,  and  the  fear  that  Great 
Britain  would  disregard  the  blockade  passed  from 
his  mind.  He  continued,  therefore,  to  urge  that 
she  should  withdraw  the  recognition  of  bellig 
erency. 

1  Dip.  Corr.,  March  6,  1862,  p.  43. 
*Jbid.,  March  11,  1862,  p.  46. 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  OKUISEKS    309 

The  actual  facts  concerning  cotton  at  this  time, 
however,  were  such  as  to  make  it  possible  that  no 
reasons  of  policy  could  withstand  the  pressure  of 
commercial  interests.  Though  Adams  had  stated 
in  January  that  there  was  enough  cotton  for  six 
mouths,  the  showing  in  March  made  it  very  clear 
that  at  the  end  of  that  time  there  would  not  be  any 
more.  For  the  six  months  ending  March,  1861, 
Great  Britain  had  imported  1,500,000  bales  :  in  the 
six  months  ending  March,  1862,  there  had  been 
imported  only  11,200  bales.  The  price  had,  there 
fore,  risen  :  in  March,  1861,  it  had  been  seven 
pence  a  pound  ;  a  year  later  it  was  thirteen  pence. 
As  the  stringency  continued,  the  price  continued  to 
go  up  until,  in  September,  it  reached  almost  half  a 
crown.  Long  before  this  time  the  closing  of  mills 
had  begun  to  result  in  very  great  suffering,  espe 
cially  in  the  north  of  England,  where  thousands  were 
out  of  work,  and  more  and  more  were  added  everyday 
to  the  mass  of  unemployed.  The  war  cost  America 
inordinately,  but  it  cost  England  a  good  deal  too. 
Many  of  those  who  paid  most,  relatively  speaking, 
were  factory  hands  who  could  least  afford  it ;  and 
strange  as  it  may  seem,  the  North  had  no  warmer 
friends  in  England  than  among  those  who  were  the 
greatest  sufferers.  They  at  least  understood  what 
the  war  was  about.  But  it  was  not  only  the  cotton- 
spinners  that  suffered :  there  were  larger  com 
mercial  interests.  All  this  loss,  Sevrard  neglected 
no  occasion  to  point  out,  arose  mainly  because 
England  had  thought  fit  to  lend  her  virtual  aid  to 
the  insurgents,  by  her  immediate  proclamation  of 


310  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

neutrality.  Adams,  however,  gave  no  ground  for 
hope  that  England  would  withdraw  that  recogni 
tion,  nor  was  he  able  to  gain  any  assurance  that  the 
ministry  would  try  to  stop  the  blockade- running. 
In  fact,  as  the  pressure  increased  during  the  spring 
and  summer,  he  was  led  to  believe  that  the  min 
istry  would  think  more  and  more  of  some  means  of 
breaking  up  the  blockade,  even  by  such  steps  as 
actual  recognition.1  Seward  felt  that  he  could  hold 
on  a  little  longer  :  some  of  the  Southern  ports 
had  been  captured  and  opened,  especially  New 
Orleans,  from  which  cotton  might  be  expected ;  he 
was  told  by  his  foreign  correspondents  that  consid 
erable  supplies  of  the  East  Indian  staple  were  on  the 
way,  and  that  the  new  crop  would  soon  follow ;  he 
had  great  hopes  that  McClellan's  campaign  in 
Virginia  would  bring  about  the  capture  of  Eich- 
mond,  and  end  the  war  ;  he  had  some  belief,  prob 
ably,  that  Napoleon's  interests  in  Mexico,  and  the 
English  element  that  sympathized  with  the  North, 
would  be  sufficient  to  prevent  England  and  France 
from  any  real  effort  at  intervention.  Whatever  his 
reasons,  he  determined  to  yield  nothing,  and  as  the 
summer  wore  on,  he  found  himself  justified.  We 
have  seen  how  the  liability  of  foreign  intervention 
disappeared  in  the  fall.  Blockade- running  still 
continued  and  indeed  became  almost  an  art,  as  well 
as  the  source  of  much  mutual  complaint  between 
England  and  the  United  States.  But  any  danger 

1  He  was  right  in  this  opinion.  In  the  course  of  the  summer, 
as  has  been  seen,  Palmerston  and  Russell  decided  that  the  time 
for  recognition,  or  even  intervention,  had  corue. 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS    311 

arising  from  foreign  action  on  the  blockade  passed 
away  with  the  year  1862. 

The  other  matter  that  has  been  mentioned,  how 
ever,  took  its  place  as  a  source  of  great  anxiety,  and 
here  too  "England,  by  the  force  of  circumstances, 
found  herself  in  a  delicate  position.  The  President 
of  the  Confederacy  in  his  proclamation  of  April  7, 
1861,  announced  that  he  was  prepared  to  issue  letters 
of  marque.  Privateering  had  been  a  common  mode 
of  naval  warfare,  and  the  United  States  had  practiced 
it  with  great  effect  in  earlier  days.  The  European 
powers  had  abolished  it  by  the  Treaty  of  1856,  but 
the  United  States  had  not  acceded  to  that  agree 
ment.  When  Seward  proposed  to  do  so  at  the  be 
ginning  of  the  war,  the  English  ministry  insisted 
that  such  accession  could  not  be  regarded  as  affect 
ing  present  conditions,  and  nothing  further  was 
done.  The  United  States  thus  had  no  especial 
ground  of  complaint  at  the  Southern  programme, 
although  it  was  obvious  that  it  would  bear  hard  on 
the  North,  which  had  almost  all  the  commerce  of 
the  country,  rather  than  on  the  South  which, 
certainly  after  the  blockade  was  established,  had 
none  at  all.  Privateering,  therefore,  sprang  up 
and  for  a  short  time  was  carried  on  with  some  suc 
cess.  But  privateering  needs  home  ports  for  fitting 
and  refitting  and  for  the  condemnation  of  prizes, 
and  the  Confederate  merchants,  as  the  blockade  be 
came  effective,  had  none.  Could  they  have  bought 
ships  in  foreign  countries  and  sold  prizes  in  foreign 
ports,  privateering  would  have  been  an  important 
element  in  the  war.  But  this  was  entirely  opposed 


312  WILLIAM  H.  SEWABD 

to  the  laws  of  neutrality,  and  the  practice,  there 
fore,  died  out  in  the  first  year  of  the  struggle.  It 
gave  place,  however,  to  a  much  more  formidable 
effort,  which  indeed  began  as  soon  as  did  privateer 
ing,  although  it  matured  in  a  slower  way';  namely, 
the  destruction  of  commerce  by  the  regularly  com 
missioned  vessels  of  the  Confederate  navy. 

Of  these  several  sailed  from  Confederate  ports. 
The  Sumter  escaped  from  New  Orleans,  and  as  long 
as  her  boilers  lasted,  succeeded  in  keeping  out  of 
the  way  of  the  Northern  cruisers  pursuing  her. 
On  her  voyage  she  captured  a  number  of  prizes,  of 
which  some  were  sent  back  to  New  Orleans  and  re 
captured  ;  others  were  sent  to  Cuban  ports  where 
they  were  released,  while  two  were  burned.  The 
Sumter  finally  put  in  at  Gibraltar  for  repairs :  as 
these  were  not  allowed  by  the  English  authorities, 
however,  she  was  sold.  Her  cruise  was  not  unsuc 
cessful,  but  it  was  clear  that  unless  some  additional 
means  could  be  found  for  building  cruisers  and  sup 
plying  and  repairing  them,  the  regular  navy  of  the 
Confederate  states  would  accomplish  no  more  than 
her  privateers. 

England  was  the  great  maritime  power  and  the 
South  naturally  turned  to  her  for  ships.  The 
law  of  England,  in  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act  of 
1815,  forbade  the  "  fitting  out,  equipping  and  arm 
ing"  of  any  vessel  for  the  purpose  of  cruising  or 
committing  hostilities  against  a  friendly  state. 
These  expressions,  however,  gave  a  considerable 
leeway  for  interpretation.  Captain  Bulloch,  who 
had  charge  of  the  naval  interests  of  the  Confederacy 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CEU1SEES    313 

abroad,  was  advised  that  ships  might  enter  the 
service  from  England  without  coming  within  the 
statute.  His  advisers  were  of  the  opinion  that 
vessels  might  be  not  only  fitted  out  there,  but  also 
equipped  and  armed,  if  the  two  things  were  kept 
entirely  separate. 

In  February,  1862,  Adams  received  evidence  from 
the  United  States  consul  at  Liverpool  that  a  ship 
was  being  made  ready  for  the  Confederate  states. 
On  the  18th  of  the  mouth  he  informed  Lord  Eussell 
of  the  fitting  out  of  the  Oreto,  "an  armed  steamer 
evidently  intended  for  hostile  operations  ou  the 
ocean."  l  Lord  Eussell  caused  inquiries  to  be  made 
and  sent  back  word  to  Adams  that  the  Oreto  was 
being  built  for  the  use  of  Messrs.  Thomas  Brothers  of 
Palermo,  and  that  he  had  every  reason  to  believe 
that  she  was  to  enter  the  service  of  the  Italian 
government.  About  a  month  later  Mr.  Dudley, 
United  States  consul  at  Liverpool,  wrote  to  Adams 
that  the  ship  was  still  in  the  river  ;  that  he  had  been 
informed  by  some  of  the  crew  of  the  Annie  Childs, 
blockade  runner,  that  they  had  brought  over  with 
them  four  Confederate  officers  for  it.  On  the  25th 
Adams  communicated  these  advices  to  Lord  Eussell, 
who  again  took  steps  to  get  the  facts  in  the  case. 
On  the  8th  of  April  the  Foreign  Minister  informed 
Adams  that  the  Oreto  had  had  an  English  crew  and 
an  assorted  cargo,  but  no  passengers,  troops  or 
guns ;  that  the  Southern  gentlemen  mentioned  had 
had  no  connection  with  her,  but  were  still  in  Liver 
pool. 

1  Dip.  Corr.,  Feb.  18,  1861. 


314  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

The  Oreto  had  by  this  time  been  gone  from  Liver 
pool  for  two  weeks.  Instead  of  proceeding  to 
Palermo  and  passing  into  the  Italian  service,  she 
went  to  Nassau,  where  she  was  delivered  to  Captain 
Maffitt  of  the  Confederate  navy.  She  then  began  to 
take  on  guns  and  ammunition  which  had  been  sent 
to  her  by  the  Bahama  from  Hartlepool.  This,  how 
ever,  looked  too  much  like  "fitting  out  and  equip 
ping"  :  the  ship  was  now  inspected  by  the  British 
authorities  and  was  libeled  in  the  Admiralty  court. 
It  appeared  to  the  court  that  she  was  preparing  for 
the  merchant  service,  so  she  was  released  and  left 
Nassau  for  Green  Cay,  a  small  island  apparently 
not  under  British  authority,  where  she  took  on  an 
armament  and  proceeded  as  a  Confederate  cruiser 
under  the  name  Florida. 

When  Adams  referred  to  these  matters  in  an  in 
terview  with  Lord  Russell,  that  minister  stated  that 
it  was  Great  Britain's  desire  to  be  neutral ;  that 
where  there  were  profits  to  be  made,  people  would 
always  take  risks  ;  that  the  government  would  go  as 
far  as  the  law  allowed.  Adams  said  that  the  answer 
that  nothing  could  be  done  was  very  unsatisfactory, 
because  it  might  be  fairly  presumed  that  every 
nation  which  possessed  the  desire  natural^  carried 
within  itself  the  power  to  prevent  abuses  of  its 
authority.  His  lordship  did  not  see  how  the  govern 
ment  could  change  its  position.1  When  this  de 
spatch  reached  Seward,  he  was  unable  to  suggest  any 
reasons  which  should  force  a  different  attitude,  but 
optimistically  hoped  that  a  change  in  military  af- 
1  Dip.  Corr.,  April  16,  1862,  p.  73. 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISEKS    315 

fairs  and  the  successes  of  the  North  would  put  a  new 
face  on  things,  and  even  bring  about  a  withdrawal 
of  the  recognition  of  the  Southern  states  as  belliger 
ents.  The  capture  of  New  Orleans  and  of  Yorktown 
early  in  the  season  led  him  to  look  forward  to  a 
successful  summer.  Victories  in  the  field  were  the 
means  by  which  Seward  counted  on  overcoming 
Foreign  opposition  :  he  was  confident  that  the  United 
States  could  quell  the  insurrection,  and  he  kept  this 
belief  through  the  darkest  hours  of  the  war,  con 
stantly  sending  to  all  the  foreign  ministers  the 
strongest  assurances  of  continued  strength  and 
ability,  even  in  the  face  of  defeat.  Just  now,  how 
ever,  his  powers  were  strained  to  the  utmost  to  ex 
plain  the  strategy  of  McClellan's  operations  in  the 
Peninsula. 

On  June  23d  Adams  wrote  to  Lord  Eussell,  re 
ferring  to  the  Oreto,  which,  he  said,  had  gone 
directly  to  Nassau,  where  she  was  completing  her 
armament,  and  calling  his  attention  to  a  "  still 
more  powerful  war-steamer  "  nearly  ready  for  de 
parture  on  the  same  errand.  Lord  Eussell  again 
sought  his  sources  of  information  and  in  a  week 
learned  that  the  customs  officers  had  gone  to  the 
shipyards  of  Messrs.  Laird  and  inquired  the  destina 
tion  of  the  vessel.  The  Messrs.  Laird  "did  not 
seem  disposed"  to  reply  to  any  such  questions,  and 
the  customs  officers  felt  that  they  did  not  have  any 
other  means  of  ascertainment.  His  lordship  there 
fore  suggested  that  Mr.  Adams  should  find  out 
something  himself.1  This  he  did  and  on  July  22d 
1  Dip.  Corr.,  Adams  to  Seward,  July  4,  1862. 


316  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

and  24th  submitted  a  number  of  depositions  which 
showed  clearly  enough  the  character  of  "  Gunboat 
290,"  as  she  was  then  called.  Lord  Eussell  put  the 
papers  before  the  law  officers  of  the  Crown,  and  on 
the  29th  received  word  from  them  that  the  "290" 
ought  to  be  stopped.  Orders  to  that  effect  were  sent 
to  Liverpool,  bat  the  "290"  had  sailed  the  same 
day.  She  was  bound  for  the  Azores,  where  she  was 
armed  and  equipped  and  took  on  a  crew.  Thence 
she  proceeded  to  cruise  under  the  name  Alabama. 

Lord  Eussell  held  now  and  afterward  that  the 
position  of  the  British  government  had  been  wholly 
in  line  with  strict  neutrality.  Asa  fact,  however, 
this  position  rather  falls  to  the  ground  between  two 
stools.  It  may  have  been  entirely  legal  for  the 
Alabama  to  go  to  sea,  but  the  government  tried 
to  stop  her  and  failed  only  by  an  accident.  The 
papers  were  sent  to  the  Queen's  Advocate  for  an 
opinion.  But  it  happened  that  at  just  that  time 
he  had  broken  down  from  overwork,  so  that  they 
lay  upon  his  table  unnoticed  for  three  days.  When 
they  were  taken  up  and  action  was  resolved  upon, 
it  was  too  late.1  But  this  was  really  only  an 
explanation  of  especial  circumstances :  the  true 
reason  that  the  Alabama  got  to  sea  was  because  there 
was  no  interest  in  England  strong  enough  to  prevent 
her.  If  the  government  had  desired,  it  could  have 
stopped  her  long  before  the  time  it  tried  to  do  so. 

All  this  kept  Seward  busy.     He  was  now  en- 

1  It  may  be,  of  course,  that  no  matter  when  the  order  came 
to  stop,  the  Alabama  would  have  sailed  a  little  before,  but  there 
is  no  evidence  to  that  effect. 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  ORUISEKS    317 

deavoriug  to  prevent  the  foreign  war,  thought  of  a 
year  before  as  something  that  would  arouse  the 
spirit  of  nationality.1  In  September  he  wrote  in  his 
circular  letter  to  the  different  ministers  :  "  We  hear, 
officially  and  unofficially,  of  great  naval  preparations 
which  are  on  foot  in  British  and  other  foreign  ports, 
under  cover  of  neutrality,  to  give  the  insurgents  a 
naval  force.  Among  these  reports  is  one  that  a 
naval  armament  is  fitting  out  in  England  to  lay 
New  York  under  contribution."  2 

This  last  rumor  refers  to  two  vessels  that  had  just 
been  begun  at  Laird's  :  these  were  iron-clads,  rams 
of  the  most  formidable  description.  As  they  came 
nearer  and  nearer  completion,  it  grew  apparent  that 
the  United  States  had  no  vessels  that  could  cope 
with  them.  When  inquiry  was  made,  it  appeared 
that  they  were  being  built  for  M.  Bravay,  a  French 
merchant,  who,  it  was  said,  was  acting  for  the 
Khedive  of  Egypt.  The  "rams"  became  a  source 
of  great  alarm  and  rumor  surged  this  way  and  that. 
At  first  England  would  not  interest  herself  in 
the  matter,  but  as  news  of  the  depredations  of  the 
Alabama  began  to  come  in  ;  as  the  losses  to  Ameri 
can  shipping  began  to  reach  the  millions  ;  and  as 
the  United  States  began  to  make  it  clear  that  it 
meant  to  present  claims  upon  Great  Britain  for  all 
losses  caused  by  her  failure  to  detain  the  ship,  the 
government  was  brought  to  think  that  something 

1  He  wrote  to  his  daughter,  telling  her  the  political  situation 
in  very  simple  terras,  and  ended,  "This  begets  disputes  and 
most  of  my  time  is  occupied  in  settling  them,  with  a  view  to 
avoiding  foreign  war."  Aug.,  1862.  Life,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  124. 

*Life,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  129. 


318  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

might  be  done.  Unfortunately  it  was  difficult  to 
suggest  just  what  to  do.  In  March,  1863,  a  ship 
called  the  Alexandra,  which  was  suspected  of  being 
another  Alabama,  was  detained,  that  the  case  might 
be  tried  in  the  courts.  The  Chief  Baron  of  the 
Exchequer  charged  a  jury  that  the  offense  of 
actually  equipping  for  hostile  purposes  could  not 
be  committed,  unless  the  equipping  was  so  far 
completed  in  British  territory  that  the  vessel  was 
capable  of  hostile  operations,  and  that,  consequently, 
the  attempt  to  equip  must  be  with  the  intent  that 
she  should  be  so  completed  within  British  territory  ; 
— all  of  which  meant  simply  that  unless  the  vessel 
were  practically  got  ready  for  war  in  British  terri 
tory,  she  did  not  come  under  the  provisions  of  the 
law.  This  had  always  been  Bulloch's  understand 
ing  of  the  subject  and  he  had  been  very  careful  to 
avoid  infringement.  The  Alexandra  was  released  ; 
so  would  the  Alabama  have  been  released  if  she  had 
been  detained  ;  so  would  the  rams  be  released  also. 

When  the  news  of  the  Alexandra  decision  came  to 
Seward,  he  thought  it  time  to  bring  forward  his  last 
resources.  He  wrote  Adams  a  long  despatch.  If 
the  decision  was  affirmed  in  the  court  of  last  ap 
peal,  he  said,  it  would  appear  to  the  United  States 
that  there  was  no  law  in  Great  Britain  which  would 
effectually  prevent  violations  of  neutrality,  and  the 
fitting  out  of  the  Florida,  the  Alabama,  the  Alexandra 
would  thus  receive  the  sanction  of  the  government. 
This,  as  he  pointed  out,  would  amount  to  an  informal 
or  a  partial  war  between  the  countries.  If  it  should 
become  general,  the  President  felt  that  the  responsi- 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CRUISERS    319 

bility  would  not  be  with  the  United  States.  He 
closed  by  referring  to  the  recent  increases  of  the 
navy  and  to  the  successes  gained  by  the  army  at 
Vicksburg  and  Gettysburg.1 

Seward  had  by  this  time  become  convinced  that 
the  English  ministry  desired  to  prevent  a  repetition 
of  the  Alabama  incident  and  that,  if  sufficiently 
pressed,  would  prevent  the  coming  out  of  the  two 
steel  ranis.  He  seems  to  have  been  sure  that  if  the 
British  government  felt  it  necessary  to  stop  the 
ships,  they  would  find  out  a  way.  He  told  Welles, 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  that  he  need  make  no 
preparation  against  them :  the  latter  relied  on  his 
information  but  grumbled  to  his  diary,  saying  that 
Seward  "knows  these  vessels  are  to  be  detained,  yet 
will  not  come  out  and  state  the  fact,  but  is  not  un 
willing  to  have  apprehension  excited.  It  will 
glorify  him  if  it  is  said  they  are  detained  through 
protest  from  our  minister."  In  the  view  of  all  the 
facts,  it  hardly  seems  that  this  could  have  been 
Seward's  opinion.  He  was  doubtless  sure,  perhaps 
too  sure,  that  the  ministers  would  interpose,  if  suf 
ficient  pressure  were  put  upon  them,  but  that  other 
wise  they  would  not  interfere.  It  could  hardly  have 
been  good  policy  to  have  announced  beforehand  that 
the  ministry  would  do  what  he  hoped  to  induce  them 
to  do.2  He  had  supplied  Adams  with  what  in  his 

1  Dip.  COJT.,  Seward  to  Adams,  July  11,  1862,  pp.  308-310. 

'Seward's  opponents  appreciated  him  even  if  his  friends  did 
not.  Benjamin,  the  Confederate  Secretary  of  State,  writing  to 
Slidell,  June  22,  1863,  regrets  very  much  that  Seward  has  so 
correctly  read  the  temper  of  the  British  ministry,  and  deplores 
the  "  success  of  his  policy  of  intimidation,  which  the  world  at 


320  WILLIAM  H.  SEWABD 

opinion  was  sufficient  means  to  bring  them  to  action. 
Throughout  the  summer,  he  kept  up  an  almost 
threatening  tone  in  his  despatches,  and  Adams  was 
well  aware  that,  if  necessary,  he  might  go  to  the 
last  extreme.  As  the  summer  went  on,  it  was  clear 
that  matters  were  approaching  a  crisis.  On  Sep 
tember  5th  he  sent  a  last  despatch  to  Lord  Russell, 
lu  it  he  presented  the  situation  that  had  been  de 
scribed  in  Seward's  letter  to  him  of  July  llth,  and 
summed  it  up  in  the  apt  phrase:  "It  would  be 
superfluous  in  me  to  point  out  to  your  lordship  that 
this  is  war."  Further  discussion  on  his  part  he 
feared  would  be  useless.  Lord  Russell  apparently 
agreed  with  him.  He  undoubtedly  desired  neu 
trality,  but  he  felt,  perhaps,  that  he  should  not  take 
the  risk  of  war,  on  what  was,  after  all,  narrow  and 
doubtful  ground,  and  Adams  saw  in  the  papers  of 
September  8th  the  statement  that  the  government 
had  decided  to  detain  the  vessels  in  order  to  try  the 
merits  of  the  case  in  court.  The  case  did  not  come 
into  court,  for  the  ministry  had  no  hope  of  a  verdict : 
they  therefore  purchased  the  two  ships  for  £225,000. 
With  the  detention  of  the  rams,  one  more  great 
danger  passed  away.  There  were  other  ships  that 
caused  some  anxiety.  The  Alexandra  had  been 
allowed  to  go  to  sea  in  the  summer  of  1863,  but 
was  detained  at  Nassau.  The  Eappahannock  was 
sold  by  the  British  government  to  parties  acting 


large  supposed  would  be  met  with  resentment,  but  which  he, 
with  deeper  insight  into  the  policy  of  the  Cabinet,  foresaw 
would  be  followed  by  submissive  acquiescence  in  his  demands. " 
Bancroft,  Seward,  Vol.  II,  p.  605. 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  CKU1SEKS    321 

for  the  Confederates,  but  when  this  action  cauie 
to  its  knowledge,  it  undertook  to  stop  her.  She 
got  to  sea  in  a  hurry  with  the  workmen  still  on 
board  and  made  for  Calais,  where  she  at  once 
engaged  the  attention  of  Dayton  and  was  finally 
detained.  The  Georgia  managed  to  get  to  sea 
under  care  of  an  English  firm,  the  members  of 
which  were  afterward  tried  under  the  Foreign  En 
listment  Act  and  fined  £  50  apiece.  The  ship  was 
shortly  captured  by  the  Niagara.  The  Sea  King 
got  away  in  1864,  became  the  Shenandoah  and  was 
in  the  Pacific  at  the  close  of  the  war.  The  French 
government  was  more  successful  in  stopping  the 
efforts  constantly  making  in  its  ports :  the  only 
cruiser  to  get  to  sea  from  France  was  the  Stonewall 
just  before  the  end  of  hostilities.1 

None  of  these  ships  except  the  Shenandoah  did 
any  considerable  damage  to  Northern  commerce ; 
but  all,  together  with  the  Florida  and  the  Alabama, 
were  the  cause  of  incessant  watchfulness  and 
anxiety  on  the  part  of  the  government.  They  make 
a  constant  figure  in  the  despatches,  not  merely  as 
to  their  fitting  out,  but  from  the  further  fact  that 
they  continually  sailed  in  and  out  of  foreign  ports. 
Here  the  recognition  of  belligerency  was  the  source 
of  great  inconvenience  and  injustice.  Without  a 
doubt  the  Confederacy  had  a  right  to  be  considered 
a  belligerent  on  laud  :  it  had  armies  in  the  field 
which  had  to  be  dealt  with  as  soldiers  and  not 
as  insurgents.  But  it  was  not  a  de  facto  belli g- 

1  This  material  is  conveniently  summarized  in  Soley,  The 
Blockade  and  the  Cruisers,  pp.  213-221. 


WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

erent  at  sea,  and  there  seems  little  justice  in 
holding  that  a  country  which  had  not  a  single  open 
seaport,  no  merchant-marine,  and  no  navy  except 
what  could  be  got  in  neutral  nations,  should  have 
at  sea  all  the  rights  of  war  that  could  be  granted. 
Seward  always  called  the  Confederate  cruisers 
pirates :  the  term  was  certainly  incorrect ;  nor 
would  he  have  advised  the  logical  consequences 
of  such  a  view ;  namely,  the  hanging  of  all  taken 
with  arms  in  their  hands.  He  was  more  nearly 
right  when  he  urged  that  so-called  neutrals  who 
aided  and  abetted  this  so-called  navy  were  really 
levying  war  against  the  United  States,  and  that 
view  he  seems  to  have  been  fortunate  enough  to 
recommend  to  the  British  ministry  with  effectual 
results. 


CHAPTEE  XVIII 

MATTERS   AT   HOME 

IN  the  first  year  of  the  war,  while  the  actual 
business  of  the  armies  was  carried  on  with  much 
practical  vigor,  there  was  some  debate  and  dis 
cussion  that  might  appear  academic  or  theoretical, 
as  to  just  what  was  its  object.  Seward  in  his 
"Thoughts"  of  April  1st,  wrote,  "  My  system  is 
built  upon  this  idea  as  a  ruling  one ;  namely,  that 
we  must  change  the  question,  before  the  public, 
from  one  upon  Slavery,  or  about  Slavery,  for  a 
question  upon  Union  or  Disunion. "  This  was  be 
fore  the  firing  upon  Sumter.  It  was  very  natural 
that  the  public  mind  should  then  be  chiefly  ab 
sorbed  in  the  questions  of  slavery.  The  country 
was  threatened  with  war  arising  from  the  secession 
of  several  states  ;  the  secession  of  those  states  had 
come  about  on  the  accession  to  power  of  the  Ee- 
publicau  party  ;  and  that  party  had  been  danger 
ous  to  the  seceding  states  only  as  it  concerned 
itself  with  slavery.  It  had  been  formed  to  with 
stand  the  advance  of  slavery  in  the  territories,  but 
it  was  currently  held  at  the  South  to  be  an  Abo 
litionist  party,  and  Lincoln  and  Seward  had  each 
of  them  said  much  to  cause  such  an  idea  to  gain 
currency. 

Still,  events  hurried  the  nation  along  the  way 


324  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

Seward  had  indicated.  The  firing  on  Fort  Sumter 
crystallized  the  vague  feelings  of  the  North,  which 
rose  at  once  to  the  defense  of  the  Union.  What 
ever  differences  existed  on  the  subject  of  slavery 
were  swept  aside  in  that  unanimous  answer  to  the 
attack  on  the  flag.  Seward' s  view,  though  perhaps 
it  called  for  no  particular  change  of  policy,  had  a 
solid  foundation  in  fact  and  in  feeling :  he  wished 
to  unite  the  North,  and  the  border  states  as  well,— 
indeed,  the  whole  people,  and  he  was  convinced 
that  the  only  way  was  to  plant  in  them  the  feeliug 
that  the  Union  was  in  danger.  The  preservation 
of  the  Union  was,  in  fact,  the  only  ground  upon 
which  the  government  could  stand  if  it  proposed 
to  coerce  the  seceded  states.  It  was  only  because 
in  the  Northern  view  secession  was  insurrection, 
that  Lincoln  could  take  a  step  in  the  direction  of 
applying  force. 

Still  in  many  minds  the  war  was  a  war  against 
slavery.  Public  opinion  is  not  generally  dominated 
by  the  principles  of  law,  nor  by  a  feeling  for  a 
consistent  policy.  Whatever  the  legal  aspect  of 
the  case,  the  people  of  the  North  felt  that  the 
Union  really  stood  for  freedom  and  liberty  and 
democracy  and  progress.  The  Union  soldiers 
marched  to  the  strains  of  "  John  Brown's  Body" 
and  "The  Battle  Cry  of  Freedom."  The  South 
was  held  to  be  the  defender  of  slavery. 

But  the  war  for  the  Union  was  not  a  war  for  free 
dom  from  the  Northern  standpoint  only.  The  South 
was  also  contending  for  freedom  ; — for  freedom  to 
manage  its  domestic  and  political  affairs  as  it  saw 


MATTERS  AT  HOME  325 

fit,  and  to  the  Southern  mind  the  Union,  in  trying  to 
prevent  their  doing  so,  was  quite  as  much  of  a 
tyrant  as  George  III  had  been.  Hence  it  was 
sung  of  Maryland,  that  "the  Despot's  heel"  was 
4  k  on  her  shore  ' '  ;  hence  the  Southern  papers  wrote 
that  the  war  was  ' '  the  most  unnecessary  and 
wicked  war  which  ambition  or  lust  has  ever  inau 
gurated  "  ; l  hence  the  President  of  the  Confederacy 
wrote  in  his  message  to  Congress,  "We  feel  that 
our  cause  is  just  and  holy." 

This  matter  proved  of  importance  in  the  foreign 
relations  of  the  United  States,  and  Seward  found  it 
a  difficulty  in  presenting  the  position  of  the  govern 
ment  to  foreign  powers.  The  North  at  first  felt  that 
it  ought  to  be  able  to  depend  upon  the  sympathy 
and  moral  support  of  England,  as  being  the  de 
fender  of  freedom  against  slavery.  Seward  and 
many  other  Americans  had  friends  there  on  whose 
interest  they  could  count.  But  it  seemed  a  fact  that 
the  war  was  a  war  for  the  Union  :  the  President's 
proclamation  had  not  mentioned  slavery.  If  this 
were  the  position,  it  would  hardly  have  been 
thought  that  there  was  anything  but  the  usual  feel 
ing  of  international  friendship  to  arouse  British 
sympathy  for  a  war  in  defense  of  the  Union.  Why 
should  England  side  with  the  North  rather  than 
with  the  South,  save  on  the  question  of  slavery? 
Seward,  in  writing  despatches  to  Adams,  letters 
suggesting  ideas  that  he  hoped  would  influence 
English  opinion,  often  argued  it  was  for  England's 
best  interests  that  the  United  States  should  remain 
1  Richmond  Enquirer,  April  26th,  in  Rhodes,  Vol.  HI,  p.  401. 


326  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

one  power  ;  but  such  a  view  was  not  very  common 
in  the  country  itself.  Nor  could  the  North  have 
expected  strong  national  feeling  on  the  basis  of  be 
ing  a  friendly  power  threatened  with  insurrection  : 
in  the  case  of  the  insurrection  of  Hungary  against 
Austria,  America's  sympathies  had  not  been  witli 
the  friendly  power,  and  if  Ireland  should  have  risen 
against  England,  the  sympathies  of  the  North  would 
pretty  clearly  have  been  with  the  insurrection. 

It  is  true  that  Seward' s  position  seemed  to  be 
necessary  both  in  law  and  in  fact.  It  was  the  posi 
tion  of  the  President  and  the  government,  of  the 
army  and  the  people  ;  it  was  of  necessity  the  foun 
dation  of  foreign  policy.  A  very  sound  judge1  in 
speaking  of  this  matter  says  that  the  error  which 
England  made  in  these  days  lay  in  the  application 
of  ordinary  political  maxims  to  what  was  not  a  po 
litical  contest  but  a  social  revolution.  "The  sig 
nificance  of  the  American  war,"  he  writes,  "  lay  in 
its  relation  to  slavery."  Few  in  England,  however, 
saw  this  clearly,  or  if  so,  they  did  not  argue  from  it 
that  England  should  support  the  North.  Lord  John 
Russell,  speaking  in  Parliament,  was  quoted  to 
Seward  by  the  minister  to  The  Hague  to  the  effect 
that  it  was  better  that  the  North  and  the  South 
should  separate.  The  basis  of  such  a  view  was 
clearly  the  idea  that  the  restoration  of  the  Union  on 
the  old  basis,  half-slave  and  half-free,  would  merely 
lead  to  a  repetition  of  the  present  evils.  Seward 
himself  was  on  record  as  saying  that  the  conflict 
could  not  be  repressed.  If  the  Union  and  the  Con- 
1  Lord  Morley  in  his  Gladstone,  Vol.  II,  p.  69. 


MATTERS  AT  HOME  327 

stitution  provided  no  means  of  doing  away  with 
slavery,  then  even  anti-slavery  men  in  England 
might  well  feel  that  the  Union  had  better  not  be 
preserved. 

Hence  many  of  the  English  leaders  had  no  espe 
cial  sympathy  with  the  North,  and  hence  Lord  John 
Russell  could  look  at  the  question  as  merely  a  ques 
tion  of  neutrality.  Here  were  two  conflicting  forces  : 
England's  interests  and  her  sympathies  led  her  to 
wish  the  struggle  at  an  end.  But  that  should  not 
induce  her  to  vary  from  the  line  of  strict  neutrality. 
True,  the  South  bought  arms  in  England,  but  the 
North  did  also  :  English  law  prescribed  the  necessi 
ties  in  the  case  of  such  transactions,  and  if  these  ne 
cessities  were  observed,  the  government  had  nothing 
further  to  say.  Lord  Russell  never  abandoned  this 
view,  and  we  have  seen  that  when  he  allowed  him 
self  to  be  forced  into  action  which  went  beyond  it, 
it  was  only  as  a  lesser  evil.  England  has  been  much 
blamed  for  the  attitude  of  her  government  in  this 
matter.  But  in  so  far  as  the  English  ministry  erred 
by  trying  to  deal  with  a  case  of  social  revolution  by 
ordinary  political  maxims,  they  merely  did  what 
the  American  President  and  Secretary  of  State  did. 
Lord  Russell,  as  he  looked  into  the  chaos  of  con 
temporary  events,  did  not  see  the  clear  lines  of  ac 
tion  that  would  have  enabled  him  to  foretell  the 
future.  Nor  did  Seward,  though  he  had  what  the 
English  minister  had  not ; — the  firm  conviction  that 
the  cause  of  human  liberty  was  somehow  bound  up 
in  the  cause  of  the  American  Union  and  would 
somehow  stand  or  fall  with  it. 


328  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

For  a  long  time  no  member  of  the  Cabinet,  nor 
the  President  himself,  had  in  mind  the  idea  of 
emancipation  of  the  slaves  as  a  necessity,  or  even  as 
a  desirable  measure.  In  1861  Fremont  rushed  into 
publicity  with  an  emancipation  proclamation  in 
Missouri  which  had  been  disavowed.  In  the  fall  of 
that  year  a  somewhat  similar  proclamation  by  Gen 
eral  Hunter  in  North  Carolina  had  also  been  dis 
avowed.  Popular  feeling  is  well  shown  by  a  note 
in  the  diary  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  July  13, 
1862,  to  the  effect  that  up  to  that  time  Lincoln  had 
been  "  prompt  and  emphatic  in  denouncing  any  in 
terference  by  the  general  government  with  the  sub 
ject.  This,"  he  adds,  "  was,  I  think,  the  sentiment 
of  every  member  of  the  Cabinet." 

Early  in  the  war,  however,  the  feeling  arose 
that  the  North  did  not  stand  on  firm  ground  unless 
she  made  it  clear  that  she  fought  not  for  the  Union 
alone,  but  for  the  emancipation  of  the  slaves,  the 
abolition  of  slavery  in  America.  Carl  Schurz,  who 
had  been  an  earnest  admirer  and  supporter  of  Sew- 
ard  in  days  before  the  war,  was  now  minister  to 
Spain.  He  convinced  himself  that  the  great  dan 
ger  of  foreign  intervention  came  largely  because 
Europe  conceived  the  war  to  be  in  fact,  as  it  was  in 
law,  a  war  simply  for  the  restoration  of  the  Union. 
Could  the  powers  understand  clearly  that  the  Union 
meant  freedom,  then  the  sentiment  of  the  people  of 
Europe  (which  he  surely  should  have  understood) 
would  be  so  heartily  with  the  United  States  that  no 
government  would  venture  to  oppose  it.  He  wrote 
to  Seward  expressing  these  ideas,  and  urging  upon 


MATTERS  AT  HOME  329 

the  administration  the  policy  that  followed  from 
them. 

Seward  thought  very  differently  and  had  already 
framed  his  policy  and  founded  it  on  other  ideas. 
He  wrote  to  Schurz  that  no  doubt  slavery  would 
be  an  issue  which  would  appeal  more  strongly  to  the 
world  than  that  of  nationality.  * '  But,"  he  went  on, 
"it  is  never  to  be  forgotten  that  although  sympathy 
with  other  nations  is  eminently  desirable,  yet  foreign 
sympathy,  or  even  favor,  never  did  and  never  can 
create  or  maintain  any  state,  while  in  every  state 
that  has  the  capacity  to  live,  the  love  of  national 
life  is  and  always  must  be  the  most  energetic  prin 
ciple  which  can  be  worked  to  preserve  it  from  sui 
cidal  indulgence  of  fear  or  faction  as  well  as  from 
destruction  by  foreign  nations."1  In  his  conduct 
of  the  diplomatic  correspondence  Seward  always  ex 
cluded  the  subject  of  slavery  from  the  considerations 
he  sent  to  the  representatives  of  the  country  abroad. 

The  precise  time  of  the  change  of  his  opinions 
cannot  now  be  stated.  The  general  tenor  of  anti- 
slavery  legislation  during  the  winter  of  1861-1862  is 
well  known,  and  also  the  general  trend  of  the  thought 
of  the  President.  It  was  not  till  July  13th  that 
Lincoln  suggested  to  Seward  and  Welles  emancipa 
tion  in  the  states  still  in  rebellion  as  a  necessary 
measure  ;  he  mentioned  it  to  them  in  an  informal 
way  only.  On  July  22d  he  proposed  the  plan  at  a 
meeting  of  the  Cabinet,  which  was  taken  by  sur 
prise.  Several  members  agreed  with  the  President, 
including  Seward.  The  latter,  however,  advised 
1  Carl  Schurz,  Reminiscences,  Vol.  II,  p.  303. 


330  WILLIAM  H.  SEWABD 

postponement :  he  felt  that  the  indirect  effects  would 
be  bad  ;  in  the  face  of  the  present  miserable  situa 
tion,  it  would  seein  like  the  last  effort  of  a  drowning 
man.  His  mind  was  probably  more  on  the  effect 
of  emancipation  upon  foreign  opinion  than  upon 
its  practical  military  advantage.  Lincoln  said  that 
the  idea  was  sound  and  that  he  had  not  thought  of 
it :  he  would  postpone  any  action  and  wait  for  a 
victory. ' 

This  action  of  the  President  renders  it  likely  that 
Seward  had  not  been  a  party  to  his  meditations  on 
this  matter.  If  Lincoln  had  talked  it  over  carefully 
with  Seward,  he  would  probably  not  have  brought 
the  idea  to  the  notice  of  the  Cabinet  at  this  time. 
If  Seward' s  idea  was  sound,  Lincoln  would  doubt 
less  have  appreciated  it,  if  offered  in  private.  The 
secretary  himself,  however,  had  come  to  feel  that 
the  slavery  issue  must  be  made  more  prominent. 
Adams  had  written  to  him  that  emancipation  was 
the  topic  to  which  public  opinion  was  most  sensi 
tive.2  In  January,  1862,  Seward  had  written  to 
Adams  to  express  surprise  that  public  opinion  in 
France  and  England  should  assume  that  the  gov 
ernment  was  favorable  to  a  continuation  of  slavery. 
It  had  come  into  power  on  the  very  issue  of  opposi 
tion  to  the  extension  of  slavery.  When  it  finally  pre 
vails  and  the  Union  is  restored,  slavery  will  be  con 
fined  to  a  certain  and  definite  sphere.3 

Reward's  view  was  correct.  The  London  Times  of  October 
7,  1862,  pointed  out  that  the  Emancipation  Proclamation 
showed  that  there  was  no  hope  of  saving  the  Union. 

2  Dip.  Com,  1862,  p.  23. 

Ubid.,  1862,  p.  37. 


MATTERS  AT  HOME  331 

About  the  end  of  May  the  secretary  had  written 
letters  to  the  ministers  to  England  and  France,  call 
ing  their  attention  to  the  subject,  "so  far  inter 
dicted"  in  their  correspondence. l  He  recommended 
to  the  consideration  of  foreign  powers  the  relation 
of  slavery  to  the  cotton  supply.  He  did  not  take 
moral  ground  any  more  than  did  Lincoln.  But  as 
Lincoln  proposed  emancipation  as  a  war  measure, 
so  Seward  now  suggested  to  the  cotton-wanting  pow 
ers  the  drawbacks  of  slavery.  As  things  stood,  he 
argued,  slaves  gained  their  freedom  by  leaving  insur 
gent  masters  and  coming  to  the  Union  armies  in 
great  numbers.  If  the  struggle  were  to  be  protracted 
indefinitely  (by  foreign  sympathy  and  indirect  sup 
port),  it  was  but  a  question  of  time  before  there 
would  be  a  servile  war,  which  would  have  a  disas 
trous  effect  upon  the  production  of  the  much-desired 
cotton.  Nor  would  intervention  be  a  remedy,  he 
added  on  July  18th,  for  it  would  result  in  renewed 
devotion  to  the  Union  "even  with  the  sacrifice  of 
slavery."  After  the  President's  proposal,  Seward 
reviewed  the  question  more  broadly,2  and  considered 
the  situation  in  the  United  States  and  Brazil,  the 
two  slaveholding  powers  of  America.  Here  he 
spoke  more  confidently  of  the  an ti -slavery  feeling 
in  Europe  and  the  inconsistency  of  upholding  the 
slave  power  by  continued  recognition  of  belligerency 
and  continued  hope  of  intervention.  He  ended  by 
pointing  out  that  intervention  would  assuredly 

'Seward  to  Adams,  May  28th,  and  cf.   a  later  despatch  of 
July  18th  ;  Seward  to  Dayton,  June  3d,  Dip.  Corr.,  1862. 
'Seward  to  Adams,  July  28,  1862.     Dip.  Corr.,  1862,  p.  157. 


332  WILLIAM  H.  SEWABD 

bring  about  "a  war  of  the  world;  and  whatever 
else  may  revive,  the  cotton  trade,  built  upon  slave 
labor  in  this  country,  will  be  irredeemably  wrecked 
in  the  abrupt  cessation  of  human  bondage  within 
the  territories  of  the  United  States." 

This  introduction  of  the  slavery  question  into  his 
foreign  despatches  was  made,  neither  on  the  high 
moral  ground  of  Carl  Schurz,  nor  on  the  ground  of 
military  or  political  effect  on  which  Lincoln  based 
his  action.  Like  Lincoln,  Seward  believed  slavery 
to  be  a  great  wrong,  but  he  did  not  believe  that  the 
world  was  governed  by  moral  considerations  di 
rectly:1  he  thought  that  moral  power  ruled  it  indi 
rectly,  and  in  his  position  of  Secretary  of  State,  he 
saw  himself  practically  forced  to  present  the  iniquity 
of  slavery  in  its  economic  form.  Before  the  war  he 
had  usually  depicted  it  to  his  countrymen,  not  as  a 
moral  evil  to  be  got  rid  of,  but  as  an  economic  fac 
tor  prejudicial  to  the  life  of  the  country.2  Now  he 
presented  slavery  to  the  nations  of  Europe  and  more 
particularly  to  England,  in  its  economic  bearings ; 
that  is,  as  related  to  the  production  of  cotton.  The 
idealists  said  that  Seward  believed  that  the  world 
was  really  ruled  by  cotton.3  It  is  not  probable  that 
this  in  any  way  truly  expresses  his  views  :  he  was 

1  Though    "  the  forces,  in   the  long  run,  go  with  the  virtues. 
The  Christian  precepts,  although  they   may  he  denied  and  re 
fused  for  ft  time,  ultimately  are  accepted  by  all  men,  equally  in 
politics,  and  elsewhere."     Doubtless  these  words,  written  after 
the  war  to  his  daughter  (Life,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  332),  show  his  real 
thought  in  the  matter. 

2  This  was  a  very  early  conviction,  coming  perhaps  from  times 
when  there  were  slaves  in  his  father's  house. 

3  Carl  Schurz,  Reminiscences,  Vol.  II,  p.  282. 


MATTERS  AT  HOME  333 

like  Lincoln  in  believing  that  the  Divine  Ruler  of 
the  world  managed  it  not  by  direct  interposition, 
but  by  the  action  of  various  people, — often  very 
faulty  and  worldly  ones.  Lincoln  about  this  time 
made  a  wise  remark  to  a  deputation  from  the  re 
ligious  bodies  of  Chicago.  * '  These  are  not  the  days 
of  miracles,"  said  he,  "and  I  suppose  it  will  be 
granted  that  I  am  not  to  expect  a  direct  revelation. 
I  must  study  the  plain  physical  facts  of  the  case,  as 
certain  what  is  possible,  and  learn  what  appears 
wise  and  right."  *  He  thought  it  wise  and  right  to 
use  emancipation  as  a  means  to  his  great  end, 
the  preservation  of  the  Union,  and  he  viewed  it 
largely  in  its  practical  effects.  Seward  in  like  man 
ner  looked  upon  slavery  as  one  of  the  factors  in  a 
very  complicated  case,  and  he  tried  to  consider  the 
case  in  all  its  bearings,  that  he  might  succeed  in 
presenting  to  each  government  that  view  which 
would  most  influence  it. 

Seward  was  not  Lincoln's  private  adviser  in 
the  matter  of  emancipation.  Doubtless  the  two 
had  often  spoken  of  the  possibility,  but  Seward 
was  unprepared  for  Lincoln's  suggestion  on  July 
13th,2  and  Lincoln  seemed  unprepared  for  Seward' s 
advice  on  July  22d.  The  secretary  acquiesced 
in  the  measure,  but  did  not  approve  of  it,  at  just 
that  time.  "  It  is  mournful,"  he  wrote,3  "to  see 
that  a  great  nation  shrinks  from  a  war  it  has 


1  Hay  and  Nicolay.  Lincoln.  Vol.  VI,  p.  155. 

2  See  Seward  to  Adams,  July  3d.  Dip.  Corr.,  1862. 

3  Life,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  118  ;  the  reference  is  not  to  Lincoln,  but  to 
the  popular  calls  for  emancipation. 


334  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

accepted  and  insists  on  adopting  proclamations 
when  it  is  asked  for  force."  His  mind  was  ab 
sorbed  in  other  aspects  of  the  situation.  On  July 
12th  he  wrote  to  his  wife  :  "  Defeat  at  Eiclimond 
or  here  would  probably  bring  011  recognition  of  the 
Southern  states,  to  be  either  acquiesced  in  or  met  by 
war.  In  such  a  case,  what  practical  thing  could  1 
do  but  examine  the  strength  of  our  armies,  and  as 
certain  the  strength  and  probable  strategy  of  the 
rebels!  While  doing  this  to  push  every  available 
and  effective  person  into  the  country  to  recruit 
men  ;  or  failing  that,  to  provide  for  a  draft  of  the 
militia." 

His  main  duty  was  to  avert  foreign  recognition, 
mediation,  or  intervention,  and  his  way  of  doing 
this  was  by  constantly  showing  that  the  government 
was  powerful  and  victorious.  If,  then,  victories 
did  not  come,  it  was  for  him  to  do  whatever  pos 
sible  to  create  them.  Hence  at  this  time  he  had 
just  been  on  an  important  mission  to  the  North, 
which  had  resulted  in  a  new  call  for  300,000  men, 
with  assurances  from  the  governors  of  the  loyal 
states  that  the  demands  would  be  honored.  Even 
this  action  he  applied  not  directly  to  the  army  in 
the  field,  but  only  to  the  case  as  he  dealt  with  it 
himself.  He  wrote  to  Adams  that  the  governors  of 
the  loyal  states  unanimously  demanded  a  speedy 
close  of  the  war  ;  that  the  President  had  called  for 
300,000  men  ;  and  that  they  would  be  furnished 
with  alacrity. 

As  time  went  on  without  the  stimulus  of  a 
decided  victory,  Seward  scanned  the  foreign  horizon 


MATTERS  AT  HOME  336 

with  anxiety.  France  and  England  persisted  in 
their  recognition  of  the  Confederacy  as  a  belligerent 
power  ;  they  continued  to  complain  of  the  blockade 
as  being  so  rigorous  that  they  could  get  no  cotton 
and  so  lax  that  their  merchant-marine  was  put  to 
much  damage  by  it ;  the  Alabama  began  to  capture 
and  burn  American  ships.  Adams  wrote  that  he 
had  informed  Lord  Russell  tbere  was  reason  to  be 
lieve  that  like  enterprises  were  in  active  prepara 
tion,  but  that  his  lordship  had  regretted  it  was  im 
possible  to  go  beyond  the  terms  of  the  law  providing 
for  such  matters. 

On  September  22d  the  first  announcement  of  the 
Emancipation  Proclamation  was  made.  It  had  no 
important  effect  on  foreign  affairs  at  once  :  in  fact, 
its  effect  was  rather  that  which  Seward  had  pre 
dicted.  At  any  rate,  in  the  fall  came  the  proposi 
tions  for  recognition  already  mentioned.  Their 
rejection  perhaps  was  due  in  some  degree  to  the 
emancipation  measure. 

While  these  things  were  taking  place,  the  time 
for  election  had  come  and  passed.  "  I  see  and  hear 
of  political  campaigns  going  on  in  the  North, "  says 
Seward,  "  and  mourn  over  so  many  evidences  that 
faction  cannot  be  kept  down,  even  by  the  presence 
of  armed  enemies  besieging  the  capital  and  inviting 
intervention.'7  The  elections,  as  is  generally  the 
case  in  the  middle  of  an  administration,  were  re 
actionary. 

In  early  winter  came  an  exhibition  of  politics, 
not  to  say  faction,  that  affected  Seward  nearly.  He 
knew  that  there  was  strong  political  and  even  public 


336  WILLIAM  H.  SEWABD 

feeling  against  him,  partly  the  result  of  general  ill 
success,  partly  the  result  of  his  "conservatism" 
and  his  support  of  McClellan,  partly  due  to  other 
causes.  A  caucus  of  the  Republican  senators  was 
held  which  passed  a  resolution  requesting  the  Presi 
dent  to  ask  for  Seward's  resignation,  action  which 
was  changed  to  a  resolution  in  favor  of  a  reconstruc 
tion  of  the  Cabinet.  It  was  thought  that  Chase 
should  be  more  prominent.  As  soon  as  Seward  heard 
of  the  resolution,  which  was  before  the  President, 
he  sent  in  his  resignation.  When  he  had  the  facts, 
Lincoln  understood  the  matter  and  dealt  with 
it  with  that  open  shrewdness  that  so  often  served 
him  well.  He  listened  to  a  committee  of  the  caucus 
and  heard  their  view  of  Seward.  He  presented  the 
idea  to  the  Cabinet  and  got  their  opinion  that  such 
legislative  interference  with  the  executive  was  out 
of  the  question.  Then,  without  saying  just  what  he 
was  doing,  he  brought  Cabinet  and  committee  to 
gether  and  asked  for  a  free  discussion.  The  com 
mittee  did  most  of  the  talking  and  accused  Seward 
of  inaction  and  conservatism,  of  lack  of  energy  and 
even  of  principle.  The  members  of  the  Cabinet 
said  little,  but  Chase,  who  had  often  expressed  these 
views,  felt  himself  in  a  false  position.  The  meet 
ing  broke  up  without  action,  but  the  next  morning 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  came  to  the  President 
and  presented  his  resignation.  Lincoln  received  it 
eagerly,  and  almost  at  once  declined  Chase's  resigna 
tion  and  Seward's  as  well. 

This    incident    was    significant    of   one    thing ; 
namely,    that    Seward    was    now    really    "  out  of 


MATTEKS  AT  HOME  337 

politics."  He  had  been  greatly  disappointed  when 
Lincoln  had  been  made  leader  of  the  party  which 
he  himself  had  led  so  long.  He  had  at  first  felfc 
that  he  was  still  to  be  the  practical  head.  But 
when  this  idea  passed  out  of  his  mind,  as  it  shortly 
did,  he  devoted  himself  to  his  proper  part  in  the 
government.  He  supported  the  President,  not  only 
in  his  own  specific  department  of  foreign  affairs,  but 
also  with  advice  and  counsel  of  all  sorts.  In  this 
latter  direction,  it  is  true,  he  was  widely  held  to 
have  gone  altogether  too  far.  We  have  seen  the 
action  of  those  opposed  to  him.  To  use  the  Presi 
dent's  quaint  figure,  "  While  they  seemed  to  be 
lieve  in  my  honesty,  they  also  appeared  to  think 
that  when  I  had  in  me  any  good  purpose  or  in 
tention,  Seward  contrived  to  suck  it  out  of  me 
unperceived."  There  were  many  who  thought 
that  Seward' s  influence  was  harmful  ;  that  he  held 
things  back,  though  he  really  longed  for  success, 
and  needed  it  to  carry  out  his  work  as  much  as 
any  one.  But  there  were  also  some  among  Seward' s 
friends  who  were  not  at  all  satisfied  with  affairs. 
A  good  example  of  these  is  Welles,  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy.1  Welles,  together  with  other  members 
of  the  Cabinet,  was  sorely  tried  by  the  Secretary  of 
State.  He  said  that  Seward  wanted  to  manage 
Lincoln  himself ;  that  he  minimized  the  Cabinet 
meetings  and  their  importance  ;  that  he  wished  to 
be  "the  Premier,  the  real  executive"  ;  that  he  was 
too  passive  in  yielding  to  England  ;  that  he  had 

1  A  good  example  because  he  expressed  himself  very  freely. 
I  believe  that  he  should  be  numbered  among  Se ward's  friends. 


338  WILLIAM  H.  8EWAED 

no  fixed  principles  or  policy  ;  that  he  was  all  wrong 
in  fearing  a  foreign  war ;  that  he  was  meddlesome 
and  wanted  to  put  his  finger  into  other  people's 
business  ;  even  that  he  was  a  cunning  contriver  and 
a  time-serving  politician.1  The  view  he  gives  of 
Seward  is  a  fairljr  consistent  one  (though  not  very 
correct)  with  one  exception  ;  namely,  that  he  says 
that  the  secretary  had  tact.2  If  Seward  had  been 
the  tactful  man  Welles  thought  him,  he  would  have 
used  his  talent  in  doing  what  he  had  to  do  without 
wounding  the  sensibilities  of  his  colleagues.  In 
this  he  did  not  succeed,  and  the  reason  is  clear. 
Seward  was  unselfishly  bent,  as  far  as  a  man  of  his 
life  and  training  could  be,  on  carrying  out  a  great 
task.  If  he  interfered  with  others,  as  he  often  did, 
it  was  not  because  he  was  a  meddlesome  busybody, 
but  because  he  felt  so  sure  of  himself  and  his  own 
view,  that  he  did  not  imagine  his  advice  could 
be  rightly  found  fault  with. 

His  especial  duty,  as  he  saw  it,  led  him  to  do 
everything  he  could,  in  and  outside  his  own  de 
partment,  to  forward  the  work  of  putting  down 
the  rebellion.  And  in  doing  this  he  often  disre 
garded  the  feelings  of  others.  Instead  of  having 
great  tact,  as  Welles  thought,  he  would  seem,  in 
these  later  years,  to  have  had  very  little  of  that 
diplomacy  which  enables  men  to  manage  easily 
the  larger  relations  of  life.  But  even  so,  Welles 
could  write,  "  Seward' s  foibles  are  not  serious  fail- 

1  Mr.  Welles'  views  on  Seward  are  apparent  throughout  his 
Diary:    they  are   most  definitely  expressed  in  the  entries  of 
Sept.  15,  1862,  April  22,  1863,  and  Jan.  2,  1864. 

2  Diary,  Jan.  2,  1864. 


MATTERS  AT  HOME  339 

ings,"  '  and  advise  strongly  against  his  resigna 
tion. 

However  all  that  was,  one  man  believed  in  him, 
and  that  man  was  Lincoln.  He  believed  in  Seward 
and  confided  much  in  him.  And  Seward  was  in 
this  respect  reliable.  Lincoln  had  deprived  him  of 
the  great  opportunity  of  his  life,  but  it  nowhere 
appears  that  Seward,  after  he  had  once  come  to  know 
the  President,  ever  had  the  idea  of  supplanting  him. 
He  was,  a  resolute  supporter  of  Lincoln  even  when, 
as  in  the  matter  of  emancipation,  the  President  was 
not  acting  under  his  advice. 

1  Diary,  Deo.  20,  1862. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

THE   END   OF  THE   WAR 

THE  Newcastle  speech  of  Mr.  Gladstone  put  an 
end  to  any  danger  of  intervention  on  the  part  of 
France  and  England.  It  is  true  that  there  yet 
remained  such  a  possibility.  Mr.  Slidell  was  still 
in  Paris,  and  his  interviews  with  Napoleon  III,  his 
intrigues  against  Lord  Kussell,  his  management  of 
Mr.  Roebuck,  brought  matters  several  times  into  a 
position  in  which  it  seemed  that  it  might  come. 
But  there  was  no  real  danger  except  in  the  oc 
currence  of  something  quite  unforeseen.  Lord 
Palnierston  and  Lord  Russell  appear  to  have  made 
up  their  minds  that  England  would,  under  existing 
circumstances,  be  no  party  to  intervention,  and 
when  these  gentlemen  decided  upon  a  line  of  policy, 
it  took  much  to  move  them.  Adams  and  Seward 
had  found  this  out  when  the  policy  was  opposed  to 
them.  They  now  confided  in  the  finality  of  the 
decision,  when  it  was  in  their  favor.  By  this  time, 
however,  the  question  of  the  cruisers  was  becoming 
acute.  By  the  winter  of  1863  the  destruction  caused 
by  the  Alabama  had  reached  enormous  proportions, 
and  there  were  now  being  made  ready  for  the  Con 
federates  the  two  steel  -beaked  rams  which  were 
building  at  Laird's.  It  was  clear  that  if  the  South 
could  get  these  ships,  she  could  get  anything. 


THE  END  OF  THE  WAR  341 

Hence  Seward  and  Adams  turned  their  attention 
chiefly  to  this  phase  of  the  foreign  peril :  the 
Alabama  claims  were  suggested,  the  Alexandra  was 
brought  into  court,  the  last  weapon  of  diplomacy 
was  furnished  Adams,  if  everything  else  should  fail. 
When  it  appeared  that  the  government  would  pay 
a  million  dollars  to  sustain  the  ministerial  idea  of 
neutrality,  then  Seward  and  Adams  felt  rightly  that 
though  their  watchfulness  could  not  be  diminished, 
yet  they  were  no  longer  contending  in  a  hopeless 
cause.  The  second  great  danger  had  been  averted. 
It  is  true  that  there  were  still  exasperating  things 
to  be  suffered,  but  the  corner  had  evidently  been 
turned,  and  so  far  as  the  ministry  were  concerned  it 
was  clear  that  they  would  maintain  a  strict  neu 
trality  if  it  were  according  to  their  own  idea. ' 

When  these  matters  ceased  to  be  so  immediately 
pressing,  another,  which  had  for  some  time  caused 
anxiety,  came  forward.  At  the  beginning  of  the  war 
the  republic  of  Mexico  had  been  in  such  a  state  of 
civil  disturbance  and  political  strife  that  private 
business  could  be  carried  on  only  with  the  greatest 
difficulty.  Commercial  troubles  arose,  which,  joined 
to  the  political  disorders,  led  finally  to  action  on  the 
part  of  the  three  European  powers  concerned.  Eng- 

1  Lord  Russell  always  contended  that  England  had  kept  strict 
neutrality  even  in  the  Alabama  case.  He  did  not  deny  that 
strict  neutrality  had  enured  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  North, 
but  that  was,  to  his  mind,  the  fortune  of  war.  He  considered 
it  unfortunate,  doubtless,  that  England's  neutrality  should  have 
cost  one  of  the  combatants  fifteen  millions,  but  the  American 
war  had  cost  neutral  England  quite  as  much  as  that  and  more, 
and  had  cost  it  in  the  daily  sufferings  of  people  who  could  ill 
afford  to  pay. 


342  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

land  desired  to  protect  her  merchants ;  Spain  also 
had  commercial  interests  that  needed  assistance, 
and  farther  had  interests  arising  from  her  large 
West  Indian  possessions  ;  France,  beside  the  com 
mercial  consideration,  had  plans  for  conquest. 
These  three  powers,  therefore,  decided  to  interfere  in 
Mexican  affairs  for  the  purpose  of  clearing  up  their 
commercial  difficulties.  They  invited  the  United 
States  to  join.  Seward,  foreseeing  the  course  of 
events,  had  used  his  best  power,  through  Mr.  Corwin, 
the  very  effective  Minister  to  Mexico,  to  arrange 
the  differences.  Failing  in  that  effort,  the  United 
States,  on  December  4,  1861,  declined  to  be  a  party 
to  the  intervention.  Seward,  in  writing  to  Dayton, 
said  that  while  the  United  States  could  not  object  to 
the  powers  in  question  seeking  redress  from  Mexico, 
yet  the  government  was  opposed  to  the  policy  of 
making  alliances  with  European  nations,  and  pre 
ferred  not  to  press  her  claim  against  Mexico  at  a 
time  when  that  country  was  distracted  by  civil  strife. 
The  three  powers  therefore  proceeded  alone.  Eng 
land  provided  three  ships  and  a  few  marines  ;  Spain, 
twenty-six  ships  and  six  thousand  men  ;  and  France 
a  still  larger  contingent  amounting  to  fifteen  thou 
sand  men.  It  became  clear  that  the  expedition  was 
not  merely  a  commercial  intervention,  and  in  April, 
1862,  England  and  Spain  withdrew  from  it. 

The  leading  spirit  in  the  matter  had  always  been 
the  Emperor  of  the  French.  He  was  a  man  of  vague 
and  indefinite  ambitions,  and  was  prone  to  distract 
attention  from  affairs  at  home  by  seeking  glory 
abroad.  He  had  sought  glory  in  Russia  and  after- 


THE  END  OF  THE  WAR  343 

ward  sought  it  in  Germany.  Now  his  mind  was 
turned  to  Mexico.  It  would  doubtless  be  a  conve 
nience  to  his  schemes  if  the  United  States  should  be 
divided  into  a  Northern  and  a  Southern  power.  If 
for  no  other  reason,  it  would  be  convenient  to  a  fu 
ture  French  power  in  Mexico  to  have  as  a  neighbor 
a  Southern  Confederacy  which  owed  as  much  to 
French  assistance  as  the  United  States  had  owed  to 
that  source  eighty  years  before.  He,  therefore, 
carried  on  continuous  negotiations  with  Mr.  Slidell 
and,  as  has  been  seen,  in  the  fall  of  1862,  suggested 
to  England  and  Eussia  that  they  should  join  France 
in  an  offer  of  mediation.  The  proposal,  however, 
had  come  to  nothing.  Though  this  plan  could  not 
immediately  be  pushed,  and  though  England  and 
Spain  had  withdrawn  from  the  Mexican  interven 
tion,  the  Emperor  pursued  his  course.  The  French 
army  in  Mexico  was  increased  to  make  good  the  in 
roads  of  disease  and  on  June  16,  1863,  succeeded  in 
entering  the  capital  city.  A  government  was  at 
once  organized  through  which  the  Mexican  people 
shortly  proffered  an  imperial  crown  to  the  Arch 
duke  Maximilian,  a  brother  of  the  Emperor  of  Aus 
tria.  The  offer  was  not  immediately  accepted  for 
it  was  too  evidently  not,  as  it  pretended  to  be,  on 
the  part  of  the  Mexican  people,  but  merely  a  set  of 
foreign  intriguers.  Maximilian  put  off  acceptance 
until  there  could  be  gained  a  more  definite  knowl 
edge  of  the  will  of  the  Mexicans.  While  this  defi 
nite  knowledge  was  becoming  more  crystallized  and 
manifest,  General  Forey  extended  as  far  as  he  could 
the  rather  narrow  field  of  French  occupation. 


344  WILLIAM  H.  SEWABD 

This  matter,  of  course,  received  the  closest  atten 
tion  of  Seward.  If,  by  their  lax  enforcement  of  the 
duties  of  a  neutral,  the  English  had  seemed  to  in 
fringe  upon  the  traditions  of  international  law  in 
general,  the  French,  through  their  Emperor,  were 
unquestionably  infringing  upon  one  of  the  well-un 
derstood  traditions  of  American  policy ;  namely, 
the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Seward  could  not  feel,  how 
ever,  that  the  country  stood  in  any  position  for  en 
forcing  this  Doctrine,  and  for  the  moment  he  al 
lowed  the  artifice  of  a  commercial  intervention  still 
to  obtain  in  the  national  intercourse  with  France. 
Time  went  on  and  Maximilian  was  offered  and  de 
clined  the  throne.  Still  the  French  minister  as 
sured  Dayton  that  France  had  no  intention  of  per 
manently  appropriating  any  part  of  Mexico  and 
that  she  would  leave  the  country  as  soon  as  she 
could  get  redress,  and  could  go  with  honor.  Day 
ton,  who  had  a  pointed  way  of  putting  things,  very 
refreshing  among  the  long- winded  utterances  of 
diplomacy,  suggested  that  France  might  leave  a 
puppet  behind  her.  The  minister  said  no :  the 
strings  were  too  long  to  work. 

In  the  course  of  the  winter,  however,  it  appeared 
to  those  who  were  managing  affairs  that  Maximilian 
might  well  claim  the  crown  offered  to  him  and  early 
in  February,  1864,  Dayton  informed  Seward  that 
the  Archduke  was  about  to  visit  Paris  to  confer 
with  Napoleon.  The  position  was  one  of  difficulty. 
Actually  the  French  Emperor  was  engaged  in  a 
perfectly  understood  plan  to  create  an  empire  in 
America,  with  a  prince  of  the  house  of  Hapsburg 


THE  END  OF  THE  WAR  345 

on  the  throne.  In  ordinary  circumstances  the 
United  States  would  never  have  thought  of  acquies 
cing  in  any  such  proceeding.  Even  now,  with  an 
immense  Civil  War  absorbing  the  energy  of  the 
country,  the  House  of  Eepreseutatives  expressed 
the  national  view  with  great  vigor.  A  joint  reso 
lution  was  introduced  into  the  House,  declaring 
"that  the  occupation  of  Mexico  or  any  part  thereof 
by  the  Emperor  of  the  French  or  by  the  person  in 
dicated  by  him  as  Emperor  of  Mexico  is  an  of 
fense  to  the  people  of  the  republic  of  the  United 
States."  Charles  Sumner,  chairman  of  the  Senate 
Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs,  saw  that  this  was 
not  the  way  to  manage  international  difficulties, 
and  when  the  resolution  came  to  the  Senate,  he  ar 
ranged  that  no  action  should  be  taken  upon  it. 
When  the  news  of  the  resolution  reached  France, 
however,  it  caused  great  feeling.  Dayton  was 
greeted  by  the  French  minister  with  the  question, 
"  Do  you  bring  us  peace  or  war  ?  "  Dayton  replied 
that  no  such  question  should  be  asked  :  that  the 
resolutions  merely  expressed  what  France  had  long 
known,— the  dissatisfaction  of  the  people  of  the 
United  States  with  her  attitude. 

Seward  still  allowed  it  to  be  officially  assumed  that 
the  French  army  was  in  Mexico  to  press  certain 
commercial  claims  and  that  Maximilian  had  been 
invited  to  become  Emperor  by  a  certain  element  in 
the  Mexican  republic.  He  instructed  Dayton  that 
if  the  Austrian  prince  appeared  in  Paris  with  any 
assumption  of  political  authority  or  title  in  Mexico, 
he  must  refrain  from  intercourse  with  him.  But 


346  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

this  was  not  put  on  the  ground  of  the  Monroe  Doc 
trine.  It  was  blandly  remarked  that  the  United 
States  acknowledged  revolutions  only  by  the  direc 
tion  of  the  President,  upon  full  and  mature  con 
sideration,  and  that  until  recognition,  the  United 
States  did  not  hold  formal  or  informal  communica 
tions  with  political  agents  or  representatives  of 
revolutionary  movements  in  countries  with  which 
they  still  held  diplomatic  intercourse.1  The  inter 
view  with  the  Emperor  was  satisfactory  and  Maxi 
milian  accepted  the  crown  of  Mexico.  Official 
proceedings  took  place  at  the  Archduke's  palace  at 
Miramar  on  April  10,  1864,  and  shortly  afterward 
he  sailed  from  Trieste  for  his  dominions.  The 
European  papers  were  full  of  enthusiastic  articles  on 
the  glorious  future  of  Mexico,  which  uby  the  re- 
establishment  of  the  monarchy,  returns  to  her  tradi 
tional  path,  and  again  finds  the  true  condition  of 
order  and  prosperity  without  sacrificing  anything  of 
her  independence."  When  Seward  received  in 
formation  of  these  matters  from  Dayton,  he  replied 
that  while  it  was  possible  that  embarrassments  might 
arise,  he  still  remained  firm  as  heretofore  in  the 
opinion  that  the  destinies  of  the  American  continent 
are  not  to  be  permanently  controlled  by  any  political 
arrangements  made  in  the  capitals  of  Europe.8 

Not  only  was  the  establishment  of  a  monarchy  in 
Mexico  a  matter  of  most  serious  interest  to  the 
United  States  and  contrary  to  her  whole  line  of  past 

1  Dip.  Corr.,  Feb.  27,  1864,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  45. 

2  Seward  to  Dayton.     Dip.  Corr.,  April  30,  1864,  Vol.  Ill,  p. 
80.     The  italics  are  mine. 


THE  END  OF  THE  WAR  347 

policy,  but  the  present  situation  gave  rise,  as 
Seward  admitted,  to  all  sorts  of  embarrassing  pos 
sibilities.  There  were,  of  course,  rumors  of  many 
kinds  :  alliance  of  Mexico  with  the  South,  cession  of 
Texas,  recognition  of  the  Southern  Confederacy  by 
France.  Of  all  this  Seward,  however  he  must  have 
felt,  took  no  official  notice.  Three  years  before  he 
had  suggested  that  there  might  be  a  war  with 
France  ;  now  he  used  every  effort  to  avoid  it.  The 
United  States  was  in  a  good  position  with  reference 
to  that  country.  Seward  was  assured  that  there  was 
no  further  thought  of  mediation  or  intervention  ; 
that  the  rams  building  at  Bordeaux  had  been  sold  to 
Sweden  ;  that  the  Rappahannock,  which  had  escaped 
from  England  to  Calais,  would  remain  there.  How 
ever  much  he  desired  to  act,  he  probably  felt  that 
he  had  better  hold  on  to  the  positive  good  a  little 
longer. 

There  were  also  other  matters  of  great  domestic 
importance  at  the  moment ;  namely,  the  summer 
military  campaign  and  the  presidential  canvass. 
On  March  9th  Grant  had  received  from  Lincoln  his 
commission  as  lieutenant-general  of  the  army  of  the 
United  States.  He  had  considered  the  situation, 
settled  the  main  points  of  attack  as  Eichmond 
and  Atlanta,  and  delegated  Sherman  to  go  to  the 
latter  place  by  way  of  the  army  of  Johnston, 
while  he  himself  opposed  Lee  before  Eichmoud. 
Prospects  were  bright :  Seward  in  his  optimistic 
circulars  hoped  for  a  speedy  close  of  the  war. 

As  to  the  other  matter,  it  seems  to-day  strange 
that  even  at  this  time  there  should  have  been 


348  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

two  opinions  about  a  renoniination  of  Lincoln. 
But  there  were  those  who  were  dissatisfied  with 
the  President,  and  those  who  coveted  his  chair. 
Seward  had  always  been  definite  in  declining  to  be 
a  candidate  :  even  when  Lincoln  himself  had  sug 
gested  that  he  ought  to  succeed  him,  he  said  no. 
But  Chase  felt  differently.  He  had  for  some  time 
allowed  it  to 'be  understood  that  he  believed  the 
times  called  for  a  man  quite  different  from  Lincoln, 
and  that  if  needed  by  the  country,  he  was  not  un 
willing  to  be  that  man.  There  were  other  radicals 
who  would  have  nominated  other  leaders.  Mean 
while,  Grant's  campaigns  were  most  costly  and 
brought  about  no  obvious  results.  The  Wilderness, 
Spottsylvania,  Cold  Harbor  were  well-known  names 
by  the  time  the  convention  assembled.  When  it  did 
meet,  however,  it  was  unanimous  and  patriotic. 
It  called  itself  the  National  Union  Convention  and 
all  of  its  votes,  save  those  of  Missouri,  were  given  to 
Lincoln. 

As  the  summer  wore  on,  however,  and  military 
successes  did  not  come,  popular  confidence  was 
shaken  and  there  were  many  who  feared  that 
Lincoln  would  be  defeated.  On  August  12th  so  ac 
curate  an  observer  of  political  conditions  as  Thurlow 
Weed  told  the  President  that  he  could  not  be  re- 
elected.  The  failures  before  Petersburg,  Early 's 
Raid,  the  danger  to  Washington  were  not  balanced 
in  the  popular  mind  by  the  destruction  of  the 
Alabama  off  Cherbourg  by  the  Kearsarge.  The 
Democratic  convention,  meeting  at  Chicago  at  the 
end  of  the  month,  declared  that  the  war  was  a 


THE  END  OF  THE  WAE  349 

failure,  and  that  efforts  should  be  made  to  restore 
peace  on  the  basis  of  the  Federal  Union.  The 
convention  nominated  General  McClellan,  who  ac 
cepted,  but  declined  to  approve  the  principles  of  the 
platform.  The  fortunes  of  war,  however,  changed 
and  only  a  fortnight  later  Sherman  and  Farragut 
put  affairs  in  a  brighter  light.  As  the  depression  of 
the  summer  passed  away,  the  country  returned  to 
its  confidence  in  Lincoln,  who  was  reflected  by  the 
votes  of  all  the  states  then  in  the  Union  except  three. 
Seward  went  home  to  vote  and  in  Auburn,  accord 
ing  to  his  old  custom,  he  spoke  the  night  before  the 
election  to  his  friends  and  neighbors,  explaining 
and  encouraging,  as  firm  here  in  his  confidence  of  a 
successful  issue  as  he  was  in  writing  to  the  American 
ministers  in  foreign  countries.  They  were  accus 
tomed  to  say  of  him  that  he  discounted  victories  ; 
never  did  one  occur  that  he  had  not  already  made 
full  use  of  it. 

In  the  winter  following  Lincoln's  reelection,  it 
began  to  be  apparent  to  all  that  the  Confederacy 
was  in  dire  straits.  It  was  naturally  in  the  minds 
of  many  that  in  some  way  the  North  and  South 
might  come  together  and  settle  their  difficulties 
without  the  loss  of  life  which  must  result  from 
another  campaign.  One  of  these  persons  was 
Francis  P.  Blair,  Jr.,  who  conceived  an  idea  that 
he  thought  would  bring  Jefferson  Davis  and  the 
South  once  more  to  desire  to  make  common  cause 
with  the  North.  He  obtained  a  pass  from  Lincoln 
who  understood  that  he  had  some  proposal  to  offer 
to  Jefferson  Davis,  but  did  not  wish  to  hear  what 


350  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

it  was.  When  he  reached  Kichmond,  Mr.  Blair 
unfolded  his  idea.  The  war,  he  said,  was  practi 
cally  over  ;  at  least  so  far  as  slavery  was  concerned, 
and  if  continued  further,  it  could  be  only  as  a  war 
for  independence  on  the  part  of  the  South.  Were 
there  not  other  matters  which  would  draw  the  two 
sections  together  more  strongly  than  such  a  feeling 
would  keep  them  apart !  He  thought  of  one : 
Napoleon  was  making  an  effort  to  establish  a 
monarchy  in  Mexico.  Could  not  North  and  South 
suspend  hostilities  while  the  Southern  soldiers  lent 
their  assistance  to  the  Mexican  republic,  aided  per 
haps  by  Northern  forces  who  had  so  far  been  their 
foes  ?  Might  not  Davis  see  here  a  chance  to  rescue 
his  country  from  danger,  and  perhaps  himself  be 
the  means  of  building  up  a  greater  America,  em 
bracing  the  whole  glorious  country  between  the 
Atlantic  and  the  Pacific  ? 

It  is  curious  to  find  here  at  the  end  of  the  war  an 
idea  which  had  passed  through  Seward's  mind  at 
the  beginning, — the  joining  of  the  two  conflicting 
powers  in  defense  of  America  for  the  Americans. 
We  do  not  know  how  much  of  a  place  the  plan  ever 
had  in  Seward's  mind  :  doubtless  he  had  thought 
of  it  only  as  a  desperate  last  resort.  As  a  last  resort, 
too,  it  may  have  been  that  Jefferson  Davis  allowed 
himself  to  consider  it.  Whatever  he  really  thought  of 
the  scheme,  he  saw  in  it  a  possible  opening  of  nego 
tiations  and  he  therefore  appointed  three  commis 
sioners.  The  President  deputed  Seward  to  meet 
them,  but  subsequently  joined  the  party  himself  in 
what  was  called  the  Hampton  Koads  Conference. 


THE  END  OF  THE  WAR  351 

Lincoln  and  Seward  met  the  Confederate  commis 
sioners  on  the  River  Queen  on  February  3,  1865. 
The  conference  was  informal  and  no  record  was 
kept  of  it.  Lincoln  had  stated  the  bases  of  any 
conversation  to  be:  no  armistice  but  a  real  end 
to  the  war  ;  the  restoration  of  national  authority  ; 
the  position  on  the  slavery  question  already  taken 
by  him.  The  commissioners  seem  to  have  agreed 
to  these  preliminaries,  but  they  opened  the  con 
versation  by  asking  whether  both  parties  might  not 
"  for  a  while  leave  their  present  strife  in  abeyance 
and  occupy  themselves  in  some  continental  ques 
tion,  till  their  anger  should  cool  and  accommoda 
tion  become  possible."  l  This,  of  course,  referred 
to  Mexico,  although  the  commissioners  had  pre 
viously  agreed  that  they  would  not  commit  them 
selves  to  the  project.  Lincoln  responded  that  he 
supposed  they  referred  to  something  Mr.  Blair  had 
said  ;  he  himself,  however,  had  taken  pains  not  to 
hear  what  the  latter' s  idea  might  be,  and  had  noth 
ing  to  say  except  on  the  bases  already  mentioned. 
On  those  grounds  he  told  the  commissioners  what 
he  himself  felt  able  to  do  and  what  he  would  like 
to  see  done  toward  reconstruction,  outlining  a 
course  more  advantageous  to  the  South  than  that 
which  was  afterward  taken.  Seward  appears  to 
have  said  little  in  the  discussion.  He  brought  to 
the  notice  of  the  commissioners  the  Thirteenth 
Amendment  abolishing  slavery,  which  was  at  the 
time  being  submitted  to  the  states  with  the  prospect 

'Nicolay  and    Hay,  Lincoln,  Vol.  X,  p.  19.     The  whole  of 

the  above  is  summarized  from  their  account. 


352  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

of  being  ratified  by  a  sufficient  number  to  become 
valid.  He  thought  to  himself  how  different  were 
the  circumstances  from  those  of  the  negotiations  in 
which  he  had  taken  part  nearly  four  years  before.1 
As  to  Mexico,  he  had  his  own  ideas,  which  were 
very  different  from  those  of  Mr.  Blair. 

"Our  foreign  relations  are  closing  up  finely, " 
wrote  Seward  to  his  wife  in  the  same  letter  that 
mentioned  the  Hampton  Eoads  Conference.  This 
was  certainly  the  case  :  the  foreign  relations  of  the 
country  in  the  last  half  of  the  war  were  no  longer 
the  difficult  and  anxious  matter  they  had  been  for 
the  previous  years.  Neither  England  nor  France 
withdrew  her  recognition  of  belligerency  in  spite 
of  the  continual  suggestion  of  Seward,  but  the 
danger  of  any  joint  action,  or  even  of  individual 
action  Looking  to  complete  recognition  or  mediation 
or  intervention,  had  ceased  with  the  summer  of 
1863.  The  Confederate  cruisers  still  used  foreign 
ports  in  a  manner  most  harmful  to  the  United 
States,  but  the  danger  of  Confederate  building  or 
equipping  of  ships  of  war  in  those  ports  had  practi 
cally  ceased  when  the  Laird  rams  were  stopped. 
Seward  and  Adams  and  Dayton  might  well  con 
gratulate  themselves  upon  their  success  in  these 
directions.  There  was  still  a  great  volume  of 
diplomatic  business  with  those  countries  and  with 
the  rest  of  Europe  as  well,  but  there  were  no  acute 
crises.  Blockade- runners  continued  to  be  active ; 

*He  spoke  of  the  contrast  in  writing  to  his  wife,  Life.  Vol. 
Ill,  p.  261,  and  it  may  have  suggested  the  beginning  of  his  de 
spatch  to  Adams  of  Feb.  7th,  Dip.  Corr.,  1865,  p.  184. 


THE  END  OF  THE  WAK  353 

the  ideas  that  cotton  was  king  or  that  the  blockade 
would  be  broken,  however,  proved  to  be  without 
foundation.  Toward  the  end  of  the  war  France  had 
become  so  involved  in  the  trouble  with  Mexico  that 
she  was  no  longer  a  dangerous  factor  in  the  situ 
ation,  while  the  gradual  change  in  public  opinion 
in  England  had  in  a  very  different  way  a  similar 
effect.  In  April,  1861,  Seward  had  questioned  the 
intentions  of  Kussia,  but  that  power  had  been  a 
steady  friend,  and  the  visit  of  her  fleet  in  the  winter 
of  1863  had  had  an  excellent  effect  not  only  in  a 
public  way,  but  upon  Se ward's  policy,  for  he  under 
stood  clearly  that  the  visit  of  the  fleet  stood  for 
Eussian  aid  in  case  of  war.1  Throughout  the 
year  1864  Seward  must  have  felt  that  he  had  the 
situation  in  hand  :  his  policy  had  been  successful. 
He  had  not  done  everything  he  had  desired,  but  he 
had  done  much.  In  spite  of  a  bad  beginning,  he 
had  averted  the  most  dangerous  possibilities  and 
had  kept  in  check  the  most  dangerous  enemies. 
With  the  help  of  his  able  ministers  and  a  few 
earnest  friends  abroad,  he  had  prevented  foreign 
intervention,  in  spite  of  the  active  sympathy  with 
the  South  of  the  Emperor  of  the  French  and  the 
leaders  of  the  Palrnerston  ministry,  and  the  constant 
effort  on  the  part  of  the  South  to  bring  these 
governments  to  a  point  where  they  would  be  most 
useful  to  the  rebellion.  In  the  winter  of  1865  he 
had  certainly  a  right  to  feel  that  the  logic  of  events 
indicated  a  favorable  conclusion. 

1  Such  is  the  statement  of  Mr.  F.  W.  Seward,  then  assistant 
secretary. 


354  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

The  final  campaign  began  with  success  and  it  was 
clear  that  Kichnioud  would  shortly  be  taken.  The 
President  was  inaugurated  and  it  appeared  that  he 
would  be  able  to  devote  his  second  administration 
to  restoring  peaceful  relations.  On  the  5th  of  April 
Seward,  as  usual,  went  for  a  drive  in  the  afternoon. 
He  had  a  pair  of  spirited  horses,  such  as  he  always 
liked,  which  took  fright  and  ran  away.  In  trying 
to  leap  from  the  carriage,  Seward  was  seriously  in 
jured,  his  shoulder  being  dislocated  and  his  jaw 
broken.  This  accident  was  but  the  precursor  of  a 
more  terrible  event.  When  the  President  returned 
from  Eichmond,  he  came  to  his  disabled  friend  and 
sitting  on  the  side  of  the  bed,  told  him  of  the  expe 
rience  which  both  had  looked  forward  to  for  so  long. 
It  was  the  last  time  that  the  two  met.  On  April 
14th  the  President  was  shot  at  Ford's  Theatre,  and 
on  the  same  evening  Seward  was  nearly  murdered  in 
his  bed.1 

For  several  days  he  lay  only  partly  conscious 
or  in  a  stupor.  On  the  day  of  Lincoln's  funeral, 
a  colleague  noted  in  his  diary:  " Seward,  I  am 
told,  sat  up  in  his  bed  and  viewed  the  pro 
cession  and  hearse  of  the  President,  and  I  know  his 
emotion. ' ' 

Of  all  the  many  thousands  killed  and  wounded  in 
that  war,  no  two  make  a  stranger  picture  than  the 
Secretary,  maimed  and  muffled  in  bandages,  raised 
upon  his  bed  and  propped  with  pillows,  looking  out 

1  He  was  severely  cut  and  slashed  in  the  face  and  throat ;  his 
son  also  was  half  killed  by  the  assassin,  while  the  nurses  and 
attendants  were  also  bev  ereiy  slashed  or  stabbed. 


THE  END  OF  THE  WAR  355 

from  under  his  shaggy  eyebrows  at  the  solemn  pomp 
with  which  the  body  of  the  great  President  passed 
away  from  the  place  where  they  had  worked  together 
throughout  the  long  struggle  now  ended. 


CHAPTEE  XX 

LAST   DAYS 

IT  was  a  long  time  before  Seward  was  himself 
again,  but  even  before  he  could  in  any  way  be  called 
well,  he  had  assumed  his  accustomed  place  at  the 
State  Department  and  at  the  Cabinet  meetings. 
Restlessly  desirous  as  he  was  to  be  at  work  once 
more,  he  could  not  even  begin  to  do  anything  till 
after  the  inauguration  of  Johnson,  the  surrender  at 
Appomattox,  the  disbandrnent  of  the  armies,  the 
beginning  of  reconstruction.  And  when  he  had  to 
some  extent  recovered  his  physical  powers,  he  could 
by  no  means  have  recovered  his  moral  and  intellec 
tual  poise  after  the  shock  caused  by  the  death  of 
Lincoln  and  by  his  own  injuries.  With  Lincoln's 
plans  and  hopes  for  restoring  the  Union  after  the 
war  should  be  over,  Seward  was  more  or  less  familiar. 
But  nothing  had  been  settled,  nor  if  it  had  been, 
would  it  be  of  necessity  now  possible.  He  felt  that 
for  the  moment  he  could  form  no  policy  himself 
but  must  merely  toy  to  work  out  old  ideas  under  the 
new  and  difficult  circumstances  that  had  arisen. 

In  the  midst  of  these  anxieties  and  perplexities,  a 
new  shock  came  upon  him.  Mrs.  Seward  had  long 
been  in  feeble  health  ; — indeed,  had  been  able  to  live 
with  her  husband  at  Washington  only  now  and 
then.  The  carriage  accident  had  called  her  from 


LAST  DAYS  357 

Auburn,  however,  so  that  she  had  actually  been  in 
the  house  at  the  time  of  the  attempted  assassina 
tion.  The  effect  of  this  succession  of  painful  and 
horrible  events  had  been  too  much  for  her,  and  after 
some  days  of  watching  and  attendance  upon  her 
husband  and  her  sou,  she  had  fallen  into  a  fever, 
and  now  died  on  June  21st. 

It  was  not  till  well  into  July,  therefore,  that  Sew- 
ard  was  able  really  to  devote  himself  once  more  to 
his  work.  By  that  time  Johnson  had  already  made 
a  beginning  of  his  policy  of  reconstruction.  Con 
gress  was  not  in  session,  and  there  was  opportunity 
for  Johnson  to  carry  out  the  plans  he  had  in  mind 
without  legislative  interference.  He  was  a  man  de 
votedly  loyal  to  the  Union  and  it  was  for  this  reason 
that  he  was  now  President.  Of  a  cruder,  coarser 
type  than  Lincoln,  he  was  therefore  more  rigorous, 
even  vindictive,  in  his  ideas  of  the  proper  treatment 
to  be  accorded  to  the  men  and  states  of  the  South. 
Yet  in  essentials,  his  policy,  except  for  some  per 
sonal  violences,  was  not  more  severe  than  Lincoln's  ; 
— in  fact,  it  was  to  a  great  degree  a  carrying  out  of 
the  plans  that  the  dead  President  had  already 
formed.  These  plans,  when  Seward  learned  what 
they  were,  were  not  such  as  he  disagreed  with.  For 
four  yearshe  had  been  engaged  in  declaring  to  for- 
6i gn  govern  men tsf  fliat  the  Union  was  intact  in  spite 
nf  frhft  rMifinm*ftirm  •  he  was  not  likely  to  fiemaud 
any  theory  of  reconstruction,  which  assumed  that 
the  fundamental  bond  had  been  broken  and  that  new 
means  of  union  were  needful.  In  the  main,  he  ap 
proved  Johnson' s  policy.  He  himself  was  extremely 


358  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

busy  with  foreign  affairs  which  are  always  heavy 
after  a  war,  for  though  the  pressure  of  immediate 
danger  may  be  over,  there  remains  or  reappears  a 
myriad  of  minor  matters  that  often  demand  more 
careful  thought  and  more  laborious  attention  than 
weightier  matters. 

Most  important  of  these,  though  not  at  this  time 
engaging  his  attention  more  than  several  other  sub 
jects,  were  the  claims  arising  from  the  destruction 
caused  by  the  Alabama  and  other  Confederate 
cruisers  built  in  England.  In  1863  when  the 
damage  done  by  the  Alabama  had  become  heavy, 
Seward  had  presented  the  claims  of  the  United 
States  to  Lord  Eussell,  who  had  declared  that  Great 
Britain  could  uot  consider  such  matters;  that  she 
had  maintained  a  strict  neutrality  ;  and  that  gains 
or  losses  resulting  from  her  course  must  be  regarded 
as  the  fortune  of  war.  Seward  agreed  that  the  time 
was  not  very  favorable  for  an  impartial  opinion  of 
the  merits  of  the  case,  but  he  continued  to  present 
them  if  only  with  a  view  to  having  them  recorded. 
After  the  war  Lord  Eussell  suggested  a  commission 
for  the  adjustment  of  claims  on  both  sides,  but 
Seward  declined  such  an  arrangement,  for  he  found 
that  the  English  minister  assumed  that  there  could 
be  no  consideration  of  the  question  of  Great  Britain's 
neutrality.  Se ward's  idea  was  that  Great  Britain 
had  been  in  the  wrong  from  the  beginning, — wrong 
in  her  early  recognition  of  belligerency  and  her  as 
sumption  of  the  position  of  a  neutral  ;  wrong  in 
the  way  she  had  maintained  this  neutral  position. 
That  the  United  States  had  suffered  so  greatly  was 


LAST  DAYS  359 

in  his  mind  due  to  her  erroneous  views  of  neutrality. 
Early  in  1866  he  gave  Adams  to  understand  that  the 
government  expected  to  receive  redress  for  such 
wrongs,  but  did  not  point  out  any  especial  way.  In 
the  summer  of  1867  there  was  a  change  of  ministry  : 
the  Conservatives  came  to  power  and  Lord  Kussell 
was  succeeded  by  Lord  Stanley.  Early  in  1867 
Seward  took  up  the  matter  with  him,  reviewing  the 
controversy  once  more  from  the  time  of  the  declara 
tion  of  neutrality.  Lord  Stanley  declined  to  con 
sider  the  propriety  of  that  declaration  or  its 
consequences,  but  said  there  would  probably  be  no 
difficulty  in  arranging  the  arbitration  of  other 
matters.1 

We  can  hardly  see  how  Seward  could  have  ex 
pected  England  to  disavow  the  principle  of  that 
declaration.  He  always  wrote  as  though  the  Con 
federate  ships  and  sailors  were  not  belligerents  and 
always  called  them  pirates.  But  he  certainly  must 
have  recognized  that  the  soldiers  of  the  Confederacy 
were  belligerents  and  entitled  to  the  usages  of  the 
laws  of  war.  Seward  himself  had  suggested  the 
blockade  of  the  Southern  ports,  which  would  seem  to 
have  extended  the  state  of  war  over  sea  as  well  as 
land.  Even  if  it  had  been  admitted  that  England 
was  wrong,  he  could  hardly  have  supposed  that 
she  would  have  agreed  to  his  idea  that  recognition 

1  At  this  time  there  was  a  most  unsettled  state  of  things  in 
Europe  and  there  was  fear  that  England  would  be  drawn  into 
war.  It  was  obvious  that  in  that  case,  in  accordance  with  the 
views  of  neutrality  under  which  England  had  acted,  her  large 
commerce  might  be  seriously  crippled  by  cruisers  built  in  the 
United  States. 


360  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD 

had  doubled  the  length  of  the  war,  and  that  Eng 
land  was  therefore  responsible  for  half  the  war  ex 
penses.  However  all  that  was,  he  continued  negotia 
tions  through  Keverdy  Johnson,  after  Adams  had 
resigned,  and  though  the  Johnson- Clarendon  Con 
vention  was  rejected  by  the  Senate,  so  that  the  suc 
cessful  adjustment  of  the  Alabama  demands  belongs 
to  another  administration,  he  kept  the  matter  alive 
and  did  not  allow  the  claims  of  the  United  States 
to  lose  anything  by  being  stated  too  low. 

Meanwhile,  however,  the  position  of  the  President 
had  been  growing  more  and  more  difficult.  When 
Congress  reassembled  in  December,  1865,  it  was 
clear  that  it  regarded  reconstruction  as  a  matter  to 
be  ordered  by  legislative  as  well  as  executive  action. 
In  the  struggle  which  followed,  Seward  remained  a 
supporter  of  Johnson.  Just  how  far  he  was  the 
President's  adviser  is  not  known  :  it  seems  to  have 
been  a  fact  that  Johnson's  chief  difficulties  arose, 
not  from  his  advisers  or  their  advice,  but  from  him 
self.  His  ideas  were  often  good  and  his  plans  wise, 
but  he  entirely  spoiled  the  effect  of  what  he  did  by 
the  outrageous  nature  of  what  he  said.  There  was  a 
real  difference  in  policy  between  the  President  and 
Congress.  Johnson,  in  spite  of  some  personal 
ferocities,  would  have  had  the  seceding  states  return 
on  as  easy  terms  as  possible.  He  would  have  in 
sisted  upon  the  abolition  of  slavery  and  the  repudia 
tion  of  the  Confederate  war-debt,  but  would  have 
given  a  very  general  amnesty  and  allowed  the  states 
to  have  followed  their  own  course  in  the  matter  of 
franchise.  Congress  wished  to  go  farther, — to  cur- 


LAST  DAYS  361 

tail  the  political  power  of  the  ex-rebel  and  to  take 
care  of  the  political  status  of  the  negro.  Seward 
agreed  with  the  President,  partly  on  the  ground  of 
general  loyalty,  but  partly  no  doubt  because  he 
liked  Johnson's  plan  better  than  that  of  Congress. 
He  was  not  afraid  of  the  ex-rebel  and  he  was  not 
especially  solicitous  about  the  negro.  Hence  he  re 
mained  in  Johnson's  Cabinet  throughout  his  ad 
ministration,  though  the  course  subjected  him  to 
fierce  party  abuse  and  even  some  hard  feeling  from 
friends. 

But  his  chief  duty  was  in  connection  with  foreign 
affairs  and  here  appeared  a  question  of  growing  im 
portance.  Maximilian  had  now  been  a  year  or 
more  in  Mexico  supported  by  a  French  army  of 
thirty  thousand  men  under  General  Bazaine,  and  it 
was  obvious  that  the  affair  was  no  longer  a  French 
settlement  of  commercial  difficulties  as  it  was  at  first 
declared  to  be,  or  a  Mexican  revolution.  It  was  sim 
ply  a  foreign  attempt  to  establish  a  monarchy  in 
America.  One  of  the  early  letters  that  Seward  was 
able  to  dictate  (June  3d)  was  to  John  Bigelow,  who 
had  become  minister  to  France  on  the  sudden  death 
of  Dayton  not  long  before.  As  the  war  had  drawn 
to  an  end,  the  French  government  naturally  began 
to  consider  what  would  be  the  position  of  the  United 
States  on  the  Mexican  question.  The  Union  soldiers 
under  arms  far  outnumbered  the  French  soldiers  in 
Mexico.  The  French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
therefore  sounded  Mr.  Bigelow  as  to  the  "antici 
pated  hostility"  of  the  United  States  to  the  French 
policy.  Seward  at  this  time  would  not  write  more 


362  WILLIAM  H.  BBWAED 

than  that  the  minister  was  well  aware  of  the  policy 
of  the  late  President ;  that  it  would  undergo  no 
change.1  Later  he  spoke  a  little  more  freely  and 
expressed  the  views  of  the  United  States  in  greater 
detail.  Without  claiming  any  right  to  insist  that 
Mexico  or  any  other  American  state  should  be  re 
publican,  he  did  hold  that  those  peoples  had  a  right 
to  their  own  choice  of  government.  Maximilian's 
empire  was  clearly  imposed  upon  the  Mexicans,  and 
the  United  States  would  in  no  case  associate  them 
selves  with  any  such  effort.  He  further  pointed  out 
diplomatically  that,  since  the  war  was  now  over,  the 
American  people  were  looking  upon  this  matter  as 
one  of  great  importance,  and  that  there  were  con 
siderable  military  forces  on  the  Mexican  frontier.* 
He  had  stated  the  case  very  moderately.  Not  only 
did  people  in  general  look  unfavorably  upon  the  em 
pire  of  Maximilian,  but  especially  in  the  army,  now 
a  very  popular  body,  was  there  much  feeling.  At 
the  close  of  the  war  Grant  had  sent  Sheridan  with 
50,000  men  to  the  Eio  Grande. 

The  French  minister  assured  Bigelow  that  it  was 
the  intention  of  the  Emperor  to  withdraw  from 
Mexico.3  Bigelow  lost  no  occasion  for  keeping  the 
matter  in  his  mind  :  in  the  course  of  the  fall  he  in 
quired  whether  it  was  true  that  Soudanese  infantry 
were  being  loaned  by  the  Pacha  of  Egypt.  The 
French  minister  was  not  backward  in  presenting  a 
strong  case.  The  United  States,  he  said,  had  held 

1  Life,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  289. 

*Dip.  Corr.,  Sept.  6,  1865,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  412. 

*lbid.,  Sept.  21,  1865,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  416. 


LAST  DAYS  363 

that  France  was  wrong  in  recognizing  Mr.  Davis 
and  his  associates,  although  those  gentlemen  occu 
pied  for  a  long  time  a  perfectly  definite,  regular, 
and  settled  territory.  Now  the  United  States  per 
sisted  in  recognizing  Juarez  who  had  no  govern 
ment,  no  army,  no  territory,  and  often  himself 
could  not  be  found.  France,  however,  did  not 
complain  of  that  while  the  United  States  remained 
neutral.  As  to  the  feeling  of  the  people  of  the 
United  States,  it  had  never  been  pretended  that 
they  did  not  sympathize  with  a  republican  form  of 
government  in  Mexico,  but  that  he  certainly  sup 
posed  that,  even  under  the  name  of  monarchy,  they 
would  prefer  order  and  security  to  brigandage  and 
misrule.  There  was  much  on  the  face  of  it  in  the 
French  presentation,  but  the  -facts  in  the  case  were 
very  clear,  and  even  to  gain  a  quiet  government  in 
Mexico  the  American  people  were  not  likely  to  ap 
prove  of  an  empire  supported  by  a  foreign  army. 

This  latter  idea,  however,  had  never  been  openly 
put  forward  by  the  French  government,  even  when 
the  United  States  seemed  most  occupied  with  do 
mestic  affairs,  nor  could  it  be  advanced  now.  The 
French  minister  assured  Seward  that  the  French 
troops  would  be  withdrawn,  but  the  Emperor  sent 
word  that  it  would  be  inconvenient  to  do  so  until 
the  United  States  should  recognize  the  imperial 
government  as  a  de  facto  political  power.  On  De 
cember  16th  Seward  returned  an  answer,  reiterat 
ing  the  view  of  the  United  States,  and  closing  with 
profound  regret  that  the  French  government  saw  fit 
to  leave  the  subject  in  a  condition  that  did  not  au- 


364  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

thorize    an    expectation    of   a  satisfactory   adjust 
ment. 

This  suggestive  answer  led  M.  Druyn  de  1'Huys 
to  confer  with  the  Emperor,  as  a  result  of  which  a 
careful  statement  of  the  French  position  was  sent  to 
the  French  minister  at  Washington  and  handed  to 
Seward.1  It  rehearsed  the  conditions  :  the  just  war 
of  France  in  support  of  its  just  claims  ; 2  the  desire  on 
the  part  of  the  Mexican  people  for  a  monarchy  in 
stead  of  the  constant  anarchy  of  the  immediate  past ; 
the  establishment  of  a  regular  government  under  a 
prince  elected  by  the  Mexican  people.  It  was 
hoped  that  the  United  States  would  maintain  strict 
neutrality :  when  assurance  to  that  effect  was  re 
ceived,  the  French  would  be  able  to  indicate  the  re 
sults  of  their  negotiations  with  Maximilian  as  to  the 
withdrawal  of  troops.  With  this  despatch  it  be 
came  evident  that  the  corner  was  turned.  Seward 
saw  there  was  no  more  mention  of  recognition.  He 
replied  that  he  could  not  agree  with  the  Emperor  in 
his  view  of  the  circumstances  ;  that  the  American 
people,  without  questioning  the  objects  or  intentions 
of  France,  regarded  the  establishment  of  a  Mexican 
empire  as  contrary  to  the  will  and  opinions  of  the 
Mexican  people  and  without  their  authority  ;  hence 
it  could  recognize  only  the  old  republic.  He  there 
fore  gave  reassurance  of  the  desire  of  the  Federal 
government  to  facilitate  the  removal  of  French 
troops  from  Mexico. 

1  Dip.  Corr.,  1865,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  805. 

2  Claims  not  less  just,  it  was  pointedly  remarked,  than  those 
of  the  United  States  twenty  years  before. 


LAST  DAYS  365 

Polite  language  this  was,  but  the  meaning  was 
plain.  On  April  5,  1866,  it  was  officially  announced 
in  Paris  that  the  French  army  would  be  gradually 
withdrawn  ;  by  March,  1867,  it  had  practically  gone. 
Maximilian  could  not  bring  himself  to  abandon 
those  who  had  put  their  trust  in  his  fortunes. 
There  followed  a  melancholy  confirmation  of  Sew- 
ard's  position:  that  the  empire  was  but  a  foreign 
usurpation  and  contrary  to  the  will  of  the  Mexican 
people.  The  government  of  Maximilian  crumbled 
away  on  the  departure  of  the  troops.  In  three 
months'  time  he  had  been  driven  from  his  capital, 
followed  up,  besieged  and  captured.  Seward  made 
every  effort  to  save  his  life-,  but  without  success. 
On  June  19,  1867,  he  was  executed.  The  govern 
ment  of  Juarez  was  reestablished  and  the  inglorious 
episode  of  French  invasion  was  ended. 

With  the  settlement  of  these  disputes,  which  were 
legacies  of  the  war,  and  with  the  passing  away  from 
national  life  of  the  burning  question  of  slavery, 
even  though  the  problems  of  reconstruction  pressed 
hard  upon  the  nation,  Seward's  mind  turned,  like  a 
spring  released  from  a  weight,  to  the  thoughts  and 
ideas  of  earlier  days,  to  the  questions  of  transporta 
tion  and  internal  development,  which  had  then 
seemed  all  important  and  which  .had  reluctantly 
been  put  aside  by  the  imperious  preeminence  of 
slavery.  The  building  of  canals  and  then  of  rail 
roads  had  been  the  popular  projects  of  his  earlier 
years.  The  building  of  railroads  and  telegraphs 
was  the  one  great  interest  in  this  decade  after  the 


366  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

war  had  ended.  The  trans- Atlantic  cable  was 
finally  completed,  after  many  discouragements,  in 
1866  :  even  before  the  war  Seward  had  found  time 
to  push  the  interests  of  this  enterprise  in  a  Senate 
where  slavery  was  the  absorbing  topic.  The  Pacific 
Eailroad  was  even  more  a  matter  to  his  mind.  He 
had  been  among  the  first  to  recognize  its  impor 
tance.  Even  in  1849  in  the  very  beginning  of  the 
gold  excitement  in  California,  his  habitual  interest 
in  internal  improvement  had  led  him  to  feel, 
without  careful  study  or  much  knowledge  of  the 
matter,  that  a  trans-continental  line  was  one  of  the 
great  necessities  of  the  republic.  As  Washington 
saw  the  importance  of  communication  over  the 
slight  divide  at  Oriskauy,  so  Seward  perceived  that 
the  Great  Divide  must  be  crossed  by  some  national 
road.  Soon,  however,  as  we  have  seen,  California 
aroused  more  exciting  questions  than  those  of 
internal  improvement.  The  Pacific  Eailroad  itself 
speedily  became  mingled  in  the  general  chaos. 
Seward,  could  he  have  ranged  himself  among  its 
promoters,  would  have  found  himself  in  strange 
company,  with  Bentou  and  Fremont  on  one  side, 
and  Achison  and  Douglas  on  the  other.  The  pro- 
slavery  element  in  Missouri,  which  demanded  the 
repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise,  demanded  also 
a  Pacific  railroad.1  So  during  the  decade  before 
the  war,  the  real  friends  of  the  measure  could  never 
quite  unite.  But  now  the  question  of  slavery  was 
out  of  the  way  and  the  only  problems  were  those  of 

1  See  Way,  Repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise,  passim. 


LAST  DAYS  367 

finance  and  construction.  With  these  Seward  did 
not  attempt  to  deal :  he  was  satisfied  to  see  the  work 
well  under  way,  aided  by  the  resources  of  the 
nation  and  in  the  hands  of  those  competent  to 
carry  it  through. 

His  views,  as  they  turned  toward  consolidation  of 
the  republic,  had,  even  in  earlier  days,  looked  out 
beyond  the  western  coast-line  of  the  United  States. 
Seward  was  one  of  the  first  of  our  statesmen  to  ap 
preciate  the  importance  of  the  Pacific.  Had  he  de 
veloped  his  own  ideas  as  he  chose,  the  years  between 
1850  and  1860  would  have  seen  him  not  merely  the 
advocate  of  an  Atlantic  cable  and  a  trans-conti 
nental  railroad,  but  also  of  a  Pacific  steamship  line, 
of  the  annexation  of  Hawaii,  and  of  the  opening  of 
Japan  and  China.  Seward  was  an  imperialist  before 
imperialism.  As  he  looked  out  in  imagination  at 
Buffalo  and  saw  the  unbounded  wilderness  and 
prairie  civilizing  and  realizing  itself  and  sending  its 
stores  of  commerce  and  agriculture  to  the  Atlantic 
seaboard  by  the  Erie  Canal,  so  in  imagination  he  had 
early  looked  out  upon  the  Pacific  and  beheld  it,  if 
not  an  American  lake,  at  least  a  means  to  the  dis 
covery  of  a  new  world.  Here,  as  before,  the  twenty 
years  of  anti-slavery  and  ^war  had  made  a  sad  break. 
The  Oregon  question  had  been  settled  so  that  Great 
Britain  retained  its  footing  at  Vancouver  ;  the  sub 
sidies  to  the  Collins  Line  had  not  proved  the  true 
way  of  establishing  trans-Pacific  communication  ; 
the  great  carrying-trade  of  the  United  States  had 
nearly  disappeared  under  the  attacks  of  the  Alabama 
and  the  Shenandoah.  These  things  could  hardly  be 


368  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

undone.  There  was,  however,  a  possibility  in  the 
way  of  compensation.  In  1844  the  campaign  dis 
cussion  of  the  Oregon  line  had  pushed  it  up  as  far 
as  the  southern  boundary  of  Eussian  America,  and 
at  that  time  it  had  been  suggested  that  Eussia  might 
dispose  of  her  American  territory  to  the  United 
States.1  Seward  believed  in  extension  to  the  north 
west,  not  by  war  but  by  purchase.2  The  idea  had 
been  suggested  later  by  various  persons,  officially  and 
unofficially.  In  1854  the  New  York  Tribune  pub 
lished  an  article  from  its  correspondent  at  Paris, 
in  which  it  stated  that  a  special  messenger  was  being 
despatched  by  the  Czar  with  a  proposition  to  cede 
Sitka  to  the  United  States,  and  said  editorially  that 
the  proposition  was  natural.  This  report  proved 
unfounded.  In  1859,  however,  an  informal  propo 
sition  was  made  by  Buchanan,  through  Senator 
Gwiu.3  Seward  himself  had  prophesied,  in  1860, 
that  one  day  the  outposts  of  the  Eussian  country, 
even  up  to  the  Arctic  circle,  would  be  the  outposts 
of  his  own.  Now  the  idea  suddenly  assumed  tangi 
ble  form.  Eussia  had  been  the  consistent  friend 
of  the  United  States  throughout  the  war.  She  had 
constantly  refused  to  join  in  offers  of  mediation. 

lLife,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  346. 

2  See  his  letter  declining  the  Chautauqua  nomination  to  the 
Constitutional  Convention  in  1846,  Life,  Vol.  II,  p.  791.  "  But 
our  population  is  destined  to  roll  its  resistless  waves  to  the  icy 
barriers  of  the  North,  and  to  encounter  Oriental  civilization  on 
the  shores  of  the  Pacific.  The  monarchs  of  Europe  are  to  have 
no  rest  while  they  have  a  colony  remaining  on  this  continent. 
France  has  already  sold  out.  Spain  has  sold  out.  We  shall  see 
how  long  before  England  inclines  to  follow  their  example."  I 
do  not  find  any  reference  of  his  to  Russian  America  at  this  period. 

3Sunmer,  Speeches,  Vol.  XI,  p.  203. 


LAST  DAYS  369 

She  had  even  sent  her  fleet  to  America  as  a  mark  of 
sympathy.  Seward  now  in  1867  opened  an  inquiry 
through  the  Russian  minister  as  to  whether  his  gov 
ernment  would  incline  to  part  with  her  American 
possessions.  The  transfer  appeared  advantageous 
to  both  parties.  Eussia  seemed  to  have  slight  need 
of  Russian  America.  In  time  of  war,  it  might  be  a 
difficulty  ;  in  time  of  peace,  it  was  of  small  value  to 
the  government,  being  turned  over  for  management 
to  a  chartered  company.  Negotiations  between  the 
capitals  were  in  progress  for  some  mouths  ;  but  the 
actual  drawing  up  of  the  treaty  was  accomplished 
with  singular  rapidity.  The  Russian  minister  called 
at  Se ward's  house  one  evening  to  say  that  he  had 
received  the  consent  of  the  Czar  to  the  transfer,  and 
that  if  it  were  agreeable,  they  might  begin  upon  the 
treaty  the  next  day.  Seward  was  still  more  active  : 
"Why  not  to-night?"  he  asked.  By  gathering 
clerks  and  secretaries  at  once,  the  treaty  was  ready 
by  the  next  morning,  and  was  immediately  brought 
before  the  Senate,  where  it  was  advocated  by  Charles 
Sumner,  who  had  been  advised  of  these  rapid  pro 
ceedings.  This  was  at  the  end  of  March  :  the  treaty 
was  ratified  by  the  Senate  on  April  8th.  It  still  re 
mained  to  gain  from  the  House  of  Representatives 
the  necessary  appropriation  for  the  purchase  money, 
which  was  $7,200,000,  but  the  treaty  was  proclaimed, 
and  even  the  cession  made  in  the  summer  before  the 
House  acted.  The  name  Alaska  was  chosen  by 
Seward. 

With  the  close  of  Johnson's  administration,  Sew- 


« 

\ 

* 


>Kftitu 
<E 


.0  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAKD 

ard's  long  political  career  came  to  an  end.  It  had 
lasted  for  almost  half  a  century ;  indeed,  could  we 
take  his  youthful  address  of  welcome  to  Governor 
Tompkins  as  a  beginning,  it  would  be  just  half  a 
century.  Such  exactnesses  are  of  course  unneces 
sary  :  more  important  is  it  that  Seward  had  been  in 
public  life  during  the  rise,  the  flourishing,  the  fall, 
of  the  slavery  question  in  national  politics.  When 
he  entered  the  arena  a  few  years  after  the  Missouri 
Compromise,  little  was  said  or  thought  by  public 
men  on  the  subject ;  there  were  still  slaves  in  New 
York  as  in  South  Carolina.  When  he  finally  left 
public  office,  slavery  had  gone.  He  had  seen  this 
great  struggle  from  beginning  to  end,  one  might  al 
most  say,  and  had  been  an  important  actor  in  it. 
Just  the  -  part  that  he  played  has  been  made  clear, 
and  that  he  looked  upon  the  question  as  an  episode 
in  the  progress  of  the  American  nation  is  also  clear. 
In  departing  from  office,  he  doubtless  felt  that  the 
uture  of  the  country  might  be  left  to  other  hands. 

lived  only  a  few  years  longer,  but  those  years 
were  most  characteristically  spent.  Three  months 
after  he  laid  down  the  duties  of  Secretary  of  State, 
he  started  by  the  just  completed  Union  Pacific  Bail- 
road  on  a  journey  across  the  continent  to  that  great 
western  dominion  which  had  so  much  interested 
him.  He  not  only  studied  the  Pacific  slope,  but  made 
a  tour  into  Alaska  to  see  the  territory  that  he  had 
added  to  the  United  States,  and  also  visited  Mexico. 
After  a  journey  of  nine  months,  he  returned  to 
Auburn,  but  he  did  not  stay  there  long  :  his  trans 
continental  trip  was  merely  the  prelude  to  a  tour 


LAST  DAYS  371 

around  the  world.  He  started  in  August,  1870,  and 
was  absent  for  a  year  and  two  mouths.  The  journey 
was  a  most  enjoyable  one,  for  everywhere  in  addi 
tion  to  the  interest  of  the  country  itself,  Seward  had 
the  pleasure  of  meeting  statesmen  with  whom  he 
had  been  dealing  in  the  long  term  of  his  secretary 
ship.  In  Europe  he  had  many  profitable  interviews 
with  public  men,  but  was  too  late  for  the  second 
Empire  and  too  early  for  the  Geneva  Court  of 
Arbitration. 

He  returned  to  Auburn  but  not  to  a  desolate  old 
age.  Almost  immediately  he  set  about  describing 
the  men  and  scenes  he  had  known  :  with  the  aid  of 
an  adopted  daughter,  he  wrote  the  story  of  his 
journey  around  the  world,  and  began  an  autobiog 
raphy.  It  would  have  been  singularly  interesting 
had  he  been  able  to  complete  the  latter  work,  but 
though  he  began  it  first,  he  laid  it  aside  in  order  to 
finish  the  account  of  his  travels.  He  was  working 
on  his  notes  on  the  very  day  of  his  death,  October 
10,  1872. 

One  can  often  do  much  for  the  understanding  of  a 
great  man  by  a  formula  or  a  judgment,  but  it  is 
better  to  see  and  understand  his  whole  life  and 
action.  Seward  began  his  career  almost  on  the 
frontier  :  with  an  interest  in  the  people  about  him 
and  a  feeling  of  civic  responsibility,  he  went  into 
politics  as  a  follower  of  Adams  and  Clinton  on  the 
issue  of  internal  improvements.  But  at  the  same 
time,  it  will  be  remembered,  he  took  a  definite  stand 
in  favor  of  the  extension  of  the  privilege  of  election 


372  WILLIAM  H.  SEWAED 

and  against  machine  politics.  This  latter  position 
was  the  more  important  of  the  two  because  it  fixed 
his  place  as  an  auti-Eegency  man  for  the  next  ten, 
not  to  say  twenty,  years.  Ten  years  later,  Seward 
and  his  political  friends  joined  the  opponents  of 
Jackson  in  other  states  in  the  Whig  party.  The 
Whigs  stood  for  the  United  States  Bank,  the  tariff, 
and  internal  improvements,  but  the  last  two  issues 
were  hardly  party  matters  in  New  York  State  and 
the  chief  ground  for  division  was  at  first  the  bank. 
Seward  favored  it  chiefly  because  he  opposed  the 
political  effects  of  the  state  bank  system,  as  he  saw 
it  manipulated  by  the  Eegency.  And  even  while  a 
Whig  he  went  far  toward  estranging  himself  from 
his  party  by  taking  the  side  of  the  immigrant,  be 
cause  he  saw  that  an  educated  workman  was  the 
great  need  of  the  country  as  a  whole.  Then  came 
the  anti-slavery  question.  As  a  public  man,  Sew 
ard  opposed  slavery  because  he  believed  that  the 
national  welfare  depended  on  free  labor.  On  this 
issue  he  was  willing  to  stand  alone,  or  even  to  split 
and  break  up  his  party  when  it  would  not  follow 
him. 

When  he  finally  found  himself  one  of  the  leaders 
of  a  great  and  victorious  political  organization,  he 
was  compelled  to  work  to  preserve  the  existence  of 
the  nation,  rather  than  to  increase  its  prosperity. 
But  even  here  he  made  such  mistakes  as  he  did 
chiefly  through  a  too  great  confidence  in  the  power 
of  the  feeling  of  nationality  which  had  so  strongly 
influenced  himself.  He  never  believed  in  secession 
until  it  came,  because  he  overrated  the  Union  senti- 


LAST  DAYS  373 

ment  in  the  South ;  he  thought  of  a  foreign  war 
through  just  the  same  error  ;  when  the  Civil  War  was 
begun,  he  was  always  thinking  it  was  reaching  its 
end  for  much  the  same  reason.  When  it  caine  to 
reconstruction,  he  took  the  unpopular  side  because 
he  still  felt  that  the  Union  had  never  been  dissolved. 
After  the  war,  as  we  have  just  seen,  he  gathered 
himself  together  with  unwearied  energy  for  work  in 
the  direction  that  had  always  seemed  to  him  the 
right  one,  and  took  steps  toward  ground  on  which 
the  country,  after  thirty  years,  was  proud  to  come 
up  to  him. 

As  a  politician  and  as  a  statesman  he  had  many 
faults  which  made  him  many  enemies,  and  he  made 
mistakes  which  still  reduce  his  friends  to  wonder. 
But  his  failures  and  his  mistakes  were  never  of  more 
than  temporary  effect  and  never  put  him  off  the 
line  of  a  consistent  and  a  splendid  career.  Of  all  the 
statesmen  of  his  day,  there  is  no  one  whose  politics 
and  principles  lead  more  directly  to  our  own.  As 
one  follows  his  life,  one  is  constantly  thinking  how 
modern  he  is.  If  he  could  come  back  to  his  be 
loved  country  a  hundred  years  after  the  days  when  he 
took  his  first  steps  in  politics,  he  would  find  himself 
quite  in  touch  with  the  present  dominant  motives 
of  public  life  : — The  placing  of  politics  in  the  hands 
of  the  people  and  the  preservation  and  development 
by  the  state  of  all  its  possibilities  and  resources. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

THE  chief  foundation  for  any  life  of  Seward  will  be  his  autobi 
ography,  his  letters,  and  his  speeches.  The  speeches  have  been 
published  in  five  volumes.  The  autobiography  and  letters  have 
been  edited  by  Frederick  W.  Seward  in  his  Life  of  his  father,  and 
have  been  used  in  the  lives  by  Bancroft  and  Lothrop.  I  have  sup 
plemented  their  work  by  some  manuscript  authorities,  by  the  official 
records,  by  newspapers,  and  by  memoirs  and  letters,  beside  the 
usual  histories  of  New  York  State  and  the  United  States. 

The  first  manuscript  authority  is  the  great  collection  of  letters  to 
and  from  Seward.  As  this  voluminous  material  has  already  been 
carefully  examined  by  my  predecessors,  I  have  felt  that  it  would 
be  more  useful  to  spend  my  time  on  other  collections,  of  which  the 
chief  are : 

1.  The  Van  Buren  Manuscripts  in  the  Congressional  Library, 
consisting  of  letters  to  Van  Buren,  and  affording  one  of  the  most 
valuable  authorities  for  the  first  years  of  Seward's  political  life. 

2.  The  Hollister  Manuscripts,  consisting  of  letters  to  Thurlow 
Weed,  chiefly  from  Seward,  but  also  from  many  other  public  men. 
It  is  especially  valuable  for  the  years  1825-1850. 

3.  The  Schuyler  Manuscripts,  consisting  of  a  number  of  letters 
from  Seward  to  Mrs.  George  Schuyler.     The  letters  are  not  numer 
ous  but  throw  very  valuable  light  upon  his  political  ideas. 

There  is  also  to  be  noted  under  this  head  a  manuscript  memoir 
of  Elijah  Miller,  now  in  the  collection  of  the  Cayuga  County  His 
torical  Association. 

The  principal  official  authorities  are  the  Journals  of  the  Senate 
of  New  York  State  for  the  period  of  Seward's  service  in  that  body, 
the  Congressional  Globe  for  the  years  that  he  served  in  the  Senate 
of  the  United  States,  and  the  Diplomatic  Correspondence  for  the 
years  during  which  he  was  Secretary  of  State.  The  first  of  these 
authorities  gives  very  little,  but  may  be  reinforced  by  the  reports 
of  legislative  proceedings  to  be  found  in  the  daily  papers  and  also 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  375 

by  Hammond's   Political  History  of  the  State  of  New    York,  of 
which  the  second  volume  is  almost  an  original  authority. 

The  value  of  the  newspapers,  at  least  for  the  earlier  political  life 
of  Seward,  is  very  great.  There  are  very  few  letters  before  1830, 
and  although  that  period  is  covered  by  an  Autobiography  written 
in  the  last  year  of  Seward's  life,  yet  much  more  is  needed  for  a 
satisfactory  understanding  of  events.  The  newspapers  give  us  a 
knowledge  of  minor  political  proceedings  that  is  often  of  impor 
tance.  They  give  details  of  caucuses  and  conventions,  resolutions 
and  addresses,  delegates  and  officers,  and  other  matters  that  are 
quite  as  important  as  the  political  opinion  and  gossip  which  they 
also  present.  The  chief  newspapers  of  value  here  are  : 

1.  Cayuga  Republican.     This  was  at  first  Clintonian  and  then 
Anti-Masonic,  and  therefore   gives  us  the  best  view  of  Seward's 
earlier  activity. 

2.  Cayuga  Patriot.     This  was  the  regular  Republican  paper: 
I  have  unfortunately  been  able  to  read  only  an  incomplete  file  for 
the  years  before  Seward  went  to  Albany. 

3.  Albany  Advertiser,  first  Clintonian  and  then  National  Re 
publican.     I  have  been  able  to  read  the  complete  file  from  the  be 
ginning  of  Seward's  political  activity  to  the  establishment  of  the 
Evening  Journal. 

4.  Albany    Evening  Journal,    first    Anti-Masonic    and    then 
Whig.     This  paper,  edited   by  Thurlow  Weed,  may   be  taken  as 
presenting  pretty  nearly  Seward's  own  view  of  matters.     The  com 
plete   file  is  hard  to  get  at,  but  I  have  read  a  good  deal  between 
the  years  1830  and  1842. 

5.  Albany  Argus.     The  regular  Republican  paper.     Extremely 
well  edited  by  Edwin  Croswell,  this  paper  is,  next  to  the  Evening 
Journal,  the  most  valuable  comment  on  Seward's  earlier  public  life. 

With  the  passing  of  Seward  from  state  to  national  politics,  the 
newspaper  field  widens  so  immensely  that  it  is  practically  impos 
sible  to  cover  it.  I  have  read  chiefly 

6.  New   York  Tribune,  1848-1860.     Besides  the  immense  gen 
eral  influence  of  this  paper,  the  fact  that  it  was  edited  by  Horace 
Greeley,  who  for  a  long  time  was  closely  connected  in  politics  with 
Seward  and  Weed,  gives  it  for  our  purpose  a  very  particular  character. 


376  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

7.  London  Times,  1860-1865,  should  always  be  consulted  for 
any  especial  incident,  as  that  of  the  Trent  or  Gladstone's  Newcastle 
speech. 

Besides  the  above,  of  course,  many  other  papers  would  be  useful. 
There  are,  for  instance,  a  considerable  number  of  Anti-Masonic 
papers  during  the  years  1827-1832,  which  often  have  good  ma 
terial,  while  the  New  York  City  dailies  before  the  Tribune  always 
have  something  of  interest  even  about  up-state  politics. 

There  is  a  great  number  of  memoirs,  autobiographies,  etc.,  which 
will  often  yield  matter  of  importance.  Of  these  I  have  found  the 
most  useful  to  be  the  Autobiography  of  Thurlow  Weed,  with  the 
Life  by  T.  W.  Barnes;  the  letters  from  DeWitt  Clinton  to  Henry 
Post,  published  in  Harper's  Monthly,  Vol.  50,  pp.  409,  563  ;  the 
Diary  of  Philip  Hone ;  the  Reminiscences  of  Levi  Beardsley ;  Ran 
dom  Recollections  by  H.  B.  Stanton  ;  Recollections  of  a  Busy  Life  by 
Horace  Greeley  ;  Reminiscences  of  Carl  Schurz ;  the  Life  and  Letters 
of  Charles  Sumner ;  the  Diary  of  Gideon  Welles,  published  in  the 
Atlantic  Monthly  for  1909;  the  Reminiscences  si  John  Bigelow  ; 
the  Life  of  J.  T.  Delane  by  W.  T.  Dasent ;  the  Life  of  Gladstone 
by  Lord  Morley.  Here,  too,  should  be  mentioned  several  valuable 
papers  in  the  Collections  of  the  Cayuga  Historical  Society. 

I  have  not  studied  the  pamphlet  literature  which  is  presumably 
voluminous.  There  are  some  thirty  or  forty  Anti- Masonic  tracts 
alone,  which  I  have  read  with  little  profit,  and  there  are  doubtless 
many  more  relating  to  the  later  years  of  Seward's  life. 

The  student  will  be  able  to  fill  out  easily  the  list  of  secondary 
authorities,  but  I  should  like  to  specify  two  monographs  of  value. 
One  is  Way's  Repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise,  a  book  that  did 
much  to  make  clearer  to  me  the  confused  state  of  public  life  at  the 
time  of  the  Kansas-Nebraska  struggles.  The  other  is  Callahan's 
Evolution  of  Seward's  Mexican  Policy,  a  book  which  I  did  not 
read  until  I  had  finished  my  account  of  the  subject.  Professor 
Callahan  presents  a  view  very  different  from  that  in  the  text,  and  I 
should  have  doubtless  been  influenced  by  his  treatment  had  I  been 
aware  of  it  earlier,  though  I  believe  I  should  not  have  varied  much 
from  my  present  ideas. 


INDEX 


ABOLITION,  Seward's  early 
sympathy  with,  14;  later 
views  on,  127. 

Abolitionist  vote  in  1840-1844, 
178,  179;  position  on  the 
Compromise  of  1850,  204. 

Abolitionists,  231,  232. 

Adams,  Charles  Francis,  Min 
ister  to  England,  282 ;  ar 
rives  in  London,  285  ;  and 
the  Trent  case,  291,  292; 
and  Gladstone's  Newcastle 
speech,  300—302 ;  information 
as  to  cotton,  307  ;  and  the 
Oreto,  313,  314;  and  the 
Alabama,  315,  316  ;  and  the 
"rams,"  319,  320;  men 
tioned,  325,  330,  334,  340, 

341,  352»  359- 

Adams,  John  Quincy,  a  presi 
dential  candidate,  34,  39 ; 
elected,  52  ;  appointment  of 
Clay,  56;  relations  with 
Clinton,  57,  58 ;  coalition 
for,  63;  electoral  vote  of 
1828,  66  ;  and  Anti-Masonry, 
70 ;  and  anti-slavery  peti 
tions,  142 ;  visit  to,  180 ; 
mentioned,  73,  74,  75,  77, 
81,  82,  134,  208,  371. 
Adams  and  Clinton "  party, 
failure  of,  66. 

Adelphic  Society,  15,  21,  23. 

Adger,  James,  The,  292. 

Amistad  case,  252. 

Alabama,  The,   316,  317,  321, 

335»  340,  348,  358,  367- 
Alaska,   cession   of,    368,  369 ; 
name,  369 ;  visited  by   Sew- 
ard,  370. 


Albany,  28. 

Albert  Edward,  Prince  Con 
sort,  284,  295. 

Alexandra,  The,  318,  320,  341. 

American  Party  (see  Native 
American  Party). 

Anderson,  Major,  270. 

Annie  Childs,  The,  313. 

Anthon,  John,  25. 

Anti-Federal  party,  33. 

Anti-Masonry,  rise,  66,  69 ;  a 
political  force,  71 ;  in  Cayuga 
County,  74 ;  in  the  election 
of  1829,  77  ;  a  national 
force,  78;  position  in  1831, 
89 ;  national  convention  of 
1832,  99;  defeat  in  1832, 
101  ;  party  in  New  York  dis 
solved,  104  ;  general  view  of, 
105;  mentioned,  112,  134. 

Anti-slavery,  Seward's  early 
sympathies,  14 ;  inquiries  of 
Seward,  127;  vote  in  1840, 
153;  position  in  1844,  !78; 
economic  ground  of,  164; 
Seward  an  anti-slavery  man, 
192  ;  mentioned,  231. 

Archer,  Mr.,  in  the  convention 
of  1852,  210. 

Argtts,  Albany,  45  ;  influence 
of,  47  ;  comes  out  for  Jack 
son,  57  ;  opposes  the  conven 
tion  system,  63;  in  the  cam 
paign  of  1834,  in;  in  the 
campaign  of  1838,  125—128. 

Argyll,  Duke  of,  303  n. 

Atchison,  David  R.,  366. 

"  Atherton  gag,"  142. 

Atlantic  cable,  247,  366. 

Auburn,  Seward  settles  in,  27  ; 


378 


INDEX 


population,  28 ;  young  men 
at,  30 ;  position  in  Western 
emigration,  51;  mentioned, 

J3>  34.  35«  40,  42. 
Auburn  Debating  Club,  40. 
Auburn  and  Owasco  Canal,  50- 

S2,  "5- 

Bahama,  The,  314. 

Baker,  J.  W.,  230. 

Bank,  U.  S.,  105,  112,  125,  136, 
372. 

Banks,  N.  P.,  240,  243. 

Banks,  State,  89,  92. 

Barnburners,  105,  177,  182. 

Bates,  Edward,  257,  259,  268, 
269  ;  on  the  Trent  case,  297. 

Bazaine,  Marshal,  361. 

Beach,  John  H.,  65. 

Beardsley,  Levi,  86 ;  Reminis 
cences,  67. 

Bell,  John,  217,  259. 

Benjamin,  Judah  P.,  319  n. 

Bennett,  Gad,  and  Lafayette,  68. 

Benton,  N.  S.,  86,  97. 

Benton,  T.  H.,  118,  187,  366. 

Berdan,  David,  22,  25,  26. 

Betts,  S.  R.,  58  n. 

Bigelow,  John,  361,  362. 

Birdsall,  John,  104. 

Birdseye,  Victory,  41,  125. 

Birney,  J.  G.,  153,  179. 

Bissell,  William  H.,  243. 

Blair,  F.  P.,  Jr.,  349-351. 

Blair,  Montgomery,  268,  270, 
296. 

Blockade    of    Southern    ports, 

3°5- 

Blockade-running,  308,  310. 
Blue  Lodges,  227. 
Bouck,  W.  C,  153,  176,  182. 
Boughton,  G.  H.,  73,  84. 
Bradish,  Luther,  123,  128,  166. 
Bravay,  M.,  317. 
Bronson,  A.,  86. 
Bronson,  Mrs.  Deborah,  quoted, 

28. 


Brooks,  Preston  S.,  24311. 
Brown,  John,  232,  250. 
Brown,   John,    raid,    254,   256, 

257- 
Buchanan,     James,     207,    245, 

247,  264,  267,  368. 
Bucktails,  The,  24,  33,  35,  60. 
Buel,  Jesse,  no. 
Buffalo,  28. 
Bull  Run,  287,  288. 
Bullock,  Captain,  312,  318. 
Bunch,  case  of,  289,  290. 
Burns,  Anthony,  227. 
Butler,  B.  F.,  44,  59. 

CALHOUN,  JOHN  C.,  39,  187, 
191. 

California,  "  El  Dorado,"  185  ; 

admission   of,    188-192,  214, 

218. 

Cameron,  Simon,  259,  268,  269 
Campbell,   Mr.   John,  and   the 

Trent,  293. 

Canals,  89,  90,  144,  176. 
Cantine,  Moses,  45. 
Carlisle,  Earl  of,  16311. 
Caroline,  The,  155,  156. 
Cary,   Trumbull,    in   the   state 


Senate,  73,  85,  104  ;  and  the 
Holland  Land  Purchase,  116, 
170. 
Cary,  Lay,  and  Schermerhorn, 

I25- 

Cass,  Lewis,  187,  196,  197, 
260. 

Cayuga  County,  politics  of,  34, 
35>  3&»  40 ;  becomes  Anti- 
Masonic,  74 ;  senatorial  vote 
of,  80. 

Chase,  S.  P.,  in  the  Van  Zandt 
case,  181  ;  in  the  Senate, 
187,  191,  201,  217,  236  ;  and 
the  presidential  nomination 
of  1856,  240;  in  the  conven 
tion  of  1860,  259  ;  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury,  268,  269 ; 
on  the  Trent  case,  297 ;  of- 


INDEX 


379 


fers  to  resign,  336 ;  desire 
for  nomination  in  1864,  348. 

Chenango  Canal,  89,  92. 

Chicago  Convention  of  1860, 
259. 

Circuit  judges,  political  position 
of,  36  ;  appointment  of,  45. 

Clarke,  Myron,  224. 

Clay,  Henry,  a  presidential 
candidate,  34,  39 ;  Secretary 
of  State,  56,  57 ;  and  the 
election  of  1832,  100  ;  nomi 
nated  in  1844,  176 ;  the 
Texas  question,  176;  defeat 
in  1844,  1 80;  and  the  Com 
promise  of  1850,  189,  191, 
194  ;  mentioned,  15,  77,  79, 
99,  125,  142,  143,  169,  187, 
197,  209,  210,  236,  246,  259. 

Clinton,  DeWitt,  quoted,  32  n. ; 
leader  of  a  wing  of  the  Re 
publican  party,  33  ;  removed 
from  the  canal  board,  41  ; 
declines  renomination  in 
1822,  45  ;  reelected  in  1824, 
48 ;  does  not  agree  with 
Adams,  58 ;  connection  with 
Jackson,  58,  61  ;  reelected  in 
1826,  60;  connection  with 
Masonry,  67,  70  ;  mentioned, 
25,  26,  43,  57,  73,  74,  76,  81, 
82,  125,  134,  138,  371. 

Clintonian  party,  40,  42,  53,59, 
105. 

Cobb,  Howell,  187. 

Collier,  J.  C.,  166,  183. 

Committee,  the  party ;  Sew- 
ard's  development  of,  98. 

Compromise,  Missouri,  207, 
215,  216,  366. 

Compromise  of  1850,  189  f., 
197,  201,  216. 

Constitutional  Convention  of 
1845,  l8°- 

Conventions,  state,  48  n.,  53, 
54;  of  1824,  60;  of  1826, 
60 ;  National  Anti-Masonic 


of  1830,  78;  development  of 
the  system,  63. 

Cooke,  Bates,  73,  85,  193. 

Cooper,  Fenimore,  The  Chain- 
bearer,  1 50  ;  The  Indians, 
150. 

Corwin,  Thomas,  187,  342. 

Courtney  of  Penwith,  Lord, 
quoted,  293. 

Crawford,   W.   H.,  34,  39,  55, 

59- 

Crittenden,  J.  J.,  264. 

Crittenden  Compromise,  The, 
264  n. 

Croswell,  Edwin,  a  member  of 
the  Regency,  45,  59;  state 
printer,  47,  117,  143  ;  opposes 
the  convention  system,  64; 
acts  with  Governor  Bouck, 
176;  mentioned,  131,  138. 

Cruisers,  Confederate,  305. 

Cuba,  215,  252. 

Curry,  case  of,  161. 

DAVIS,  JEFFERSON,  in  the  Sen 
ate,  187 ;  view  of  Seward, 
239 ;  on  the  Committee  of 
Thirteen,  264 ;  President  of 
the  Confederate  States,  268  ; 
mentioned  by  Gladstone, 
300 ;  view  of  the  war,  325  ; 
and  the  plan  of  F.  P.  Blair, 
349,  360  ;  mentioned,  363. 

Davis,    Mrs.  Jefferson,   quoted, 

239. 
Dayton,  Wm.  L.,  candidate  for 

the      vice-presidency,     243 ; 

Minister  to  France,  282,  303, 

321,  342,  344-346,  35 2- 
Delane,  John  T.,  294. 
Democratic-Republican     party, 

33,  105. 
Dickenson,    Senator,    186,   198, 

226. 
Dix,  John  A.,  86,  89,  117,  138, 

265. 
Douglas,    Stephen    A.,   in   the 


380 


INDEX 


Senate,  187  ;  and  Kansas, 
242;  connection  with  Sew 
ard,  247  ;  Dred  Scott  de 
cision,  248,  249 ;  debates 
with  Lincoln,  249,  25 1 ; 
mentioned,  207,  215,  219, 
258,  261,  264,  366. 

Dred  Scott  Case,  247. 

Drouyn  de  1'Huys,  303,  364. 

Dudley,    consul    at   Liverpool, 

3*3- 

Duer,  John  A.,  25. 
Duer,  William,  200. 

EAGLE  TAVERN,  84. 

Eames,  Moses,  228. 

Edwards,  Judge,  123. 

Emancipation,  328-335. 

England  recognizes  the  Con 
federacy,  285 ;  relations  with 
Mexico,  342. 

Erie  Canal,  Seward's  earlier 
views  on,  24,  25  ;  and  Au 
burn,  29  ;  importance  of,  33  ; 
a  political  factor,  5 1  ;  almost 
complete,  57  ;  ceremonies  at 
completion,  67  ;  Seward  a 
supporter  of,  134,  253; 
freight  on,  135. 

Erie  Railroad,  91,  253. 

Eve,  Mount,  14. 

Evening  Journal,  Albany,  85, 
98. 

FEDERALIST  party,  32,  105. 

Federalists,  The,  32,  33. 

Fessenden,  William  P.,  217. 

Fillmore,  Millard,  in  the  legis 
lature,  86  ;  in  Congress,  139; 
considered  for  governor  in 
1842,  166 ;  nominated  and 
defeated  in  1844,  J79  > 
elected  Vice-President,  183, 
1 86 ;  becomes  President, 
J95  >  position  in  politics, 
205  ;  and  the  nomination  of 
1852,  208-210;  attitude 


toward  slavery,  212  ;  and  the 

Know-Nothings,  229  ;  Native 

American  candidate  in  1856, 

240. 
Fish,   Hamilton,   184,  201,  205, 

217,  236. 
Flagg,  Azanah,  32,  40,  47,  59, 

117,  138,  176. 
Florida,  13. 
Florida,     The     (formerly     the 

Oreto},  314,  318,  321. 
Floyd,  John  B.,  264. 
Foote,  Senator,  187. 
Forey,  General,  343. 
"  Forum,"  New  York,  15,  25. 
France,  relations  with  Mexico, 

342,  343- 
Freeman  murder  case,  173,  174, 

1 80. 
Free-Masonry,     popularity     of, 

67  ;  and  public  men,  68. 
Free  Soil  movement,  182,  196, 

198,  204,  231. 

Frelinghuysen,  Theodore,  179. 
Fremont,   John    C.,    243,    260, 

282,  328,  366. 
Fugitive     Slave     Law,    189  ff., 

197,  201,  213,  217,  268. 
Fuller,  Philo  C.,  85. 
Fullerton,  Matthew,  17. 

GARDNER,  GOVERNOR,  in  the 
Native  American  Conven 
tion,  230. 

Garrison,  W.  L.,  192,  250. 

Garrow,  Nathaniel,  79. 

Geneva  Arbitration,  371. 

Georgia,  321. 

Gilmer,  Governor,  of  Virginia, 
160,  161. 

Gladstone,  W.  E,  303  n. ; 
speech  at  Newcastle,  299, 
302,  340. 

Goshen,  Seward  studies  law  at, 
23,  24. 

Goshen  Academy,  14. 

Granger,  Francis,  at    Anti-Ma- 


INDEX 


381 


sonic  conference,  73 ;  nomi 
nated  for  governor,  78  ;  de 
feated,  8 1,  85 ;  and  the 
Chenango  Canal,  92 ;  and 
Anti-Masonry,  94 ;  second 
nomination,  99;  defeat,  101, 
104;  and  the  Whig  party, 
109,  no;  and  nomination 
of  1838,  1 20;  in  Washing 
ton,  169 ;  and  the  "  Silver 
Grays,"  200 ;  and  anti- 
slavery,  212;  mentioned, 
1 68,  183. 

Grant,  General,  347,  349. 

Granville,  Lord,  and  recogni 
tion,  300. 

Greeley,  Horace,  on  Internal 
Improvement,  206 ;  and  the 
campaign  of  1852,  210;  on 
the  Whig  convention  of 
1854,  231  ;  view  of  Seward 
in  1854,  219;  on  the  canvas 
of  1854,  221  ;  on  the  presi 
dential  nomination  of  1856, 
244;  action  in  1860,  259; 
as  to  recognition,  285. 

Grey,  Sir  George,  30311. 

Griffin,  John,  104. 

"Gunboat  290"  (the  Ala 
bama),  316. 

Gwin,  Dr.,  and  the  Pacific 
Railway,  253 ;  and  Russian 
America,  368. 

HALE,  JOHN  P.,  191,  201,  236. 
Hall,  Captain  Francis,  quoted, 

28. 
Hall,  Willis,  Attorney-General, 

139. 

Hampton  Roads  Conference, 
275  n. 

Hard  cider  campaign,  151-153. 

Hardenburgh,  J.  L.,  50. 

Hardenburgh's  Corners  (Au 
burn),  28. 

Hardshell  Democrats,  225. 

Harper's  Ferry,  254. 


Harrison,  W.  H.,  presidential 
candidate,  143,  151-154; 
death,  155  ;  mentioned,  169, 
176,  208,  211,  259. 

Helderberg  Anti-Rent  War, 
167. 

Hoffman,  Ogden,  25. 

Holland  Land  Company,  116, 
126. 

Holley,  Myron,  41. 

Holt,  Joseph,  265. 

Hone,  Philip,  io8n. 

Hopkins,  Lieutenant-Governor, 
of  Virginia,  160. 

Houston,  Samuel,  187,  217. 

Hughes,  Bishop,  147,  290. 

Hungary,  326. 

Hunkers,  182. 

Hunt,  Washington,  199,  232. 

Hunter,  General,  and  emanci 
pation,  328. 

Hunter,  Senator,  271. 

ILLINOIS,  133,  215. 

Indiana,  133,  215. 

Internal  Improvements,  34,  51, 
55,  76,  81,  90,  105,  109,  1 10, 
126,  134,  146,  175,  184,  206, 

231,  365- 
Ireland,  326. 
"Irrepressible    Conflict,"    251, 

252. 
Isaac,    escape    and    return    of, 

158. 

JACKSON,  ANDREW,  presiden 
tial  candidate  in  1824,  34, 
39  ;  defeated  in  the  House, 
56;  candidate  in  1828,  61  ; 
opposition  to,  62;  a  Mason, 
70,  71  ;  and  the  electoral 
vote  of  1828,  66;  and  the 
bank,  93,  136;  Seward  pre 
sented  to,  115;  and  the  panic 
of  1837,  119  ;  mentioned,  75, 
92,  105,  131,  143,  246,  371. 

Jackson,  Professor,  21. 


382 


INBEX 


Jefferson,  Thomas,  55. 
Johnson,  Andrew,  inauguration, 
356 ;    reconstruction     policy, 

357.  36o,  369- 
Johnson,  Reverdy.  360. 
Johnson-Clarendon  convention, 

360. 
Journal,  Evening,  Weed  editor 

of,  85  ;  and  the  campaign  of 

1838,  123. 
Juarez,  363,  365. 

KAMES'  Elements  of  Criticism, 
19. 

Kansas,  218,  227,  242. 

Kearsarge,  The,  328. 

King,  Rufus,  quoted,  37. 

"  King  Caucus,"  40. 

Knower,  Benjamin,  44,  47,  59, 
94,  138- 

Know-Nothing  party,  formation, 
213;  in  1854,  228;  carry 
Auburn  in  1855,  229 ;  na 
tional  council  of  1855,  229- 
231  ;  a  Silver  Gray  party, 
231  ;  in  the  election  of  1859, 
255  ;  mentioned,  234,  237 
(see  Native  American  party, 
"  Sam  "). 

Know-Somethings,  231,  232. 

LAFAYETTE,  reception  of,  68; 
Seward's  visit  to,  102. 

LaGrange,  Seward  at,  102. 

Lansdowne,  Lord,  284. 

Leake,  44. 

Lewis,  Sir  G.  C.,  300,  303  n. 

Liberty  men,  182. 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  considered 
for  the  vice-presidency,  243  ; 
debates  with  Douglas,  249; 
"  a  house  divided  against 
itself,"  251,  252;  Cooper 
Union  speech,  258 ;  nomi 
nated  in  1860,  259  ;  election 
a  cause  of  secession,  265  ; 
Fort  Sumter,  270,  277,  278 ; 


view  of  the  "  Thoughts  "  of 
April  1st,  276 ;  plans  for 
diplomatic  service,  282 ;  in 
the  Trent  case,  297 ;  policy 
in  1861,  323  ;  and  emancipa 
tion,  328,  329,  330  ;  relations 
with  Seward,  336,  337,  338; 
reelection,  347-349;  Hamp 
ton  Roads  interview,  350  ; 
assassination,  354;  Seward's 
familiarity  with  his  ideas,  356. 

Littlejohn,  Speaker,  hanged  in 
effigy,  228. 

Locofocos,  105. 

Log  cabin  campaign,  151-153. 

Louisiana,  215. 

Luckey,  Doctor,  advises  on  the 
school  question,  145. 

Lush,  S.  S.,  introduces  a  Small 
Bill  resolution,  122. 

Lynde,  C.  W.,  in  the  state  Sen 
ate,  85. 

Lyons,  Lord,  284,  286,  297, 
301. 

MCCAULEY,  REV.  THOMAS,  16. 

McClellan,  General,  310,  315, 
336,  349- 

Mcllvaine,  Bishop,  290. 

McLean,  John,  243. 

McLeod,  Alexander,  156,  157. 

McLeod  case,  155-157,  287. 

Madison,  James,  55. 

Maffitt,  Captain,  314. 

Maine  Law,  221. 

Mallory,  230. 

Marchand,  Captain,  292. 

Marcy,  William  L.,  a  member 
of  the  Regency,  44,  59  ;  in 
the  caucus  of  1822,  45  ; 
elected  comptroller,  46,  47; 
and  the  spoils  system,  97  ;  de 
feats  Seward  in  1834,  U2n., 
121;  governor,  117;  advo 
cates  a  Small  Bill  Law,  122, 
128  n.,  129,  131,  138,  207, 
260. 


INDEX 


383 


Martineau,  Miss,  254. 
Mason  and  Slidell,  290-297. 
Matthew,  Father,  187. 
Maximilian,  343-345,  361-365. 
Maynard,   William  H.,  85,  93, 

97.  I03- 

Maynard,  168. 

Mechanics  and  Farmers'  Bank, 

45*  47.  94- 

Mercier,  M.,  286. 

Mexico,  France  in,  275,  341, 
342,  350,  361-365  ;  visited 
by  Seward,  370. 

Michigan,  215. 

Miller,  Elijah,  position  in  Au 
burn,  29  ;  Seward's  law  part 
ner,  30 ;  his  politics,  33 ; 
succeeded  by  Gershom  Pow 
ers,  35  ;  elected  supervisor, 
38  ;  plans  Niagara  trip,  49  ; 
advocates  Owasco  Canal,  5 1  ; 
delegate  to  the  convention  of 
1826,  60,  65  ;  delegate  to 
Anti-Masonic  convention,  78 ; 
mentioned,  83 ;  advises  as  to 
message  of  1838,  137. 

Miller,  Miss  Frances  (after 
ward  Mrs.  Seward),  27,  49. 

Miller,  Miss  Lizette,  27. 

Missouri  Compromise,  207,  215, 
216,  366. 

Mohawk  and  Hudson  Railroad, 
90. 

Mohawk  River,  24. 

Mohawk  Valley,  33,  133. 

Monroe  Doctrine,  344. 

Monroe,  James,  55. 

Morgan,  Christopher,  65. 

Morgan,  William,  and  the 
secrets  of  Masonry,  68  ;  pub 
lishes  a  book,  68  ;  disappear 
ance  of,  69. 

Morpeth,  Lord,  163. 

Morris,  Gouverneur,  133. 

Morris,  Robert,  1 1 6. 

Myers,  Mr.  Van  Schoonhoven, 
27- 


NAPIER,  LORD,  284. 

Napoleon  (Bonaparte),  252. 

Napoleon  III,  238,  310,  340, 
342,  350. 

National  Republican  party,  or 
ganization  of,  55,  56  n.,  62 n., 
78,80,99. 

Native  American  party,  177, 
213,  223,  226,  240,  245  (see 
also  Know-Nothing  party, 
"  Sam  "). 

Nebraska  Bill,  215-221,  236. 

Nebraska  territory,  215. 

Newcastle,  Duke  of,  287,  303  n. 

New  Mexico,  204. 

New  York  State  in  1838,  132. 

New  York  and  Erie  Railroad, 
Seward's  advocacy  of,  136. 

Niagara,  The,  321. 

Northwest  Territory,  215,  218. 

Nott,  Doctor,  character,  19 ; 
influence  on  Seward,  20;  ad 
vice  on  the  message  of  1838, 
137;  advice  on  the  school 
question,  145  ;  letters  on  the 
politics  of  1850,  16,  23,  115, 
151,  202,  234. 

Nye,  General  James,  234. 

O'CoNNELL,  DANIEL,  Seward's 
interest  in,  101 ;  repeal  agi 
tation,  165. 

Ohio,  133,  215. 

"  Omnibus  Bill  "  of  1850,  193. 

Oregon,  21 8,  367. 

Ostend  conference,  227. 

Ostend  Manifesto,  275  n. 

Owasco  Lake,  51. 

PACIFIC  RAILROAD,  252,  266, 

366,  370. 

Palmer,  F.  W.,  226. 
Palmerston,     Lord,    284 ;    and 

the    Trent    case,     291-295  ; 

and   mediation,  304,  310 n.; 

and    the    Newcastle    speech, 

297.  301.  3°2- 


384 


INDEX 


Panic  of  1837,  113. 
Payne,  Miss  Sarah,  27. 
Peace  Convention  of  1861,  267. 
Pennsylvania,  vote  of  in  1856, 

245- 
People's  party,  rise  of,   39 ;  in 

Cayuga  County,  40,  49,  109. 
Phi  Beta  Kappa,  21. 
Philomathean  Society,  21. 
Pickens,  Fort,  268,  277. 
Pierce,     Franklin,    nominated, 

208;  pro-slavery  view,  21 1; 

position  on  Kansas,  249. 
Pittsburg    Landing,   battle    of, 

299. 

Poinsett,    establishes    Free-Ma 
sonry  in  Mexico,  67. 
Porter,  P.  B.,  45. 
Potts,  Rev.  George,  18. 
Powers,  Gershom,  35,  79. 
Premier,    Seward's    liking    for 

the  title,  276. 
Presidential     electors,    election 

of,  39- 
Privateering,  Southern,  311. 

RAILROADS,  89,  90,  91,  135, 
144. 

Rams,  Ironclad,  at  Laird's,  317. 

Rappahannock,  The,  320,  347. 

Regency,  origin  of  the  name, 
44  n. ;  rise  of,  43  ;  supports 
Jackson,  57  ;  defeat  of,  137  ; 
voyage  up  Salt  River,  48; 
mentioned,  54  n.,  55,  57,  58, 
59,  76,  79,  82,  93,  94,  97, 
112,  129,  130,  131,  246,  372. 

Repeal,  agitation,  287. 

Republican  party  (earlier),  24, 

33,  i°5- 

Republican  party  (later),  rise 
of,  220;  name  adopted,  221  ; 
formation  in  New  York,  233  ; 
position  of  in  1856,  237. 

Republican  party,  National,  or 
ganization  of,  55,  56 n.,  62  n., 
78,  80,  99. 


Richmond  Junto,  55,  56. 

River  Queen,  351. 

Road  through  the  Southern 
counties,  57. 

Rochester,  growth  of,  51. 

Roebuck,  Mr.,  340. 

Rome,  28. 

Root,  General,  his  attack  on 
the  Regency,  89. 

Ruggles,  S.  B.,  137. 

Russell,  Lord  John,  284;  in 
terview  with  Yancey  and 
Rost,  285  (see  Lord  Russell). 

Russell,  Lord,  and  the  case  of 
Bunch,  289,  290;  and  the 
Newcastle  speech,  300-302; 
and  mediation,  304,  3 ion. ; 
and  the  Oreto  (or  Florida), 
313,  314;  and  the  "290"  (or 
Alabama),  315,  316;  and  the 
rams,  320 ;  view  of  the  Ala 
bama  claims,  335,  340,  358. 

Russell,  Dr.  W.  H.,  296. 

Russia,  policy  toward  the 
United  States,  353 ;  transfer 
of  Alaska,  369. 

SACKETT,  JUDGE,  167. 

"  Sam "  (the  Know-Nothing 
party)  in  1855,  235. 

San  Jacinto,  The,  290. 

Sanford,  Nathan,  45. 

Sanford,  H.  S.,  303. 

Schenectady,  15  ;  influence  on 
Seward,  23. 

School  question,  the,  153,  177. 

Schurz,  Carl,  opinion  of  Sew 
ard,  56,  238;  feeling  for 
Seward,  20 ;  opinion  of  Sew 
ard's  policy  in  1861,  329, 
332  n.;  quoted,  256  n. ;  Min 
ister  to  Spain,  282. 

Scott,  Sir  Walter,  170. 

Scott,  Winfield,  nominated  and 
defeated  in  1852,  208-211; 
advice  as  to  Fort  Sumter, 
270 ;  mentioned,  260,  295. 


INDEX 


385 


Sea  King,  The,  321. 

"  Seventeen  Senators,"  The, 
41,42. 

Seward,  Augustus,  82. 

Seward,  Frances  M.,  83,  113, 
'9' i  357  (see  Miss  Frances 
Miller). 

Seward,  Frederick  W.,  82,  286, 
354  ;  quoted,  280  n. 

Seward,  Samuel  S.,  15,  23;  po 
litical  position,  24,  33,  49, 
6 1  ;  favors  the  People's 
party,  40  ;  visits  Auburn,  49 ; 
at  the  convention  of  1824, 
48  n. ;  at  the  Anti-Masonic 
convention  of  1832,  99  n. ; 
goes  abroad  with  his  son, 

102. 

Seward,  William  Henry,  birth 
and  ancestry,  13;  early  life, 
14;  college  education,  17- 
22;  visit  to  Georgia,  22; 
studies  law,  23 ;  graduates, 
23 ;  in  New  York  City,  25- 
27  ;  admitted  to  the  bar,  27  ; 
settles  at  Auburn,  27  ;  part 
nership  with  Judge  Miller, 
29  ;  turns  to  politics,  32-35, 
39 ;  address  on  the  Regency, 
43,  47  ;  marriage,  49 ;  visit 
to  Buffalo,  50;  interest  in 
Owasco  Canal,  5 1 ;  unites 
with  opponents  of  Republican 
party,  52,  56,  58;  nominated 
surrogate,  61 ;  not  confirmed, 
62;  president  of  Young 
Men's  Convention,  66;  re 
ception  of  Lafayette,  68; 
conference  on  Anti-Masonry, 
72;  works  for  Adams,  74; 
becomes  an  Anti-Mason,  75, 
77,  78;  nominated  to  state 
Senate,  79 ;  elected,  80,  81  ; 
early  political  principles,  82  ; 
position  in  the  Anti-Masonic 
party,  85 ;  work  in  the  ses 
sion  of  1831,  87-90;  interest 


in  canals,  90  ;  early  views  on 
railroads,  91  ;  opposes  Jack 
son's  Bank  policy,  93,  95  ; 
and  the  politics  of  1832,  98; 
develops  the  party  commit 
tee,  98;  goes  abroad,  101  ; 
in  the  session  of  1834,  103, 
106;  and  the  new  Whig 
party,  109 ;  campaign  for 
governorship,  uo-112;  trip 
to  Virginia,  114;  presented 
to  Jackson,  115;  interested  in 
Holland  Land  Purchase, 
117;  and  the  panic  of  1837, 
119;  candidate  for  nomina 
tion  in  1838,  120;  and  the 
Small  Bill  Law,  122;  in  the 
campaign  of  1838,  124,  125, 
128;  elected  governor,  129; 
political  position  in  1838, 
130-136;  message  of  1839, 

I3S~I37»  °f  l84°»  *44J  and 
the  school  question,  144-148; 
and  the  pardoning  power, 
149 ;  and  the  administration 
of  law,  149;  and  the  Anti- 
Rent  War,  150;  reelection, 
151-154;  the  McLeod  case, 
155-157  ;  the  Virginia  Search 
case,  158-164,  212;  and 
anti-slavery  legislation,  163; 
and  the  Repeal  agitation, 
165  ;  and  the  Whig  party, 
166,  168,  175;  turns  to 
patent  law,  171  ;  Wyatt  mur 
der  case,  172-174;  Freeman 
murder  case,  173,  174;  and 
his  trees,  174;  and  the  anti- 
slavery  movement  in  1844, 
178 ;  takes  the  stump  as  an 
anti-slavery  man,  183  ;  elected 
senator,  183,  184;  in  Wash 
ington,  185 ;  relations  with 
Fillmore,  186;  and  Cali 
fornia,  190-196;  almost  an 
Abolitionist,  192;  the 
"Higher  Law,"  192;  and 


386 


INDEX 


Fillmore,  195  ;  and  the  New 
York  convention  of  1850, 
199,  200 ;  review  of  earlier 
political  life,  206;  position 
on  extension  of  slavery,  205- 
207 ;  and  Native  American 
party,  177,  213,  214,  228; 
opposes  Nebraska  Bill,  217, 
218;  Greeley's  opinion  of 
in  1854,  219;  position  in 
1854,  222,  223;  and  the  sen 
atorial  election  of  1855,  225, 
226 ;  and  the  Republican 
party  in  1855,  232,  234;  po 
sition  and  character  in  1856, 
237»  239  J  and  the  nomina 
tion  of  1856,  240-244;  takes 
the  stump  for  Fremont,  246  ; 
in  Washington,  1856,  236- 
238;  view  of  slavery  in  1856, 
250,  25 1 ;  the  "  Irrepressible 
Conflict,"  251;  and  a  Pacific 
Railroad,  207,  252,  253,266; 
tour  abroad,  253-255  ;  speech 
of  February  29,  1860,  256, 
257 ;  presidential  canvass  of 
1860,  257-259;  defeat  in 
1860,  259-261 ;  Secretary  of 
State,  261,  263,  268;  winter 
of  1860-1861,  262-267; 
speech  of  January  12,  1 86 1, 
265,  266 ;  opinion  on  Fort 
Sumter,  270,  27 1  ;  and  Con 
federate  commissioners,  271- 
272;  "Thoughts"  of  April 
1st,  273-276,  323;  Union 
policy  in  1861,  274,  275, 
323;  foreign  policy,  274, 
275,  279-281  ;  and  the  diplo 
matic  service,  282;  English 
policy,  285-288;  and  the 
Declaration  of  Paris,  289; 
case  of  Bunch,  290;  the  Trent 
case,  292-299  ;  and  the  New 
castle  speech,  300-302  ;  and 
the  blockade,  306-308  ;  and 
the  demand  for  cotton,  309, 


310;  the  Oreto,  314;  the 
Alabama,  316;  the  Alexan 
dra,  318;  the  rams,  317- 
320;  view  of  Confederate 
cruisers,  322,  359;  emanci 
pation,  328-335  ;  desire  for 
his  resignation,  336-339 ; 
and  the  Mexican  question, 

342,  344-347.  36l~367i 
Hampton  Roads,  351,  352; 
and  Russia,  353 ;  attempted 
assassination,  354 ;  presents 
Alabama  claims,  358  ;  takes 
up  earlier  questions,  365 ; 
and  the  Pacific,  367;  pur 
chase  of  Alaska,  369 ;  visits 
Pacific  slope,  370 ;  tour 
around  the  world,  371; 
death,  372;  summary  of  his 
career,  371-373. 

Seymour,  Horatio,  138,  21 1, 
224. 

Shenandoah,  The,  321,  367. 

Sheridan  on  the  Rio  Grande, 
362. 

Silver    Grays,    200,    201,    203, 

210,  212,  226,  231. 

Skinner,  Roger,  44,  45,  59,  138. 

Slavery,  in  Doctor  Seward's 
family,  14;  harmful  effects, 
34 ;  opposed  to  national  de 
velopment,  105  ;  in  Virginia, 
115;  the  Virginia  Search 
case,  162;  the  extension  of, 
237 ;  economic  aspects  of, 
164,  250,  252;  and  the  war, 
323-325 ;  and  the  foreign 
policy,  326-335 ;  mentioned, 

55.  I05- 

Slave  trade,  African,  216. 
Slidell,  290-297,  303,  340,  343. 
Small  Bill,  question,   122,  136, 

HI,  153- 

Smith,  Gerrit,  254. 
Smith,  C.  B.,  268,  269. 
Softshell  Democrats,  224,   225, 

232. 


INDEX 


387 


Southwick,  Solomon,  53. 
Spain,   relations   with    Mexico, 

342- 

Spencer,  Ambrose,  37  n. 

Spencer,  Ambrose  (the 
younger),  156,  157. 

Spencer,  John  C.,  a  Jackson 
man,  57  n.,  58  n.,  61,  62  n. ; 
Secretary  of  State,  139 ;  re 
port  on  the  school  question, 
146  ;  mentioned,  79,  85,  100, 
183. 

Stanley,  Lord,  359. 

Stanton,  Edwin  ML,  265. 

Stephens,  A.  H.,  268. 

Stevens,  S.,  78,  99,  101,  104. 

Stewart,  Alvin,  178,  179. 

Stewart,  Dugald,  1 8. 

Stonewall,  The,  321. 

Stowell,  Lord,  292. 

Sumner,  Charles,  in  the  Senate, 
201,  217,  236;  on  the  Trent 
case,  296;  on  the  Mexican 
question,  345 ;  and  Alaska, 

369- 
Sumter,  Fort,  268,  270,  273  n., 

274,  277,  278. 
Sumter,  The,  312. 
Susquehanna,  51. 
Sutherland,  Duchess  of,  284. 
Syracuse,  28,  51. 

TALCOTT,   S.   A.,  44,  45,  47, 

138- 

Tallmadge,  James,  41,  46. 

Tallmadge,  N.  P.,  Regency 
leader  in  Senate,  86;  U.  S. 
senator,  139,  143. 

Tammany  Hall,  67. 

Tammany  Society,  26. 

Tappan,  Lewis,  164. 

Tarde,  Colonel,  21. 

Taylor,  Mr.,  141. 

Taylor,  Zachary,  and  the  presi 
dency,  181 ;  position  as  Presi 
dent,  1 86;  action  on  Cali 
fornia,  1 88;  position  as  to 


California,  193;  death,  194; 
mentioned,  197,  198,  208, 
209,  260. 

Texas,  179,  347. 

Thomas,  David,  51. 

Thouvenel,  M.,  303. 

Throop,  Enos  T.,  career,  36; 
political  character,  36 ;  circuit 
judge,  35;  approves  Anti- 
Masonry,  7 1 ;  mentioned,  79, 
121,  138. 

Throop,  George,  71,  79,  89,  97. 

Tilden,  S.  J.,  138. 

Tippecanoe      campaign,     151- 

I53- 

Toombs,  Robert,  196,  264. 
Torr,  Mr.,  and  the  Trent  case, 

293- 
Tracy,  Albert  F.,  73,  85,  103, 

121,  168,  169,  183. 
Trent  case,  290-299,  305. 
Turner,  J.,  and  the  Trent  case, 

293- 

Tyler,  John,  143,  152,  155, 157, 
179. 

ULLMAN,  DANIEL,  224. 

Union  College,  Seward  enters, 
15;  educational  system,  1 6- 
20 ;  and  the  University  of 
Virginia,  115;  Se ward's  an 
nual  visit  as  governor,  150. 

United  States  Bank,  92,  93. 

Utah,  204. 

Utica,  27,  28. 

VAN  BUREN,  MARTIN,  leader 
of  the  Bucktails,  34;  favors 
Crawford,  35,  39;  disap 
proves  the  removal  of  Clin 
ton,  41  ;  in  the  constitutional 
convention,  43 ;  political 
methods,  48 ;  non-commit- 
talism,  37  ;  and  Clinton,  60, 
6 1  ;  interested  in  Anti-Ma 
sonry,  71;  President,  117, 
118;  and  the  Texas  question, 


388 


INDEX 


179;  mentioned,  45,  46,47, 
55,  59,  82,  85,  93,  103,  105, 
138,  152,  176,  183,  196,  211, 
260. 
Van    Rensselaer,    Stephen,  67, 

ISO- 
Van  Zandt  case,  181. 
Verplanck,  G.  C.,  108,  1 10. 
Victoria,  Queen,   284;  position 

on  the  Trent  despatch,  295. 
Villiers,  C.  P.,  303  n. 
Virginia  Search  case,  158-164. 
Virginia,  University  of,  115. 

WADE,  BENJAMIN,  201,  217 
236,  264. 

Washington  at  Oriskany,  133, 
366. 

Watson,  Elkanah,  and  the 
Owasco  Canal,  51. 

Wayland,  Francis,  17,  19,  22. 

Webster,  Daniel,  position  in 
1840,  142,  143;  and  the 
Compromise  of  1850,  191 ; 
Secretary  of  State,  196,  197  ; 
and  the  nomination  of  1852, 
208-210;  mentioned,  15, 
152,  187,  194,  236,  260. 

Weed,  Thurlow,  first  meeting 
with  Seward,  50  ;  interest  in 
Anti-Masonry,  72;  editor  of 
the  Evening  Journal^  85 ; 
suggests  nomination  of  Sew 
ard,  79 ;  political  system  in 
1831,  98;  and  the  Whig 
party,  109 ;  nomination  of 
Seward  in  1834,  Iio;  thinks 
of  emigrating,  113;  forecast 
of  the  election  of  1838,  128, 
131  ;  advice  on  message, 
137;  "Dictator,"  139;  State 
Printer,  143 ;  view  of  the 
campaign  of  1840,  152  ;  story 
of,  167;  goes  abroad,  169; 
relations  with  Taylor,  194  ; 


opinion  in  1855,  223;  view 
of  the  presidential  nomina 
tion  of  1856,  240;  in  the 
presidential  canvass  of  1 860, 
258  ;  peace  convention,  263  ; 
unofficial  envoy,  290;  asked 
to  go  abroad  in  1862,  301, 
302;  mentioned,  44,  61,  97, 
103,  123,  127,  168,  171,  177, 
180,  187,  190,  193,  198,  239, 
262  n. 

Weedsport,  29. 

Welles,  Gideon,  Secretary  of 
the  Navy,  268;  and  the 
rams,  319;  view  of  Seward, 
337»  339i  quoted,  27511.; 
and  emancipation,  329. 

Wheaton,  Henry,  40,  41,  48  n. 

Whig  party,  an  opposition 
party,  105 ;  rise,  108 ;  use  of 
the  name,  108  n. ;  victory  in 
1837,  1 20;  preponderance  in 
1839,  141  ;  and  anti-slavery, 
165;  position  in  1850,  196; 
position  in  1851,205;  men 
tioned,  134,  372. 

Whittlesey,  Frederick,  85,  109, 
1 68,  169. 

Willard's  School,  Miss,  27, 
28. 

Wilkes,  Captain,  and  the  Trent, 
290. 

Wilson,  Henry,  230. 

Wilson,  J.  G.,  171. 

Winthrop,  R.  C.,  187. 

Wirt,  William,  99,  100. 

Wisconsin,  215. 

Workingmen's  party,  77,  80. 

Wright,  Stlas,  47,  59,  86,  94, 
117,  138,  179,  182. 

Wyatt  murder  case,  172-174. 

YATES,  GOVERNOR,  35,  39,  46, 

47>  53»  'a8- 
Young,  Colonel,  45. 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 
Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


<*  -..,,. , 


INTER  LBRAR? 


— - 


7 


LD  21A-60m-7,'66 
(G4427slO)476B 


General  Librar 
University  of  Cali/ 
Berkeley 


YB  374 


THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


